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Abstract 
FACTORS INFLUENC ING EFFECTIVENESS IN PERFORMANCE OF THE STATE 
COMPTROLLER ' S  AGENCY 
By John T. Nix , Jr . ,  ph . D .  
A dissertation submit ted i n  partial  ful f i l lment of the requ irements for 
the degree o f  Doc tor o f  Phi l osophy a t  Virginia Commonwea l t h  Un ive r s i ty . 
Virginia Commonwea l t h  Univers i t y ,  1 9 9 9  
Ma j or Director : Blue E .  Wooldridge , As sociate Pro f e s sor , Department o f  
Pol i t ical S c ience and Pub l i c  Admini s t ra t i on 
The S ta t e  Comptro l l e r  i s  an important state o f f i c i a l . Thi s  research i s  
intended to de termine whether method of select i on of the state 
comptro l ler ( e l e c t ion or appo intment ) ,  organ i z a t i onal conf igurat i on o f  
the s ta t e  comptro l l e r's agency , professional qua l i f i ca t i ons o f  the 
state comptro l l e r , or l ength of t enure se rved by the state comptro l l e r  
have an impact o n  t h e  e f fect ivenes s  o f  t h e  performance o f  t h e  s tate 
comptro l l er ' s agency . 
Thi s  research u t i l i z e d  a mUl t i - cons t i tuency model of e f fect ivenes s .  
Under this mode l ,  e f fect ivenes s  was de f ined a s  sati s fa c t i on o f  the 
needs o f  maj or const i tuenc ies of the state comptrol l e r ' s agency . Maj or 
cons t ituenci e s  o f  the state comptrol l er ' s  agency were ident i f ied . 
Variables to de termine e f f ec t iveness for each cons t ituency were a l s o  
ident i f i ed . 
Cross tabulat i ons were prepared that compared the measures o f  
e f f e c t i vene s s  f o r  each con s t i tuency ( dependent variable s )  to the 
independent variable s ; method of s e l ec t i on ,  organ i z a t iona l 
con f igura t i on ,  cert i f ication of the s tate compt rol l e r ,  and l ength of 
t enure of the state comptro l ler . 
In summary , the research produced the fol l owing f indings : 
x 
• Method of select i on was found to be a factor in sat i s faction of the 
needs of the f inanc i a l  communi t y ,  an exte rnal const i tuency of the 
state comptro l l e r ' s  agency . Genera l l y ,  more pol it i cal , higher 
pro f i l e  comptrol l ers , those appo inted by and serving at the pleasure 
of the governor and those who are directly e l ected , were found to be 
more e f fect ive than l ower prof i l e , l e s s  pol i t ical compt rol l e rs 
appo inted at l ower l eve l s  of government .  Me thod of s e l e c t ion wa s 
not found to be a factor in sat i s fact ion of the needs o f  othe r ,  
interna l con s t i tuenci e s  . 
• Organizat i onal configura t i on of the comptro l l e r ' s agency in the 
context of the larger government was not found to be a facto r  in 
e f fe c t i veness .  
xi 
• P ro f e s s i onal cert i f icat i on of the state compt rol l e r  was not found to 
be a factor in e f fectivene s s  of the state comptro l l e r . E l ec t ed 
compt ro l lers , who are l e s s  l ike ly to be profess i ona l ly c e rt i f ied 
than comptrollers s e l e cted by other methods , are e f fect ive . 
• Tenure in o f f ice on the par t  of the s tate comptro l l e r  i s  not a 
factor in e f fectivene s s  o f  the comptro l l e r ' s  agency . 
Chap t e r  1 
The Func tions o f  t h e  S t a t e  Comp t ro l l e r's Agency 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
Each state gove rnment includes an organ i zat i on that ope rates as the 
state's central a ccount ing agency and performs certain core f i nanc i a l  
funct i ons . The organ i za t i on ,  an agency of s tate gove rnment i s  typica l ly 
headed by an o f f i c i a l  t i tled the State Comptrol l er or Contro l l e r . Other 
t i t l es such as Di rector , Comm i s s i oner ,  and Chi e f  o f  Accounts are a l s o  
used . None - the - le s s , the states are organi zed to have someone who heads 
an agency that is charged with the respons ibi l i ties for carrying out the 
core funct i ons of a state ' s  central accounting agency ( NASACT , 1 9 9 2 , 
1 9 9 6 ) . The core functions are I} accounting and report ing , and 2 )  
budgetary control . Typica l l y ,  these funct i ons are centra l i zed in the 
organ i zat i on . The contro l l e r  i s  not l imited to these core funct i ons , 
however ,  these funct i ons are the ones common to the role o f  a central 
accounting agency for s ta t e  government ( NASACT , 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 9 6 ) . Thes e  two 
funct ions are interdependent . 
Al though the s tates appear to be fai rly s imilar with regard to the core 
funct ions they perform and the too l s  ava i lable to them , they are not 
organ i zed s imilarly in terms o f  the state comptrol l e r  and his or her 
relat ion to the s tate' s governor ,  the state ' s  budget o f f i c e r ,  and the 
1 
heads o f  the other state agencies performing f inance functi ons ( NASACT , 
1 9 9 6 , 1 9 92 ) . The method of select ing the State Comptrol l e r  d i f fers 
among the s ta te s . In some states the comptrol l e r  i s  e l ected . I n  some 
the person holding this o f f ice is appointed by the governor and s erves 
at the governor ' s  pleasure . In some s ta te s , the compt rol l e r  i s  
appointed or hired b y  someone a t  a l eve l l owe r than Governor . Usual l y ,  
t h i s  i s  a Secre tary or D i rector o f  Financ e . In some s tate s , the S tate 
2 
Compt rol l e r  i s  a c iv i l  servant ( NASACT , 1 9 92 , 1 9 9 6 ) . In some s tates the 
func t ions of budget o f f ice and the accounting o f f i ce are i nt egrated into 
a f inance department , which usua l l y  includes other f inance funct i ons , 
managed by a f inance director or cabinet l eve l secre tary of f inance . In 
some states the budget o f f ice and the accoun t ing o f f ice are s eparate and 
equal or unequal agencies both report i ng to the governor . Frequent l y ,  
the budget o f f icer i s  a cabinet member a l though the compt rol l e r  rarely 
i s  ( NASACT , 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 96 ) . Addit i ona l l y ,  some state comptrollers are 
profess ional accountants ; others are not . S ome comptrol lers s erve 
l onger t enures than others ( NASACT , 199 6 ) . 
Expectat ions for pub l i c  organi zat ions empha s i z e  two compe t ing value 
sets . These are " competence" values and " re spons ivene s s "  values . 
Both are important . Pub l i c  agencies operate in an environment that 
includes a hea l t hy tension between these value sets . Effectivenes s  
comes under the compe tence s e t  of va lues ( Rainey , 1 9 9 1 ) . Recent 
discontent with gove rnment s t ems from a number of factors , not the least 
of which are ideologically driven . Howeve r ,  the usual way that the s e  
dis contents a r e  voiced i s  t h e  c r i t i c i sm of ine f fe c t ivene s s . Some 
scholars , comparing s t rong mayor ( non - re formed)  to c i ty manager 
( re formed)  c i t ies , argue that direct e l e c t ion of pub l i c  o f f i c ia l s  
empha s i zes " po l i t i ca l "  respons ivenes s , whi l e  compet ence values are 
3 
enhanced by appo intment of pub l i c  o f f i c i a l s  (Lineberry and Fowl e r ,  1 9 6 7 ;  
Karnig , 1 9 7 5 ;  Lineberry and Sharkansky , 1 9 7 8 ) . Add i t i ona l l y ,  the 
l i terature on integra t ion of the f inance func t ion suggests that 
organ i z a t i onal placement of the agency may impact its e f fe c t ivenes s  
( Wooldridge , 1 9 8 2 ; Lynch , 1 9 8 5 ;  Hal l ,  1 9 8 7 ;  Wes tberry , 1 9 8 9 ;  Thurma i e r ,  
1 9 9 0 )  . 
The purpose o f  this research proj e c t  i s  to de termine whether the manner 
in which the State Comptrol l e r  is s e lected ( e l ected , appointed by the 
Governor , appointed by an o f f i c i a l  l owe r than the Gove rnor , or c i v i l  
servic e )  and t h e  organizat ional pos i t ion of the State Comptro l l e r ' s 
agency impact the agency ' s  e f fect ivenes s  with a l l  other factors 
rema ining the s ame . Al so , this research i s  to determine whether 
profess i ona l qual i f i ca t i ons or length of tenure of the state compt rol l e r  
impac t  e f fect ivenes s  of the agency . 
4 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research que s t ions that this s tudy is intended to answer 
are : 
• Does the manner in which the State Compt rol l e r  i s  s e lected impact the 
e f f e c t i venes s  of the State Comptro l l e r ' s agency? 
• Does the organi za t i onal configurat ion of the State Comptro l l er ' s 
agency impact i t s  e f fectivene s s ?  
• D o  the profess i onal qual i f i ca t i ons of the State Compt rol l e r  impact 
the e f fect ivenes s  of the State Compt ro l l e r ' s agency? 
• Does the length of tenure of the State Compt ro l l e r  impact the 
e f fect ivenes s  of the State Comptro l l e r ' s agency? 
CONTROLLERSH I P  
The chief accountant in a n  organi zat ion i s  the pos i t ion usua l ly t i t l ed 
as the contro l l e r ,  a l t hough other t i t les may be used ( W i l l son , Roehl -
Anderson , and Bragg , 1 9 9 5 ) . In governmental organi zations , this t i t l e  
i s  some t imes compt rol l er ( Ros s e l l  and Frasure , 1 9 6 4 ) . Horngren ( 1 9 7 2 )  
considers the contro l l e r  t o  be the chie f  management ac countant i n  the 
organizat ion . In addit i on to concern with general accounting and cost 
accoun t i ng ,  the contro l l e r ,  according to W i l l son , Roehl-Anderson , and 
Bragg , 1 9 9 5 , should have a management viewpoint . The bas i c  
cont rol l e rship funct i ons are plann ing , contro l , reporting and accoun t ing 
al though the o f f ice i s  not neces sarily l imited to these . 
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The duti e s  o f  the contro l l er may vary f rom organi zat ion to organi za t i on ,  
Horngren ( 1 9 7 2 )  c i te s  S imon , Guet zkow , Kozme tsky and Tynda l l , ( 1 9 5 4 , 
Central i zat i on vs . Decent ral i zat i on in Organi z ing the Cont rol l e r ' s 
Department) , as to the k inds of informa t i on furni shed by managerial 
account ing staff for dec i s i on making in organi zations . Three types of 
dut ies providing informat i on are carried out . Thes e  are s co rekeeping , 
attent i on direct ing and probl em solving . 
Scorekeeping dut ies include trad i t ional general accounting funct ions 
such as accounts payab l e , a ccounts rece ivable , general l edge r 
accounting ,  b i l l ing , payrol l and preparation of cost repor t s . Attent ion 
direct ing funct ions include providing ana lys i s  of performance and budget 
variance report ing . Problem solving involves research in whi ch spe c i a l  
proj ects and s tudie s  are ass igned when probl ems arise ( Horngren , 1 9 7 2 ) . 
Ros s e l l  and Frasure ( 19 6 4 ) indicate that accounting involves recording , 
c l a s s i fying and summa r i z ing e conomic event s  and providing an 
int e rpretat i on o f  them . 
Today , these funct ions are per formed in a l l  stat e s . An organ i z a t i on in 
each state funct i ons a s  the central accounting agency for the state . 
The head of this agency i s  the State ' s  chief accountant . About ha l f  of 
the states use the word contro l l e r  or comptro l l e r  in this o f f i c e r ' s  
t i t l e  and another fourth use the word director . The rema ining fourth 
use a number o f  t i t les including commi s s ione r ,  chie f  of accounts , s tate 
auditor and state f i scal o f f icer ( NASACT , 199 6 ) . In this research 
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proj ect , the t erm state comptrol le r  i s  used generically to refer to the 
individual who heads the agency that performs the funct i ons des c r ibed 
here in . Fourteen s ta t e  compt ro l l e rs come to o f f ice through e l ec t i on ,  
nineteen are appo inted directly by the s tate ' s  governor ,  s eventeen are 
appointed by other state o f f i c i al s ,  and one ( W i s cons in)  i s  s e lected by 
compet i t ive examinat ion ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . (Note : the total o f  5 1  i s  due 
to the fact that two o f f i c i a l s  are iden t i f ied as sharing this function 
in Wes t  V i rginia ) . Most s tate compt rol lers are not civil  s e rvice or 
mer i t  system employees . Of the ten indicated as such in the NASACT , 
1 9 9 6  survey,  at least two are exempt f rom mos t  of the usual c ivi l 
s e rvice regulat i ons ( NASACT , 1 9 96 ) . 
Origins of Control lership 
Nissen , Damerow and Englund ( 1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 )  discuss the emergence of 
account ing and wri t i ng i n  ancient Sume r . Sumer was an anc i ent count ry 
in what i s  now southern I raq ( The Ameri can Heri tage D i c t i onary , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
Late r ,  this a rea became known as Babylonia ( Encarta 9 8  Desk 
Encycl opedia , 1 9 9 7 ) . Roberts ( 1 9 9 3 , 4 0 )  indicates that " Sumer i s  an 
anc ient name for southern Mesopotam i a " . S e t t l ement s  in anc i ent Sume r 
began during the f i f th mil l enium BeE ( The Amer i can He r i tage D i c t i onary , 
1 9 9 6 ) ,  with the ear l i e s t  writ ing appearing toward the end o f  the fourth 
mi l l en ium BCE a round 3 1 0 0  BCE (Nissen , Damerow and Englund , 1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 ) . 
Gladden ( 1 9 7 2 )  a l s o  i ndicates that Sumer ian wr i t ing appeared during the 
fourth mi l lenium BC . He po ints out that the Sumerians use of sun baked 
brick a s  a bui l ding material  was easily adapted into a medium ,  the sun 
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baked mud tabl e t , for wr i t t en records . One problem with the baked mud 
tablet was that i t  had to be damp whi le be ing wri t t en on . Once a tablet 
was dried,  latter entr ies could not easily be made to i t . 
Even before the emergence of wri t ing , pe rhaps as early as 3 3 0 0  BCE , 
methods of recording numbers existed . Firs t , s tone then later c l ay 
tokens were used . Each token repre s ented a uni t  such as an anima l or a 
standardi zed measure of gra in . Later , through the use of d i f f erent 
shapes and markings , tokens could repre sent l arger uni t s  than one . They 
used a s exage s imal number system , that is a system based on the number 
6 0  ( The Ame r i can Heri tage D i c tionary , 1 9 9 6 ; Nissen , Damerow and Eng l ung , 
1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 ) . 
Niss en , Damerow and Englung ( 1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 , p .  2 1 )  argue that " . . .  the 
appearance of wri t ing is to be viewed me rely as an addi t i ona l , a l be i t  
crucial s t ep i n  a s equence o f  exper iments in imp l ement ing e f fective 
control mechani sms in the economy . . .  " . 
This early wr i t ing , proto- cunei form ,  as described by Nissen , Damerow and 
Englund ( 1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 , p .  3 0 )  was " . . .  almost exc lus ive l y  res t r icted to 
bookkeeping; it was an ' accountant ' s  script . ' "  This early accounting 
oriented wr i t ing evolved in two direct ions . One was " . . .  into a 
language funct ional cun e i form . . .  " becoming a wr i t ten means of 
communicat ion that repres ented the spoken l anguage during the third 
mi l l enium BCE ( N is s en , Damerow and Englund , 1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 , p .  3 0 ) . 
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The other direct ion of evolution for the archa ic wr i t ing was to make the 
syst em of a ccounting i ncreas ingly e f fe c t ive " . . .  eventua l l y  turning ( i t )  
into a powerful instrument o f  forma l i zed control o f  e conomic procedure s , 
employing s ign systems and document forms " (Nissen , Damerow and 
Englund , 1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 , p .  3 0 ) . 
Gl adden ( 1 9 7 2 ,  p .  1 4 ) states that " the contents of surviving records , 
inscribed on baked mud tab l e t s , cons isted on the one hand of rout ine 
de tai l s  of day- t o - day administration and on the other of l it erary 
fragment s "  Gl adden ( 1 9 7 2 , pp . 2 0 - 2 1 )  indicates that the Sume r i ans 
used the cyl i nder seal " for marking a package or j ar a l ready sealed 
with c l ay" He describes this administrative device a s  " an early 
forerunner o f  the personal s i gnature " . 
Records are l e f t  from the operat i ons of a grain storehouse .  Records 
conta ined informat ion on how many loaves of bread and how many and what 
s i ze j ars of beer were a l located to whom . Individua l s  are i nd i cated by 
graphs that are conta i ned in the c l ay records . An individual i s  
indicated t o  have been respons ible for the operat ion . Either the 
person ' s name or t i t l e  is indicated as veri fying the t ransact ions 
contained on the tablet Records ( Nissen , Damerow and Englund , 
1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 ) . 
Admini s t ration of the Sume rian t emp l e  economy created a need " whi ch 
ca l l ed for the cons i stent recording of numerous da i ly transac t i on s "  
( Gladden, 1 6 7 2 , p .  2 0 ) . 
" Perhaps the mos t  important accounting operat i on introduced during the 
third mi l lenium B . C . was the balancing of theoretical  deb i t  post ings 
with real product ion . _ The ear l i e s t  evidence for the exis t ence o f  such 
techniques originates in the Old Sumer ian period" (Ni s s en , Damerow and 
Englund , 1 9 9 0 / 19 9 3 , p .  4 9 ) . In this reconc i l ing scheme , the deb i t s  
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cons i s t  of performance expectat ions , which have been conve rted into 
s t andardized uni t s , such as labor workdays . Credits , on the other hand , 
are i tems of real and compensatory performance , also converted into 
standard i z ed value s . The accoun t i ng period usua l ly covered a year 
cons i s t ing of twe lve , thirty - day months . At the end of the accounting 
period , the deb i t s  we re subtracted f rom the credits with the balance 
be ing e i ther a surplus or de f i c i t , usua l l y  i t  was a de f i c i t  ( Ni s sen , 
Damerow and Eng lund , 1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 ) . 
The de f i c i t  or surplus bal ance was " ... carried over and pos ted into the 
account of the fol lowing period , so that each balanc ing period was part 
of a cont inuous f i l e . Accounting procedure , of course , requ i red that an 
eventual surplus be posted into the credits sect ion , a de f i c i t  into the 
deb i t s  sect ion of the fol lowing account " (Nis sen , Damerow and Englund , 
1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 , p .  4 9 ) . 
In add i tion to keeping books on labo r ,  the anc i ent Sumer ians kept 
records on anima l  husbandry and for use in surveying and admini s t ra t ion 
of f i e lds. Be fore the appearance of script , profess ional admin i s t rators 
used complex , though non - l i terate , methods o f  recording economic 
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transactions . As writing deve l oped , the admini strators l earned and 
transmitted i t . " The t radi t i onal administrat ive profess i ona l thus 
turned into a l i terate administrat ive expe r t "  , whom Nissen , Damerow and 
Englund , 1 9 9 0 / 1 9 9 3 , p .  1 0 5  " rather inexactly" ca l l " ' a  scri be ' "  
Gladden ( 1 9 7 2 )  describes the work of the Sumerian scri be a s  be ing 
tedious and requ iring pat ience . 
Hendriksen ( 1 9 7 7 , p .  3 4 ) indicates that peop l e  have been keeping wr i t t en 
records s ince at least 3 6 0 0  Be and that .. . . .  some account ing concept s  
can be traced back to the e a r l y  Greek and Roman pe riods . "  Garner 
( 1 9 9 1 )  incl udes early Egypt and Babylonia ( see above Sume r )  as wel l  as 
Greece and Rome where wr i t t en records of money , goods and taxes were 
kept . 
Doub l e - entry book keeping as we know i t  began in about the fourteenth 
century or possibly even earl i e r  in I ta ly . Bank l edgers f rom Florence 
dated 1 2 1 1  have been found in which some at t empt at doubl e  entry book 
keep ing wa s used . The earl iest complete record o f  a double entry sys t em 
that has been found was for Genoa dated 1 3 4 0  ( Garne r ,  1 9 9 1 ) . 
In 1 4 9 4 , Luca Pacol i ,  an Franc i s can friar , pub l i shed in Venice a 
trea t i s e  on mathema t i c s  that included a section on doubl e - entry book 
keeping . Al though Pacol i did not originate this techni que , pub l i ca t i on 
of his work fac i l itated i t s  use in Europe ( Garne r ,  1 9 9 1 ) . The purpose 
of book keeping at f i rs t  was primarily to provide informa t i on to the 
trader or owner of a comme rcial enterprise . 
1 1  
Adam Smith ' s  Wea l t h  o f  Nat i ons was publ i s hed i n  1 7 7 6 . Smith ' s  doctrine 
argued for l a i s s e z  f a i re and reduced tari f f s  which u l t imately led to 
freer trade and qui ckened the coming of the industrial revolut ion 
( Hendriksen , 1 9 7 7 ) . The 1 8th and 1 9 t h  century witnessed the indust r i a l  
revolut ion and many mechanical l abor saving inventions that gave r i s e  t o  
factorie s . Accounting was used for management purposes as bus ine s s e s  
grew i n t o  l a rger organ i z a t ions , and a s  corporat ions with absentee owners 
( s tockholde rs ) f louri s he d ,  accounting se rved the need to report to these 
abs entee owners . Cost accounting deve loped in the latter 1 9 th and early 
2 0 th century ( Hendriksen , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
" The pos i t ion of contro l l e r  in Ame ri can bus ine s s  appears to have been 
f i r s t  created in the 1 8 8 0s when several ra i l road compani e s  e s tabl i shed 
the o f f i ce of ' comptro l l e r ' ( Sathe , 19 8 2 , p .  6 ) . Sathe points out 
that use of the term " comptro l l e r "  origina l l y  was due to an e rror i n  
translat ion from La t i n  and that t h e  term control l e r  i s  a more correct 
spe l l ing . 
At f i r s t , the re spons ibi l i ty of the contro l l e r  involved rout ine 
account i ng matters , including report preparat ion and stewardship of 
assets ( Sa the , 1 9 8 2 ) . However , this role " . . .  broadened to include the 
analys i s  and exp l ana t ion of f inanc i a l  fac t s  and f igures in order to 
a s s i s t  management in the running o f  the bus ine s s "  ( Sa the , p . 6 ) . 
Recogn i z ing the enhanced role of the control l e r , the Controllers 
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Insti tute of Amer i ca was formed i n  1 9 3 1  and in 1 9 6 2  became the Financial 
Executives Institute ( Sathe ) . 
According to Sathe ( 1 9 8 2 )  the Financial Executives Institute de f ines the 
funct i on of contro l lership to include : 
• planning for control 
• report ing and interpret ing 
• evaluating and consult ing 
• t ax administra t i on and gove rnment report ing 
• protection of asset s , and 
• economic appra i sal . 
Onl y  during the twentieth century has the funct ion of the contro l l e r  
deve l oped into a s eparate pos i t i on or o f f i ce ( W i l l son , Roehl-Anderson , 
and Bragg, 1 9 9 5 ) . Increas ing organ i zat ion s i ze and complexity,  
globa l i za t i on ,  gove rnment regulat ion o f  bus ine s s  and nume rous sources of 
capital  have increased the need for f inanc ial accountab i l ity in 
busine s s . These factors have impacted the role of the bus iness 
f inanc ial o f f icer ( W i l l son , Roehl - Anderson and Bragg ) . 
The o f f ice of the s tate comptrol l e r  i s  l i s t ed by Hebert, Wr ight and 
Brudney ( 1 9 9 2 , p .  5 )  as a " s econd generat i on agency that is present in 
3 8  or more states s ince 1 96 9 " . Al so included in the ' s ince 1 9 6 9 '  
category i s  Administra t i on . Present in 3 8  or more states s ince 1 9 5 9 ,  
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clas sed a s  trad i tional agencies were Budgeting ,  Revenue , Post Audi t  and 
Treasurer .  Finance is included in the ' s ince 1 9 7 9 ' , or third 
generation, group . 
Marsha l l  W .  Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 )  s tudied a large number of f inance agencies for 
state and local governments . The agencies that Meyer dea l s  with t ake 
three d i f f e rent forms . Thes e  are f inance departments , comptrollers 
o f f ices and departments o f  administrat ion . The account ing fun c t i ons 
that these agencies provide are needed in a l l  state and local 
gove rnment s . 
Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 ,  p .  1 1 )  indicates that the comptrollers o f f ice i s  the olde s t  
of t h e  three forms o f  f inance agency . "prior to Wor ld War I I ,  f i scal 
respons ibi l i t i e s  were usua l ly divi ded among uni t s  such a s  the 
comptrol l e rs'  o f f ice, the treasurer, and the departments o f  revenue and 
purcha s i ng . "  
The next deve lopment i s  the f i nance department in which adminis trat ion 
of the f inance fun c t i on i s  central i zed . The department i s  headed by the 
government's chie f  f inanc ial o f f i ce r  who reports directly to chief 
executive . Writ ing in 1 9 7 9 ,  Meyer indicates that centra l i zation of the 
funct ion was advocated by the MFOA ( now the GFOA) . This trend began 
during the 1 9 4 0's and 1 9 5 0's according to Meyer . 
The mos t  recent form ident i f ied by Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 )  i s  the department of 
admini s t rat ion to include the f inance funct ion . This began in the 
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1 9 6 0's . Meyer indicates that the budget funct i on devel oped into a 
s eparat e  ent ity out of the comptrol l er ' s o f f i c e  and i s  genera l l y  
included in t h e  f i nance department . In some model s  of local government 
f inanc e , the budget director reports to the f inance directo r ,  howeve r ,  
this re lat ionship i s  indicated by a dotted l ine on the organ i za t ion 
chart . At the same time , the budget director a l so reports directly to 
the c i ty manage r  a s  indicated by a solid l ine on the chart . This i s  
intended t o  suggest that whi l e  located administrat ive ly i n  the 
department of f i nanc e , the budget o f f icer is o f ten prima r i l y  respons ible 
to the chief execut ive o f f icer ( Ruche lma n ,  1 9 8 7 ) . In state government , 
budget i s  of ten an executive s t a f f  funct ion and i s  some t imes located in 
the Governor ' s  o f f ice rather than in a department of f i nance . 
The Job of the State Compt ro l l e r  
The state ' s  central accounting agency i s  t h e  one that i s  concerned with 
the impos i t ion of a ccounting and budgetary cont rol s  on l ine agency 
pub l i c  managers to ensure a ccountab i l i ty and comp l iance with legal 
spending l imits . Reporting on the f inanc i a l  pos i t ion and resul t s  o f  
operat ions f o r  t h e  s tate government f o r  a f i scal period , ensures 
accountabi l ity on the part of state o f f i c i al s . 
The state comptrol l e r  typ i c a l l y  ma intains the statewide general l edge r 
account ing system and performs the func t i on of appropriat ion control . 
This i s  usua l l y  handled through the statewide account ing sys t em which i s  
a l s o  used f o r  interim f inanc ial report ing ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
The budgetary proces s  i s  usua l l y  divided into d i f f e rent phases ( Doos t ,  
1 9 8 6 ) . Thes e  are preparation, approva l , execut ion and audi t . The 
budget f i rs t  mus t  be prepared , then approved by legis lature and 
governor . The budget execut ion phase involves the carrying out o f  
agency miss ions whi l e  expending the re sources lega l l y  appropriated for 
the se purposes in accordance with the budget .  The pos t aud i t  i s  the 
f inal s tage ( Doos t ,  1 9 8 6 ) . 
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McKinney ( 1 9 8 6 ,  p .  1 5 )  points out that account ing i s  impor tant for 
control and accountabil ity . He states that account i ng i s  " . . .  the bas i c  
e l ement of the f inancial control structure" and that " account ing i s  
the mos t  important means f o r  ensur ing that pub l i c  expenditures are 
l imited to the purposes and amounts lega l ly authori zed" Al s o ,  
regarding account ab i l i t y ,  McKinney indicates that " the account ing 
syst em ma intains a s e t  of procedures to ensure that o f f i cers and 
employees are he l d  re spons ible and accountable for the saf eguarding o f  
money and property entrusted or ass igned to them" . Governmental 
account ing systems are genera l l y  requ i red to subs tantiate l egal 
compl i ance as we l l  as report on f inancial condit ion o f  the gove rnmental 
ent i ty ( GAAFR , 1 96 8 ) . 
NASACT ( 1 9 9 6 ) i ndicates that a maj or respons i b i l ity of the state 
comptrol l e r  i s  genera l ly preparat ion of the s tate ' s  comprehens ive annual 
f inancial report ( CAFR ) . This conta ins the f inancial s tatements for the 
government for the f i scal year . Output f rom the sta tewide account ing 
system is usua l l y  the s tart ing point for the annual f inancial 
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statement s .  T o  ensure that the financ i a l  statements present fai rly the 
f inancial pos i t ion and resu l t s  of ope ra tion of the s tate for the f i scal 
yea r ,  an independent audi t genera l l y  occurs . Usua l l y ,  this i s  performed 
by a legislative audit group , al though it may be performed by an 
independent CPA f i rm ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
The aud i t  genera l l y  includes a review of the internal cont rol s  and 
resul t s  in an opinion regarding the f inanc ial statement s .  An 
unqua l i f ied opinion i ndicates that the f inanc i a l  s tatements do , in fact , 
present fairly the f inanc i a l  pos i t ion and resu l t s  of operation for the 
organ i zation for the f i scal year . Inab i l i ty to render an unqual i f i e d  
opinion resu l t s  in a qua l i f ied opin ion , or a discl a imer o f  opinion . A 
qual i f ied opi nion means that the s t atements present f a i r l y ,  except for 
those areas indicated . A discla imer means that the auditor can not 
render any opinion ( S tettler , 1 9 7 4 ) . 
The Government Finance O f f i cers As sociat ion ( GFOA) awards i t s  
Cert i f i cate of Achievement f o r  Exce l l ence in Financial Reporting t o  
s t a t e  and loca l governments that prepare f inanc ial statements and 
reports that conform to Genera l ly Accepted Account ing Princ iples ( GAAP ) 
and to other GFOA disc losure recommendat ions . Gi roux and Shields ( 1 9 9 3 , 
p .  2 4 9 )  argue that the Cert i f icate of Achievement ( CA )  " . . .  i s  one 
measure of reasonably complete f inanc ial reporting and can be cons i dered 
an accounting monitoring technique . "  An unqua l i f i ed audit opinion i s  
required for a s t a t e  to rece ive the GFOA Cert i f icate o f  Achievement . 
Internal control 
Internal control i s  a concept , which i s  de f ined by the account ing 
profession ,  Sta tement on Audi t ing Standards ( SAS ) #1 as fol lows : 
Int ernal control comprises the plan of organ i z a t ion and a l l  of the 
co - ordinat e  methods and measures adopted within a bus ine s s  to 
safeguard i t s  a s s et s , check the accuracy and rel iabi l ity of i t s  
account ing data , promote opera tional e f f i ciency , and encourage 
adherence to prescribed managerial pol ici e s . This definit ion 
pos s ib i l i ty is broader than the meaning some t imes attr ibuted to the 
term . It recogni z e d  that a ' sys tem' of interna l control extends 
beyond those matters which relate direct l y  to the functions o f  the 
account ing and f inancial department s .  ( S tett l e r , 1 9 7 4 , p .  5 4 ) . 
Stettler ( 1 9 7 4 )  i nd icat e s  that internal control i s  the means by which 
management obtains the informat ion , protect ion , and control for 
succe s s ful operat ion of an organ i za t ion . 
According to McKinney , ( 1 9 8 6 ,  p .  3 1 - 3 2 )  " . . .  internal controls are 
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commonly clas s i f ied a s  admini s t ra t ive contro l s  and accounting controls . 
Internal administrat ive controls are comprised of procedures and records 
that a s s i s t  management in achieving an organ i z a t ions ' goa l s  . . .  Int e rna l 
account ing control s  refer to procedures , records , and reports that have 
been des igned to promote the rel iabi l i ty of f inancial records and 
reports .  For example ,  guide l ines and speci f i c  procedures deve loped to 
ensure the recording o f  transact ions in accordance with genera l l y  
accepted account ing princip l e s  a i d  in assuring the re l iabi l ity o f  
f inancial records " . 
In order to properly ope rate an account ing system, account ing internal 
controls that are appropriate to the s i ze , funct ion and l eve l of 
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complexity o f  the organi z a t ion mus t  b e  i n  place . Auditors can not 
pos s ib i l ity review every expendi ture transaction that f l ows through a 
large corporat i on or a state government accounting system . The audi tor 
evaluates the organ i zation ' s  system of internal controls and de termines 
the degree to whi ch these may be rel ied upon to ensure proper 
funct ioning of the accoun t ing system ( S te t t ler, 1 9 8 2 ) . The audi tor 
evaluates an organ i zation ' s internal contro l s  by reviewing i t s  
organ i za t ional s t ructure , i t s  relevant pol i c i e s  and procedures, and 
other internal control mechan i sms aga inst an internal control check l i s t . 
Thes e  checkl i s t s  have been deve l oped by accounting f i rms for use in the 
audit funct ion . I f  the prel iminary evaluat ion of internal contro l s  
indi cates that they appear t o  b e  appropriate , then later t e s t i ng o f  
actual account ing transact ions w i l l  e i ther con f i rm this conc lus ion o r  
not ( S tet t l e r , 1 9 8 2 ) . 
An organ i zation that has been de termined to have a rel iable system o f  
interna l controls may be audi ted b y  reviewing a samp l e , s t at i s t i ca l  o r  
otherwi se , o f  account ing transactions . I f  the organizat ion has s trong 
control s ,  the audi tor can rely on these and rely on l e s s  substant ive 
test ing of account ba lance s . On the other hand , i f  the organ i z a t ion has 
weak control s ,  more test ing is neces sary ( Me igs , Larsen & Meigs , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
The resu l t s  of a review of a sample of account ing transactions can 
con f i rm whether the control s  are e f fect ive and there fore whether the 
sys t em can be rel ied upon to produce f inanc i a l  s tatements that present 
fairly the f inancial pos i t ion and results of operat ion of the 
organi z a t ion ( S tettl e r ,  1 9 8 2 ) . 
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I f  the audi tor de termines that an organ i zat ion does not have a rel iable 
syst em of internal contro l s , e i ther as a result of the evaluat i on or the 
test ing of t ransact ions , the organ i zat ion may not be completely audi ted . 
The only way the auditor coul d  render an opinion on the f inancial 
condit i on of the organ i za t ion , as presented in f inancial s ta t ements 
produced f rom the organ i z a t ion ' s  account ing system , in the absence o f  a 
proper system of interna l contro l s , would be to review a l l  account ing 
transact i ons for a f i scal peri od . This is not feasible for any l arge 
organ i zat i on . I f  internal controls can not be rel ied upon , the auditor 
would have to i ssue a disclaimer of opinion . I f  controls are de termined 
to be weak i n  certain areas , the audi t opinion may have to be qua l i f ied 
to the degree that internal controls fail to be e f f ect ive i n  these areas 
( S t e t t l e r ,  1 9 8 2 ) . 
El ement s  of the Audit opin ion 
The f inancial statements are the respons ibil ity of management , not of 
the aud itor ( S tett l e r ,  1 9 8 2 ) . In state government , the s tate 
comptro l l er ' s agency typ ica l l y  prepares the CAFR . The aud i t  may be by 
an independent CPA f i rm or by a legislative branch aud i t  agency . 
The aud i t  opinion accompanies the CAFR and contains at least two 
paragraphs . The f i r s t  paragraph addresses the appropriate respons ible 
o f f icia l s , genera l l y  the governor and relevant legisl ators . The 
2 0  
statements o f  the organ i z a t ion cove red by the opinion are ident i f ied and 
the f i scal period ( f i s cal yea r )  covered is indicated . The f i rs t  
paragraph contains a s t atement that t h e  examinat i on was made in 
accordance with genera l ly accepted aUd i t ing s t andards ( GAAS ) and 
included such tests of the account ing records and such other aud i t ing 
procedures as was cons idered necessary in the c i r cums tances ( S t e t t l er, 
1 9 8 2 ,  p .  5 ) . " Comp lying with genera l l y  accepted aud i t ing s tandards 
involves comp l i ance with each of ten bas i c  standards that are grouped 
under three ma j or headings : general standards (pe rsonal a t t r ibute s  of 
the auditor ; s tandards of f i e ld work ; ( and) s tandards of report ing . "  
( S te t t l e r , 1 9 8 2 , p .  9 ) . 
To be in comp l iance with GAAS , ( S t e t t l e r , 1 9 8 2 )  the auditor : 
• must be techn i ca l ly qua l i f i e d  to perform the aud i t  
• should adequa tely plan and supervise audit s t a f f  and exerc i s e  due 
pro f e s s i onal care in pe rformance of the aud i t  
• must evaluate t h e  systems o f  interna l cont rols and obtain s u f f i c ient , 
competent evidence to support the opinion that wi l l  be rendered . 
The s econd paragraph i s  the opinion paragraph . The unqua l i f ied ( c l ean ) 
opinion contains wording to the e f fect that in the aud i tors opinion , the 
f inanc ial statements referred to in the above paragraph present fairly 
the f inanc i a l  pos i t i on of the XYZ organizat ion ( the s tate ) at June 3 0 ,  
1 9XX , and the resu l t s  o f  i t s  opera t i ons and the changes in i t s  f inanc i a l  
pos i t ion f o r  t h e  f i scal year then ended , in conformity w i t h  genera l ly 
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accepted account ing principles app l i e d  on a bas i s  cons i s t ent with that 
of the preceding year ( S te t t l er , 1 9 8 2 , p .  5 ) . 
Generally accepted account ing pr inciples ( GAAP ) are principles o f  
handl i ng a ccount ing transact ions in a manner that resul t s  in acceptab l e  
f inanc i a l  statements that " present fai rly· the f inanc ial condi t ion o f  
the organizat ion . At f i rs t , the s e  evolved by a sort of general 
consensus . Account i ng l i terature up to the 1 9 2 0 ' s  and 1 9 3 0 ' s  
cont r ibuted to the development o f  prac t i c e s  that were commonly used . In 
1 9 3 8, Sanders , Hat f i e l d  and Moore pub l ished A Statement o f  Accounting 
Principles at the reques t  of the Haskins & S e l l s  Foundat i on . The s e  
principles were deve loped b y  interviewing competent i ndividua l s , 
reviewing the accoun t i ng l i terature and reviewing corporate f inanc i a l  
statements ( Hendriksen , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
Committees under the auspi ce s  of the Ame r i can Ins t i tute of Cert i f ied 
Publ i c  Accountants (AICPA) i s s ued a number of Account ing Research 
Bul l e t ins prior to 1 9 6 0 . The Accoun t ing Pr inciples Board ( APB ) was 
formed by the AICPA in 1 9 5 9 . The APB i ssued a number of opinions and 
statements ( Hendriksen, 1 9 7 7 )  The APB was replaced by the Financ i a l  
Account ing S tandards Board ( FABB ) in 1 9 7 6 . The FASB h a s  i ssued a large 
number of s t andards s ince i t s  incept ion . with regard to governmental 
accounting ,  the Governmental Account ing S tandards Board ( GASB )  i ssues 
statement on s t andards that pertain to governments . Where these are 
s i lent , the FASB ' s  are in e f fe c t . 
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The profess ion o f  accounting i s  involved with the enterprise of 
cont inua l l y  ref ining and implementing GAAP . Thi s  i s  one reason why the 
audit must be per formed by a Cert i f ied Publ i c  Accountant ( CPA) . I t  i s  
a l s o  why large complex organi z a t ions hire CPA ' s t o  operate accounting 
syst ems and prepare f inanc i a l  s t atement s .  
An unqua l i f i ed opi nion requ i re s  that the statements be in conformity 
with GAAP . Fa i l ure to comply with GAAP in a way that mat er i a l ly a f fe c t s  
the f inanc ial s ta tements woul d  l e a d  to a qua l i f i ed or adverse aud i t  
opinion . Inab i l i ty to render an opinion because of inadequat e  i nt ernal 
control s  could lead to a d i s c l a ime r o f  opinion ( S tettl e r ,  1 9 8 2 ) . 
If the audi t opinion i s  qual i f i e d ,  addit ional informat ion mus t  be 
included . A qua l i f i ed opinion requires an addi t ional paragraph be fore 
the opinion paragraph that explains the qua l i f icat ion . In addi t i on ,  the 
opinion paragraph contains the wording " except for" and " a s  di scussed 
in the preceding paragraph" , the accompanying f i nanc i a l  stat ements 
" present f a i rly" , e t c . The adverse opinion woul d  indicate that the 
f inanc i a l  statements do not present fai rly in conform i ty with GAAP 
( St e t t l e r ,  1 9 8 2 ) . 
The bas i c  f inanc i a l  statements that are sub j ect to audi t and opinion are 
the bal ance sheet and the operating s tatement . The balance sheet 
contains the general l edger accounts for asset s , l iabi l i t ie s  and fund 
balance of the organ i z a t ion at a part icular point in t ime . That t ime i s  
the end o f  the f i scal year . General ledger accounts for a s s e t s  i nc l ude 
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such i t ems a s  cash,  inve s tment s ,  accounts rece ivab l e  and f ixed assets . 
Fixed assets include l and , bui ldings , equipment and construct i on i n  
progres s . General l edge r  accounts f o r  l i abi l i t i e s  include such i tems a s  
accounts payab l e , pens ion l iabi l i t ie s  and bonded debt . Fund bal ance i s  
the d i f ference between a s s e t s  and l iabi l i t ie s . The formul a  for 
computi ng fund ba l ance i s  assets minus l iabi l i t i e s . Fund balance should 
be a pos i t ive number .  
The operating s t at ement for governmental funds i s  typ i c a l l y  the 
statement of revenues , expendi tures and changes in fund balance . Thi s  
statement presents revenues by source for the f i scal year . Al so , i t  
inc ludes expenditures by funct ion ( broad program category) and t rans fers 
in and out . Expendi tures are subtracted f rom revenue s . Trans fers i n  
a r e  added and tran s f e rs o u t  a r e  subtracted . The result i s  revenues and 
other f inanc ing sources ove r ( unde r )  expenditures and other uses for the 
f i scal year . Thi s result is then added ( i f ove r )  or subtracted ( i f  
under )  to the prior f i s cal yea r ' s fund ba l ance to arrive a t  the current 
f i scal year ' s  fund balance . The two statements shoul d " articulate"  , 
that i s , fund balance presented on the ba l ance sheet at f i scal year end 
shoul d  be the same as fund bal ance presented on the ope rat ing s tatement 
computed by applying the f i scal yea r ' s f inanc ial opera t i ons to the prior 
years fund balanc e . 
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Below are s impl i f ied diagrams o f  the f inanc ial statements described 
above : 
Balance Sheet Figure 1. 
Assets Liab i  l i  t i e s  
Cash Bonds Payabl e  
Inve s tments Accounts Payable 
Accounts Receivabl e  Pens ion Liabi l i t i e s  Payabl e  
Fixed As s e t s  Total Liabi l i t i e s  
Fund Balan c e  
T o t a l  As s e t s  Total Liab i l i  t i e s  &: Fund B a l an c e  
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Statement o f  Revenues, Expendi tures & changes i n  Fund Balance f igure 2 .  
Revenues 
(List  by revenues source ) 
Les s : Expend i tures 
(List  by function /programmat i c  
area ) 
Add : Trans fers In 
Les s : Trans fers Out 
Amount o f  revenues & trans fers in 
over ( unde r )  expendi tures & 
trans fers out 
Add : Fund bal ance : Beginning of 
Fisca l  year 
Fund Ba l ance : End of F i s cal Year 
The general l edge r  accounts may be grouped into subsystems . For 
examp l e , one cyc l e  involve s , for private organi zat ions, sales,  accounts 
rece ivabl e  and revenue s . This set of accounts has a related s e t  o f  
internal contro l s  that shoul d  be in place . For pub l i c  sector 
organizat ions , this cyc l e  would be related to tax col lect ions rather 
than sales . Another cyc l e  involves purchases , accounts payable and 
expenditure s . Internal contro l s  for this set should a l so be in place . 
The interna l cont rol s  for each subsys tem should be studied , eva luated 
and tested to determine the abi l i ty o f  the auditor to rely on them 
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( Stett l e r ,  1 9 8 2 ) . Int ernal control s may a l so be appl icable to spe c i f i c  
accounts taken individua l ly . 
To the degree that interna l contro l s  may be rel ied upon , substant ive 
test ing to de termine account bal ances may be performed on a samp l e  
bas i s . Howeve r ,  l a c k  o f  internal controls in a part icular account o r  
subsystem o f  account s  may requ i re a great dea l of subs tant ive t e s t ing in 
order to a l l ow for an opinion of that account . Ul t imat e l y ,  each maj or 
general l edger account ( a ccount having a balance that i s  material  to the 
statements taken a s  a who l e )  must be audited for the opinion on the 
stat ements as a whol e  to be rendered ( S te t t l e r , 1 9 8 2 ; Meigs , Larsen & 
Me igs , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
A weakness in internal controls ove r an important account or subsystem 
of accounts that can not be compensated for by addit ional substantive 
test ing or other evidence cou l d  result in a qual i f ied opi nion but not 
require a d i s c l a imer if other controls ove r the other accounts are 
deemed to be rel iable . 
Maj or general l edger accounts that mus t  be inc l uded in the f i nanc i a l  
statements include cash , inves tment s , accounts rece ivabl e ,  f ixed a s s et s ,  
debt , accounts payab l e , revenues ,  expendi ture s , trans fers - in and 
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trans fers - out . Amounts presented for each must be veri f i ab l e  based on 
support ing documentat ion . For example, expenditures for payrol l  for 
government employees should be based on a human resource s  system which 
ma intains a record for each employee, including the employee ' s  s tep and 
grade . Each expendi ture for a vendor payment mus t  be supported by a 
vouche r . The voucher includes a purchase orde r ,  a receiving report and 
a vendors invo i ce ( S tett l e r , 1 9 8 2 ) . This voucher " vouche s ·  that the 
purchase has been author i z e d ,  that the goods have been received, and 
that the vendor has submi tted a b i l l . 
Genera l  l edge r  accounts are typi cally backed up by subs idiary l edgers 
that individua l ly support the part i cular general l edger balance . For 
example, the balance for the ' accoun t s  payab l e ' general l edger account 
should be equal to the sum of a l l  the individual accounts payabl e  
records . The sources of subs idiary records for each of the maj or 
categori e s  of general l edger a ccounts fol low s imilar l og i c . 
The s tate t reasure r ' s agency typically per forms the funct ions of the 
Treasurer ' s  o f f ice in any large organ i z a t ion . The Treasurer ma intains 
cus tody of cash . Proper internal control requ i re s  that accoun t i ng and 
treasurer funct i ons be s egregated ( Me igs , Larsen & Meigs , 1 9 7 7 ) . The 
Treasury agency reconc i l e s  bank accounts, inve s t s  resources and 
ma intains records for bonded debt o f  the s tate . Accordingly, the 
department o f  treasury for the s tate wi l l  be the source for suppor t ing 
documentation for cash , inve s tments and bonds payable , as we l l  a s  
interest expense s . 
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Although state governments have many sources o f  revenue , the mos t  
important for governmental activi t ie s  are genera l l y  the s tate income tax 
and sales t ax ( Cope, 1 9 9 2 ) . Thes e  are managed by the s ta t e ' s  taxat ion 
agency . This department w i l l  be the source for records document ing 
revenues to the s tate . 
Expendi tures generally originate in the l ine agencies as they expend the 
moni e s  appropriated for them to use in ca rrying out the i r  miss ions . The 
vouchers support ing many expenditures are assembled by l ine agency 
f i scal s t a f f . The s e  supporting records may be reta ined at the l ine 
agency or submi tted to the s tate comptrol l e r ' s agency ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) 
Human resources records w i l l  be ma inta ined at the l ine agenc i e s  or in a 
central personnel agency . Entries to f ixed assets sys tems usua l ly 
originate in the agenc ies where the assets actua l l y  res ide , a l though a 
general services agency may be the source for many of the state ' s  l and 
and bui l ding asset records ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
Budget amount s  origina t e  from the state ' s  budget o f f i ce where records 
supporting these, and f i na l  budget amount s  that are approved into law , 
are maintained . The budget appropriat ions by fund and program and/or 
obj ect code mus t  be i ntegrated into the general l edge r  a ccount ing sys t em 
to fac i l i tate the budgetary control function . Al s o ,  the s e  are presented 
in the CAFR . 
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From the foregoing , i t  i s  obvious that the amount s  presented in the CAFR 
by the s tate comptrol l e r  have sources in other agencies in the s tate . 
In addi tion to the l ine agencies , certain overhead or control agencies 
are important to the core functions of the s tate comptro l l e r, including 
those trad i t iona l ly a s sociated with the f i nance funct ion, i .  e . ,  
treasury, taxat ion, budget .  The tasks o f  these d i f fe rent iated agenci e s  
must b e  i ntegrated and coordinated f o r  t h e  state comptrol l e r  t o  per form 
e f fective l y .  
Sta tewide Account ing Sys t em and Budgetary Control 
The State Comptro l l e r  typica l ly operates the sta tewide account ing syst em 
and spec i f i e s  the account ing controls that govern i t s  operat ion . 
Inasmuch as the proces s  of expending s tate funds usua l ly begins at the 
l ine agency ( NASACT, 1 9 96 ) , where the voucher is prepared, controls mus t  
come i n t o  p l a y  a t  t h e  agency l eve l as we l l  as in t h e  Comp t rol l er ' s 
o f f i ce in the proces s ing of transact ions through the account i ng sys tem . 
NASACT ( 1 9 9 6 ) indicates that in twenty- two states, the Comp t ro l l er i s  
responsible for e s tabl i shing and ma intaining the interna l control 
s t ructure . In f i f teen states, this duty i s  de l egated to l ine agency 
pe rsonn e l  and in the rema ining states this respons ibi l i ty is shared . 
However, in a l l  cas e s, certain internal account i ng control s  di rectly 
as sociated with operations o f  the comptro l l er ' s o f f ice mus t  be speci f i ed 
by the comptrol l e r .  Some o f  these are bui l t  into the account i ng sys t em . 
Governmental account ing systems generally contain controls that are 
des igned to ensure expendi tures do not exceed budgeted amount s  ( Hay and 
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Mikese l l , 1 9 7 4 ) . When an obl igat ion i s  incurred , the funds are 
encumbered , that i s  subtracted from the rema ining ava i lable 
appropriat i on or a l l otment . This control technique i s  very important in 
governmental account ing and i s  intended to ensure that expenditures do 
not exceed l ega l ly budgeted amounts . 
A modern automated account ing system that has budgetary appropriat i ons 
and a l lotments integrated into i t , with appropriate edi t control s ,  
provides a means to ensure that expenditures that exceed appropriat i ons 
or a l l otments w i l l  be i denti f i ed at the t ime o f  pos t ing , before the 
check is s ent to the vendor . This is recommended in governmental 
account ing textbooks ( Hay& Mikese l l , 1 9 7 4 ) . Before computer systems 
became common , this funct ion was manual ly performed . System 
ident i f icat i on of expendi tures that are in exce s s  of ava i labl e , 
unexpended appropriat i ons a l l ows for a " management by excep t i on "  
approach to this control . Once the account ing system ' s edit s  i dent i fy 
an expenditure for which rema ining appropriat ions are insuf f i c i ent , 
budget o f f ice s t a f f  w i l l  become involved in deal ing with the problem 
agency . 
Centra l i z ing this control i s  intended to ensure that for the government 
as a who l e , expendi tures do not exceed revenues and any ava i l ab l e  
balance s .  P i tsvada and Howard ( 1 9 8 6 ) c i te Arthur Buck ' s  1 9 3 4  c l a s s i c  
work o n  t h i s  subj ect . Buck argued that executive control over spending 
should be centra l i zed so that i f  revenues f e l l  below forecas t s , 
expendi tures could be adjusted downward so as to maintain budgetary 
equil ibrium . P i t svada and Howard a l so c i t e  Je sse Burkhead ' s  1 9 5 6  work 
which argues that ensuring legislative intent is a funct ion of budget 
execut ion . 
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Budge t s  are driven by revenue that i s  e s t imated to be ava i l ab l e  during 
the f i s cal per iod ( f i scal year usua l l y ) . A bal anced budget requi rement , 
which nearly a l l  s tates have , means that expendi tures mus t  be within 
avai lable revenues and any ava i lable ba lance ( Lauth , 1 9 9 2 ) . This 
highl ights the importance of revenue e s t imates in the budgetary proce s s . 
A balanced budget i s  one in which appropriat ions are within the 
constra ints imposed by forecast ava i lable re sources . Hence, i f  
expenditures are he l d  to amount s  appropriated , the budget ,  a s  execute d ,  
wi l l  b e  in balance provided that actual revenues a r e  at l e a s t  equa l t o  
estimated revenues .  I f  expendi tures are properly contro l l e d ,  then 
revenue is the potential problem whi ch must be a l so constantly 
monitored . 
Given the above s ta tement, the importance of the revenue e s t imat e s  can 
not be overstated . Rodgers and Joyce ( 1 9 9 6 ) conclude that states 
routinely under forecast revenues .  None - the - le s s , g iven the requi rement 
of ba l anc ing the budget , the concept of a ra iny day fund should be 
cons idered important . During good years , surplus funds are not 
expended ,  but s aved for a ' ra iny day ' when a revenue short f a l l  occurs 
due to a recess ion . Economic recess ions have a doub l e - edged impact . 
Not only are revenues l ikely to f a l l  short of e s t imates , but certain 
categori e s  of expendi tures increase during bad e conomic t imes . 
The opt imum s i ze for a rainy day or budget s tabi l i za t ion fund has been 
est imated at 5\ of general revenue s . At least this f igure has been 
' recommended '  by Wa l l  S t reet Analysts and has found the i r  way into 
Nat ional Conference of State Leg i s l atures l iterature ( Navin & Navin ,  
1 9 9 7 )  . 
Navin & Navin ( 1 9 9 7 )  did not f ind the 5 \  of general revenues to be 
suf f i c i ent for the s tate of Ohio duri ng the early 1 9 9 0 ' s  recess ion . 
They found that 1 3 \  was closer to an optimal s i ze . In any case , the 
f i gure o f  5\ has found i t s  way in the back door as some k ind of 
benchmark . 
The busi ne s s  cyc l e  i s  not l ikely to cease to occur , thus leading to 
shortfal l s  in revenue s . Ra iny day funds should be cons i dered prudent 
f i scal pol i cy . 
Control l ing expenditures i s  not always easy . As Schick ( 1 9 8 8 , p .  5 2 9 )  
points out , however ,  " budgets are not sel f - execut ing dec i s ions . H  
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Certa in types o f  expenditure s , such a s  ent i t l ement s , may we l l  exceed 
amount s  budgeted . Economi c condit ions greatly impac t  state government 
f inance s  ( Go l d ,  1 9 9 5 ) . During recess ions , revenues typically f a l l  short 
and certain cat egori e s  of expenditures i ncreas e . Thi s  l eads to f i scal 
s t re s s  and to potent i a l  budget def i c i t s . States react to revenue 
shor t f a l l s  by cutt ing expendi tures , if pos s i bl e , during the rema ining 
portion of the f i scal year and , usua l l y  in the next f i scal year ,  by 
ra i sing taxes ( Poterba , 1 9 9 4 ) . 
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The importance o f  interim f inanc ial report i ng for providing f eedback to 
state f inance o f f i c ia l s  for monitoring revenues and expenditures is 
obvious . The sooner that i t  becomes evident that revenues may not meet 
foreca s t s , the easier i t  w i l l  be to ma inta in bal ance by cutt ing 
expenditure s . NASACT ( 1 9 9 6 ) indicates that twenty seven state 
comptrollers prepare interim f inanc ial reports . These are usua l ly 
monthly or quarterly report s . 
Preaudi t  procedures w i l l  i dent i f y  expendi tures that f a i l  to compl y  with 
laws and regulat ions or that are inappropriate for agency missions 
before the fact . Pre - audi t s  may be performed by the centra l i zed 
accounting agency ( comptrol l e r ' s o f f i c e )  as we l l  as by l ine agency 
f i scal sta f f . This control proce s s  is frequently shared . Agency f i scal 
o f f i cers are expected to be respons ible for ensuring that agency 
expenditures are proper .  The preaud i t  func t i on i s  centra l i zed to some 
degree in approximately three quarters of the states (NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
NASACT ( 1 9 9 6 ) indicates that in twenty s tate s , the pre - audit func t i on i s  
performed b y  the comptro l l e r ' s o f f ice ; in thirteen s tates t h i s  funct ion 
i s  performed by the agenc i e s  and i s  shared in the remai ning s ta te s . 
Genera l l y ,  the volume of expendi ture t ransact ions i s  suf f i c i ent ly l a rge 
to prohibit preaud i t  of a l l  of them . Comptro l l e r ' s O f f ice staff that 
perform pre - aud i t s  typ ically do so on a samp l e  bas i s . 
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The post audit ,  which u l t imately results in the opinion o n  the f inanc ial 
statements i s  typ i c a l l y  performed by a legislat ive aud i t  organizat i on . 
Although after the f ac t ,  the post audit i dent i f ie s  improper 
expenditures . Governmental aud i t s  are required to encompass comp l iance 
with appl icable laws and regulations as we l l  a s  financ i a l  presentat ion 
( S tett l e r , 1 9 8 2 ) . The (pos t )  audit is usua l l y  considered a later phase 
of the budget cyc l e  and not part of the execut i on phas e  ( Doos t ,  1 9 8 6 ) . 
Given the above discuss i on , the budgetary control funct ion of the S tate 
Comptro l l e r  i s  the control that ensures that the execut i on phase of the 
budgetary process is properly carried out . That i s : 
• expendi tures are within amounts appropriated 
• expenditures are in comp l iance with laws and regulat ions , and 
• expenditures are appropriate for agency miss ions . 
This functi on i s  shared with other s tate o f f ic i a l s  during the budget 
execut ion phas e . 
The State Comptrol l er ' s c l ients are the f i scal o f f icers and s t a f f s  of 
the l ine agencies and the other top ranked s tate government o f f i c i a l s  
( Governor ,  budget directo r ,  e t c . ) . The State Comptrol l er ' s agency 
regulates the l ine agencies in the area of expendi tures , spec i f i e s  
account ing pol i c i e s  and internal control pol i c i e s  and provides some 
accounting service s . 
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Budgets are relied on for control o f  expendi ture s .  Idea l l y ,  the 
interact i on between the budget system and the account i ng system when 
these are properly integrated i s  where this happens ( Garner , 1 9 9 1 ) . I f  
the State Comptro l l e r  i s  e f fe c t ive i n  carrying out the budgetary control 
function ,  i t  is reasonabl e  to conc lude that the execut ion phas e  o f  the 
budget cyc l e  wi l l  result in outcomes intended as indicated by the 
approved budget and by s tate o f f i c ia l s  concerned with the budget , 
prima r i l y  the Governo r ,  Secretary of Finance and budget director and 
members of legislat ive money commi ttees . 
The outcomes intended by these o f f ic i a l s  are ( Brown , 1 9 9 0 ; P i tsvada and 
Howard , 1 9 8 6 ; Hol de r ,  1 9 8 7 ) . 
• publ i c  moneys are spent in furtherance of agency miss i ons as 
indicated in state law and legislative appropriat i on 
• expenditures are controlled to the degree poss ib l e  to ensure that 
budget s  rema in in bal ance during the budget execut i on phase 
• expendi tures are he l d  to amounts that are lega l ly appropriated , and 
• i f  revenues are de termined to be f a l l ing short during the f i scal 
year , contro l s  des igned to check expendi tures are e f fe c t ive i n  doing 
so . 
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Just a s  the budget genera l ly mus t  b e  ba lanced , i f  the execution phas e  of 
the budget cyc l e  i s  properly performed, actual expenditures should be 
within actua l  revenues and any ava i lable balance s .  
Fa i lure to carry out this funct ion e f fect ively could lead to 
expenditures not be ing contro l l e d ,  budget imbal ances, def i c i t s , improper 
expend i tures and other probl ems . Holder ( 1 9 8 7 ,  p .  1 6 5 )  stresses the 
importance of budgetary compl iance in accounting for governmental funds . 
" Because budgetary comp l iance i s  of such s i gn i f i cance in managing 
governmental activi t i e s , and because expenditure overages may endanger 
the f i scal hea l th of the whol e  ( governmental enti ty) . . .  i f  a l l owed to 
accumulate, techni ques have been adopted to ensure conformance with 
budget spe c i f i cat ions " Accordingly, i t  i s  reasonabl e  to conc lude that 
e f f ective performance o f  the budgetary control funct i on , a core funct i on 
of the State Comptrol l e r ,  i s  important for the f i scal hea l t h  and we l l  
being o f  the state government ent i ty a s  a whole . In order to 
e f fect ive l y  perform this funct ion , an adequate account ing sys t em and a 
system of internal control s  must be in place . The o f f i ce must be 
staffed with profess iona l ly qua l i f ied sta f f . Fina l l y ,  preparat ion o f  
f inanc i a l  statements and a n  independent audit complete the budget cyc l e . 
Inasmuch as a favorabl e  outcome , at least in part , involves coopera t ion 
between such key pl aye rs as the Gove rnor , S ecretary of Finance and 
Budget Director , the way in which the State Comptrol l e r  is chosen and 
the manner in which these relat ionships are organ i zed should play a part 
in the outcome . For examp l e , a favorab l e  outcome may require 
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independence a s  we l l  a s  neutral competence on the part o f  the State 
Comptrol l e r . Other important attribute s  pos s ibly impact ing success 
include a long term a s  opposed to a short term perspect ive , a systems 
orientation, and appropriate s e t  of profess ional qua l i f i cations in terms 
of educat i on and expe ri ence . 
Thi s  research i s  concerned with variables that may impac t  the 
e f fect ivenes s  of performance by this key player in state government . 
The two primary var i ab l e s  are ( 1 )  the me thod of select ion of the state 
comptro l l e r  and ( 2 ) the organ i z a t ional pos i t ion of the comptrol l er ' s  
agency . However ,  other characteri s t i cs , such as whether the state 
comptrol l e r  i s  a CPA and the l ength of tenure in the pos i tion wi l l  also 
be cons idered . 
THE NEED FOR THE STUDY 
The s tates are fairly s imilar in that they general ly a l l  perform the 
core func t i ons of budge tary control and account ing and f inanc i a l  
reporting and have t h e  too l s  w i t h  which to d o  so . Each s ta t e  h a s  an 
organizat ion that funct ions as the s tate ' s  central accounting agency and 
performs these core funct ions . In each state , the functions of general 
ledger accounting / f inancial reporting and budgetary control are 
centra l i zed i n  this organ i zat ion . That i s , with regard to 
centra l i zat ion vs . decentra l i zation of these func t i ons the states are 
s imilarly centra l i zed . S imilarly,  each s tate appears to have at l ea s t  
re lat ive l y  u p  to date automated data proce s s ing systems to fac i l i tate 
performance of these core functions ( NASACT, 1 9 9 2 ) . 
The states are not s imi lar , however in outcome s . Some states produce 
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GAAP based f inanc ial statements with c l ean audi t opinions and GFOA 
Cert i f i cates of Achievement , others do not . The f inanc i a l  s tatements 
shoul d  present fai rly the f inanc ial pos i t i on o f  the state for the f i scal 
period presented . This de l iverable i s  the spe c i f i c  product of the 
o f f ice of the state comptro l l e r  ( NASACT , 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 9 6 ) and can provide a 
means o f  determining the e f fect ivenes s  of performance of the account ing 
funct ion . 
Add i t i ona l l y ,  in part as a byproduct o f  the budget cyc l e ,  as we l l  as 
other factors , the f i nanc i a l  cond i t ions o f  states a s  a whol e  can be 
d i f f e rent iated . S ome states have s t ructural de f i c i t s , mos t  do not . The 
recess ion of the early 1 9 9 0 ' s  impacted mos t  a l l  of the states ( Go l d ,  
1 9 9 5 ) . Some states have higher debt l oads , some l ower ( Book of the 
State s ,  1 9 9 2 ) . The rat ing agenc i e s  rate some states h igher that others . 
Barre t t  and Greene wr i t ing for Financial Wor ld and Governing have 
periodically ranked the 50 s tates ( 1 9 9 1 , 1 9 92 , 1 9 9 3 , 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 9 )  
D i f fe rent ways o f  choos ing the individual t o  b e  State Comptro l l e r  and o f  
organi z ing the agency may b e  more l i kely t o  bring about d i f f e rent 
outcome s . It is a commonplace that " organ i zat ion mat t e r s "  . 
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ORGANI ZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS 
In performing a cursory review of the methods of s e lect ing the State 
Compt rol l e r  and the organ i z a t i ona l configurat i ons o f  the s tates with 
regard to the interact i on o f  the Governor ,  Secretary or D i rector o f  
Finance , S t a t e  Comptro l l e r , and State Budget O f f icer ,  three bas i c  mode l s  
are noted . Add i t i onal l y ,  however ,  a number o f  hybrids are in evidence . 
Inasmuch as the State Trea surer i s  e l ected in mos t  s tates ( Book o f  the 
States , 1 9 9 2 ) , the fol l owing conf igurat ions only deal with the 
structural integra t i on of the account ing and budgeting funct i ons and not 
with i nt egrat ion o f  the ent i re f inance funct i on . This ana lys i s  i s  based 
on a review o f  organ i z a t i on cha rts and other informat i on i ncluded in 
State Compt ro l l e rs : Techn ica l Act i v i t i e s  and Funct i ons ( NASACT , 1 9 9 2  AND 
1 9 9 6 ) and was expanded during the research phase by acces s ing the web 
s i te s  of the individual s tates to ensure it is accurat e . The three 
bas i c  conf igura t i ons are : 
• funct iona l ly integrated f inance funct i on 
• indirect ly funct iona l ly integrated f i nance funct i on ,  and 
• not funct iona l ly i nt egrated f inance funct i on 
FULLY INTEGRATED F INANCE FUNCTION 
State Compt ro l l er ' s  organ izat ion as Divis i on of a large r Department o f  
Finance 
In this conf igura t i on ,  typica l l y  the State Comptro l l e r  reports to an 
appointed o f f icial be l ow the level of Governo r ,  usua l ly a D i rector o f  
Finance or a cabinet Secretary o f  Finance . The State Compt rol l e r' s 
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o f f i ce or agency i s  a divis ion or bureau o f  a l arger department o f  
f inance that includes t h e  budget o f f ice as we l l  as other f inance 
agencies such as the treasurer ' s  o f f ice , o f f i ce of taxation ,  e t c .  I n  
t h i s  mode l , the S t a t e  Compt rol l e r  funct ions in a funct iona l ly integrated 
f i nance organi zation . In this mode l ,  the State Comptrol l e r  i s  usua l l y  
appointed or chosen b y  t h e  head of t h e  Department of Finance , some t imes 
with concurrence or approval of the Governor . Some t imes in this mode l , 
the State Comptro l l e r  i s  a career civ i l  service employee and somet imes 
not . In this model ,  the State Compt rol l e r  does not typ i ca l ly report 
di rectly to the Governor . 
Figure 3 .  
State Comptroller's organization as Division of a larger Department of finance 
State Budget Office< State Comptroller 
State Compt ro l l e r  a s  po l i t ical appo intee or po l i t ica l execut ive 
In this conf igura t ion , the State Comptro l l e r ,  l ike the State Budge t 
Office r ,  i s  typica l l y  appointed by and serves at the p l ea sure of the 
Governor ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . The contro l l e r ' s o f f i ce and budget o f f ice are 
typica l ly s eparate agencies both reporting direct ly to the Governor . 
Al though not integrated into a larger Department of Finance , funct ional 
integrat ion is achieved by vi rtue of the fact that both the budget 
officer and the comptrol l e r  report directly to the governor . 
Figure 4 .  
State Comptroller as Political Appointee or Political Executive 
State Budget OffICer State Comptroller 
IND IRECTLY INTEGRATED FINANCE FUNCT ION 
4 1  
State comptrol l e r  and state budget o f f icer do not report directly to the 
same o f f ic i a l  
Some t imes t h e  budget o f f i ce r ' s and t h e  comptro l l er ' s organ i zat ions are 
further organ i za t iona l l y  s eparated in that the budget di rector ' s  o f f i ce 
i s  located the o f f ice of the Governor . In this conf igurat ion , the 
budget o f f i ce r  is directly appointed by and reports directly to the 
gove rnor ,  whi l e  the comp t rol l e r ' s agency , usua l ly located in a 
department of f inance that doe s  not include the budget o f f i ce r ' s agency , 
does not report directly to the governor . I t  i s  pos s ib l e ,  of course , 
for a s tate comptrol l e r  whose agency i s  located in a f inance department 
to be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the governor ( NASACT , 
1 9 96 ) . This conf igurat i on i s  consi dered to be onl y  indirectly 
funct i ona l ly integrated . 
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Figure 5 .  Comptrol le r  and Budget director report to d i f f e rent o f f i c i a l s  
I ndirect Functional I ntegration 
State Budget Officer 
NON- INTEGRATED FINANCE FUNCTION 
State Comptrol l e r  as e l e cted o f f i c i a l  
In this mode l ,  the State Comptro l l e r  i s  a n  independently e l e c ted 
o f f i c i a l . Having his or her own power bas e ,  the e l ected contro l l er i s  
independent o f  the governor . Typ i ca l l y ,  in this arrangement , the 
control l e r' s organi z a t ion is functiona l ly s eparated f rom that o f  the 
budget o f f i ce r . S ince the e lected contro l l e r  doe s  not report to the 
governor ,  he or she i s  not organizat iona l l y  under pressure to coordinate 
activi t ie s  with the budget o f f i ce r . In this conf iguration ,  the Governor 
has s igni f i cantly l e s s  control over the budgetary control aspec t  of the 
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budget execut ion phase . The budgetary control funct i on i s  an important 
task of the State Comptro l l e r . The State Comptro l l e r  i s  obl igated to 
the voters rather then the Governor . Of course , i t  woul d  mat te r  i f  the 
Governor and e l e cted Comptrol l e r  we re of the same or o f  d i f f e rent 
pol i t ical part i e s . 
Figure 6 .  Elected State Comptroll e r  
Non - integrated Funct ional Conf igurat ion 
Voters 
State Com ptroller 
SELECTION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
The l i tera ture on select ion of rel evant government o f f i c i a l s  is mixed as 
to which method might be pre ferred . Beyl e ,  1 9 8 5  and Chi , 1 9 9 2  present 
pros and cons for e l e c t i on and appo intment . 
The earl ier l iterature that compares the c i ty manager form of government 
to the s trong mayor form found d i f f e rences in performance betwe en these 
two forms of mun icipal government . City manager governments were found 
to be more rat iona l l y  managed and l e s s  pol i t i c a l l y  respons ive than 
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s trong mayor forms ( Lineberry and Fowl e r ,  1 96 7 ;  Karnig, 1 9 7 5 ; and 
Lineberry and S harkansky , 1 9 7 8 ) . La ter research by Morgan and Pe l i ssero 
( 1 9 8 0 ) found , to the contrary , that i n  the long run , whe ther the c i ty 
was reformed or not made l i t t l e  d i f f erence , a l though they agree that 
research suggests that s t ructure influences pol i c i e s  at the s tate l eve l . 
schneider and Park ( 1 9 8 9 )  cons ider the evidence regarding c i ty manager 
c i t i e s  and rat ional administration to be mixed . 
Box ( 1 9 9 5 )  argues that whether ra tional administration or pol i t ical 
respons iveness i s  the bes t  s t ructure for local governments depends on 
one s  i deological preference . 
D i f f erences have a l so been noted in county gove rnments run by appointed 
or e lected chie f  execut ives and those governed by the Commission form of 
county gove rnment . Clearly,  having a s trong execut ive matters whether 
e l e cted or appointed ( S chne ider and Park , 1 9 8 9  and DeSant i s  and Renner ,  
1 9 94 ) . 
Cons idering the earl i e r  c i ty manager vs . s trong mayor l i te rature , 
e l ected comptrollers were thought to be more l ikely to s tress pol i t ical 
re spons ivene s s , whi l e  appointed comptro l l ers were thought to stress 
neutral compe tenc e / ra t ional administration to a greater degre e . In view 
of the i de a  that neutral compe tence /rat ional admin i s t ration was felt to 
relate to e f fect iveness for the funct ions of the compt rol l e r ,  appointed 
comptrollers might theoret ically be more e f fe c t ive . 
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Gi roux and Shie l ds , 1 9 9 3  found d i f f erences i n  performance for those c i ty 
manager c i t i e s  preparing GAAP based f inanc i a l  statements for which they 
rece ived the GFOA cert i f icate . 
Considering Meye r ,  1 9 7 9 ,  e l ected comptrol l e rs and those with c ivi l 
service protect ions were expected to be more independent of the 
appoint ing o f f i c i a l  (mayor or governor ) and therefore better abl e  to 
perform neutral ly and rat iona l ly without be ing re spons ive to the 
appoint ing o f f i c i a l . 
The above suggests that method of selection of the State �omptro l l er can 
have an impact on the e f fect ivenes s  of the f inance State Comp t ro l l er ' s 
agency . However ,  the mixed nature of the l i terature does not a l l ow a 
predict ion as to which method , i f  any , would be more conducive to 
e f f e c t ivenes s . 
Hypothe s i s  1 .  
The f i rs t  hypothe s i s  i s  that there wi l l  be a s t rong relat ionship between 
the method of s e l e c t ion of the State comptro l l e r  and the e f fe c t ivene s s  
of the State Comptro l l e r ' s  agency . 
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COMPARATIVE STATE RESEARCH 
The State Pol i cy Literature 
There is a good deal of l ite rature , summari zed by Treadway ( 1 9 8 5 ) , that 
attempts to de termine whether pol i t ical or socioe conomic factors have 
the greatest impact on state government pol i cy outputs . This state 
pol icy l itera ture suggests that whether pol it ical or socioe conomic 
factors i s  of mos t  importance depends on the pol i cy d imens ion s tudi e d ,  
but c l early these factors impac t  pol i cy output s  ( Treadway , 1 9 8 5 ; 
Sharkansky , 1 9 6 8  and Sharkansky and Hof f erbert , 1 9 6 9 ) . 
In the state pol icy l iterature , particularly the work of S harkansky 
( 1 9 6 8 ) , expendi tures of the s tates are used as mea sures of pol icy 
output . Sharkansky wanted to know why some states spend more than 
others . This l i terature seeks to de termine what factors are important 
to the pol icy output s  that set the leve l s  and prior i t i e s  of s tate 
spending . As such , the focus i s  on the budget preparat ion phas e  o f  the 
budget cyc l e  rather than the budget execut ion phase . 
INTEGRATION OF THE FINANCE FUNCTION 
Regarding the organi zat ional conf iguration of the comptrol l e r ' s agency, 
l iterature on organ i z ing the f inance fun c t i on for government favors 
integrat ion of the f inance funct ion . Fol lowing the l i t erature for the 
private sector ( Rossel l and Frasure , 1 9 6 4 ) , pub l i c  f inance 
organ i z at ional integrat ion is fac i l i tated by having the several f i nance 
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funct ions ; those activi t ie s  performed by the comptro l l e r , treasurer , 
taxation director and budget director , report to a director o f  f inance 
who reports directly to the Chi e f  Execut ive ( Lehan , 1 9 9 1 ; Ruchelman , 
1 9 8 7 ) . Thi s conf igurat ion faci l i tates coordina t i on and coopera t i on and 
reduces f ragmentat i on . Add i t i ona l l y ,  integra t i on of the budget and 
accounting systems is de s i red ( Wooldridge , 1 9 8 2 ; Lynch ,  1 9 8 5 ;  Ha l l ,  
1 9 8 7 ;  Westberry , 1 9 8 9 ;  Thurma i e r , 1 9 9 0 ; Garne r ,  1 9 9 1 ) . Organ i z a t i ona l 
conf igura t i on o f  the comptrol l e r ' s agency and budget agency may impact 
int egrat ion of the respective systems . 
The l itera ture on integra t i on of the f inance funct i on sugges t s  that the 
organizat i onal conf igura t i on in which the State Comptro l le r ' s agency is 
a divis ion o f  a l arger department of f inance would be the mos t  e f fective 
of the three . 
Hypothe s i s  2 
The s econd hypothe s i s  i s  that there w i l l  be a s trong relat i onship 
between the organi z a t i onal con f igurat ion of the State comptro l l er ' s 
agency in the l arger s tate gove rnment and i t s  e f fe c t ivenes s .  
PROFESS IONALI SM 
The funct i ons of the state comptro l l e r  are those that are typical ly 
performed by members of the account ing profess i on . I t  i s  reasonabl e  to 
conc l ude that the spe c i f i c  profess ional character i s ti c s  o f  the funct i ons 
of the state comptro l l e r  are be s t  mat ched by the knowl edge , ski l l s  and 
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abi l i t ie s  o f  those with an accounting educat i on and expe r i enc e . Much of 
the power o f  government o f f i c i a l s  i s  the power to persuade whi ch i s  
ga ined by thei r  profess ional qua l i f i cations . The abi l ity of the state 
comptro l l e r  to exercise this power i s  enhanced i f  the state comp t ro l l e r  
is a CPA . Other appropriate f inance oriented cert i f i ca t ions may be 
subs t i tuted . 
Hypo the s i s  3 
The third hypothe s i s  i s  that there w i l l  be a s trong relat ionship between 
the profess ional qual i f i cat ions of the State comptro l l e r  and the 
e f fect ivenes s  of the State Comptro l l e r ' s agency . 
TENURE IN OFFICE 
Based on the research of Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 ) , the comptrol l e r  that has l onge r  
tenure i n  o f f ice wi l l  be be tter abl e  t o  she l ter the opera t ing core o f  
h i s  or h e r  agency f rom t h e  uncerta inty of t h e  pol i t i cal environment 
faced by the agency . According l y ,  longe r  tenure is expected to be 
associated with e f fect ivene s s . Addi t i ona l l y ,  career civil  s ervants have 
some protect ions aga inst arb i trary dismissa l , they may a l so have longer 
t enure than appointed or e l ected comptrollers . 
Hypothe s i s  4 
The fourth hypothe s i s  i s  that there w i l l  be a s t rong relat ionship 
between the length of tenure in o f f ice of the State comptrol l e r  and the 
e f fectivene s s  o f  the State Comptro l l e r ' s agency . 
4 9  
ORGANI ZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
A number o f  scholars have attempted to deal with the concept of 
organizat ional e f fect ivene s s . Repre sentat ive are : Steers ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 
Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 )  and Rainey ( 1 9 9 1 ) . The consensus i s  that the concept i s  
d i f f icul t  both t o  def ine and t o  eva luat e . 
Wri t ing in 1 9 7 7 , Steers examines the l i tera ture on organi z a t ional 
e f f ect ivene s s . He summa r i z e s  the resu l t s  of numerous rel evant s tudi e s . 
Steers ( 1 9 7 7 , p .  3 8 )  argues that i t  i s  d i f f icul t  to measure 
e f f ect ivene s s . To view e f f ect ivene s s  as a general l eve l of organ i z a t ion 
goa l s  attainment is an abs t ract not ion which is d i f f icu l t  to apply . 
Steers ( 1 9 7 7 ) , Rainey ( 1 9 9 1 ) and Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 )  a l l  i dent i f y  achieving 
goa l s  as a means for determining organizat ional e f f ectivene s s . Rainey 
and Zammuto ident i f y  other theoret ical mode l s  as we l l . 
Can organi zat ional e f f ect ivenes s  be measured by one overal l measure o f  
goal achievement ? Steers ( 1 9 7 7 )  reviewed t h e  resul t s  o f  a number of 
studies of e f f ect ivene s s . Some researchers , according to Steers ( 1 9 7 7 , 
p .  3 9 )  approached e f f ect ivenes s  research by i denti fying one cr i t er ion 
for eva l uation . This has usua l ly been an organ i zat ion wide criterion ,  
such a s  overal l performance , productivity,  pro f i tab l y ,  return on 
inves tment , or j ob satis fact ion . One d i f f icu l ty with use of a 
univariate measure i s  the choice of which to use . 
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Organizat ions have many goa l s . Not inf requently,  some of the goa l s  may 
be in con f l i c t  ( Rainey, 1 9 9 1 ) . 
Steers ( 1 9 7 7 ,  p .  3 9 )  f e e l s  that a more meaningful approach re l ie s  on 
eva l uating s everal criteria treated s imul taneous l y .  H e  concludes that 
use o f  mul tivariate measures of e f fect ivenes s  of an organ i zat ion is 
preferable to rel iance on merely an univariate measure . I n  other words , 
e f f ect ivenes s  should be based on measurement of more than one var iab l e . 
This a l l ows for the development and test ing of hypothe s e s  concerning 
relat ionships between var i abl e s . 
I f  achieving goa l s  const i tutes e f fect ivene s s , which goa l s  shoul d  be met ?  
The concept o f  organi zat ional e f fect ivenes s  i s  very comp l ex . Pas t  
research at tempting to measure e f fe c t iveness h a s  encountered probl ems 
( Rainey, 1 9 9 1 ; Steers , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
Steers ( 1 9 7 7 ,  pp . 4 4 - 5 7 )  compares 1 7  mul t ivariate s tudies o f  
e f fe c t ivene s s . Steers i dent i f ies several probl ems with a t tempts to 
research organ i zat ional e f f ect ivenes s . Problems are encountered with 
the va l idity o f  the " cons truc t "  o f  what const itutes e f fect ivene s s . 
The criteria used to measure e f fe c tiveness have often been uns table ove r 
t ime . The criteria used may be s ens i t ive to the t ime perspect ive of the 
researche r . Effectivenes s  for the short term may we l l  not be the same 
thing as e f fect ivene s s  for the intermediate or long t erm . Problems of 
measurement preci s ion are encounte red . Can f i ndings be general i zed? 
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How may mul t ip l e  cri te r i a  b e  integrated? Should the l eve l o f  analys i s  
be the ent ire organizat ion o r  a subun i t ?  
Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 )  categori zed organi zat ional e f f ect ivenes s  model s  a s  goa l 
based, systems based and mul t ip l e  const i tuency mode l s . E f f ect ivenes s  in 
mul t i p l e  const i tuency mode l s  involves satis fying the const ituencie s  o f  
t h e  organ i z a t ion . Zammuto prefers mul t ip l e  const i tuency mode l s . Thi s  
concept w i l l  b e  di scussed i n  some deta i l  be low . This research a t t empts 
to i dent i f y  the mul t ip l e  cons t ituencies o f  the state comptro l l er ' s 
agency . 
Rainey ( 1 9 9 1 )  also groups approaches to the evaluat ion of organi zat iona l 
e f f ect ivene s s . Like Zammuto , Ra iney ident i f i e s  a goa l s  approach and a 
systems - re source approach . Other mode l s  are concerned with participant 
satis fact ion . Ra iney po ints out that compet ing values are o f t en 
ident i f ied . Ra iney presents a compet ing va l ue s  model by Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh ( 1 9 8 3 ) . In this approach , model s  are j udged as emphas i z ing 
e i ther f l exibi l ity or control on one axis and having an interna l or 
externa l orientat ion on the other . The result i s  four mode l s . 
• The human relat ions mode l empha s i z e s  f l exibi l i ty and has an i nt ernal 
orientation . I t s  means are cohes ion and mora l e , whi l e  i t s  ends are 
human resources deve lopment . 
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• The internal process mode l empha s i ze s  control and has a n  internal 
orientat ion . Its means are informa t ion management and commun icat ion 
whi l e  i t s  ends are s tabi l ity and control . 
• The opens systems mode l empha s i zes f l exibi l i ty and has an exte rna l 
orientation . I t s  means are f lexibil ity and readine s s  whi l e  i t s  ends 
are growth and resource acqu i s i t ion . 
• The rat i onal goal mode l empha s i z e s  control and has an externa l 
orientat ion . I t s  means are pl anning and goal s e t ting whi l e  i t s  ends 
are product ivity and e f f i c iency . 
In e f fect ive organ i zat ions , compet ing values mus t be bal anced . 
D i f fe rent organ i zat ions do this in d i f f erent ways . What are some of the 
ways that s cholars have attempted to operat iona l i z e  e f f ectivene s s ?  
Rainey ( 1 9 9 1 )  c i t e s  Campbe l l ' s , 1 9 7 7  comprehens ive l is t  o f  
organizat ional e f fect iveness dimens ions and measures which includes 3 0  
cri ter ia . In add i t ion to an attempt to measure overal l e f fe c t ivenes s  
these e f fectivene s s  criteria include , product ivity,  e f f i c i ency , prof i t ,  
qual ity,  absenteeism,  j ob sat i s fact ion , turnover ,  
f l exibi l ity/adaptat ion , goa l consensus , managerial task s k il l s , 
s tabi l i ty,  e t c . Steers ( 1 9 7 7 ,  pp . 4 4 - 4 5 )  compa res 1 7  mul tivariate 
s tudies o f  e f f ect ivene s s . Based on his research,  Steers indicates that 
the mos t  f requent l y  used criteria we re adaptab i l i ty- f l exibi l it y ,  ( 1 0  
t imes ment ioned)  product ivi ty ( 6 ) , sat i s faction ( 5 ) , prof i t abi l i ty ( 3 ) , 
resource acqu i s i t ion ( 3 ) and others c i ted twice that include control 
over environment , e f f i c i ency , and open commun i ca t ions . 
Few of the s tudies noted by Steers ( 1 9 7 7 )  and Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 )  are 
concerned with pub l i c  organi zations . None with f inance agenc i e s . The 
mos t  relevant research i s  that performed by Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 )  whi ch dea l t  
with s tate and local gove rnment f inance agencies . 
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More recentl y ,  Barre t t  and Greene ( 1 9 9 5 ,  1 9 9 3 , 1 9 92 , 1 9 9 1  and 1 9 9 0 )  have 
eva l uated and ranked the f i fty s tates on how we l l  they are managed for 
Financi a l  Worl d  maga z ine . Thei r  e f forts have led to the Government 
Performance Proj ect f inanced by the Pew Charitabl e  Trusts and managed by 
the Maxwe l l  School at Syracus e .  The s e  mos t  recent rat ings of s ta t e  
governments ( Barrett and Greene , 1 9 9 9 )  were pub l i shed in t h e  February 
1 9 9 9  i ssue of Governing maga z ine . 
In the i r  1 9 9 5  rankings of the states for Financ ial Worl d ,  ( The S ta t e  o f  
t h e  States , Sept ember 2 6 , 1 9 9 5 )  three areas a r e  eva luated b y  Barre t t  and 
Greene . These are f inanc i a l  management , managing for resu l t s  and 
infrastructure . They are concerned , for example , with the hones ty and 
accuracy of the e s t imat e s  underlying the budget ,  the adequacy of pension 
funding and whe ther the state has a " ra iny day" fund . The bond 
rat ings are cons idered . Other criteria , more directly under the control 
of the state comptro l l e r ,  that are important to Barre t t  and Greene are 
" how consi stent and conservative are a ccount ing prac t i ce s ?  I s  the 
state in comp l i ance with genera l l y  accepted accoun t ing princ i p l e s ?  Does 
i t  have an unqua l i f ied Comprehensive Annual Financial Report ?  Did i t  
rece ive the Government Finance O f f icers Cert i f icate of Achi evement ? "  
(Barrett and Greene , 1 9 9 5 , p .  3 9 ) . 
The 1 9 9 9  rat ings rated f i nancial management , capital management , human 
resources management , manag ing for results and information technol ogy . 
Addi t iona l l y ,  an average ( overa l l ) grade i s  a l so g iven to each s ta t e  
( Barrett and Greene , 1 9 9 9 ) . 
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In summary , determining the e f f ect ivene s s  o f  pub l i c  organ i z a t ions i s  
problema t i c . Inasmuch as public organ i za t ions o f t en have vague , 
mul t ip l e  and con f l ict ing goa l s , any a t tempt at de termining e f f ect ivenes s  
must involve eva l uat ion of mul t ip l e  variabl e s . This research has re l ied 
on Zammuto ' s mul t ip l e  const i tuency mode l . S everal cons t i tuencies have 
been i denti f ied . The pr imary needs of each const i tuency have been 
i dent i f ied and means of determin ing sat i s fact ion of the s everal goa l s  
have been de termined . Each w i l l  lead to the opportunity of determ i ning 
e f f ectivene s s . Overa l l  e f f ect ivene s s  could conce ivably be de termined by 
some means of aggregat i ng these several measure s ,  al though that woul d  
appear to b e  a d i f f i cu l t  and not necessarily u s e f u l  operation . 
MODELS OF EFFECTIVENESS - THREE APPROACHES 
Wri t ing in 1 9 8 2 , Zammuto categori zed organ i zat ional e f f ect ivene s s  mode l s  
a s  goa l bas e d ,  systems based and mul t ip l e  const i tuency mode l s . In goal 
based mode l s ,  which predominate , e f f ect ivenes s  involves achieving goa l s . 
Systems based mode l s  focus on t rans formation proce s s e s . E f f ect ivene s s  
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i n  mul t ip l e  con s t i tuency mode l s  involves mee t ing the criteria s e t  by the 
cons t ituenc ies of the o rganizat i on . 
Goa l - based Mode l s  
Zammuto ( l 9 8 4 )  c i t e s  Hay and Gray ( l 9 7 4 ) regarding the evolut i on o f  
mode l s  o f  organi zat i onal e f fe c t ivene s s . Shifts  in society ' s de finit i on 
of acceptable organ i z a t iona l behavior have occurred during the twentieth 
century that have found the i r  way into changing perspect ives of Ame r i can 
management . Each shi f t  has resulted in a new approach to organi z a t i onal 
e f f e ct ivene s s . The earl i e s t  approaches to the problem of det e rmining 
organi z a t i onal e f fe c t ivenes s  we re goa l - based approache s . An 
organ i zat i on was cons idered e f fect ive i f  i t  a t ta ined i t s  goal s .  Early 
in this century , the dominance of the class ical e conomi cs, l a i s se z - f a i re 
capital ism view led to an empha s i s  on the goa l s  o f  the owne rs of 
bus ine s s e s . The performance criteria were essent i a l l y  f inanc ial,  
usua l l y  pro f i t s  and return on equity ( Zammuto , 1984  c i t e s  Hay and Gray) . 
In goal based mode l s ,  the goa l s  of the organ i z a t i on must be ident i f ied . 
I f  the goal s  are me t ,  the organ i zat i on has performed e f f e c t ively . Of 
course , the problem with goal based mode l s  i s  ident i f icat i on of the 
relevant goa l s . As indicated above, early approaches empha s i zed the 
goa l s  of the owners and we re largely f i nanc ial . Corporat ions came to 
dominate Ame r i can industry and management became an important factor a s  
owne rs increas ingly became minority s tockholders . Zammuto ( l 9 8 2 )  traces 
interest in organi z a t ional e f fe c t ivenes s  and consc ious l y  goal based 
approaches to Bernard ' s  1 9 3 8  book, Funct i ons o f  the Execut ive . Later , 
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research attempted to identify the goal s  of managers who we re able t o  
strongly inf luence the performance of the organi zat ion ( Conno l l y ,  Conlon 
and Deutsch, 1 9 8 0 ) . 
Thompson ( 1 9 6 7 ,  c i t ed by Zammuto , 1 9 8 4 )  developed the concept of a 
dominant coa l i t ion in an organi zat ion that is able to impose its goal s .  
Pennings and Goodman ( 1 9 7 7 ,  cited by Zammuto , 1 9 8 4 )  developed a dominant 
coa l i t ion model of organizat ional e f fect iveness . 
Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 )  points out that each of these types of model involves 
att ribut ion of some kind o f  value . In goal based mode l s  the ques t ion is 
whose values are cons idered . Usua l l y ,  the goals ident i f ied to be met 
are those o f  management . 
Systems - based Mode ls 
The depress ion led to public dissatis fact ion with bus ines s .  In addit ion 
to owners , the interests of other direct part ic ipants o f  the bus iness 
organi zat ion came to be the obj ect o f  legislat ion at the federal leve l . 
These direct part icipants included stockholders , employees and 
customers . The resul t ing changes in managerial perspect ive involved 
considerat ion o f  the pre ferences of the se direct par t i c ipants in the 
organizat ion ( Zammuto , 1 9 8 4  c i tes Hay and Gray , 1 9 7 4 ) . Systems - based 
model s  of organizat ional ef fect ivene ss were developed during the 1 9 6 0 ' s .  
D i f f icul t i es with identi fying the appropriate goal s  to measure , at least 
in part , led to the development of other approaches to determining 
organi zational e f fect ivene ss ( Ra iney , 1 9 9 1 ) . Yuchtman and Seashore 
( 1 9 6 7 ) were important in development o f  the systems model . 
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In sys tems based mode l s  o f  organi zat iona l e f fect iveness , a systems 
approach to evaluat ion is used . Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 ) indicates that the open 
sys tems approach of Kat z  and Kahn ( 1 96 6 )  which emphas i ze s  input , 
trans formation ,  output and a feedback loop i s  widely c i ted in system 
based organi zat iona l e f fect iveness mode l s . The focus in systems based 
model s  o f  organi zat i onal e f fect ivene ss is on organi zat ional processes 
rather than organizat ional ends ( Zammuto , 1 9 8 2 ) . 
An example of a systems based approach is that of Yuchtman and Seashore 
( 1 96 7 )  who identify three bas ic proce sses which are important to an open 
sys tems view . These processes are resource acquis i t ion , t rans format i on 
and di sposal . They are su f f i c iently t ight ly interconnected to a l l ow 
overal l e f f ect i vene ss of the organi zat i on to be determined at any po int 
in the l oop . Choosing the resource acqui s i t ion process as the point o f  
eva luat ion , Yuchtman and Seashore cons ider the e f fect ive organi zat i on to 
be able to obta in scarce and valuable resources from the emvi ronment .  
Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 )  points out that syst ems ba sed mode l s  are somet imes 
considered to be " val ue free" mode l s . Al though system based model s  
attempt t o  b e  va lue free , Zammuto argues that the values a re rea l l y  
submerged in spe c i f i cat ion of the t rans format i on proces ses . 
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Mul t ipl e - cons t i tuency Model s  
Also , during the 1 9 6 0 ' s  public dissat is fact ion with not j us t  bus iness 
but other American ins t i tut ions increased again . Management was pushed 
to cons ider the des i res o f  indirect part ic ipants of organizat ions as 
we l l  as direct parti c ipants . Indirect part ic ipants inc lude those 
impacted by the externa l i t i es produced by the organization ,  and certain 
segments o f  the general publ ic . This f inal shi f t  in American management 
perspect ive led to the emergence ,  during the 1 9 7 0 ' s  of mUl t iple 
consti tuency model s  o f  organi zat iona l e f fect ivenes s  ( Zammuto , 1 9 8 4  cites 
Hay and Gray , 1 9 7 4 ) . 
Writ ing in 1 9 8 0 ,  Conno l l y ,  Conlon and Deutsch proposed the term 
" multiple- constituency" approach because earl ier model s  seemed to 
require a s ingle e f fect iveness statement be made about an organizat ion . 
Conno l l y ,  Conlon and Deutsch prefer the term " cons t i tuency" to 
" part i c ipant"  because they " . . .  mean to emphasize the possibi l i ty that 
individua l s  and groups not directly associated with the focal 
organizat ion may form evaluations of its activi t ies , and may be able to 
inf luence the activities o f  that organizat ion to some extent" ( p ,  2 1 3 ) . 
The mul t iple const i tuency model as sumes mul t iple va lues . 
The argument for a mul t iple cons t i t uency approach i s  that i f  one asks i f  
an organizat ion i s  e f fect ive , the answer depends on who i s  asked 
( Connol l y ,  Conlon and Deutsch,  1 9 8 0 ) . As Conno l l y ,  Conlon and Deutsch 
( p . 2 1 2 ) put i t ,  " . . .  individua ls become involved with an organi zat ion ( a s  
owners , managers , employees , customers , suppl iers , regulators , e tc . )  for 
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a variety o f  di f ferent reasons , and these reasons will  be reflected i n  a 
variety of di f ferent eva luat ions . I t  appears somewhat arb i t rary to 
label one of these perspect ives as the ' correct ' one . "  
Conno l ly , Conlon and Deutsch ( 1 9 8 0 )  argue that both goal based and 
systems based approaches share the as sumpt ion that arr iving at a s ingl e  
s e t  of evaluat ive criteria is both pos s ible and desi rabl e .  They relax 
this assumpt ion and argue that the mul t iple consti tuency approach goes 
beyond Steers ( 1 9 7 7 ) mul t ivariate approach to the eva luation of 
ef fect iveness . Whi l e  Steers ' approach could obtain an di f fe rent rat i ng 
for each var iable , the mUl t iple cons t i tuency approach could obtain a 
di f f erent rat ing from each cons t i tuency for each va riabl e .  
Conno l ly , Conlon and Deutsch ( 1 9 8 0 )  argue that they are abl e to 
integrate mul t iple cons t i tuency mode ls with earlier exist ing approache s .  
For example , the dominant coa l i t ion approach can be cons idered as a 
.. special case" of mul t iple consti tuency as can approaches based on the 
sys tems mode l . 
Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 )  groups mul t iple constituency model s  according to the 
values underlying the primacy given to each set o f  consti tuents .  He 
ident i f ies three meta criteria . These are relat ivism , power and social 
j us t ice . 
Where relativism is the meta cri terion , a l l  sets of constituents are 
cons idered equal ly important . Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 )  draws on the work of 
Connol l y ,  Conlon and Duet sch ( 1 9 8 0 )  for this model . 
Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 ) cites Pennings and Goodman ( 1 9 7 7 ) , Pfeffer and Sa lancik 
( 1 9 7 8 )  and Hrebiniak ( 1 9 7 8 )  in his di scuss ion of power as a meta 
criterion . Where power is the meta crite rion , e f fect iveness involves 
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sat is fying the pref erences o f  the mos t  powe rful sets o f  const i tuents .  
Zammuto ( 1 9 8 4 ) compares power as a me ta criterion for a mul t iple 
cons t i tuency mode l to the dominant coa l i t ion model suggest ing that power 
is an unde rlying theme of the latter approach . 
Fina l l y ,  where social j ust ice is the meta criterion , Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 ) 
indicates that e f fect iveness sat i s f ies the least advantaged ,  based on a 
mode l by Kee l ey ( 1 9 7 8 )  derived from Rawl s '  1 9 7 1  theory of j us t ice . 
Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 ) pre fers mul t iple cons t i tuency model s  but cri t ic i z e s  them 
as not be ing suf f i c i ently oriented to the context in which performance 
takes place . He deve l ops a fourth mul t iple consti tuency model which he 
labe l s  as the evolutionary mode l . This model al lows the evaluat ion to 
consider context by requiring that the envi ronment in which the 
organizat ion funct ions be cons idered also . In fact he rede f ines " _the 
uni t  of analys is as the organi zat ion plus envi ronment " ( p . 7 5 ) . 
Addi t iona l l y ,  the el ement of t ime is introduced . The pre f erences o f  
constituencies change over t ime . 
Citing Rittel and Webe r ,  1 9 7 6 , Zammuto argues that evaluating the 
ef fect ivenes s  o f  organi zat ions i s  a " wicked- and not a " tame -
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problem . Evaluat ive research should involve a proces s  in which dialogue 
and argument among partic ipants l eads to the gradual emergence o f  
de f init ion o f  t h e  problem and o f  a preferred solut ion . 
Mul t iple const i tuency approaches are generally mul t i - value approaches ,  
especially where relat ivism i s  the meta criterion . Salancik ( 1 9 8 4 )  
argues that i t  i s  logically pos s ible t o  derive a s ingle value funct ion 
for evaluating organi zat ions with mul t iple const i tuenc ies if the 
evaluation is based on the relat ionship of organi zat ional outcomes 
rather than on the pref erences of the consti tuents .  This approach would 
be extreme ly di f f icult to implement . 
A mul t iple const i tuency approach has been developed for evaluating the 
e f f ectivenes s  o f  public personnel departments . Thi s i s  the Mul t iple 
Constituencies Act iv i t ies and Standards ( MCAS ) framework , which has been 
succe s s fully app l ied in several counties in North Carol ina ( S t raus s , 
1 9 9 1 )  . 
This research ut i l i z e s  the mUl t iple const i tuency approach to evaluat ing 
organi zat ional e f fect ivenes s . Internal and external const i tuencies are 
ident i f i ed .  Variables to measure satis fact ion for each cons t i tuency are 
also iden t i f ied . 
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The iden t i f i cat ion of const i tuencies and e f f ect ivenes s  variables i s  
based o n  the funct ion of the organizat ion . In the pr ivate sector , the 
function o f  an organizat ion may be prof i t  maximi zat ion as opposed to the 
manufac ture o f  good qua l i ty automobiles or cavity f ighting toothpaste . 
In the pub l i c  secto r ,  agencies are typica l ly legally establ i shed with 
very speci f ic intentions and that impact certain pr imary sets o f  
cons t i tuencies . These may or may not be the mos t  or least powerful but 
rather the ones intended by the estab l i shing legislat ion . 
The funct ion of a pub l i c  organi zat ion dictates the type of employees 
that mus t  be recruited and hi red , the technology ut i l i zed by the 
organizat ion and spec i f ies the envi ronment faced by the organizat ion . 
The o f f ice of the state comptro l l e r  is charged with the dut ies of be ing 
the central account ing agency of the state . Accordingly , the agency 
must hire accountants and ope rate an accounting system . The funct ion o f  
t h e  s t a t e  comptroller ' s o f f ice is es sent ially t h e  accounting funct ion 
and the const i tuencies ident i f ied are the same for all of the state 
comptrolle r ' s o f f ices . 
CONSTITUENC IES OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER ' S  AGENCY 
Fol lowing Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 ) , the State Compt roller ' s  agency can be seen to 
have mul t iple const i tuencies . Account ing has di f f e rent func t ions . 
Financ ial account ing is primarily concerned with the preparation and 
auditing of f inancial statements according to GAAP for external users o f  
f inancial statement s .  Managerial account ing , ( o f  which cost account ing 
is a subse t ) , on the other hand , is concerned with the provis ion o f  
accounting informat ion to an organi zat ion ' s  managers to assist then in 
making managerial deci s ions (Meigs , Mos ich , Johnson and Kel le r ,  1 9 7 4 ) 
S imilarly,  governmental accounting informat ion is provided to both 
internal and external users ( Holde r ,  1 9 8 7 ) . 
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The const i tuencies o f  the State Comptroller ident i f ied are external and 
internal const i tuencies . The external const i tuencies include users o f  
the audited f inancial statements ,  the financ ial / investment community . 
The value of producing a CAFR with an unqual i f ied audi t  opinion for this 
const i tuency is obvious . Al s o ,  the c i t i zens of the state are an 
important exte rnal const i tuency of the state comptroller . Internal 
const i tuencies o f  the state comptroller ' s  agency include the state ' s  top 
f inancial management team and the l ine agenc ies of the state . 
INPUTS , PROCESSES AND OUTPUTS 
The state comptrol ler provides a s tatewide general ledger accounting 
sys tem . This system i s  ope rated by the staff of the state comptro l l e r ' s  
agency . The sys tem is complete with accounting and other inte rnal 
controls , and with account ing pol i cies and procedures des igned to ensure 
the integrity of the system . The system provides the s t ructure for the 
bas ic processes o f  the accounting funct ion ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
Expendi ture of publ ic funds by the l ine agenc ies in furthe rance of the i r  
miss ions is authori zed by budget process . During the budget execution 
phase of the process , l ine agencies collect revenue and expend pub l i c  
funds ( Doos t ,  1 9 8 6 ) . The accounting t ransact ions , which are t h e  input 
for the account ing proces s , are processed sub j e c t  to the controls 
contained in the statewide general l edger account ing sys tem . 
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The accounting system c l a s s i f ies and categorizes the accounting 
t ransact ions and is then used to produce f inanc ial reports ,  which are 
the output , of the proces s  ( Wooldridge , 1 9 8 2 ) . These f inancial reports 
are used by const i tuenc ies of the state comptrol ler and his or her 
agency to make managerial , pol i t i cal and economic dec i s ions . The types 
of reports produced are t ime l y ,  interim reports which are used by 
internal con s t i tuencies of the state comptrol ler to make managerial , and 
a l so , pol i t i cal dec i s ions . Economic dec i s ions are made by external 
cons t i tuenc ies of the state comptrol ler based on an audited 
Comprehens ive Annua l Financial Report ( CAFR ) produced for the ent ire 
f i scal year ( Meigs , Mos i c h ,  Johnson & Ke l l e r , 1 9 7 4 ) . pol i t i cal 
decis ions may a l so be made by c i t i zens who review summaries intended for 
those not having a f inance background contained in the audi ted CAFR . 
Consti tuencies of the state comptrol ler and his or her agency may be 
grouped into external and internal users . Each relies on d i f f e rent 
aspects of control and output of the state comptro l l e r ' s  agency . In 
some cases , these cons t i tuencies may have compet ing needs and demands 
that the state comptroller mus t  sat i s fy in order to be cons idered 
e f f ective . 
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Financ ial Sys tems, Financ ial Reports and Audi t s  
The dut i e s  o f  t h e  s tate comptrol ler involve operat ion o f  a statewide 
general ledger account ing sys tem, maintenance of appropriate pol icies , 
procedures and internal controls , produc t ion of pertinent f inancial 
reports inc luding both interim reports and the f i scal year Comprehens ive 
Annual Financial Report ( CAFR ) . The account ing system is the bas i s  for 
the f inanc ial report s .  An independent audi tor evaluates the internal 
control s ,  revi ews transact i ons , and performs such other tasks as are 
felt necessary to render the audit opinion . The audit is undertaken by 
qua l i f ied pro fess iona lly t rained accountants according to standards 
( S tettler , 1 9 8 2 ) . Further , the review by the GFOA br ings about an 
additional measure of cons istency in the compar ison process . 
An integral product of the accounting and report ing funct ion i s  
prepara t ion of t h e  s tate ' s  comprehens ive annual f inancial report ( CAFR ) . 
The CAFR contains the f inancial sta tements of the s tate and is typically 
prepared by the o f f ice of the state comptrol ler ( NASACT , 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
Reports produced f rom the account ing system , such as the trial balance , 
are the start ing point for the f inanc ial statements .  Abi l i ty to rely on 
the output of the account ing sys tem is based on the existence o f  
adequate internal contro l s . These cont rol s  are accounting and 
admini strat ive controls which the state comptrol l e r  spe c i f i e s  as part of 
his or her pol icies and procedures .  
Each f i scal yea r ,  almos t a l l  of the states are requ i red to be audited by 
an independent auditor ( NASACT , 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 96 ) . The audit is a f inancial 
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and compl iance audi t  o f  the state and ideally resul ts i n  an unqua l i f ied 
opinion on the f inanc ial statements of the state as a whole . An 
unqua l i f ied op inion indicates that the f inancial statements have been 
prepared in conformance with generally accepted accounting principles 
( GAAP) and that they present fai rly the f inanc ial pos i t ion and resu l t s  
of operations of t h e  governmental organ ization ,  i n  t h i s  case , t h e  state 
( Giroux and Shields , 1 9 9 3 ; S t e t t l e r ,  1 9 8 2 ) . 
The audi t  is performed by profess ional accountants in conformance with 
genera l l y  accepted aUdit ing standards ( GAAS ) . According to GAAS , the 
audi tor must be technical ly qua l i f ied to perform the audi t ,  should 
adequately plan and supervise audit staff and exercise due professional 
care in performance of the audi t . The auditor must evaluate the systems 
of internal control s and obta in sufficient , competent evidence to 
support the op inion that wi l l  be rendered ( S t e t t l e r ,  1 9 8 2 ) . 
Meier and Brudney ( 1 9 9 3 )  indicate that rigorous training of those who 
perform the measurement funct i on increases rel iabi l i ty of the research . 
The training and cert i f i cat ion process that CPA ' s go through i s  rigorous 
and intended to enhance cons istency in the preparation and aUdit ing o f  
f inancial statements . 
Me ier and Brudney ( 1 9 9 3 )  ment i on several kinds of measurement val idity . 
One of these i s  consensual val idity . This means that there is genera l l y  
a consensus by many di f ferent people in di f fe rent s i tuat ions as to the 
val idity of the indicator . The audit opinion i s  genera l ly cons idered to 
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be a val id indicator a s  t o  the f inancial condit ion o f  the audited 
organizat ion . By extens ion , it can be considered an indicator of the 
performance of the comptro l l e r . I f  the comptrol ler ' s  function i s  not 
e f fect ive l y  pe rformed , the f inanc ial condit ion can not be cert i f ied . 
The concepts of generally accepted accounting principles and gene ral ly 
accepted audit ing standards are indicat ive of consensus within the 
accounting profess ion . 
The state comptroller directs the agency that ma inta ins and operates the 
general ledge r  accounting system , including the underlying inte rnal 
cont rol s  and prepares the f inancial statements . Employees having the 
appropriate degree of profess ional ism to ope rate the account ing sys t em ,  
establ ish pol icies and procedures , deal with except ions and produce the 
nece ssary reports mus t  be recru i t ed hired and retained by this agency . 
The state comptro l l e r  mus t  e f f ect ively supe rvise and provide guidance to 
a large ly professional sta f f . 
Periodi cal ly,  new account ing sys tems , complex sof tware app l i cat ions mus t  
b e  developed and/or acquired and implemented , a s  o l d  ones become 
obsolete qui ckly . The State Comptrol ler has a great deal of inf luence 
on the choice o f  the account ing sys tem that wi l l  be ut i l i zed . The state 
comptrol ler must have the abi l i ty to ensure necessary appropriat ion o f  
funds f o r  ma intenance o f  account ing systems and acqu i s i t ion of new one s 
as needed . 
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Al though sub j e c t  t o  personnel and procurement regul at ions and laws , the 
state comptrol ler , none - the - I ess is large ly in control of these 
processe s as they pertain to the core funct ions o f  the agency . The core 
funct ions of accounting and reporting and budgetary control requ i re an 
organi zat ion with the necessary degree of profess ional expert ise , the 
appropriate tools and adequate funding . The se resources mus t  be 
e f fectively managed i f  the core funct ions are to be properly carried 
out . 
The abi l ity of the comptrolle r ' s agency to produce a CAFR with a clean 
audi t  opinion is one very important measure of e f fectiveness that this 
research wi l l  use . Proper operat ions of the day to day account ing 
funct i ons are necessary for performance of the f inancial reporting 
funct ion ; the resul t is production of an audi table CAFR . A modern 
automated accoun t ing system is necessary for e f f i c i ent provis ion of this 
output as we l l . 
The audited CAFR of the state is the most visible output of the state 
comptrolle r ' s agency . This set o f  f inancial sta tements presents the 
f inancial condi t ion of the state and i s  generally audited by 
profess iona l accountants who are independent of the state comptro l l e r . 
The abi l ity to produce the CAFR requ i res the ma intenance of a 
centra l i zed f inancial accounting sys tem operated by people with the 
appropriate level o f  knowledge , ski l l s  and abi l i t ies . The system must 
operate in an envi ronment with appropriate internal accounting contro l s . 
The audit and result ing opinion , based on sample test ing of account ing 
transactions , rel ies on the accounting sys tem and the related internal 
accounting control s .  
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Although the audit opinion accompan ies the CAFR and refers spec i f ically 
to i t , an unqual i f ied audi t  op inion requ i res that an accoun ting sys t em 
with the necessary controls be in place and that i t  be ope rated by 
people with the necessary expertise . The internal envi ronment of the 
agency is essential ly evaluated by the auditor in order to render the 
opinion on the CAFR . 
I f  the state comptroller does not perform his or her dut ies e f fect ive l y ,  
the intended outcomes of the comptrol lers core funct ions wi l l  n o t  be 
real i zed . Moreover ,  the auditor wi l l  be unable to render an unqua l i f ied 
opinion on the f inancial statements . Accordingly , i t  is reasonable to 
conclude that the independent audit involves an obj ect ive eva luat ion o f  
the accoun t ing and reporting funct ion performed by t h e  state 
comptroller ' s  o f f ice . For this research , ef fect ivenes s  wi l l  be 
evidenced by the abi l i ty of the state comptroller to produce a GAAP 
bas i s  CAFR that has received an unqual i f ied ( c lean) audit opinion f rom 
an independent auditor . 
The Government Finance O f f icers Associat ion ( GFOA) awards i t s  
Cert i f icate of Achievement f o r  Excel lence in Financial Report ing t o  
state and l ocal governments that prepare f inancial statements and 
reports that conform to GAAP and to other GFOA disclosure 
recommendat ions . Gi roux and Shields ( 1 9 9 3 ,  p .  2 4 9 )  argue that the 
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Cert i f icate o f  Achievement ( CA )  . . .  i s  one measure of reasonably 
complete f inancial reporting and can be considered an accounting 
moni toring techn i que . "  An unqua l i f i ed audi t  opinion is requ i red for a 
state to receive the GFOA Ce r t i f icate of Achievement . Addi t iona l l y ,  for 
this researc h ,  e f fect ivenes s  will be evidenced by receipt o f  the GFOA 
Cert i f icate . 
In addit ion to the CAFR , other types of f inancial reports may be 
produced f rom the statewide central accounting sys tem . Expendi ture 
transact ions in mos t  states are coded with organi zat ional , programma t i c  
and obj ect o f  expenditure codes . Revenue transact ions are coded with 
organizat ional and revenue source codes . Modern technol ogy a l l ows for 
the sort ing o f  expendi ture and revenue informat ion along these l ines to 
produce f inancial reports that are use ful to dif ferent leve l s  o f  
managers . For example , expendi ture reports that are sorted by agency 
and program or agency and obj ect are frequent opt ions . Interim 
f inancial reports are produced that al low managers , both statewide and 
at the agency leve l , to monitor expendi tures and revenues during the 
budget exe cution phase . For these reports to be usefu l , they must be 
t imely and accurate .  Product ion of interim reports requires that the 
central accoun t ing system and the rel evant controls mus t  be in place and 
properly ope rat ive . 
I nterim f inanc ial reports are an important managerial tool . Holder 
( 1 9 8 7 , pp . 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 )  points out that managers and admini s t rators 
responsible for such funct ions as budget execution , cont rol l ing 
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expendi tures , reviewing operat ions and applying analytical techniques to 
f inanc ial informat ion are internal users of governmental accounting 
systems . The informat ion needed by these users is not the CAFR , which 
is produced as of the end o f  the f i scal period , but rather more t imely 
informat ion that is contained in f inanc ial reports that are prepared on 
a recurring bas i s  during the f i scal year ( Holder ) . Considering the 
importance o f  interim f inancial reports to internal cons t i tuencies ; that 
is , both the statewide and agency l evel managers , genera l l y ,  those State 
Compt rolle r ' s o f f i ces that produce t imely and frequent interim f inancial 
reports would be cons idered more e f fect ive than those that do not 
produce them or that produce them less frequent ly . The abi l i ty of the 
comptrolle r ' s agency to produce t ime ly interim reports is another 
measure o f  the e f fe c t iveness that this research u t i l i zes . 
Fol l owing Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 ) , internal and exte rnal cons t i tuenc ies of the 
state comptrol lers agency have been ident i f ied . The CAFR and interim 
reports are shown to sat i s fy certain cons t i tuencies of the agency as 
does the centrali zat ion of accounting internal controls and the s e t t ing 
of accounting pol icies and procedures . 
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The dependent var iabl es intended to measure e f f e c t ivenes s  include the 
abi l i ty o f  the state comptro l l e r ' s  agency to produce a GAAP based CAFR 
with a clean ( unqua l i f ied)  audit opinion . Receipt of the GFOA 
cert i f i cate i s  also cons idered a measure of e f fect iveness . Abi l i ty to 
produce a CAFR with a c l ean opinion and receipt of the GFOA cert i f i cate 
are indicat ions that the state comptroller ' s  agency has been effective 
in sat is fact ion of the needs of its external const i tuencies . 
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Product ion of t imely and f requent interim f inancial reports ,  provis ion 
of f inanc ial analys is and ident i f i cat ion of best pract ices or 
development of benchmarks on the part of the state comptroller ' s  agency 
would be conside red dependent variables that measure e f fect iveness in 
sat is fact ion of the needs o f  the state ' s  top f inanc ial management team , 
an internal consti tuency of the state comptrolle r ' s agency . 
Line agencies of state government must ut i l i ze the sta tewide account ing 
sys tem and related pol icies and procedures promulgated by the 
comptroller ' s  o f f ice . Several i tems intended to proxy user f r iendl iness 
in providing services to the l ine agenc ies have also been developed to 
test for e f fect ivene ss in sat is fying these consti tuencies . 
The state ' s  top f inanc ial management team is interested in other 
measures of the state ' s  f inancial performance which are not total ly 
under the cont rol of the state comp t roller or his or her agency . This 
study proposes three other measures that wi l l  be included . The se are 
bond ratings , Barrett and Greene rat ings and an index o f  general 
expenditures to gene ral revenues for a period of eight f i scal years . 
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Three measures of Statewide Financial Performance 
• Barrett and Greene ( 1 9 9 5 )  periodica l l y  rated the states on how wel l  
they are managed . Al though Barre t t  and Greene are at tempt ing to rate 
the states overa l l  performance , i t  i s  fairly clear that the states 
f inancial health and performance are important factors in the rat ing . 
The 1 9 9 5 ,  rat ings give each state a separate lette r  grade on i t s  
f inanc ial management . Thi s sub j e c t ive method i s  used as a measure . 
The most recent rat ings ( Barre t t  and Greene , 1 9 9 9 )  for f inancial 
management are a l so considered . 
• The bond rat i ng agencies , Moody ' s and S &P ,  rate the state as to r i sk 
of the i r  bonds . Genera l l y  having an unqua l i f i ed audit opinion tends 
to resul t in a higher bond rat ing , but i t  is not the only factor in 
the rat ing . The s i z e  o f  the state ' s  debt is a large factor in this 
rat ing which is not largely under the control of the State 
Comptroller . Bond rat ings are one of Barrett and Greene ' s  ( 1 9 9 5 )  
criteria . S ince this is included in the Financ ial World ratings , i t  
could b e  cons idered redundant , howeve r ,  i t  i s  a measure that could be 
tes ted separa tely for correlat ion with other characteristics of the 
State Compt ro l l e r ' s  agency . 
• Final l y ,  a reasonable hypothe s i s  is that effective performance of the 
budgetary control func t ion over t ime would resul t in hol ding a 
state ' s  expenditures in l ine with its revenues . A ratio of each 
state ' s  general revenues to its general expendi tures has been 
computed . This inc ludes the resul ts of f inancial operations for a 
number of f i scal years including both good t ime s and recess ions . 
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This informat ion is available i n  edit ions of The Book o f  the States . 
States having managed to keep expendi tures in l ine with revenues over 
t ime are cons idered e f fect ive . I f  an opt imum percentage for a rainy 
day fund , for example 5 \ , ( Navin & Navin , 1 9 9 7 )  were evi dent in the 
ratios for some state s ,  these would be considered more e f f ective . 
Inasmuch as variables not under the control of the State Comptrol ler , 
such as the rel iabi l i ty of revenue est imate s ,  relationship of revenues 
to appropriat ions in the budget that is passed into law,  and the 
performance of the economy , would be expected to impact the f inancial 
we l l  being of the state over t ime , and would be reflected in its bond 
rat ing , these could be only a secondary focus of research . Gold ( 1 9 9 5 )  
argues that the economy i s  the most important , but not the only factor 
influencing the f i scal condit ion of a s tate . S t i l l , the budgetary 
control funct i on of the State Comptrol l e r  i s  the cont rol to ensure that 
the execut ion phase of the budget cyc le is prope rly handled . The State 
Comptrol ler i s  a partner with state program managers in ensuring that 
expendi tures are within amounts appropriated , in compl iance with laws 
and regulat ions and are appropriate to agency miss ions . 
An argument can be made that i f  the State Comptrol l e r  i s  e f f ect ive , the 
execut ion phase of the budget cyc l e  wi l l  result in intended outcomes , 
that is , balance between actual revenues and actual expendi tures wi l l  
resul t ,  a t  least over a per iod o f  several f i scal years , a s  we l l  a s  a 
budget that i s  balanced in the preparat ion and approval phases . 
Ef fect ive ope rat ion by the State Comptrol ler of the budgetary control 
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funct ion is necessary though not suf f i cient for the f inanc ial wel l  be ing 
of the state . 
IMPORTANT SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
A great deal of data on the central accounting agenc ies of the states is 
avai labl e .  A valuable source is the publ icat ion State Comptroll ers : 
Technical Act iv i t ies and Functions , revised edit ions 1 9 9 2 and 1 9 96 
pub l i shed by the Nat ional Associat ion of State Auditors , Comptrol l e rs 
and Treasurers ( NASACT ) , Lexington , Kentucky , Relmond P .  Van Danike r ,  
Execut ive Director and Patricia A .  O ' Conne r ,  Res earch As s i s tant . NASACT 
is one of the associat ions that comes under the umbrel l a of the Council 
of State Governments ( COGS ) . 
The NASACT 1 9 9 2 AND 1 9 9 6  books , compiled f rom surveys , contain much data 
on the 50 state comptrollers and the i r  organi zat ions that can be 
ut i l i zed in a comparat ive study . Informat ion is included on whether each 
state comptro l ler is a CPA or not , how long the tenure of each state 
comptrol ler has been , informat ion on each deputy state comptro l l e r , 
whether recent audits of each state have been qua l i f i ed or unqua l i f i e d ,  
whether the GFOA cert i f i cate has been achieved b y  each state , degree t o  
which each state prepared periodic interim f inancial reports , e t c . 
Also helpful i s  Budge t Processes in the State s ,  publ i shed in 1 9 9 5  by the 
Nat iona l As sociat ion of State Budget Of f icers ( NASBO) and The Fiscal 
Crises o f  the States : Les sons for the Future , edited by Steven Gol d ,  
1 9 9 5 , Georgetown Univers ity Press , Washington , DC . The late Steven Gold 
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was wi th the Center for the Study of the States , which i s  part o f  the 
Nel son A. Rockef e l l e r  Ins t i tute of Government of the State Univers i ty of 
New York , at Albany . The Council of State Governments pub l i shes i t s  
Book of the States on a biennial bas i s  which contains much rel evant 
informat ion , including general revenues and expendi tures for each of the 
two f i scal years cove red by the edit ion . For several years running ,  
Barrett and Greene ( 1 9 9 0 ,  1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 2 , 1 9 9 3 , 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 9 )  have rated 
the states in the publ ications Financ ial Wor ld and , mos t  recent ly , 
Governing .  Also , text books on governmental f inanc ial management and a 
number of relevant books and j ournal articles have been reviewed 
METHODOLOGY 
Independent variables hypothe s i zed to inf luence e f fect ivenes s  on the 
part o f  the state comptro l l e r ' s  agency have been ident i f ied . The se 
independent variabl es are method of select ion of the state comptrol ler , 
organ i zat ional conf igurat i on of the state comptrolle r ' s agency , 
professional qua l i f i cat ions of the state comptrol ler and length of 
tenure of the state comptroller . Dependent variables that indicate 
ef fect iveness in satis fact ion of the needs of the several cons t i tuencies 
of the state comptrolle r ' s agency have also been ident i f i ed . This 
research at tempts to answer the research ques t ions by determining 
whether a st rong relat ionship exists between the independent variables 
and the dependent va riables developed to measure e f f e c t ivenes s  on the 
part of the state comptroller ' s  agency . 
7 7  
Cross tabulat ions have been computed that compare independent variabl es , 
such as method of select ing the State Comptroller with variables 
measuring the e f f e c t iveness of that o f f i cial in performance o f  the 
control l ers funct ions such as the production of a CAFR with a clean 
( unqua l i f i ed )  audit opinion . The cross tabulat ion will  ana lyzed to 
determine i f  a st rong relationship exist s .  Cross tabulations between 
all of the independent and dependent variables will  s imilarly be 
produced and analyzed . 
This proj ect u t i l i ze s  the relevant informat ion on a l I S O  states 
comparatively rather than any sample of the 5 0 . 
Addi t iona l l y ,  this research will  det e rmine whether any s t rong 
relationship is noted between the independent variabl e s  and variables 
intended to measure the f inanc ial condit ion o f  the state as a whole . 
Thi s  might imply that e f fe c t ive performance by the state comptroller is 
important to the f inancial we l l  being of the state and pos s ibly whether 
method of choos ing the state comptroller , organizat ional conf iguration ,  
profess iona l qua l i f icat ions o r  length o f  tenure i s  important i n  that 
outcome . 
This research wi l l  attempt to determine i f  the indicators ident i f ied 
above , resul t in the same groupings o f  states be ing classif ied as 
generally e f fect ive or ine f fect ive . That i s , do these d i f fe rent means 
of rat ing the states produce similar resul t s . 
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QUALITATIVE ASPECTS O F  PROJECT 
For the mos t  part , this proj ect is oriented along quantitat ive l ines . 
However ,  some qual itat ive informat ion might be ins ight ful . Intervi ews 
with several individua l s  who e i ther current ly are state comptroll ers or 
have been in the pas t would provide an addi t i onal perspect ive . 
Comptrollers who have been appo inted by governors , who have been 
appo inted or hired at a leve l lowe r than governor and who have been 
elected we re chosen for interview . They were asked the i r  op inions on 
whether method of select ion and/or organizat ional conf igurat i on of the 
o f f ice of the state comptroller are important elements in e f f ect ive 
performance . 
Nine comptroll ers representing e ight states were interviewed . The 
resul ts have been ana lyzed and are reported along with the quant i tat ive 
research . 
LIMITATIONS 
The des ign of this research is es sent ially a correlat iona l study . Me i e r  
and Brudne y ,  1 9 9 3 , indicate that nonspuriousness is a n  important threat 
to internal val idity for this kind o f  research des igns . " A nonspurious 
relationship is a covariat ion or associat ion between two variables or 
phenomena that cannot be expla ined by a third factor" (Meier and 
Brudney, 1 9 9 3 , p .  1 2 9 ) . This research looks for s t rong relat ionships 
between var iables and attempts to compensate for this threat to inte rnal 
val idity by use o f  reasonable and theoret ical explanations for the 
exi stence o f  any important relat ionships that are noted . 
Me ier and Brudney ( 1 9 9 3 , p .  1 4 1 )  indicate that Correlat ional research 
designs " tend to be relat ively st rong with respect to external 
validity" A study that spec i f ically relates to a particular state 
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o f f i c ial , the State Comptrol ler , may not be gene ra l i zable t o  other state 
o f f icials such as Tax Commiss ioner or Budget Of f icer . 
Given that private sector controlle rs are nei ther el ected nor appointed 
by pol i t ical ly e l ected o f f icials , this research is not l ikely to be 
genera l i zable to controlle rs in private , for pro f i t  organizat ions . 
OUTLINE OF STUDY 
Chapter 1 provides a s tatement of the problem, its s igni f icance , an 
overview of the s tate f inanc ial management system , discusses relevant 
concepts and iden t i f ie s  the research quest ions . 
Chapter 2 i s  the l i t erature review . Genera l l y ,  the l i teratures relevant 
to the research que s t ions is reviewed . Included is l i terature on the 
importance o f  the method o f  select ion of government o f f icials and of 
organizat iona l s t ructure or conf igurat ion , profess ional ism and length of 
tenure o f  o f f icials . 
Chapter 3 contains the research des ign and methodology . The methodol ogy 
and tests that are carried out in order to answer the research ques t ions 
are spec i f ied . 
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Chapter 4 contains the findings of my research . The resu l t s  of test ing 
of the hypotheses are presented and inte rpreted . 
Chapter 5 contains an executive as we l l  as conclusions and 
recommendat ions . 
Appendix A contains a glos sary of terms used in this dissertat ion . 
Appendix B contains cross tabulations generated during the research phase 
of the dissertat ion process . 
Appendix C contains a code book that describes the coding of the 
variables uti l i zed in the research process . 
Appendix D contains the names , t i t l e s , states and dates of the state 
comptrol lers that were intervi ewed for the qua l i tat ive port ion o f  the 
research as we l l  as the interview guide used and a summary of the 
resul ts o f  the intervi ews . 
Chap t e r  2 
L i t e ra t u re Review 
SELECT ION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
State Government O f f i c i a l s  
Gove rnors and Lieutenant Governors o f  t h e  state s , o f  cours e ,  a r e  always 
e lected . Beyle ( 1 9 8 5 , p .  92 ) points out that there i s  a category o f  
elected state o f f i c ia l s  that may " . . .  arguably have ove rs ight 
respons ibi l i t ie s  over other e l ected o f f i c i a l s . _" The se are a t t orneys 
gene ra l , secretaries of sta te , compt rol lers , audi tors and t reasurers . 
At torneys general have the authority to prosecute other e l ected s tate 
o f f i c i a l s . Secretaries o f  s tate have the autho r i ty to cert i fy the i r  
elect ions . Comp t ro l lers and audi tors have the authority to audit the 
expendi tures o f  other e l ected o f f i c i a l s , e i t he r  on a preaudi t or post 
aud i t  bas i s . Treasurers hold custody o f  pub l i c  funds separa t e l y  f rom 
those o f f i c i a l s  who autho r i z e  di sbursement of expendi ture s . Fina l l y ,  
there i s  a group o f  e l ected o f f i c i a l s  that have mixed admi n i s t rat i ve and 
regulatory funct i ons . The se include commis s i oners o f  educat i on , 
insurance , agr i cul ture and pub l i c  ut i l i t i e s  ( Beyl e , 1 9 8 5 ) . 
Top l eve l execut ives are f requently pol i t ically appo inted , howeve r ,  mos t  
of the i r  subordinates a r e  career , c i v i l  servants h i red and mainta ined by 
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mer i t  systems ( Gordon , 1 9 9 2 , p .  6 5 ) . Wi l son ( 1 9 8 9 )  indicates that 
appointments may be for pol i t ical reasons , but don ' t have to be . 
Some t ime s ,  appoi ntment s  are made to career employee s  because t hey have 
expert i s e  in the pol icy area . Sometime s ,  elected o f f i c i a l s  appoint 
o f f i c i a l s  to push a part icular pol i cy agenda . The individual could be 
appointed because he or s he has the relevant expert i s e  or because he or 
s he shares a pol icy agenda that the Governor wishes to push on t he 
career civil  service . 
In state government , " . . .  many ma j or or cabinet l eve l agency execut ives 
are independently e l ec t ed and thus not behol den to the chief execut ive 
through appointments "  ( Rainey, 1 9 9 1 ,  p .  6 0 ) . Rourke ( 1 9 7 6 , p .  7 5 )  
points out t hat e l e c t ion o f  administrat ive agency heads i s  s t i l l  common 
at the level of state government and t hat " . . .  inevitably pol i t ic i zes 
the a tmosphere in which administrat ion i s  carried on" . 
Genera l l y ,  state cons t i tut i ons dictate which o f f i c i a l s  are e le c ted ( Chi , 
1 9 9 2 ) . Chi indicates , however ,  that changes in t hree s tate pos i t ions 
have occurred in recent years . Thes e  are comptro l l e r , educat i on 
superintendent and pub l i c  ut i l ity commi s s ioner . 
Be tween 1 9 7 2  and 1 9 9 2 , ( Chi , 1 9 9 2 ) the number of e l ected comptro l l er ' s 
has increased f rom 1 1  to 1 6 . Currently,  1 4  comptro l l e r ' s are e l ected 
( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . The numbers of t he other two e l ected state pos i t i ons 
have decreased . During this period, the number o f  e lected educat ion 
superintendents decreased from 2 0  to 1 6 , and the number of e l ected 
pub l i c  ut i l i ty commis s i oners has decreased from 1 4  to 11 ( Chi , 1 9 92 ) 
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Beyle ( 1 9 8 5 ,  pp . 9 3 - 94 )  presents the cases both for and aga inst the 
popular e l e c t i on of s tate o f f i c ia l s  ( other than Governor and L i eutenant 
Governor ) .  The case for direct e l ect i on of these o f f i c i a l s  is " ( t ) he 
unde rlying concept . . .  that the pub l i c  shoul d  rule in a l l  cases where 
this is feasibl e "  ( p . 9 3 ) . Those favoring elect ion argue that it i s  
feasibl e . Elect i on renders these o f f i c ia l s  accountable to the pub l i c . 
The dut i e s  of the s e  o f f ices require the o f f i cial to make pol i tical 
j udgments which are mos t  appropriately made by someone who i s  
accountable directly to the voters rather than by experts who are 
appointed and are not accountable to the publ ic . Genera l ly ,  those 
favoring e l e c t i on t end toward a " pub l i c  knows be s t "  ( p . 9 4 )  wor l dview . 
Those who oppose e l e c t i on argue that " . . .  accountab i l i ty in principle i s  
not mat ched b y  accountab i l i ty in fact . "  ( Beyl e , 1 9 8 5 ,  pages 9 3 - 94 )  
Measuring performance o f  these j obs i s  d i f f icult for the publ i c . 
Elect ions f requently hinge on unrelated factors such as name 
recogn i t i on . Those favor ing appo intment argue that the Governor i s  in a 
better pos i t i on than the pub l i c  to choos e  a competent candida t e  for 
o f f ice and i s  be tter f i t ted to do so than the general publ i c . 
Chi ( 1 9 9 2 )  c i t e s  the f o l l owing arguments aga inst elect ing state 
execut ive s : 
• Direct e l e c t ion of s tate execut ive s  resul t s  in a " l ong bal l ot­
which makes i t  d i f f icult for voters to be informed about the 
candi dates . 
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• El ected execut ives are independent of the Governor , who cannot 
exercise control ove r them . S ince the Governor i s  supposed to be 
accountable to the peopl e ,  he or she needs to have this control over 
state executive s . 
• Cooperat i on among e l ected exe cut ives i s  discouraged as some may 
be long to d i f f erent part ies than others . 
Beyle ( 1 9 8 5 )  points out that each group argues that the opposed method 
of select i on tends to at tract the wrong type of person and that the 
person selected is beholden to the wrong peopl e . Those favor ing 
elect i on feel  candidates for appointment may be seek ing future j obs with 
the regula ted indust ry and that the gubernatorial appo intee i s  too 
beholden to the Governor and may be too respons ive pol i t i c a l l y  to h i s  or 
her vi ews . Those favoring appointment argue that the mos t  qual i f i ed 
candidates for o f f ice w i l l  not put up with the aggravat ion of running 
for pol i t ical  o f f ice and that e l ected o f f i c i a l s  may be too beholden to 
special interest groups . Al so , they argue that those pursuing these 
" minor- e l ected o f f i ce s  are s imply us ing them as " s t epping s tone- to 
higher o f f i ce s  ( Beyl e ,  1 9 8 5 ,  page s 9 3 - 94 ) . 
Fina l l y ,  to counter the publ i c  knows be s t  view, those favoring 
appo intment a rgue that exper t i s e  i s  neces sary to prope rly perform and 
that the elect i on process panders to the short term popular dec i s ion 
that may be at the expense of long term s tewa rdship ( Beyl e , 1 9 8 5 ) . 
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The a rguments seem t o  be e i ther the publ i c  knows bes t  or , pe rhaps a 
s l ight ly more e l i t i s t  view , that expe rtise i s  be tter in the l ong run and 
that the pub l i c  does not always know bes t . 
Hebert , Wr ight and Brudney ( 1 9 9 2 , p .  1 4 ) , c i t ing surveys conducted 
between 1 9 6 4  and 1 9 8 8  indicate that mos t  s tate department heads .. 
gain the i r  pos i t ions outs ide the state me r i t  systems " and that only 2 7  
percent are appo inted under the mer i t  systems . Agency heads are 
becoming increas ingly educated and profe s s i ona l i zed . In the more recent 
surveys , Hebert , Wr ight and Brudney point out that better than 9 0 \  
be long to a profes s i ona l associat ion and that 6 0 \  have graduat e  degree s . 
Hebert , Wr ight and Brudney state ( p . 1 4 ) that .. ( t ) o a greater extent 
than in the pas t , agency heads are fol l owing career t racks a s  state 
administrators . . .  " and that many " . . .  as sume the i r  pos i t ions f rom an 
agency within the same state . "  
Lauth ( 1 9 8 4 )  compared budgetary outcomes for e l ected agency heads and 
appointed agency heads in Georgia between 1 9 7 4  and 1 9 8 1 . E l ected agency 
heads , presumably more independent of the Governor than appointed agency 
heads , might be more l ikely to deal directly with the l e g i s lature on 
budget reque s t s . They fared no better than appointed agency heads in 
percentage o f  budgetary reques t s  be ing granted . 
REFORMED AND NON- REFORMED GOVERNMENTS 
C i ty Manager vs S t rong Mayor 
The focus o f  this proj ect on the importance of the method o f  select i on 
of the State Comptrol l e r  a l s o  has some para l l e l  in the l i t erature that 
compares the City Manage r  form of gove rnment to the St rong Mayor form . 
The c i ty manager i s  appo inted by the counc i l , whi l e  the ( s t rong ) mayor 
is an e l ected o f f i c i a l . 
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Lineberry and S ha rkansky ( 1 9 7 8 )  argue that confl icts between reformers 
and thei r  opponents have shaped municipal ins t i tutions . Reformers 
sought pro f e s s i onal management and pol i t ical accountab i l i ty . They point 
out ( pp .  1 6 1 )  that " ( t ) he way in which a government i s  s t ructured is 
not an i deol ogically neutral matter . Formal s t ructures advantage some 
interests and d i sadvantage others . -
Lineberry and Fowler ( 1 9 6 7 ,  p .  7 0 3 ) argue that " . . .  governments that are 
the produc t s  of the re form movement behave d i f ferently f rom those whi ch 
have unreformed ins t i tutions . - The centerp iece of the reform movement 
is the c i ty manager form of government . Other reform e l ement s  include 
non - parti san , at - large e l e c t ions , and a short ba l lot . Lineber ry and 
Fowl e r  ( p . 7 0 7 )  found that " . . .  reformed c i t i e s  both spend and tax l e s s  
than unreformed c i t i e s . - Furthe r ,  the i r  research indicates that 
reformed and unreformed c i t i e s  d i f fe r  in the degree to which they 
re spond to social cleavages in the i r  respect ive populat ions . 
Re formed c i t i e s  are those with counc i l - manager forms of government 
pr imar i l y .  Early reformers a l s o  advocated non - parti san e l e c t ions and 
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at - large elect i ons . The s e  reforms s temmed f rom the progress ive era and 
intended to counteract corrupt ion and machine pol i t ics ( Li neberry and 
Fowle r ,  1 9 6 7 ) . Non - re f ormed c i t i e s  had e lected s t rong mayors , par t i san 
e l ect i ons and choos e  representat ives by d i s t ract or ward . L ineberry and 
Fowl e r  ( 1 96 7 ,  p .  7 1 0 )  s tate t ha t  reformed c i t ies are l e s s  respons ive to 
cl eavages . They o f f e r : 
I f  one of the premises of the " pol i t i ca l  ethos- a rgument i s  that 
reformed insti tut i ons g ive l e s s  we ight to the " pr ivate regarding­
and " ar t i f i c i a l - c l eavages in the population ,  that premi s e  rece ives 
striking support f rom our anal ys i s . Our data suggest t ha t  when a 
c i ty adopt s  reformed s t ructure s , i t  comes to be governed l e s s  on the 
bas i s  of con f l ict and more on the bas is of the rat i ona l i s t i c  t heory 
o f  admi n i s t ra t ion . The making of pub l i c  pol i cy takes l e s s  count o f  
the enduring d i f f e rences be tween Whi t e  and Negro , bus iness and labor , 
Pole and WAS P .  The logic of the bureaucra t i c  ethic demands an 
impersonal , apol i t ical s e t t l ement of i s sues , rather than the 
s e t t l ement of conf l i c t  in the arena of pol i t ical ba t t l e . 
Karnig , 1 9 7 5 ,  con f i rmed this view , that unreformed c i t i e s  are more 
pol i t i ca l ly respons ive . He found that civil r ights groups in unreformed 
c i t i e s  obtained more favorable pol i cy outputs than those in reformed 
c i t ie s . 
Although L ineber ry and Fowler in 1 9 6 7  conc luded t hat reformed c i t i e s  
spent and taxed l e s s  t han non - reformed c i t ies , Morgan and Pe l i s s e ro , i n  
8 8  
1 9 8 0 ,  did not reach the same conc lus ion . They used an inter rupted t ime -
series quas i - exper imental model to test the hypothe s i s  that reformed 
c i t ies tax and spend l e s s  than unre formed c i t i e s . Regarding the deba te 
over whe ther pol i t i c s  and governmental s t ructure inf luence pol i c i e s , 
Morgan and Pel i s sero ( 1 9 8 0 ,  p .  9 9 9 )  indicate that " ( a ) l though much 
state - l evel research sugges t s  the answe r is clearly ye s ,  cons iderably 
less agreement exi s t s  for the local leve l . "  Morgan and Pe l i s se ro 
( 1 9 8 0 )  compa red el even c i t ies that changed the i r  pol i t ical s t ructures to 
e l even that did not . They reported that rega rding taxing and spending 
pol i c i e s , in the l ong run , whethe r  the city was reformed or not made 
l i t t l e  d i f fe rence . They state ( p . 1 0 0 3 ) " ( t ) he s e  f indings c l early do 
not bode we l l  for the theore t i cal as sumptions growing out of the re form 
l i te rature . "  Whi l e  Morgan and Pe l i s sero ( 1 9 8 0 )  did not f ind l ong t e rm 
pol icy d i f f e rences be tween s t rong mayor and city manage r  c i t i es , they do 
not suggest that the reform movement did not have pos i t ive resul t s . 
They s t a t e  ( p . 1 0 0 5 ) , " there i s  a wide ly shared view that this group 
was la rge ly responsible in i t s  e f fort to rid c i t i e s  of pern i c i ous 
machine inf l uence s ; presumably today ' s  mun i c ipa l i t ie s  are more hone stly 
gove rned , more e f f ic ient , and be t t e r  managed than was t rue in the 
past . "  
Schne ider and Park ( 1 9 8 9 )  indicated that theore t i c a l l y  reform c i t ie s  
we re expected to have l ower expendi tures than unreformed c i t i es . This 
i s  because reform wa s intended to increase e f f i c i ency and reduce was t e . 
Cit ing Morgan and Pe l i s s e ro ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Morgan and Brudney ( 1 9 8 5 ) , and 
Schne ider ( 1 9 8 1 ) , S chne i der and Park ( page 3 4 9 )  a rgue that emp i rical 
evidence for the posi t ion that reformed c i t i es would spend l e s s  due to 
greater e f f i c i ency " _ has been mixed , at best . "  
Abney and Lauth ( 1 9 8 6 , p .  1 3 2 ) surveyed c i ty pol i ce , f i re and pub l i c  
works depa rtment heads i n  order t o  " . . .  de termine i f  the goal s  o f  the 
mun i c ipal reform movement are in fact re f l ected more in a t t i tudes and 
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behavior of o f f i c i a l s  i n  c i t i e s  that have reform ins t i tut i ons . "  Thes e  
goa l s  included increas ing rat ional ity in dec i s ion making a s  we l l  as 
increas ing " . . .  e f f i c iency , e f fect iveness , and equity in urban 
admini s t ra t i on . "  They concluded that this i s  the case . Al so , in 
contrast to the view of reformed ins t i tut ions being less respons ive , 
Abney and Lauth ( p . 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 )  found " . . .  adminis trators from mun i cipal 
reform c i t ie s  do not appear less concerned about the needs o f  indivi dua l 
c i t i z ens , but rathe r  more so . Furthermore , re form c i t i e s  
adminis trators ' concern f o r  equity in service de l ivery procedures 
sugges t s  a style of admini s t ra t i on whe re a l l  c i t i z ens are to be treated 
fairly . "  
Point i ng out that some of our c i t ies are ungovernabl e , Abney and Lauth 
( 1 9 8 6 , p .  1 5 3 )  agree that " ( c ) ity managers do lack the pol i t ical base 
to be the necessary coa l i t ion bui l ders in many large and heterogeneous 
c i t i e s . "  
Accounting Controls and Re form 
Gi roux and Shields , in 1 9 9 3 , performed research on the e f f i cacy o f  
account ing controls i n  mun i cipal governments . They concl ude that the 
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budget ing , account ing and f inanc i a l  report i ng processes exert control 
over the bureaucracy . For examp l e , use o f  appropriat i ons by department 
and l ine i tem is cons i dered by Giroux and Shie l ds as a means of output 
control and performance measures are considered an e f f i c i ency contro l . 
Pub l i c  cho i c e  theory that e f fective moni toring of the bureaucracy does 
not take place notwi thstanding , Gi roux and Shields ( 1 9 9 3 , p .  2 4 3 )  point 
out that : 
Real i s t i c a l l y ,  i t  i s  unl ikely that there exi s t s  a governmental ent i ty 
whi ch i s  not moni tored . Federal l aws require state and local 
gove rnment s to have an annual f i nanc ial and comp l i ance audi t .  A 
local government can obtain an unqua l i f ied opinion only i f  generally 
accepted account i ng princ iples ( GAAP ) are fol l owed , if  there are no 
res trict i ons on s cope , and no factors are known to exist whi c h  
adversely a f fect t h e  f i nanc i a l  pos i t i on of t h e  government . I f  a n  
unqua l i f i e d  opinion i s  i ssue d ,  voters and other f inanc i a l - s tatement 
users can expect ful l d i s cl osure of re levant f i nanc ial informat ion 
according to GAAP . 
As Gi roux and Shie lds ( 1 9 9 3 )  point out , an unqua l i f i ed opinion by an 
independent auditor makes i t  much more d i f f icult for bureaucrats to 
distort f inanc ial informa t i on and thereby hide the costs o f  providing 
government services . Furthe r ,  Gi roux and Shields ( 1 9 9 3 , p .  2 4 4 ) a rgue 
" ( t ) the budget and other accounting informa t i on ,  as we l l  as the 
f inanc i a l  and comp l i ance audi t ,  may be viewed a s  a means o f  exert ing 
cont rol over the spending behavior of bureaucrat s . "  
The Government Finance O f f i cers Associat i on ( GFOA ) awards i t s  
Cert i f icate o f  Achievement f o r  Exc e l l ence i n  Financial Report i ng t o  
state and local governments that prepare f inanc i a l  s ta tement s  and 
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reports that conform to GAAP and t o  other GFOA disc l osure 
recommendat i ons ( G i roux . and Shields , 1 9 9 3 ) . Barret t  and Greene ( 1 9 9 5 )  
cons ider receipt o f  the GFOA c er t i f i cate t o  b e  an important i nd i cator in 
their ranking o f  t he f inanc i a l  management o f  t he s tates . A good bond 
rat ings is a l so cons i dered important to Barret t  and Greene as is a CAFR 
with a .. c l ean" opinion . 
Gi roux . and Shields , ( 1 9 9 3 , p .  2 4 9 )  argue that t he Cert i f icate o f  
Achievement ( CA )  .. . . .  i s  one measure o f  reasonably comp l e t e  f inanc i a l  
report ing and c a n  be cons idered an account i ng monitoring techn ique "  , 
and further that " ( a ) s t he d i s c losures required to obtain the CA woul d  
reduce t he informa t ion monopoly o f  the bureaucracy , i t  i s  expected t ha t  
t h e  C A  i s  associated with l ower expenditure leve l s "  Sanders , Berman 
and Wes t  ( 1 9 9 4 )  found t ha t  part i c ipa t i on by mun i cipal i t i e s  in the GFOA 
Cert i f icate of Ach ievement for Exc e l l ence in F inanc i a l  Reporting p rogram 
was a s sociated with an increased level of f inanci a l  d i s c l osure . 
Reformed c i t i e s , with appointed c i t y  managers are supposed t o  be 
governed more rat i ona l ly than non - reformed c i t i e s  with s t rong e l ected 
mayors ( Lineberry and Fowl e r ,  1 9 6 7 ) . More rat ional government suggests 
more e f f i c iency . S imi l arly , Sanders , Berman and Wes t  ( 1 9 9 4 )  argue that 
City-manager c i t i e s  are a s sociated with reform and more profess ional 
l eve l s  o f  government . Unexpectedly, Sanders , Berman and West ( 1 9 9 4 )  
found that Mayo r - counci l  c i t i e s  had a higher l evel o f  disclosure than 
did C i ty Manager c i t i e s , however the d i f f erences were sma l l  ( p . 7 4 ) . 
Gi roux and Shields ( 1 9 9 3 ) a l s o  l ooked at how the c i t i e s  were gove rne d ,  
whether b y  a c i ty manager o r  mayor . Addit i ona l l y ,  they considered 
whet he r  the c i t y  had obta ined the certif icate of achi evement or not . 
Four pos s ib l e  outcomes were pos i ted . First was the c i ty governed by a 
mayor that had not achi eved the CA . Thi s was cons idered the bas e l ine 
cas e . Other pos s ibi l i t i e s  were mayor with CA , c i ty manager without CA 
and c i ty manager with CA . They found that an unqua l i f i ed opinion 
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" . . .  h a s  a s i gn i f i cant direct e f fect with expendi tures , suggest ing that 
the audit is a relatively success ful device for reducing contro l - loss 
when an unqua l i f i e d  opinion i s  obtained . "  
Whether a " Big 8 "  ( now Big 6 )  f i rm was used was not s i gn i f i cant . 
Also , t he interact i on between the c i ty manager/mayor and t he CA/not CA 
variab l e s " . . .  suggest that both the exi s t ence of a c i ty manager and a 
Cert i f icate of Achievement are e f fe c t ive . "  Although the combinat i on of 
mayor and CA i s  e f f e c t ive to some degree , only the combina t i on of c i ty 
manager and CA we re s igni f i cant for a l l  three categories o f  expendi tures 
measured ; i . e . , general fund operating expenditure s , total current 
opera t i ng expend i ture s , and capital out l ay expendi tures (Gi roux and 
Shie lds , 1 9 9 3 , p .  2 5 7 ) . 
Gi roux and Shields ( 1 9 9 3 , p .  2 5 7 )  conclude : 
A key point i s  that accounting regulat ions poten t i a l l y  l imi t t he 
monopoly powe r o f  bureaucrats over informat ion . Mun icipal i t i e s  mus t  
prepare annual report s  in conformance with GAAP , ho ld pub l i c  hear ings 
on the budget , and procure f inanc i a l  audi t s . The se requ irements 
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provide control procedures and make substantial f inanc ial informa t i on 
ava i lable to vot ers and other user of f inanc ial data . 
Comm i s s i on Form of C i ty Government 
In add i t i on to s trong mayor and c i ty manager forms of gove rnment , a 
third form i s  the Commi s s i on form of c i ty gove rnment . In this form , 
department heads are s epa rately e l ected . Thi s  form does not f ea ture a 
st rong head of t he gove rnment . Al though early in this century this form 
was popular with reformers , currently i t  i s  not wide ly in use . 
Lineberry and Sharkansky ( 1 9 7 8 , p .  1 6 7 )  point out that only 3 7  l arge 
c i t ies ( populat ions over 5 0 , 0 0 0 )  and a few sma l l e r ,  ma inly southern , 
c i t ies u t i l i z e  this form . Lack of a central authority makes 
coordina t i on d i f f icult whi l e  t he style of government tends to degenerate 
to vote trading and a " you s tay out of my department and I ' l l s tay out 
of yours· mental i ty ( Linebe rry and Sharkansky , p .  1 6 7 ) . 
Rubin ( 1 9 9 0 )  indicates that only a few commiss i on c i t e s  rema i n ,  these 
tend to use the l ine i t em budget format but to operate in a h ighly 
decentral i zed mode . She cons iders the commiss ion form to be outdated , 
l argely abandoned , and not the direc t i on of the future . According to 
the 1 9 9 7  Interna t i ona l C i ty/County Management Assoc iation ( I CMA ) 
yearbook , out of 6 6 8 8  c i t i e s  with populat i ons of 2 5 0 0  and ove r ,  only 1 5 5  
use the comm i s s i on form o f  government . 
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County Government s  
Reform movement s  came l a t e r  t o  coun t i e s  and there fore had d i f f e rent 
obj e c t i ve s  f rom those of the mun icipal reform movement . Munic ipal 
reformers were conce rned with economy and e f f i c i ency , whereas county 
re formers are concerned with central i z ing execut ive autho r i ty in order 
to be t t e r  manage s e rvice del ivery ( DeSant i s  and Renne r ,  1 9 94 ) . 
Schne ider and Park ( 1 9 8 9 )  argue that county government s , part icularly 
those cove ring met ropo l i tan areas , are important inst i tut i ons for local 
service de l ivery . 
The t radit i onal form o f  county government was the commiss i on form . Thi s  
form i s  s imilar t o  t h e  commi s s ion form f o r  c i t i e s , lacks a s ingl e  
execut ive author i ty and i s  composed of a number of e l ected comm i s s i oners 
DeSan t i s  and Renner ( 1 9 9 4 ) argue that this form has s imilar problems t o  
t he commi s s i on c i t ies . The problem of ext reme decent ra l i zat i on for 
commiss i on c i t ie s  plagues commiss i on c i t ies ( Rubin , 1 9 9 0 ) . 
The commi s s i on form of county government is cons idered to be too 
f ragmented t o  handl e  t he current re spons ibi l i t i e s  of modern county 
government s  so t ha t  reformers advocate change ( DeSant i s  and Renne r ,  1 9 9 4  
and Schne i de r  and Park , 1 9 8 9 ) . I ncreas ing suburbani z a t i on has l e d  t o  
t h e  need for expanding r o l e s  f o r  county gove rnments and to reform 
( Schneider and Park , 1 9 8 9 ) . 
County government reform comes in two cho i ce s , both advocat ing a s i ng l e  
execut ive admin i s trator . In the county manager ( o r  county 
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admini s t ra to r )  form ,  the manage r  i s  appointed ( Schne ider and Park , 
1 9 8 9 ) . Thi s  form i s  s im i l a r  to the c i ty manage r  form of government . In 
the county execut ive form, the execut ive i s  e lected ( DeSan t i s  and 
Renne r ,  1 9 94 ) . 
Us ing data f rom only one yea r ,  1 9 7 7 ,  Schne ider and Park ( 1 9 8 9 )  found 
that count i e s  with e l ected county execut ives spent more per capita and 
pe rformed more s e rvices than counties with appointed execut ive s . 
Howeve r ,  both of the s e " reformed" county s t ructures were ahead of 
unreformed , commiss i on forms of county government in both expenditures 
and s e rvices provided . In 1 9 7 7 , counties with e l ected execut ives spent 
about $ 3 3 0  per cap ita . Those with appo inted execut ives spent about $ 1 8 3  
per capita . Per cap i t a  expenditures for commiss ion coun t i e s  was about 
$ 1 5 0  per capita ( S chne ider and Park ) . 
DeSant i s  and Renner ( 1 9 9 4 ) used a broade r and more recent data base than 
Schne ider and Park ( 1 9 8 9 )  in the i r  analys i s  of county expenditures to 
determine if county government s t ructure impacts spending , and by 
extens i on ,  i f  county government s t ructure impacts pub l i c  pol icy 
outcome s . As the i r  dependent va riabl e ,  DeSant i s  and Renner used total 
per capita expendi tures less educat ional expenditures ( logari thm base 
1 0 )  . 
DeSant i s  and Renner ( 1 9 9 4 )  found that both types of reformed count i e s  
spent more than unreformed . However , this impact was s t a t i s t i ca l l y  
sign i f i cant only f o r  the county admini s t rator ( appointed) form . The 
d i f f e rence in resul t s  f rom Schneide r  and Park ( 1 9 8 9 )  may have been due 
to the l a rger sample .  
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Per cap i t a  income was found to be an important independent variable by 
DeSant i s  and Renner ( 1 9 9 4 ) . They cons idered this va riable to be a proxy 
for communi t y  wea l t h  or revenue capac i ty .  The statistically s ignif i cant 
resul t s  of t he i r  research " . . .  indicate that as per capita income 
increase s , t here is an increase in noneduca t i onal county expenditures "  
(page 2 9 3 )  
DeSant i s  and Renner ( 1 9 94 )  po int out that the research on county 
expenditures s hould not be cons idered to contradict earl i e r  research on 
reformed c i t ies where reformed c i ty gove rnments should spend l e s s  than 
unreformed . There are d i f f e rences in the types of services to be 
de l ivered as we l l  as other factors , including the obj ect ives o f  county 
vs c i ty reform , t ha t  l ead to greater expenditures by reformed count i e s . 
Regarding S chne ide r and Park ' s 1 9 8 9  research , DeSant i s  and Renner ( 1 9 9 4 , 
page 2 9 3 )  state " { i ) n  fac t ,  the reformed county type that had the 
highe s t  expendi tures ( county execut ive ) follows the same bas i c  blueprint 
as the unre formed c i ty type { mayo r - counc i l ) . "  DeSant i s  and Renner 
conclude that " ( c )  consequent l y ,  there i s  reason to expect that reformed 
county s tructures are correlated with pol i cy outputs in the oppo s i t e  
direct i on o f  reformed mun icipal s t ructure s "  ( page 2 9 3 )  . 
The l itera ture on county gove rnment reform sugges t s  that i t  i s  important 
to have a s t rong administrator , whether elected or appointed { S chne ider 
and Park , 1 9 8 9  and DeSan t i s  and Renner ,  1 9 94 ) . Morgan and Pe l i ssero ' s 
( l 9 8 0 )  research on c i t i e s  does not contradict this . 
Ideology of pre f e rence for reformed or non - re formed structures 
In his d i scuss ion of the d i f f e rent views about the be s t  structure for 
local government s in the United State s , Richard Box ( l 9 9 5 )  argues that 
it boi l s  down to a preference for e i ther rational administra t i on or 
pol i t ical re spons ivene s s . He suggests ( p .  7 l l )  that " ( t ) he 
conventiona l wisdom equates ra t i onal administrat ion with reformed 
s tructures l ike the counc i l - manager plan and pol i t ical re spons ivenes s  
w i t h  s t ructures which have a n  e l ected chie f  execut ive o f f icer . "  One 
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group advocates rat ional administra t i on whi l e  another advocates 
pol i t i c a l  respons ivenes s  and these groups are at " polar ends " of this 
debate . 
Box ( l 9 9 5 , p .  7 l 2 ) argues that this discus s i on of preferred structure 
" . . .  has revolved around a continuum o f  values about the degree to which 
( the government ) should be pol i tically accountable . "  Rat i onal 
admini strat i on i s  characteri zed by professional managers and dec i s ion 
making that is apol i t i ca l . On the other hand, pol i t ical re spons ivene s s  
i s  characteri zed b y  " . . .  competit ion for control of government programs , 
c i t i z en int rus i on into admini s t ration ,  and s trong pol i t i ca l  l eadership 
s tructures . "  
Box ( 1 9 9 5 )  l abe l s  the value con f l i ct between these two views as 
ideolog i ca l . Cons i de r ing the relat ionship between the individual and 
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the community,  the pre f e rence for ra t i onal administrat ion , advocated by 
pub l i c  administra t i on trad i t iona l i s t s , t ends toward col l e c t ivism . The 
pref erence for pol i t ical re spons ivene s s , on the other hand , advocated by 
the pub l i c  choice e conomis t s ,  tends toward individua l i sm .  
Box ( 1 9 9 5 , p .  7 1 1 )  concludes that the debate between rat i onal 
admini s tration ( the reformed model )  and pol i t ical respons ivenes s " ... is 
unresolvabl e  wi thin this va l ue - driven framework . . .  " Further ( p . 7 1 2 -
7 1 3 )  Box argues that even though attempt s  have been made t o  resolve this 
con f l ict i n  values through the use of emp i r i ca l  research , " . . .  such 
fundamental normat ive que s t i ons are remarkably res i s tant to pos i t ive 
resolut i on . "  Not only does Box stress the d i f f i culty o f  resolving the 
va lue d i f f e rences by appeal ing to emp i r i ca l  evidence , but he a l s o  ( p . 
7 1 7 )  accuses both factions of construct ing " research which 
deduct ively val ida tes the i r  pos i t ions . De ciding whe ther to be l i eve i n  
one v i e w  of l o c a l  government or the other s eems to depend l argely o n  
what one would l ike to b e  true . "  Howeve r ,  Box doe s not cite examp l e s  
f o r  this s tatement . 
Summary of Litera ture on Select ion of O f f i c i a l s  
Some of t h e  l i t e rature above c i ted regarding method of select i on of c i ty 
and county admi n i s t rative o f f i c ia l s ,  part icularly that of c i ty manager 
as compared to s t rong mayor argues that there is a d i f ference in 
outcomes depending on the method of sel ect i on of certain government 
o f f i c i al s . El ected o f f i c i a l s , in this cas e ,  s trong mayors ,  are more 
l ikely to be pol i t ically re spons ive whi le appointed o f f i c i a l s ,  in this 
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cas e ,  c i ty managers , are more l ikely to exhibit rational management . O f  
course , c i ty managers a r e  profe s s i ona l s  who a r e  hired b y  c i ty counc i l s  
t o  manage c i t i e s  ( Lineberry and sharkansky , 1 9 7 8 ) . Other research does 
not f ind evidence of l ong t erm pol icy consequences result ing from method 
of select i on ( Morgan and Pe l i ssero , 1 9 8 0 ) . S chne ider and Park ( 1 9 8 9 )  
conslude t hat the resul t s  for re f ormed vs . non - re formed c i t ies are 
mixed . 
Rainey ( 1 9 9 1 )  po ints out that pub l i c  agencies operate in an environment 
t hat includes a degree of tens i on betwe en competence values and 
responsivenes s  va l ue s . Ra iney ( 1 9 9 1 )  argues t hat e f fect ivenes s  comes 
under the competence s e t  o f  va lue s . S ince ra t i onal admini s t ra t ion and 
neutral competence are f e l t  to be better att ributes for the 
comptrol l er ' s funct i on ,  and f o l l owing Rainey ( 1 9 9 1 ) it was hypothes i z e d  
that appointed comptrollers would b e  more e f f ect ive than t hose who a r e  
elec ted . 
I t  woul d  appear t ha t  i t  i s  important to have a s t rong administrator , 
whe ther e l ected or appo inte d ,  in charge . Too much fragmentat ion , as in 
the case o f  the comm i s s i on f orm o f  government , i s  not cons i dered to be 
e f f e c t ive ( S chneider and Park , 1 9 8 9  and DeSant i s  and Renne r ,  1 9 94 ) . 
Under the pres sure form the federal gove rnment for recipients o f  grant 
funds , s tate and local governments have general l y  reformed personnel and 
procurement syst ems . The re form movement has a l s o  had an impact i n  
improving mun icipal government ( Morgan and Pe l i s se ro , 1 9 8 0 ) . With 
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pat ronage systems replaced by c iv i l  s e rvice systems and with reformed 
procurement sys t ems in place , there is less s cope for " pol i t ical 
respons iveness"  to have the adverse e f fects that i t  had during the days 
of machine pol i t ics . 
STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE AGENC IES 
McKinney ( 1 9 8 6 ,  p .  7 )  regarding f i nanc ial administra t i on a t  the state 
and local leve l s  o f  government , state s : 
The view that honesty can be promoted by dividing powers among 
independently e l e c ted o f f icers has led to the elect ion of many 
f i scal o f f i c ia l s . Though this view is wide l y  he l d  and the practice 
i s  still  preva l ent , there is l i t t l e  evidence to show that i t  
produces competent and creat ive o f f i c i a l s . On the contrary , i t  has 
somet imes led to f ragmented , decentral i z ed , uncoordinated , and 
ine f fect ive f i nanc i a l  systems . This has gene rated a number o f  
problems , inc luding the fol l owing : ( 1 )  inabi l i ty to a c t  quickly;  ( 2 )  
compet i t ion ove r pol i cy space and respons ibi l i ty for f inanc i a l  
activi t ie s ;  and ( 3 )  mul t ip l e  cl earances and con f l i c t ing advi ce from 
f inanc i a l  de c i s ion makers . 
In his 1 9 8 6  text book , McKinney,  clearly,  does not advocate e l e c t ion of 
f i scal o f f i c ia l s . McKinney c i t e s  Moak and H i l lhouse ( 1 9 7 5 )  for h i s  
sta tement of the probl ems associated w i t h  e l ected f i scal o f f i c i a l s . Not 
everyone necessarily agre e s  with this pos i t ion , however .  
Marshal l  W .  Meyer ' s  book Change s in Publ ic Bureaucrac i e s  was pub l i shed 
in 1 9 7 9 . This book presents the results of Meyer ' s  research that 
involved a comparat ive s tudy of a large number of f inance agenc ies for 
state and local governments . Studying change in bureaucracy , 
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spe c i f ic a l l y  i n  t he f inance agencies , Meyer concluded that the 
environment of the f inance agencies i s  somewhat turbul ent and subj ects 
them to pressure for change . Characteristics of agency l eadership 
render t he f inance agency more or less capabl e  of res i s t ing this 
pressure . In a turbul ent environment ,  the finance agenc ies were 
cons idered more or l e s s  stable and hence more or l e s s  abl e  to resist the 
environment depending on certain characteristics  of the agency head . 
These were whe ther e l e c ted or appointed , also l engt h  of t enure in 
o f f i ce . 
The work was l ongitudinal and invol ved data col l ected on these agencies 
in 1 96 6  and 1 9 7 2 . Meyer i s  a sociolog i s t  whose intere s t  in this subj ect 
is from an organ i z a t i onal theory perspect ive . The agencies t hat Meyer 
dea l s  with t ake t hree d i f ferent forms . Thes e  are f inance departments ,  
comptrol lers o f f ices and departments of administrat i on . The account ing 
func t i ons that these agenc ies provide are needed in a l l  state and l ocal 
governments . 
Meyer found t ha t  at the l eve l o f  department , the f inance agenc i e s  we re 
highly s t abl e ,  a l t hough some contract ion in s i z e  was noted . The 
internal organizat i onal s t ructures of the f inance agenc ies , as de f ined 
in terms of numbers of divis ions , l eve l ,  sect i ons , e t c . were not 
predictable nor s tabl e . I t  would appear that l i t t l e  would be ga ined by 
comparing the internal s t ructures o f  f inance agencies . However ,  t he 
l arger s t ructure o f  gove rnment in which the f inance agencies are nested 
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comprehends the agenc ies a s  who l e s  and a cross state comparison could be 
meaning ful . 
Meyer f ound ( 1 9 7 9 ,  p . 9 7 )  that " ' "  characteristics o f  l eadership 
pos i t i ons have a profound e f fect on organi zations . "  As Meyer puts i t  
( p . 9 8 )  " S tab l e  l eadership and l eadership that i s  autonomous o f  higher 
authority block envi ronmental intrus ions , whe reas l eadership turnover 
and dependence accel erate change . "  Meye r argues that " . . .  ( t } he 
f unct i on o f  leadership . . .  i s  to mediate between envi ronmental 
uncertaint i e s  and organ i z a t ional s tructure . "  Meyer indicates ( p . 1 0 l )  
that " ( t } he l i terature o n  management succes s i on sugges t s  that shi f t s  in 
l eade rship are accompani ed by other changes in organ i z a t ions ; hence a 
plausible hypothe s i s  i s  that l eadership turnover creates turbul ence or 
uncertainty in organi zat i on . "  
Meyer hypothe s i z e s  ( 1 9 7 9 ,  p . 1 0 2 ) " . . .  that change in l eadership i s  
associated w i t h  change in organi z at ional arrangements and , 
corresponding l y ,  s tabi l i ty in l eadership pos i t i ons i s  a concomi tant o f  
organ i z a t i onal s tabi l i ty . " Addit i ona l l y ,  he hypothe s i ze s  ( p . 1 0 7 )  
" . . .  that constraints on l eadership a f f e c t  the stabi l i ty o f  
organi z a t i onal s t ructure s . "  That i s ,  " . . .  autonomous l eade rship 
shields organi zat i ons f rom pressures to change organi zat ional 
arrangements . "  
Leaders are e i ther autonomous or dependent . Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 ,  p . 1 0 7 )  
cons idered the f inance agency heads t o  b e  " dependent on higher 
autho r i ty" if they were pol i t ically appointed and autonomous if they 
were e i ther e l ected o f f i c i a l s  or if they were " . . .  appo inted through 
civil s e rvice procedure s . "  He indicates ( p . l 0 7 )  that pol i t ically 
appointed agency heads are " . . .  sub j e c t  to a rb i trary d ismi ssal . "  
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An addit i onal charac t e r i s t i c  of leadership i s  i t s  insul a r i ty in 
relat i onship to higher author ity . As Meyer puts i t  ( 1 9 7 9 ,  p . l O S ) , " the 
more t ime a f inance di rector spends in dea l ing directly with the head of 
government , the more he is inf luenced by him and the more vulnerab l e  to 
externa l influence t he f i nance department become s . "  For Meye r ' s  
research, an agency head t hat spends more than ten percent o f  his or her 
t ime with the higher autho r i ty individua l f i t s  this descr ipt i on . 
Al s o ,  uncerta inty exists when the f inance agency head has a s hort 
tenure . In h i s  s tudy , Meyer cons idered l e s s  than s i x  years to be short 
tenure . 
uncertainty exist s , according to Meye r ,  when the f inance agency head 
has : 
• s hort t enure 
• is pol i t ically appo inte d ,  and 
• spends more than 1 0 %  of his t ime with the head of the gove rnment . 
Meyer f inds that ( 1 9 7 9 ,  p . l O S ) { f ) or both indicators of department 
heads autonomy f rom higher authority , the resu l t s  were s imilar and quite 
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cons i st ent . The l e s s  dependence and the less interchange , t he greater 
the predictabi l i ty o f  organ izat ional s t ructure . "  What does this mean? 
Meyer indicates ( p . 1 2 0 )  that · ( c ) hange occurs in organi z a t ions when 
causa l  relat ions operat e ; and change can be res i s t ed , hence causal 
relat i ons rendered inopera t ive , by f i rmly entrenched l eadership . "  He 
sugges t s  ( p . 1 2 1 )  t hat · . . .  t he mos t  fundamental d i f f e rence between 
organ i zat i ons is whe ther they are stable or changing , not whether they 
are ' open ' or ' c l osed ' to the envi ronment . "  
Concluding ( 1 9 7 9 ,  p . 1 2 4 ) t hat · . . .  l eade rship i s  an important e l ement 
mediat ing be tween envi ronmental uncerta inty and organi z a t ional change" , 
Meyer indicates the three va riables used in his study to descri be 
l eadership , • . . .  turnover ,  dependence on higher authority,  and 
insul a r i ty - predict fundamental d i f f erences in organ i zat i ons . "  
Turnove r has to do with the l ength of tenure , dependence with method of 
appointment and insularity with the amount of t ime spent by f inance 
department heads with the i r  respect ive supe r iors , i .  e . ,  t he heads of 
the governments . Longer tenure leads to more s tab i l i ty .  E l e cted and 
civil s e rvice contro l l e rs provide more stab i l i ty than appointed 
control lers . Cont rol l ers that spend less t ime with the head o f  t he i r  
government , l e s s  than 1 0 % , provide more stab i l ity . 
Further research i s  needed to de t e rmine whether t he characte r i s t i c s  o f  
l eadership impac t  organizational performance . A s  Meye r puts i t  ( p . 1 2 5 ) , 
•
. . .  attempt s  to evaluate the e f fect ivene s s  o f  organ i za t ions wi l l  have 
to cons ider a t t r ibutes of l eadership pos i t i ons if t he k inds of bas i c  
d i f f erences in causal patterns revea led here bear any relat i onship to 
performance . "  
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Meyer ' s  1 9 7 9  research does not t e s t  any hypotheses that directly l ink 
performance e f fect ivene s s  or outcome s with these concepts , which is the 
intent of this research . Howeve r ,  Meyer doe s provide research that 
supports his view that f inance agencies face uncertain envi ronments and 
that l eadership charac t e r i s t i c s  are important e l ements in creat ing 
stab i l i ty in these envi ronments . Accordingly,  Meyer provides a s tart ing 
point for this proj e c t . 
This i s  not to argue that resistance to change i s  necessarily a good 
thing , howeve r ,  if subj ected to too much uncertainty, the morale of 
s t a f f  can suffer as can the agency ' s  abi l i ty to e f f i c iently or 
e f fectively perform i t s  mi s s i on . Accordingly , i t  may be argued that the 
abi l ity of the agency head to buffer the organ i zat ion f rom too much 
turbulence can e f fect the e f fect ivene s s  of the organizat i on . 
METHOD OF SELECTION OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER- ANALYS I S  
What can b e  concluded from t h e  l i terature on method of s e l ect ion? 
Clearly , the evidence i s  mixed . Ear l ier l i terature on reformed and non­
reformed mun i cipal governments suggested that selec t ion did make a 
di f f e rence . The appointed c i ty manager form of government was l ikely to 
be more rat i ona l l y  managed , whi l e  the s trong mayor ( e l ected) form of 
government was l ikely to be more pol i t ically respons ive ( Lineberry and 
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Fowl e r ,  1 96 7 ;  Karnig , 1 9 7 5 ;  and Lineberry and Sharkansky , 1 9 7 8 ) . 
Later research did not support this view ( Morgan and Pel i ssero , 1 9 8 0 )  
Time may b e  a n  important factor . Municipa l i t i e s  may generally be l e s s  
corrupt than they were earl ier be fore personne l and procurement reforms 
were ins t i tuted ( Morgan and Pel is s ero , 1 9 8 0 ) . 
Gi roux and Shields ( 1 9 9 3 )  found d i f f erences in f inanc i a l  performance 
between c i ty manager and s trong mayor c i t ie s . This f inding i s  important 
to this research because i t  conce rns one of the measures of 
effectivenes s  that i s  used . Gi roux and Shields found that c i ty manager 
c i t i e s  that prepare GAAP based f inanc ial statements that rece ive c lean 
audit opinions and which have been awarded the GFOA Cert i f i cate of 
Achievement t end to spend l e s s  on bas i c  services than c i ty manager 
c i t i e s  that did not receive the cert i f i cate and s trong mayor c i t i e s  
whether or not they received the cert i f icate . 
Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 )  found that e l e c ted and civil  s e rvice f inance o f f icers were 
better abl e  to buf fe r  the operat ing core of thei r  agencies against the 
pol itical  envi ronment than we re appointed f inance o f f icers . In add i t ion 
to independence , Meye r found insularity and tenure to have the same 
e f fect . However ,  Meye r ' s  research did not conside r  the e f fectivene s s  o f  
the s t a t e  and local f i nance agencies 
Intere s t ing l y ,  Meye r ' s  ( 1 9 7 9 )  research indi cates that those f inance 
o f f i cers that are independent of the head of the government , prima r i l y  
el ected comptro l l e r s , but a l so civil  service comptro l l ers , a r e  better 
able to shield the i r  technical core from the pol i t ical environment .  
This may a l l ow them to pract i ce more rational management and be less 
pol i t i ca l ly respons ive to the governor than appointed compto l l e r s . 
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Research on county government found both county admini s t rator and county 
execut ive forms of government pre ferable to t he commi s s ion form of 
county government ( Schneider and Park , 1 9 8 9 ;  and DeSant i s  and Renner ,  
1 9 9 4 ) .  This suggests that having a s trong adminis tra tor , whether 
elected or appo inted i s  important . 
Meyer ' s  ( 1 9 7 9 )  evidence t ha t  e l ected or c iv i l  service f inance o f f i c e rs 
are be tter abl e  to protect the i r  agencies from a some t imes turbulent 
environment t han were appo inted f inance o f f i cers i s  important . Gi roux 
and Shie lds 1 9 9 3  research is re cent and favors appo inted c i ty manage rs . 
State governments are d i f ferent f rom mun icipal governments .  State 
governments are much l arger and more complex . Al so , t he i s sue o f  
integra t ing a large and comp l ex organ ization l ike a state government 
must be cons i dered as wel l .  
We have a trade - o f f  between neut ral competenc e / ra t i onal admini s t ra t i on 
as encouraged by appo intment of the s tate comptro l l e r  and independence 
as encouraged by e l e c t i on of the s tate comptro l l e r  or the s tatus of t he 
state comptro l l e r  as c iv i l  service with appropriate protect i ons against 
pol i t ical interference . Thi s  research i s  intended to determine which 
method of select ion is be s t  in actual pract ice . 
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I t  i s  reasonabl e  to conclude that the method of sel ect ing the state 
comptro l l e r  will impac t  the e f fect ivene s s  of the performance of t he 
state comptro l l e r ' s agency . Howeve r ,  the mixed nature of the l i terature 
does not a l l ow a predi c t ion as to which method , if any , would be more 
conduc ive to e f fect ivene s s . 
ORGANI ZATION DES IGN 
A brief discus s i on of organi zat i on des ign l i terature is presented 
because these concepts are necessary to a discuss ion on organi zat ion of 
the account ing func t i on in a large organi zat ion , such a s  a state or 
loca l gove rnment . 
Gul ick ( 1 9 3 7 )  a t t empted to lay down princ iples in his Not e s  on the 
Theory o f  Organ i zation . Thes e  include the not ion that divis i on o f  l abor 
is neces sary . Gul i ck ( 1 9 3 7 )  argued that in large organizat i ons , the work 
must be divided . A s t ructure of coordina t ion mus t  be imposed on the 
work uni t s . In addit i on to such concepts as span of contro l , uni ty of 
command , l ine and staf f ,  and POSDCORB , Gul ick noted that t here are 
different ways to group peop l e  into work uni t s . Organ i z a t i on can be by 
ma j or purpose , ma j or proce s s , c l ient l e  or materiel , or by place . 
Of course , S imon ( 1 9 4 6 ) c r i t i c i zed Gul i ck ' s principles as be ing 
proverbial . However ,  Hammond ( 1 9 9 0 , p .  1 4 5 )  de fends Gul i ck and states 
that " Gul i ck ' s  e s s ay had an intel lectual subtlety,  coherenc e , and 
soph i s ticat i on which S imon completely fai led to recogn i z e  or 
acknowledge . "  
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As organ i z a t i ons become more complex , s impl e  des igns n o  l onger suffice . 
S impl e  prescript ions , such as organ i ze by funct ion often proved 
inadequate as organ i z a t ions grew and became more diverse . For many 
large corpora t i ons , the func t i onal s t ructure proved too s l ow i n  
responding to changes and t o o  hierarchical to a l l ow rapi d  coordina t i on 
across the func t i onal divis ions " ( Rainey, 1 9 9 1 , p .  1 1 0 ) . According l y ,  
they adopted product l ine s t ructure s . Gol embiewski ( 1 9 8 3 )  makes a 
dist inc t i on between functional organi zat ion and one based on work f l ow .  
The latter i s  s imilar t o  product l ine grouping and i s  better abl e to 
deal with complexity . 
Compound organizat ions include both l ine and s t a f f  functions ( Rice , 
1 9 8 0 ) . S t a f f  pos i t ions are nece s s i tated by the need for techn i cal 
expert i s e . Rice ( 1 9 8 0 , p ,  2 4 )  s tates " ( t ) he s t a f f  advi sors pos s e s s  the 
spe c i a l i zed expert knowledge which the commander needs to run the 
organi zation ,  but do not f i t  into the ' chain of command ' structure . 
. . . Addit i on o f  s t a f f  vas t l y  improves the f l ex ib i l ity and technical 
e f f i c iency of the l ine organ i zat i on . "  However ,  the l ine and s t a f f  
organi z a t i on has some t endency f o r  con f l i c t  to b e  bui l t  i n t o  i t . Where 
d i f ferences o f  values occur , l ine dominates staff (Rice , 1 9 8 0 ) . Hybrid 
organi zat i onal s t ructures are common , in which l arge corpora t ions are 
organi z e d  by ma j or product divis ion whi l e  also having some functi onal 
uni t s , such as accounting and human resources ( Ra iney , 1 9 9 1 , p .  1 1 0 ) . 
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George Rice ( 1 9 8 0 )  presents a number o f  d i f fe rent mode l s  that could 
pos s i bl y  be adopted by an organ i zat i on . Thes e  include bureaucracy 
( c lass ical , with sma l l  span of control ) ,  decent ra l i za t ion ( l arge r span 
of control ) ,  Line and s t a f f , proj ects ( matrix ) , profess i ona l , col l eg i a l , 
federat i ons , and egal i tarian . 
The s tate comptro l l er ' s  agency f i t s  into the overa l l  state government 
organizat i on as a s t a f f  funct i on . This i s  t rue of other f i nance and 
control funct i ons such as t reasure r ,  budget o f f ice , revenue or taxa t i on ,  
and procurement . 
Organi z at i on and E f f e c t ivenes s  
The l i terature on e f f e c t ivene s s  includes research that dea l s  with 
certain aspects o f  organ i zat i ons , such a s  organ i zat ional s t ructure . 
This l i t e ra ture includes de s c ript ions o f  research s tudies by researchers 
such as Woodard , Pugh , H i ckson and As sociate s , Burns and Stalke r ,  and 
Lawrence and Lorsch that found organ i zat ion s t ructure mediat ing between 
the t echnology used by the organ i zat ion and the envi ronment faced by the 
organ i z a t i on and its e f fect ivenes s  ( S teers , 1 9 7 7 ; Gibson , I vancev i ch and 
Donnel ly ,  1 9 7 9 ;  Rainey , 1 9 9 1 ) . Organ i zat i onal theor i s t s , such as 
Thompson , Galbra i t h ,  Mintzberg and Go lembi ewski provided ins ight on the 
relat i onships be tween techno l ogy , envi ronment and organ i zat i onal 
s t ructure ( Ra iney , 1 9 9 1 ; Harmon and Maye r ,  1 9 8 6 ) . 
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The l i terature above mentioned suggests that internal aspects of 
organi zat ional s t ructure , such as span of control , relate to 
e f fect ivenes s . However this l i terature does not provide a great deal o f  
guidance o n  organi z ing t h e  accoun t i ng funct ion in t h e  context o f  the 
overa l l  s t ructure of a complex organi zat ion . 
The envi ronment faced by the state comptrolle r ' s agency across the 
states should be simi l ar , though not identi cal . Larger states are more 
complex . The economy does not impact all  states in the same way . 
States have d i f f e rent dominant industries and d i f ferent taxat ion 
pol i cies . 
For the purposes of this resea rch , the inf luences of envi ronment , 
technology and type of employees recrui ted and hired are cons idered to 
be suf f i c iently s imilar over the f i f ty states to al low focus on certain 
organi zat ional factors ; spec i f ically , method o f  select ion , 
organizat ional conf igurat ion , profess iona l i sm ,  and length of tenure of 
the state comptro l l e r . 
Leadership and leadership s tyle are also important as are 
characteristics of the organi zat ion ' s  employees . Steers ( 1 9 7 7 )  includes 
managerial po l i c ie s  and prac t i ces and employee characteristics in his 
factors that contribute to e f fect iveness . 
Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 )  argues that leadership characte ristics are important to an 
organizat ion . Concluding ( p o  1 2 4 ) that " . . .  leadership is an important 
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e lement mediating between envi ronmental unce rta inty and organizat ional 
change , Meye r ( 1 9 7 9 )  indicates the three variables used in his s tudy to 
describe l eadership , " . . .  turnove r ,  dependence on higher authority , and 
insularity - predict f undamental d i f ferences in organi zations . "  
Management pol i c i e s  and prac tices are important to e f fect ivene s s  as 
we l l . Management s tyle ha s an e f fect on organizat ional c l imate whi ch 
has a l arge impact on the emp l oyees . Employee sat i s fact ion i s  
f requently cons idered one measure o f  e f fect ivene s s  ( S teers , 1 9 7 7 )  
Sat i s f ied employees theoret i c a l l y are more produc t ive . At l ea s t  this i s  
some times the case . 
ORGAN I Z ING THE ACCOUNTING FUNCTION 
Organiz ing the Accounting Function In Bus iness 
Horngren ( 1 9 7 2 , p .  1 0 )  indicates that the accoun t ing funct i on in 
organ i z a t i ons i s  general ly s t a f f  as opposed to l ine . The account ing 
funct ion has the " . . .  respons ibi l i ty for providing l ine managers , and 
a l so other s t a f f  managers with spe c i a l i zed service . This includes 
advice and he l p  in the areas of budget ing , control l ing , pricing , and 
special dec i s i ons . The account ing department does not exercise direct 
authority ove r l ine department s . "  
In the typical manu facturing company , the control l e r  and treasurer both 
report to the vice pres i dent for f inance . Inte rna l control theory ca l l s  
for a s epara t i on o f  duti e s  between the t reasurer and control l e r . The 
contro l l e r  ma intains the accounting system that processes account ing 
transact i ons whi l e  the treasurer is charged with cus tody of cash and 
making disbursement s  that have been authorized by the contro l l e r  
( Horngren , 1 9 7 2 ) . [ In government , the system of internal controls 
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includes a third organ i zat ion , the budget o f f ice which has budget 
prepara t ion as one o f  its func t i ons . Be fore the contro l l e r  authorizes 
an expendi ture , i t s  compl iance with appropriat ions and a l l otments mus t  
be ensured . )  
Ros s e l l  and Frasure ( 1 9 6 4 ) indicate that the contro l l e r  and t reasurer 
typ i c a l l y  report to a vice pres ident of f inance , al though they could 
both report directly to the pre s i dent or any other arrangement , such a s  
cont rol l e r  report ing to the pre s i dent and treasurer report ing to the 
cont rol l e r  or vice versa . 
Integrat i on o f  the Pub l i c  Finance Funct i on 
Organi zat i onal integra t i on i s  genera l ly cons ide red des i rabl e  to 
faci l i tate commun i cat i on ,  coordinat ion and control of f inanc ial 
informa t i on and to ensure that pol i cy makers are not g iven conf l i c t i ng 
and confusing informat i on ( Ruchelman , 1 9 8 7  and Lehan 1 9 9 1 )  . 
Ruchelman ( 1 9 8 7 )  discusses the importance o f  the re form movement on the 
organ i za t i on of the f i nance funct i on in local government . He points out 
( p . 2 0 )  that the Nat i onal Mun i cipal League , in i t s  model c i ty charter , 
sugges t s  what i s  described as a " ful l y  integrated f inance system- . 
This concept places the f inance funct ion in a department of f inance 
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headed b y  a di rector o f  f inance . This department of f inance includes 
divisions of accounts ( headed by the control l e r ) , budget , purcha s ing ,  
assessment s  and t reasury . Ruche lman indicates that sometime s , the chief 
budget o f f icer s e rves in the capacity o f  the f inance director . In the 
model presented by Ruche lman , the budget o f f icer reports to the f inance 
director via a dotted l ine and d i rectly to the c i ty manager by a solid 
l ine . This indicates that whi l e  l ocated in the f inance department , the 
budget o f f ic e r  is o f t en primarily re spons ible to the chie f  execut ive 
o f f i c e r . 
The d i rector of f inance coordinates the d i f fe rent activities that 
comprise the f inance funct ion and advises the chief execut ive on f inance 
mat ters . Ruche lman ( 1 9 8 7 )  indicates that the f inance o f f icer has two 
rol e s . The s e  are both administrator and de c i s ion make r . 
The early twentieth century re formers saw f ragmentat ion of autho r i ty as 
unde s i rabl e  and a problem for local government ( Lehan , 1 9 9 1 ) . Lehan ( p o 
2 9 )  s tates " { s ) ince the turn of the twent ieth century . the key 
organizat i onal i s s ue of local government has been integra t i on . "  
Integrat ion of the f inance funct ion was intended to remedy the problem 
of f ragmenta t i on by the " . . .  concent rat ion of f inance superv i s i on in a 
finance d irector reporting to a chi e f  execut ive . "  
Pub l i c  Financ i a l  Management t extbooks typically dea l with local 
government f inance . As stated ear l i e r , McKinney ' s  1 9 8 6  t ext does not 
favor e l e c t ion of f i scal o f f i c i a l s  at e i ther the local or state leve l . 
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FUrthermore , McKinney a rgues i n  favor o f  a central i zed f inanc i a l  
dec i s ion making mode l . He cites the need for coordinat ion and 
f l exibi l i ty as we l l  as accountab i l i ty .  He presents a model o f  a l arge 
non -prof i t  organ i z a t ion ( p . 8 )  in whi ch a Vice President or Director o f  
Finance reports to the Execut ive Director . Report ing to the Director of 
Finance are the heads of the f inance funct ions , inc luding the Chi e f  
Accountant o r  Cont rol l e r  and Treasure r . 
That the budget d i rector i s  some t imes respons ible to the governor of a 
state i s  evidenced by the fact that state budget directors some t imes are 
located in the governor ' s  o f f ice . Some s tates have a cabinet l eve l 
secretary o f  f inance to coordinate the f inance functi on ( NASBO , 1 9 9 5 )  
The l ite rature on organ i zat ion o f  the f inance funct ion favors a 
s t ructure in which a Di rector of Finance reports directly to the Chi e f  
Execut ive with divi s i ons containing the f inance funct i ons reporting t o  
the D i rector o f  Financ e . The se funct ions typ i c a l l y  include account ing , 
treasury , budget ing , taxat i on and other funct ions ( Ruchelman , 1 9 8 7 ) 
Financial accoun t ing report ing and budgetary control are the core 
funct ions o f  the s tate comptrol l e r  and these are carried out by the 
state comptrol l e r ' s agency in con j unct ion with other agencies of state 
government . In chapter 1 ,  i t  was pointed out that the amount s  presented 
in the CAFR by the state comptro l l er have sources in other agencies in 
the state . In addi t ion to the f i scal o f f ices of the l ine agenc i e s , 
certain overhead or control agencies , including those trad i t i ona l ly 
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associated with the f inance function ,  i .  e . , t reasury , taxa t i on ,  budget ,  
are important t o  the core funct i ons o f  the state comptro l l e r . The tasks 
of these d i f f e rentiated agencies mus t  be integrated and coordinated for 
the state comptro l l e r  to perform e f fective l y . 
Below , the impor tance o f  integrat ion between the state comptro l l e r ' s  
off ice and the budget o f f ice and part i cularly of the systems ma intained 
by thes e  agencies w i l l  be di scussed . Howeve r ,  the other f inance 
overhead agencies ma intain systems that need to be reconc i led and/or 
integrated in some manne r . The t reasure r ' s  o f f ice maintains i t s  system 
which mus t  be reconciled with bank statement s .  The comptro l l er ' s  o f f ice 
general l edge r  sys t em cash ba lance mus t  be reconciled to the bal ance 
indicated by the treasure r ' s  system . 
The inves tments and debt gene ral l edger amount s  presented in the CAFR 
are supported by records mainta ined in the t reasure r ' s  o f f ice . The bulk 
of the dol lars in revenue t ransact i ons that are posted to the 
comptro l l er ' s  general l edge r  accounting system f requently originate in 
the tax o f f i ce . Expendi tures , as we l l  as f ixed assets t ransactions 
typically or iginate in the f i scal o f f ices of the l ine agencies . 
An argument can be made that having the departments of taxation ,  
t reasury , budget and state comptro l l e r  report t o  a cabinet l eve l 
secre tary o f  director o f  f inance would faci l i tate integrat i on o f  the 
function as a who l e , as wel l  as those aspects the f inance functi on that 
1 1 7  
have an important bearing on the core funct ions o f  the state comptro l l e r  
that a r e  subfuncti ons o f  t h e  f inance func t ion . 
Integration of Budge t and Account ing Sys tems in Governmental 
Organi zations 
In the case o f  the relationship o f  comptro l l e r  to budget director and 
f inance secre tary , the importance o f  coope rat ion i s  indicated by the 
pref e rence for integrat ion of the f inance funct ion . The pub l i c  
f inanc i a l  management l i terature typ ically favors integra t i on of the 
f inance funct i on . In addi t i on to the organ i zat i onal d imens i on o f  an 
integrated f inance funct ion , the l i tera ture s t rongly f avors spe c i f i c  
integrat i on o f  the accounting and budget ing syst ems . these syst ems 
shoul d  be compa t i bl e . 
Garner ( 1 9 9 1 )  points out that syst ems are made up of interacti ng parts . 
Systems are intended to he lp achieve an organi zation ' s goa l s  or 
obj ective s . For a sys t em to operate proper l y ,  i . e . , in an e f f i c i ent and 
e f f ect ive mann e r ,  it is necessary for the d i f f erent parts to interact 
appropr iate l y .  The proper interaction of the parts o f  a systems i s  
referred t o  by Garner a s  integrat ion . When a change in one part of a 
system a f fects another part , this informat ion mus t  be communicated 
between the part s . 
Garner ( 1 9 9 1 ) argues that pub l i c  organi z a t i ons mus t  use both budget 
systems and account ing systems and these systems mus t  be integrated . 
That i s  ( p . 1 8 3 )  " . . .  they mus t  properly interact with each other . "  
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The systems unde rlying an organizat ion ' s  budget i ng and accounting 
processes may be vi ewed in one of two ways according to Garner . One view 
i s  o f  a f inanc i a l  system having a budgeting subsystem and an account ing 
subsystem with appropriate informat ion communicat i on between the two 
subsystems . The other view, preferred by Garner ,  i s  of two s eparate 
systems with the appropriate communicat i on between the two . 
Garner ( 1 9 9 1 )  indicates that achieving integrat ion between budgeting and 
account ing systems is not easy . Cooperat ion by everyone concerned i s  
required . Garner i ndicates that a problem for some pub l i c  and nonpro f i t  
organi zat i ons i s  the fai lure t o  achieve integration between the 
budget ing and account ing systems . 
Kraemer and King ( 1 9 8 2 , p . 5 9 )  contrast independent and integrated 
systems , but point out that " . . .  all syst ems fal l somewhere on a 
con t inuum between the two extreme s . "  Even i f  independent sys t ems 
exi s t , they can be i ntegrated on an " ad hoc" bas i s  by use of manual 
and automated l inking . Kraemer and King argue that systems exis t  i n  
organi zat i ons and these systems a l so have impact o n  the organi zations . 
Hal l  ( 1 9 8 7 )  cons i ders an integrated f inancial management system to be 
des irable . By thi s ,  he means that the var ious component s , including 
data base s , interact and interface with each other in a meaningful way . 
Automated budget ing and account ing systems mus t  be compat ible and 
integrated i f  current technology is to be used to proper advantage . 
Westberry ( l 9 8 9 )  favors the integrat ion of budgeting and accounting 
systems .  He a rgues that accounting i s  a s ervi ce funct i on that serves 
the budget proce s s . Good accounting fac i l i tates good budget ing . 
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Compute r i zation o f  account ing systems occurred i n  the f i rs t  e ra o f  
comput ing according to Mechl ing ( l 9 9 l ) . Mechl ing ( p . 4 2 l )  points out 
that " . . .  compute r i z a t i on requ i res that f inancial data be expl i c i t  and 
cons i s t ent across the organ i zat ion . This increases central control over 
departmental operations and the power of central o f f icials  . . .  " .  and 
that " ( o ) ver the pas t  hal f - century , one of the maj or changes in local 
government has been the increas ing power of f i nancial over s ight agencies 
( executive prima r i l y ,  but also legislative ) , a ided substanti a l l y  by 
growing standard i z a t i on and computerization . "  
Individual appl ications are des igned as modules that f i t  together i n  an 
integrated package . Transact ions that are entered into one modul e  o f  an 
integrated syst em are captured in the data base and made ava i l ab l e  to 
the other modules as needed ( Mechl ing , 1 9 9 1 ) . Mechling indi cates that 
the integra t i on concept is expanding to encompass appl ications other 
than general ledger accounting and budgeting ,  including payrol l ,  
accounts payabl e ,  and grant account ing . Mechl ing indicates that 
integration is nei ther wi thout r i sk nor easy . The involvement of 
dif f erent departments carries some turf problems . However ,  as Mechl ing 
( p . 4 2 2 )  sugges t s ,  " . . .  integrat ing f inanci a l  with program data promi ses 
far bet t e r  analys i s  and contro l . "  
Lynch ( 1 9 8 5 )  a rgues that the accounting system should be des igned to 
serve budgetary needs and cites lack of synchronizat ion between 
budgetary and account ing systems as a p i t f a l l  to avoid . 
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wooldridge ( 1 9 8 2 )  a rgue s that a n  integrated f inanc ial management system 
would al l ow for compa ri son o f  actual performance aga inst planned 
performance ,  as indicated by the budget .  Also , compari son between 
organ i zat ions could be made . 
Thurmaier ( 1 9 9 0 . p .  4 0 )  states that " ( g ) ood f inancial management of 
informat ion resources requ i res an integrated account ing and budget ing 
informa t i on system that can provide program managers and budget 
decis ion- makers with t ime ly data on the types of expendi tures that dr ive 
program costs . "  
funct ion . 
The budget ing proce s s  i s  served by the accounting 
Gordon and S e l lers ( 1 9 8 4 ) note that during t imes of economic scarc i t y ,  
program managers t ry to r e s i s t  budget cutbacks . I f  budget i ng and 
accounting systems are not compatibl e ,  it i s  eas ier for them to resort 
to obfuscat ion . This i s  another argument for integrated ( and 
compatib l e )  budget ing and accounting systems . 
Stevens and Cahi l l  ( 1 9 9 2 ) found at the state l evel an associat i on 
between an environmental variabl e ,  pub l i c  demand for accountabi l i t y ,  and 
a s t rategic l eve l dec i s ion making variabl e ,  the presence o f  an 
integrated f inanc ial management system . 
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I n  order f o r  the state comptrol l e r  to e f fect ively perform the budgetary 
control funct i on ,  i t  i s  necessary for the accounting and budget ing 
sys tems to be both integrated and compatibl e . Method of select i on of 
the state comptro l l er impacts the organ i zat i onal placement of the state 
comptro l l er ' s agency in the l arger context of state government . The 
elected comptro l l e r  does not report to the governor . Comptrol lers 
appointed by and s e rving at the pl easure of the governor may have more 
access to the governor than those appo inted at a l owe r l eve l or e l ected 
comptro l l er s . Me thod o f  selec t i on may impact the abi l ity o f  the 
governor to coordinate or integrate the activities of the f inance 
agenc ies . 
In addi t ion to being rel ated to method of s e l e c t ion , organi zat i onal 
placement o f  the s tate comptrol l er ' s agency may a l so impact the 
integrat i on of the f inance funct ion . The importance of integrat ion of 
the budget and accounting systems suggests that organi z a t ional placement 
of the comptro l l er ' s  agency and the budget o f f ice is important to 
effective operations . 
According l y ,  three model s  of organi zational conf igurat ion we re 
ident i f ied and d i s cussed in chapter 1 .  The se are ; the ful ly i nt egrated 
f inance funct i on ,  the indirectly integrated f inance func t i on and the 
non - integra ted f inance func t ion . The latter coincides with the states 
having e l ected comptrol lers . 
Integra t i on of t he f inance funct ion is conside red important to 
e f fect ivene s s . This research cons iders both method of sel ect i on and 
organi zat ional conf igurat ion as factors impacting organizational 
e f fect ivenes s . 
Work Flow Mode l vs . Functional Model 
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The accounting funct ion i n  l arge organizat i ons i s  s t a f f  rather t han l ine 
( Horngren , 1 9 7 2 ) . Sathe ( 1 9 8 2 , p .  1 5 )  suggests that " ( t ) he t e rms l ine 
and staff probably originated in mi l i tary organizat ions . - However ,  
widespread use in bus ine s s  in the Uni ted States occurred only after t he 
great depress i on when increas ing complexi ties necess itated the use of 
staff experts ( Sathe , 1 9 8 2 ) . 
Staff functions theoret i cally have no authority over the l ine . Howeve r ,  
Sathe ( 1 9 8 2 ) c i te s  McGregor ( 1 9 6 0 )  to point out t hat comp l ex 
organ izat ions are rea l ly webs of inte rdependence and that t he 
distinct ion between s t a f f  and l ine in terms of authority i s  more 
i l lus ion than real i ty .  Sathe ( p . 1 6 )  points out that " . . .  an important 
aspect of s t a f f  work is the abi l ity to inf luence organi zat iona l 
dec i s ions . -
Gol emb iewsk i  ( 1 9 8 3 ) contrasts two organizat ional des igns . One i s  based 
on orthodox principles of bureaucracy in which organizat i on is according 
to " . . .  a divis ion of l abor based on special i zat ion by ma j or function o r  
process t hat vert ically f ragments the f low of work . ( p .  1 9 4 ) - The 
alternat ive i s  organ i zed so that " ( d ) epartmenta l i zat ion r e f l e c t s  t he 
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f low o f  work ; that i s , related activi t i e s  are put together whether they 
are ' l ike ' or ' un l i ke ' . ( p .  2 0 6 ) "  Thes e  two model s  are the funct ional 
model and the work f l ow mode l . Golemb iewski ( 1 9 8 3 )  demons trates the 
superiority of t he work f low mode l . 
Diagrams o f  Golemb i ewski ' s  ( 1 9 8 3 ) funct iona l and work f low mode l s  are 
presented below with the descript ion o f  both which highl ights the 
advantages of the work f l ow model for complex organizat ions . 
In the func t ional model ,  the manager M of processes a , b ,  and c manages 
three groups or work units comprised of a supervisor of process a ,  a 
supervi sor o f  proce s s  b and a supervisor of proces s  c .  Supervisor a 
supervi ses three individua l s  with specialty a ( a , a  and a ) . Supervisor b 
supervi ses b , b  and b .  Supervisor c supervises c , c  and c .  
Funct iona l Mode l , Figure 7 
F u n ctio n a l  M odel 
M a b c  
S a  S b  S c  
a a a b b b c c c 
The characteristics o f  this model are that dec i s ions must be made at the 
Macb leve l . This i s  highly cent ral i zed and in a complex environment 
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could cause Mabc to experience informat i on overload . Other 
characteri s t i cs are that it reduces mutual inf luence across funct ional 
l ine s ,  encourages compet i t ion between functions and creates an 
organi z a t i on in whi ch i t  i s  d i f f icult to eva luate performance of the 
work uni t .  
In the work f l ow mode l , the manager M of processes a , b  and c manages 
three work uni t s  compri s ed of a supervisor of work f l ow 1 ,  a supervisor 
of work f l ow 2 and a supe rvisor of work group 3 .  Supervisor 1 
supervi ses a , b , and c .  Supervisor 2 supervi ses a ,  b and c .  Supervisor 
3 supervi s e s  a,  b and c .  
Work Flow Mode l , Figure 8 
VV o rk F lovv M odel 
M ab c  
S 1  S 2  S 3  
a b c a b c a b c 
The characteristics of this model are that i t  i s  less central i z ed and 
allows many de c i s ions to be delegated to s l ,  s2 and s 3 . Addit iona l l y ,  
this arrangement increases mutual inf luence across funct ional l ines , 
encourages col l abora t i on between functions within the same f low of work 
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and creates a n  organizat ion in which it i s  easy t o  evaluate performance 
of the work uni t . 
Organi z ing the Accounting Funct ion 
Gol embiewski ( 1 9 6 4 )  indicates that in the class ical l ine - staff model , 
the staff pe rson , be ing outs ide the chain of command , provides neutral , 
expert advice . Cons ider the large organi zat ion . I f  a l l  the accountants 
were l ocated in one organi zat ion , ine f f i c iency and conf l i ct would 
resul t .  I t  woul d  be l ike the funct ional model described above . The 
work f low mode l , on the other hand allows for an accountant to be 
ass igned to a non - ac counting l ine work uni t . Gol emb iewski ( 1 9 6 4 )  
presents a model i n  which the headquarters group includes unit d ( the 
accounting funct i on ) . Also , each l ine uni t  employs operat ives a , b , c ,  
and d .  ( d  i s  the accountant . )  
Accounting Organizat ion Mode l , f igure 9 
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Although operative d i n  each l ine uni t  reports t o  h i s  or her l ine 
supervisor (by a solid l ine ) , the chart indicates by a broken l ine f rom 
headquarters uni t  d to each l ine operat ive d that the headquarters 
accounting unit provides t echnical tra ining , he lps set technical 
standards , e t c . 
For an organi z a t i on that i s  very large and complex , such as s tate 
government , the prescripti on presented by Gol embiewski in the two above 
writ ings essent i a l l y  rat iona l i zes the way in which the s t a f f  account ing 
function ,  as wel l  as other staff control or overhead functions such as 
budget ,  purchasing and personnel ,  are organized in most state 
government s . The state comptro l l e r ' s off ice functions as the 
headquarters account ing function . The f i s ca l  and accounting s t a f f  in 
the l ine agencies report to the agency head . The comptro l l er ' s  o f f i c e  
provides centra l i zat ion to the organizat ion wide accounting funct ion by 
the operat ion o f  a s tatewide genera l l edger accounting system that l ine 
agenc ies mus t  comprehend and by speci fying accounting pol i c i e s  and 
procedures and relevant accounting internal cont rol s  to ensure the 
integri ty of the central accounting sys tem . 
ORGANI ZATI ONAL CONFIGURATION/ I NTEGRATION OF THE FINANCE FUNCTION­
ANALYS I S  
Thi s  analys i s  takes place in two part s . Firs t ,  the analys i s  cons iders 
state government as a whol e  be ing the rel evant uni t  of anal ys i s . In 
this presentat ion , the s tate comptrol l er ' s  agency i s  t reated as a sub -
unit . Secondly , the ana lys i s  wi l l  proceed from the view of the state 
contro l l er ' s agency as the relevant uni t  for analys i s . The second 
presentati on cons i ders the account ing and control function ,  which 
includes the f i scal sections of the l ine agenc ies . 
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The state a s  a who l e , part icularly the execut ive branch,  mus t  be 
organized as a comp l ex bureaucracy with l ine and staff funct i ons . The 
staff funct i ons include the overhead or control agencies . The state 
comptro l l er ' s agency i s  one of these . The l ine agenc ies are general ly 
organ i z ed a l ong work f l ow l ines . That is , whi l e  tending to be organ i z ed 
by ma j or funct ion , the l ine agenc ies include sub - un i t s  for f i scal , 
budget ,  human resources and procurement funct ions . 
Each state agency i s  a sub-un i t  of the state government organization . 
In fact , each state agency contains several sub - uni ts . Each sub - un i t  
faces a d i f f e rent envi ronment . Given the wide range of s ervi ces that 
are provided by the exe cut ive branch of state government , it may be 
concluded that this comp l ex bureaucracy is highly d i f f erentiated . The 
maj or problem for the governor i s  to integrate this bureaucracy . 
To some degree , this integrat ion is accomp l i shed by gubernatorial 
appointment of cabinet secretaries and agency heads . To the degree that 
some agency heads are directly e l ected,  integrat ion is made more 
diff icult .  To the degree that agency heads are appointed by and serve 
at the pl easure of the governo r ,  integra t ion is fac i l i tated . There has 
been a trend over the past several decades to reorgani z e  state 
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government s . The move has been away from the tradit iona l mode l ,  i n  
which many s tate agencies report t o  the governor , t o  a cabinet or 
secretary- coordinator model reducing the governor ' s  span of control to 
manageabl e proport ions . Addit iona l l y ,  the move has been to s trengthen 
the pos i t ion of the governor by increas ing the number of agency heads 
that the governor appoints .  The intent ion has been to reduce 
fragmentat ion in which many agency heads were appo inted by boards or 
commis s ions ( Conant , 1 9 8 6 a ,  1 9 8 6 b ,  1 9 8 8 ; Chi , 1 9 9 2 ) . In a number of 
states , comptro l l e rs and/or treasurers continue to be e l ected o f f i c ia l s . 
The state comptrol l er ' s agency f i t s  into this complex bureaucracy as a 
staff agency with overs ight respons ibil i ties for the budget execut ion 
phase of the budget cyc l e  and the product ion of f inancial reports . 
Rel evant interdependenc ies with other sub - units necess itate the need for 
hori zontal commun i cat ion and , somet imes mutual adj ustment with the state 
budget o f f ice and the f i s ca l  o f f i ces of the l ine agencies . Integration 
between the s tate budget o f f ice and the state comptro l l er ' s o f f ice i s  
fac i l i tated i f  both the budget director and state comptrol l er report t o  
the same o f f i c ia l . Thi s could be e i ther a cabinet l evel secre tary o f  
finance o r  the governor . Al s o ,  this structure would facil itate 
integra t i on of budget and accounting systems . 
It would appear that integration of the f inance funct i on i s  not 
fac i l i tated by e l ec t ion of the state comptro l l e r . The same could be 
said for direct e l ect ion of the state treasurer or tax commiss i oner for 
that matter . 
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Line agencies do the i r  own procurement , rece ive invoices f rom vendors 
and prepare vouchers with the proper support ing documentation for vendor 
payments that result in expendi ture of state funds . The se expendi ture 
transact ions f l ow through the s tatewide general ledger accounting system 
that is ma intained by the state comptro l l e r . Accordingly,  this activity 
must be integrated . 
Line agencies report to the i r  own rel evant cabinet l evel secretaries . 
Line agency f i scal o f f icers report to the i r  respect ive agency heads and 
not to the s ta t e  comptrol l e r . I ntegra t i on can not be achieved 
vertically in mos t  day to day operat i ons . Mechani sms mus t  be in place 
to fac i l i ta t e  communicat i ons between l ine agency f i s cal o f f i cers and the 
state comptro l l er ' s  o f f ice . Typ i cal l y ,  the state comptro l l er ' s  o f f ice 
produces written pol i c i e s  and procedures that l ine agency f i scal 
off icers mus t  comply w i th . State comptro l l er ' s  o f f ices f requent l y  
provide training f o r  agency f i scal o f f icers and of ten provide networking 
opportun i t ie s  for l ine agency f i scal o f f i cers . Regular communications 
media be tween the state comptrol l e r ' s o f f ice and l ine agency f i scal 
off icers are ma intained in mos t  s tates ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
In this environment , in which the l ine agency f iscal o f f i cers do not 
report to the s tate comptro l l e r  but to the i r  respect ive l ine agency 
heads , whether the state comptro l l e r  is e lected or appo inted may not 
matter in mos t  day to day operat ions . However ,  in very high prof i l e  
cases , which shoul d  b e  f ew ,  integra t ion i s  not fac i l itated b y  direct 
elect ion of the s tate comptro l l e r . These cases which may cause 
di f f i culty w i l l  mos t  l ikely be due to the uncertainty that economic 
reces s ions bring about . 
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The model presented above by Gol emb iewski ( 1 9 6 4 ) for organi z ing the 
accounting funct ion in a large , complex , organization ,  appears to be the 
theoret i ca l l y  best for organiz ing the state comptro l l e r ' s  o f f i c e  in 
state gove rnment . The complexity of state government compels this form 
of organi zat ion . Gol emb iewski presents a theoretical underpinning that 
clearly j us t i f ie s  i t . With regard to integration of the budget o f f ice 
and state comptro l l er ' s o f f i ce , as we l l  as integrat ion o f  the entire 
f inance func t i on ,  this theory is s i l ent . 
The concept o f  integration can be vi ewed as one of integrating the state 
comptro l l er ' s o f f i ce into state government as a who l e . The budget 
office and comptrol l e r ' s o f f i ce must be integrated in terms of 
organ i zat i on as we l l  a s  systems . However , according to the l iterature , 
the f inance funct ion as a whole , including , at least the treasury and 
the taxat ion funct i ons , shoul d  be integrated . 
When approached f rom a macro l eve l , the ma in problem of managing the 
executive branch of state government is to integrate a highly 
dif ferent iated set of subunits . To the degree that integrat ion i s  
inhibited by direct elect ion of the state comptro l l e r ,  t h i s  practice 
woul d  be cons i dered as not be ing in the interest of e f fectivene s s . 
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However ,  for mos t  day t o  day operat i ons , except perhaps during periods 
of e conomic uncerta inty , it probably is not l ikely to be a maj or factor . 
On a mi cro l eve l , when one vi ews the state comptrol l er ' s o f f ice as the 
relevant uni t  of anal ys i s , we shoul d  ask what k ind of external 
envi ronment does the agency face? What kind of te chnology mus t  it 
employ? What k ind of employee s  mus t  i t  recruit and hire? Thes e  
ques t i ons should he l p  u s  to c l a r i fy how the agency shoul d  be s t ructured , 
and what kind o f  organ i zat ion c l imate and management style woul d  be mos t  
appropriate . Earl i e r ,  both internal and external const i tuencies of the 
state comptro l l er ' s  o f f ice were ident i f ied . 
As regards the l ine agency f i scal o f f icers and thei r  interdependencies 
with each other and the state comptrol l e r ' s  o f f ice , we have an examp l e  
of James Thompson ' s  1 9 6 7  concept c i ted by Rainey , 1 9 9 1  o f  pooled 
interdependenc i e s  which result in mediating technol ogies . The l ine 
agency f i scal o f f ices are sub - un i t s  of the l ine agenc ies , but as regards 
the i r  funct i ons in the budget execut ion phase , they ope rate l ike branch 
o f f ices . The state comptro l l e r ' s  o f f ice operates as the headquarters 
i s suing wr i tt en pol i c i e s  and procedure s .  According l y ,  the f o l l owing 
appl ies to the l ine agency f i s cal o f f i cers as we l l  as the state 
comptrol l er ' s o f f i ce . 
Organ izat ional con f igurat ion for the state comptro l l e r ' s  agency 
The above research indicates that organi zation shoul d  be as a funct ional 
uni t  of state gove rnment that provides oversight to l ine agency f i scal 
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off icers t o  ensure that expendi tures are prope rly supported and in 
compl i ance with appropriate controls , operates the statewide general 
l edger accounting system and provides the neces sary f inanci a l  reports .  
( See Gol embiewsk i ,  1 9 6 4 ) . A review of the NASACT ( 1 9 9 6 ) material 
indicates that this i s  the typ i cal mode of organizat i on . According l y ,  
thi s propos i t ion need not b e  tested . This propos i t ion is s i l ent with 
regard to the relationship of the comptro l l e r ' s  o f f ice with the budget 
office or the other f inance agencies . 
The above l i terature indicates that the budget system , or at least the 
budget appropriation and a l l otments mus t  be integrated into the 
statewide general ledger account ing system . A review of the NASACT 
( 1 9 9 6 )  material indicates that this i s  general ly the case in the state s . 
Accordingly,  this propos i ti on need not be tested . 
The above l i terature indicates that integrat ion of the f inance funct ion 
is des i rabl e .  Most important is integrat ion of the budget and 
account ing funct i ons . Integration of the f inance funct ion as a whol e  i s  
recommended by the l i t erature . See above , the l i terature suggests that 
the appointed comptro l l e r  arrangement be tter fac i l i tates integrat ion of 
the comptrol l er ' s  agency . Howeve r ,  the organizat ional placement of the 
comptro l l e r ' s agency may have an impact on integrat ion of the relevant 
funct i ons . 
Aga i n ,  we have a trade o f f  between independence in the abi l ity o f  an 
elected s tate comptrol l e r  better able to protect his or her agency 
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against a some t imes turbulent pol i t i cal environment and the d i f f iculty 
of integrat ing a complex and dif ferent iated government . Integration is 
an important factor . The s tate comptrol l er ' s agency does not operate in 
a vacuum . Hence , the appointed compt rol ler is hypothesi zed to result in 
be tter integra t i on of the f inance funct ion than wi l l  an e l ected or civil 
service comptro l l e r . 
As indicated above , the organizat iona l conf iguration of the state 
comptro l l er ' s agency in the broader context of state government has a 
bearing on integrat ion of the f inance function . El ected comptro l lers 
are not organ i z ed in an integrated pattern with other finance 
organizat ions . 
The l iterature suggests that i t  i s  more d i f f icult to integrate an 
elected comptro l l er ' s  agency into the government than i t  i s  to integrate 
the appointed comptrol le r ' s  agency . Accordingly,  the organi zat ional 
conf igurat ion that accompanies the e l ected compt rol l e r  wi l l  resul t in 
less e f fective performance of the state comptrol l e r ' s core functions 
than w i l l  other organizational con f igurations that accompany the 
appointed comptro l l e r . Based on the l i terature , the organ i za t iona l 
conf igurat ion in which the state comptrol ler and the other f inance 
agency heads report to a cabinet l evel secretary or dire ctor of f inance 
is hypothes i zed to be the mos t  e f fective in terms of the core functions 
of the state comptro l l e r ' s  agency (as wel l  as the finance funct i on and 
state as a whole ) .  The cabinet level s ecretary of director o f  finance 
then integra t e s  the f inance funct ion . Thi s is l ikely to place l e s s  
strain o n  the governor . 
PROFESS IONAL I SM 
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Many profe s s ional s are employed i n  the pub l i c  sector , many publ i c  
agencie s a r e  dominated b y  pa rt i cular profess ions ( Mosher , 1 9 8 2 )  
Al though some theo r i s t s  point out that some characteristics of 
profess i ona l s  are in con f l i c t  with the norms of large bureaucrat i c  
organ i zat i ons ,  others s e e  l i t t l e  d i f f i culty with employment o f  
professiona l s  in the s e  organi zat ions ( Toren , 1 9 7 6 ) . The not i on that 
bureaucracy means a lack of autonomy for the employee goes against the 
profe s s ional grain . On the other hand , profess ional values agree with 
bureaucra t i c  va lues on the importance of technical  qual i f i cat i ons for 
parti cular pos i t i ons ( Ra iney, 1 9 9 1 ) . 
Al though they indicate that some c r i t i cs of professiona l i sm in publ i c  
organi zat ions argue that professiona l i sm i s  a threat t o  bureauc rat i c  
respons ivenes s ,  Kearney and S i nha ( 1 9 8 8 ,  p .  5 7 1 )  " sugge s t  that the 
expanded role of the profe s s i onal administrator encourages bureauc rat i c  
respons iveness and conc lude that the advantages of a prof e s s i ona l i zed 
bureaucracy far exceed the disadvantages . "  
Given the above d i s cus s ion ,  i t  i s  obvious that professional s  would not 
be happi l y  employed in organizat i ons that are highly centra l i ze d ,  i n  
which except ions a r e  passed to the top , and l i t t l e  discret ion i s  
al lowed . G iven the technol ogical requirements f o r  the employment o f  
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profes s i onal s ,  i t  i s  unl ikely that organi zat ions dominated by a 
particular profess i on w i l l  exhibit those tendencies . In l arger 
organizations having command and control cl imates , profes s i onal s  would 
l ikely be organi zed in subunits with more amenabl e  cl imates ( Rainey , 
1 9 9 1 )  . 
Publ i c  organi za t ions should not a l l  be seen as stereotyp ical ly command 
and control , highly central i z e d ,  bureaucracies . Rather , pub l i c  
organi zat ions , l i ke privat e  ones may have many different 
characterist ics , depending on technol ogy , type of employees ut i l i zed , 
external envi ronment ,  and organizat ional cl imate . Use of profess iona l s  
is not incons i s tent with decentral i z e d ,  f l exible s t ructures 
Due to the complexity of f inancial accounting sys tems needed to manage 
the opera t i ons of state governments and the core functions of the state 
comptrol l e r , part icularly the preparat ion of the CAFR , i t  i s  reasonable 
to conc lude that the accounting profess ion w i l l  be represented in upper 
management of the state comptro l l er ' s  agency . Even i f  the state 
compt rol l e r  i s  not an accountant , the agency ' s  top management w i l l  
genera l l y  include CPA ' s .  
Should the state comptro l l e r  be a CPA? Je f f coat ( 1 9 8 8 )  argues that 
contro l l ers at the f ederal l evel should be profess ional accountant s . He 
blames the prob l em of fragmentat ion of accounting systems at the federal 
level on the fact that many in top f inancial management pos i t ions are 
not accountants . Furman ( 1 9 8 8 )  disagrees with Je f f coat . Furman argues 
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i n  favor of genera l i s ts because he feels that accountants are too rigid 
and narrowly focused . 
Too suggest that accountants are too rigid and narrowly focused i s  to 
resort to s te reotype s . Some accountants , no doubt , f i t  this 
descript ion . None - the - le s s , the argument for a genera l i s t  vs . an 
accountant seems to be s imilar the argument between appointed vs . 
el ected comptrol l e rs , or c i ty managers vs . s trong mayors . 
to ideolog ical preference ( Box , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
I t  boil s  down 
There i s  very l i t t l e  l i terature that speci f ically argues for the state 
comptro l l e r  to have the qua l i f icat ions of a CPA, al though s i x  states 
have this requ i rement ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . The profess iona l i sm l i terature 
general l y  supports a view that profess ional ism is a pos i t ive attribute 
for pub l i c  administrators . Accounting i s  a profes s i on with very 
speci a l i zed knowledge . That the control l er ' s shop in the private sector 
i s  headed by an accountant i s  taken for granted . The core funct ions of 
the state comptrol l e r  require this knowledge . This proj ect hypothe s i z e s  
that the more e f fect ive s t a t e  comptrol ler wi l l  have t h i s  knowledge and 
wi l l  not have to rely on s t a f f  extensively . 
Operat i on of the s tatewide general ledger accounting system with i t s  
nece ssary account ing controls involves the proces s ing of a very large 
volume of transac t i ons . The control s include edits to rej ect 
transac t i ons with improper coding , for funds with insuf f i c i ent cash 
balances , or insuf f i c ient remaining unexpended appropriat ions or 
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allotment s . The ext remel y  large volume of transact i ons that i s  produced 
wi l l  result in some transactions be ing rej ected . Thes e  must be deal t  
with individua l ly . 
Although a very l ow pe rcentage of transactions w i l l  be rej ected by the 
system edits , the large volume of transactions that are processed 
ensures that a fai rly large number of exceptions will occur . For mos t  
of these except ions , wr i t ten pol icies and procedures wi l l  b e  in p l a c e  to 
direct the accountants to be able to resolve them . Thi s  technology 
appears to relate to Perrow ' s concept c i ted by Rainey ( 1 9 9 1 )  of 
eng ineering te chnol ogy . This i s  somewhat centra l i zed but must rema in 
f l exible and i s  charac terized by the existence of wr i t ten rul e s . That 
is , the centra l i zat ion occurs in the state comptrol l e r '  o f f ice where the 
statewide general ledger account ing system is operated and where the 
accounting pol i c i e s  and procedure s are devel oped and enforced . 
The employees o f  the state comptro l l er ' s  o f f ice and the l ine agency 
f i scal o f f ices typ i c a l l y  are account ing oriented . Typ i cal l y ,  the state 
comptrol l er ' s o f f ices are dominated by the members of the account ing 
profess ion . The top career civil se rvants in the state comptro l l er ' s 
office are usua l ly accountants as are the l ine agency f i s cal o f f i cers . 
Thi s  sugges t s  that Mint zberg ' s  ( 1 9 8 0 )  clas s i f i cation of profess ional 
bureaucracy is appropriate . 
In the pas t , state comptrol l er ' s  off ices had many clerica l  emp loyees and 
a f ew accountant s at the top of the organi zat ion . The number of 
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transact i ons that were processed was fewer and the except i ons were a l so 
fewer . This resulted in a more centra l i zed , bureaucratic organi zat ion 
structure with a command and control cl imate . The exceptions were 
referred to the top . At that time , the state comptroller ' s  o f f ice 
probably was more l ike Mint zberg ' s  ( 1 9 8 0 )  clas s i f icat ion of a pub l i c  
machine bureaucracy . 
The clerical funct i ons have been replaced by the computer and the number 
of transact ions have increased . More professional accountants are 
employed and dec i s ions are more often decentra l i zed . The state 
comptro l l er ' s o f f ice has evolved from the pub l i c  machine bureaucracy 
model into the profess ional bureaucracy mode l . 
Even though the technology i s  somewhat stabl e except during e conomic 
downturns , the employment of profess iona l s  sugges t s  that a l e s s  
centra l i zed bureauc ratic structure i s  appropriate . 
The funct ions of the s tate comptrol ler are those that are typically 
performed by members of the account ing profession . Al though there may 
be an argument be tween genera l i s t s  and specia l i sts as highly placed 
government o f f i c ia l s , i t  i s  concluded that the speci f i c  profess i onal 
characteri s t i cs of the functions of the state comptro l l e r  are best 
matched by the knowledge , s k i l l s  and abi l i ties o f  those with an 
accounting education and experience . Much of the power of government 
o f f i c i a l s  i s  the power to persuade which is ga ined by thei r  profess ional 
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qua l i f i ca t i ons . The abi l i ty of the state comptrol ler to exerc ise this 
power i s  enhanced if the state comptrol ler i s  a CPA . 
LENGTH OF TENURE IN POS I TION 
Is stab i l i ty in the o f f ice of state comptrol ler associated with 
e f fect ivenes s ?  Are those state comptrol lers with l onger t enure i n  the 
off ice l ikely to be more e f fect ive ? The top managerial l evel of the 
state comptro l l e r ' s agency wi l l  be career civil servant s  and wi l l  
provide cont inuity for the day t o  day operat i ons o f  the agency . 
Interest ingly,  some directly e l ected state comptro l l er ' s have had very 
long t enure ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . 
At the federal l eve l ,  pol i t ical execut ives tend to have short tenures 
for a number of reasons . This instab i l ity i s  consi dered to be a 
problem . Several wr i ters on tenure cite Heclo ' s  1 9 7 7  work A Government 
of St rangers : Execut ive Pol i t i c s  in Washington ( Ban and I ngraham , 1 9 9 0 ; 
Joyce , 1 9 9 0 ; Haas and Wright , 1 9 8 9 ) . A short tenure does not g ive the 
agency head t ime to l earn on the j ob .  Of course , i f  the agency head has 
a background within the organizat ion , this could be helpful . Agency 
head turnover at the state l evel appears to be less acute than for 
federal appo intees . 
Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 )  argued that state and l ocal f i nance o f f icers having l onger 
tenure we re be tter able to shelter the i r  agenc ies from intrus ions f rom 
the external environment . Meyer also argued that e lected and civil 
service f inance o f f i cers we re be tter abl e to shel ter thei r  agencies than 
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appointed ones a s  were those agency heads that were more insulated from 
the heads of the i r  governments . 
Uncertainty exists when the f i nance agency head has a short tenure . In 
thi s s tudy , Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 )  cons idered less than s ix years to be short . 
Meyer a l s o  f inds that ( p .  1 0 8 )  ( f ) or both indicators of department 
heads autonomy f rom higher authority,  the resul ts were s imi l ar and qui t e  
cons i stent . The l e s s  dependence and the less interchange , the greater 
the predictabi l i ty of organizational structure . ·  What doe s this mean? 
Meyer indicates ( p . 1 2 0 )  that " ( c ) hange occurs in organi zat i ons when 
causal relat i ons operate ; and change can be res i s ted , hence causal 
re lations rendered inope rat ive , by f i rmly entrenched l eadership . ·  
Concluding ( p . 1 2 4 ) that " . . .  l eadership i s  an important e l ement 
mediat ing between environmental uncerta inty and organizationa l change , 
Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 )  indicates the three variables used in his s tudy to de scribe 
l eade rship , " . . .  turnover ,  dependence on higher authority,  and 
insularity - predict fundamental differences in organi za t i ons . ·  
Further research i s  needed to determine whether the characteristics  of 
l eadership impac t  organ i zational performance . As Meyer puts i t  ( 1 2 5 ) , 
" . . .  attempt s  to eva luate the e f fect iveness of organizat ions wi l l  have 
to cons ider attr ibutes of l eadership pos i t i ons i f  the k inds of bas i c  
diff erences in causal patterns revealed here bear any relat ionship t o  
performance . ·  
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Computeri z ed f inanc i a l  a ccount ing systems become obsolete and mus t  be 
repl aced with newer technology periodica l ly . This requires a l ong range 
planning vi ewpo int on the part of the state comptrol l er ' s agency . New 
systems mus t  be acqu i red and implemented . Provis ions for appropriati ons 
must be made . This i s  an important aspect of the core funct ions of the 
state comptro l l e r . 
Considering Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 ) , i t  i s  reasonabl e  to conclude that those state 
comptro l l ers with l onger tenure wi l l  be more e f fective than those with 
shorter tenure . 
Based on the research of Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 ) , the comptro l l e r  that has l onger 
tenure in o f f i ce wi l l  be be tter able to shelter the operat i ng core of 
his or her agency f rom the uncertainty of the pol i t ical environment 
faced by the agency . Because career civil servants have some 
protections aga inst arbi trary dismissa l , they may also have l onger 
tenure than appointed comptro l l e rs . 
Chap t e r  3 
Research Methodo l ogy 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research quest ions that this s tudy is i ntended to answer 
are : 
• Does the manner in which the State Comptrol ler i s  selected impact 
the effectiveness of the State Comptro l l e r ' s agency? 
• Does the organizat ional conf igurat ion of the State Comptro l l er ' s  
agency impact i t s  e f fect ivene s s ?  
• D o  the profess ional qua l i f icat ions of the S t a t e  Compt rol l er impact 
the e f fect ivenes s  of the State Comptro l l er ' s  agency? 
• Doe s the length of tenure of the State Compt rol l e r  impact the 
e f fect ivene s s  of the State Comptroller ' s  agency? 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
This research plan i s  to use mul t ivariate measures of e f fect iveness . 
Based on Zammuto ' s  ( 1 9 8 2 )  theory of mul t iple cons t i tuency mode l s  of 
ef fect ivenes s , the s everal cons t i tuencies of the state comptro l l e r ' s 
agency are identi f ied be low . Fol l owing that , measures indicat ing some 
degree of satis fact ion of each const i tuency are ident i f ied . 
1 4 2  
1 4 3  
The f i r s t  s t ep i n  the research i s  an operat ional de f in i t ion of 
effectivenes s .  Fol l owing Zammuto ' s  ( 1 9 8 2 ) mul t ip l e - const ituency 
theory , s a t i s fact ion of the needs of const i tuenc ies is cons i dered to be 
an indicat i on of e f fect ivene s s  on the part of the state comptrol l er ' s 
agency . The con s t i tuenc i e s  of the State Comptro l l e r  identi f ied are 
external and internal cons t i tuencies . 
INFORMAT ION 
The informa t i on that is ava i lable for this res earch proj ect is 1 9 9 4  and 
1 9 9 5  informat ion that is conta ined in NASACT ( 1 9 9 6 ) and in the Barret t  
and Greene 1 9 9 5 rat ing of the s t a t e s  f o r  Financ ial World . To a l imited 
degree , informa t i on from the Barrett and Greene 1 9 9 9  rat i ngs in 
Govern ing are ut i l i z ed . Some o f  this same informat i on i s  ava i l ab l e  
from 1 9 9 0 in t h e  NASACT , 1 9 92 , and in the Barrett and Greene 1 9 9 2  
rat ing of the s tates i n  Financ i a l  World . In Addition to t e s t s  of 
effectivene s s  as of 1 9 9 5 , some of the tests can be a l so made as o f  1 9 9 0  
and the two may b e  compared . 
Informa t i on on genera l revenues and general expenditures o f  the s tates 
for the expendi ture to revenue ratios i s  ava i l able in biennial i s sues 
of The Book of the States that covered f i scal years from 1 9 8 5  through 
1 9 9 2 . 
CONSTITUENC IES OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER ' S  AGENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
CRITERIA 
Externa l Cons t i tuenc i e s - F inanc ial Communi ty 
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Users o f  governmental accounting ,  reporting and audit ing informat ion 
may be categorized as exte rnal and internal ( Holder , 1 9 8 7 ) . The f irst 
set of const ituenc ies of the State Comptroller ' s agency ident i f ied for 
this research are the external users of the governmental ent i ty ' s 
f inanc ial s tatements conta ined in the state ' s  Comprehens ive Annua l 
Financ i a l  Report , the CAFR . Thi s  set i s  made up of the 
f inanc ial/inves tment communi ty ,  including inves tors in governmental 
bonds , trade rs in these bonds and bond rating agencies ( Moodys and 
Standard & Poor ' s ) . 
The primary value that this set of cons t i tuencies demands i s  adequate 
disclosure of f inanc ial condit ion of the governmental uni t . Adequate 
f inanc i a l  disclosure i s  necessary for the inve s tors to make informed 
investment de c i s i ons . The vehicle for adequate f inanc i a l  disclosure i s  
the audi ted s e t  o f  f inanc ial statements f o r  the f i scal year ( CAFR ) that 
accords with Gene ra l l y  Accepted Accounting Princ iples ( GAAP ) and that 
has an unqua l i f ied ( c lean) audit opinion . The CAFR i s  prepared a fter 
the books have been c l osed for the f i scal year . 
Ra ters and i nvestors can compare the f inancial statement s  of each state 
government and balance risk with return i n  making the inves tment 
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decis i on . I f  the f i nanci a l  statements are not in accordance with GAAP , 
an unqua l i f ied opinion can not be rendered . I f  the f inanc i a l  
statements do n o t  have a c l ean opinion ; that i s , the opinion i s  
qua l i f i ed or d i s cla imed (not rendered due to lack of proper internal 
control s ) , pert inent f inancial informat ion i s  miss ing , i ncomplete or 
generally inadequately disclosed and thus does not faci l i tate the 
investment dec i s i on . The value of an unqua l i f ied audit opinion to this 
const i tuency i s  obvious . 
Most state governments that do not have unqua l i f ied opinions at the 
present t ime have qua l i f i ed opinions . Disclaimers of Opinion are rare 
for state governments . Only one state rece ived a disclaimer for 1 9 9 5  
and this was part ial i n  nature ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . The mos t  usual reason 
for qua l i f i cat ion i s  the inabi l i ty to present auditable f ixed asset 
informa t i on ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) . The dol l ars invested in f ixed assets in 
state government are large . Inabil i ty to present this informat ion in 
the CAFR materially impacts the f inancial presentat ion resulting in the 
qua l i f ied opinion . Tradit iona l l y ,  governments did not account for 
f ixed ass ets , howeve r ,  current GAAP for governments requires rel iable 
account balances for f ixed asset accounts . Fa i lure to have f ixed asset 
accounting systems or general l edger account ing sys tems that w i l l  
accommodate f ixed a s s e t  ac count ing i s  the reason f o r  t h i s  s ituati on . 
Over t ime , more and more states have implemented f i xed asset accounting 
systems thus obtaining unqua l i f ied opinions . 
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The financi a l  communi ty i s  generally sat i s f i ed with a Comprehens ive 
Annual Financial Report ( CAFR ) that is GAAP based and that has rece ived 
an unqua l i f i ed aud i t  opinion . NASACT , 1 9 9 6  indicates that 4 8  states 
used a GAAP bas i s  for the i r  1 9 9 5  f i s cal year CAFR . Vermont began to 
use GAAP for f inanc i a l  report i ng in f i s cal 1 9 9 6 . Kansas uses the 
modified cash bas i s  ( not GAAP ) . At the t ime of the 1 9 9 1  NASACT ( 1 9 9 2 ) 
survey , 4 3  states used GAAP for the i r  f inanc ial report i ng . 
NASACT ( 1 9 9 6 ) , table 2 8 , pages 1 6 7 - 1 7 4 contains informa t i on on t he 
audit opinion for each state that was ava i l able at the t ime of the 1 9 9 6  
survey f o r  S tate Comptrol l ers : Te chni cal Act ivities  and Funct i ons . Of 
the 48 s tates that had a pub l i shed audit ,  37 had unqual i f ied opinions , 
1 0  had qua l i f i ed op inions and one had a qua l i f i ed opinion and a 
disclaimer of opinion . NASACT , 1 9 9 2 , table 2 9 ,  pages 1 1 7 - 1 2 4 , 
indi cates that 2 5  s tate had unqual i f ied opinions on 1 9 9 0  f i nanc i a l  
statements . The f i rst measure of e f fect ivenes s  wi l l  be having a CAFR 
with an unqual i fied opinion . 
Additiona l l y ,  rece iving the GFOA Cer t i f i cate of Achievement wi l l  be a 
measure of e f fect i vene ss . NASACT , 1 9 9 6 , table 3 4 , pages 2 0 8 - 2 1 1  
presents informa t i on on states that have rece ived the GFOA cert i f i cate . 
By 1 9 9 5 , 3 1  s tates had rece ived this award . NASACT , 1 9 9 2 , t able 3 6 ,  
pages 1 4 5 - 14 9 ,  indicates that for the i r  1 9 9 0  f inanc ial statements ,  2 1  
states had rece ived the GFOA Cert i f i cate o f  Achievement . 
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States having GAAP ba s i s  f inanc ial statements with " cl ean" audit 
opinions would be consi dered e f fect ive whi l e  states not having GAAP 
statements with c l ean opinions would be cons idered less e f f e c t ive . 
Simi larly,  s tates having the GFOA Cert i f i cate of Achievement for 
Excellence i n  Financial Reporting ,  which requ i re s  GAAP bas i s  stat ement s  
with a n  unqua l i f i ed audit opinion , would b e  conside red e f fect ive . The 
GFOA certi f i cate is based on an obj ect ive and consis tent review of the 
CAFR of each state by the GFOA pane l . Accordingly,  reliance on this as 
a measure of e f fect ivenes s  would be preferable to rel i ance only on the 
audit opinion . 
Based on the above , i t  appears that both the ut i l i za t ion of the audit 
opinion and certi f i cat ion by the GFOA as indicat ion or measure of the 
ef fectivene s s  of the performance of the s tate compt rol l e r  have val idity 
and rel i abi l i ty and are appropriate measures of e f fectivenes s  for the 
external con s t i tuencies of the State Comptrol l e r ,  the 
f inanc ial / inves tment community . 
External cons t i tuenc i e s - c i t i zens 
A second set of external cons t ituencies of the State Comptro l l er ' s 
agency would be the c i t i z ens o f  the state . Holder ( l 9 8 7 )  includes 
interested c i t i zens a s  external users o f  governmental account ing 
sys tems . C i t i zens pay the taxes that support governmental operations . 
In add i t i on to being re sources providers , they are the recip ients of 
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the service s  provided by the governmental uni t . C i t i zens are concerned 
with the f i nanc i a l  viab i l i ty of the governmental uni t . Thei r  concern 
is to be abl e  to determine that the governmental organizat ion wi l l  be 
able to continue to provide services ( Wooldridge , 1 9 8 2  c i tes Robert 
Anthony 1 9 7 8 ) . The i r  expectations would be for f i s cal respons ibi l i ty ,  
reasonable control over expendi tures of s tate funds and reasonabl e  
financ ial disclosure . 
Ult imately,  reasonabl eness woul d  be determined by the c i t i z ens 
pol i t i ca l l y . I f  the c i t i z ens f e l t  f inanc ial control to be inadequate , 
in the case of an e l e c ted state comptro l l e r ,  they would f a i l  to re -
elect him or her to that pos i t ion in the next e l ect ion . In the case of 
an appo inted state comptrol ler , the issue woul d  have to be determined 
at a higher leve l , that of the governor . I f  a candidate for governor 
felt lack of f inanc ial control to be an i s sue , it would be brought up 
during the campa i gn . The winning candidate could then replace the 
state comptrol l er . 
Citi zens of the state are an important external cons t ituency o f  the 
state comptro l l e r . Obtaining an unqua l i f ied audit op inion and rece ipt 
of a GFOA certi f i cate are equally good measures for c i t i zens as for the 
f inanc i a l  commun i t y .  Usua l ly ,  the CAFR contains a wri t t en summary , 
including graphs , that pres ents the important el ement s  o f  the state ' s  
f inanc i a l  cond i t i on in terms that are understandabl e  by those not 
having an ac count ing or f inancial management background . 
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summary External Const i tuencies 
According to NASACT 1 9 96 , 37  states had unqua l i fied audit op inions on 
the i r  mos t  recent CAFR ' s  and 3 1  states have rece ived the GFOA 
cert i f i cate for the f i scal year 1 9 94 or 1 9 9 5 . For the f iscal years 
1 9 8 9  or 1 9 9 0 , 21 states received this award and 25 had unqua l i f ied 
opinions ( NASACT , 1 9 9 2 ) . 
The state comptro l ler genera l l y  has an inf luence on the choice of the 
statewide ac count ing system ut i l i zed by the state . Also , the state 
comptrol l e r  estab l i shes ac counting internal contro l s  neces sary to the 
proper funct ioning of the statewide accounting system . The state 
comptro l ler has at l ea s t  some cont rol over the staf f of the 
comptro l l er ' s agency that administers the accounting sys tem and 
prepares the CAFR . Based on these , it is reasonabl e  to conc lude that 
the State Comptrol l er ' s abi l ity to produce cert i f iable f inanc ial 
statement s  i s  l argely under his or her contro l . Thi s  research wi l l  
ut i l i z e  obta ining an unqua l i f ied audit opinion a s  a measure of 
organizat ional e f fect ivene s s . Whether the state ha s an unqua l i f i ed 
op inion on i ts CAFR and a l so whether i t  has rece ived the GFOA 
Cert i f icate of Achievement , wi l l  determine the e f fectiveness of the 
state comptro l l e r  and of the comptro l l e r ' s agency to sat i s fy its 
external const ituencies . 
Internal Con s t i tuenc i e s - S tate ' s  Top Financ ial Management Team 
Two sets of internal users are ident i f ied . The primary needs of each 
these sets of users d i f f er . 
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The state ' s  top f inancial managers need accounting information to make 
f inanc i a l  dec i s i ons dur ing the budget execut ion phase .  The top 
f inancial managers are genera l l y  Secre tary or Director of F inance , 
State Comptrol l e r , State Budget D i rector and State Tax Commiss ioner ,  
and members and s t a f f  o f  l eg i s l a t ive money commi ttees . Thes e  managers 
need t ime ly interim reports of ac tual revenues and expenditures 
compared to those e s t imated and budgeted . Holder ( 1 9 8 7 ,  pp . 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 )  
points out that managers and admini s trators re spons ible for such 
functions as budget execut i on ,  control l ing expendi tures ( f is cal 
compl ianc e ) , revi ewing ope rat i ons and applying analytical techn i ques to 
f inanc i a l  informat ion are internal users of gove rnmental accounting 
systems . The informat ion needed by these users is not the CAFR , which 
i s  produced a s  o f  the end of the f i scal period, but rather more t ime ly 
informat ion that i s  conta ined in f inanc ial reports that are prepared on 
a recurring bas i s  during the f i scal year ( Holder , 1 9 8 7 ) .  
Consider ing the importance o f  interim f inanc ial reports to this 
cons t i tuency , i t  i s  reasonable to conclude that those State 
Comptro l l er ' s o f f ices that produce t imely and frequent interim 
f inanc i a l  reports are more e f fect ive than those that do not produce 
them or that produce them less frequent ly . 
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Thi s  group values f i scal respons ibi l i ty , which i s  achieved by 
centra l i zation of budgetary control to ensure that expenditures are 
held i n  l ine with appropriations and with revenues to the degree 
pos s i bl e . Genera l ly ,  the states have bal anced budget requirement s  
( NASBO , 1 9 9 5 ) . The bal anced budget requi rements of the states 
nece s s i tate the f i scal respons ibi l i ty value of this const ituency . 
Pi tsvada and Howard ( 1 9 8 6 ) cite Buck ' s  1 9 3 4  work on the need for 
centra l i z a t i on for f i nanc i a l  execut ives to contro l  spending i f  
necessary due to revenue shor t f a l l s  during the budget execut ion phase . 
The veh i c l e  used by these managers are interim reports and control 
features of the s tatewide accounting system that ensure that 
expendi tures w i l l  not exceed appropriat ions . Al so , they rely on the 
pol i c i e s , procedures and account ing cont rols mandated by the State 
Comptrol l e r . 
The produc t i on of interim f inancial reports by the state comptrol l er ' s 
agency may be used to determine e f f e c t ivene ss in mee t ing the needs o f  
the state ' s  top f inanc i a l  management team . Interim management 
f inanc i a l  reports are produced from the s tatewide account ing sys tem . 
An unqua l i f i ed aud i t  opinion provides assurance that the internal 
contro l s  surrounding the a ccounting system are in place and operat ing 
properly in conj unc t i on with the statewide accounting system to enab l e  
the S t a t e  Comp t ro l l e r ' s  agency to produce a CAFR that presents fairly 
the f inanc i a l  cond i t ion of the state . I nasmuch as the audit mus t  occur 
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every f i s cal yea r ,  i t  i s  reasonable t o  conclude that a success ion o f  
cl ean audi t opi n i ons suggests that assurance extends t o  product ion o f  
t imely and accurate interim reports between years with clean audit 
op inions . 
Preparat ion of interim reports wi l l  be one aspect of evidence of 
effectivene s s  in s a t i s fying this cons t i tuency . NASACT , 1 9 96 , tab l e  3 4 , 
pages 2 0 8 - 2 1 1  contains information on whi ch state compt rol l e rs off ices 
prepare interim reports . At the t ime of the 1 9 9 5  survey,  27 states did 
prepare interim f inanc i a l  reports . At the t ime of the 1 9 9 1  survey, 2 2  
states prepa red i n t e r i m  f inanci a l  reports ( NASACT , 1 9 92 , t a b l e  3 6 , 
pages 1 4 5 - 1 4 9 ) . 
Al s o ,  provis ion of f inanc i a l  ana lys i s  in conj unct ion with periodic 
report ing by the state comptroller wi l l  be evidence of e f fect ivene ss 
that sat i s f i e s this cons t i tuency . NASACT , 1 9 9 6 , table 1 2 , pages 6 9 - 7 0 ,  
provides i nforma t ion on wh ich s tates provide f i nanc ial anal ys i s . 
NASACT , 1 9 92 , provides this informat ion f rom the earl i e r  survey in 
table 1 5 ,  pages 4 3 - 4 4 . 
Furthe r ,  evidence of act ions taken by the state comptroller to ident i f y  
best pra ct i ces or deve l op benchmarks wi l l  b e  used to determine 
effect i vene s s . Thi s  in forma t i on is presented in NASACT , 1 9 9 6 , table 
16 , pages 1 0 0 - 1 0 5 . 
not ava i l able . 
Comparable informa t ion for the earl i e r  period i s  
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Prepara t i on of interim f inanc ial s tatements , provision of f inancial 
analysis and i dent i f icat ion of best p ractices and deve l opment of 
benchmarks are activi t ie s  that are under the control of the state 
comptro l l e r . In add i t ion , three other measures of e f fect ivenes s  wi l l  
b e  cons idered . The se are bond ratings by the bond rating agenc ies , the 
Barret t  and Greene ( 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 9 )  rat ings in Financ ial Wor l d  and 
Governing and rat i o  of expenditures to revenues for each state ove r a 
reasonable per i od of t ime . The se measures of e f fect iveness are l ess 
directly under the control of t he state comptro l l e r  than those 
identi f ied earl i e r . 
The state ' s  f inanc i a l  management team i s  interested in receiving a good 
bond rat ing . As of 1 9 9 5 , Barre t t  and Gre ene present thi s informat ion 
in the i r  rat ing o f  the states ( The S tate of the States 1 9 9 5 , in 
Financ i a l  World Septembe r  2 6 , 1 9 9 5 , pages 3 6 - 6 0 ) . 
Addit i ona l l y ,  the state ' s  f inancial management team wi l l  cons ider a 
good rat ing f rom Barrett and Greene in Financ i a l  World to be indicat ive 
of e f fectivenes s . Ac cordingly , the rat ing for the states for 1 9 9 5  for 
f inanc i a l  management wi l l  be use as a measure of e f fect ivene s s . 
Barrett and Greene present 1 9 9 1  bond rat ings in the i r  1 9 9 2  rat ing of 
the s tates in Financial World . 
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The state ' s  f i nanc ial management team wi l l  b e  satisfied i f ,  over time , 
general expendi tures wi l l  have been he ld in l ine with general revenues . 
I f  a ra iny day or budget s tab i l i zat ion fund has been maintained so much 
the bet ter . Evidence of holding general expenditures in l ine with 
general revenues wi l l  be determined by a ratio of general expenditures 
to general revenues for each state for a period of f i scal years . Thi s  
period w i l l  inc lude the early 1 9 9 0 ' s  recess ion . A ratio of 1 . 0 0 or 
greater wi l l  be considered ine f fect ive . A rat io of less than 1 . 0 0 w i l l  
b e  cons idered e f f ective . A ratio of . 9 5 or less wi l l  be evidence of a 
5 \  rainy day fund bal ance and wi l l  be considered more e f fect ive . The 
ratio has been deve l oped based on f i s cal years 1 9 8 5  through 1 9 9 2  f rom 
informat ion conta ined in the several edit ions of The Book of the 
States . 
Internal Constituenc ies - Line Agencies of the State 
Another set of internal users are the l ine agenc ies of state 
government . The relevant managers here a re the agency heads , usua l l y  
appointed b y  t h e  Gove rno r ,  and the agency f i scal personne l , usua l l y  
career civil service emp l oyees w i t h  publ i c  f inanc ial management or 
accounting backgrounds . The l ine agencies must follow control pol icies 
and procedures of the S tate Comptro l l e r . The values of the l ine 
agenc ies include having the abi l i ty to use some discret i on in spending 
the resource s  appropr iated to them in carrying out the agency ' s  
miss ion . The l ine agencies value reasonabl eness of cont rol s  ( not too 
stringent ) and a statewide accounting sys tem that is reasonably user 
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friendly .  One veh i c l e  used by l ine agenc ies i s  also interim f inanc ial 
statements a t  the level of agency . 
Variabl es have been i dent i f i ed to measure the e f fect ivene ss of the 
state comptro l l e r ' s agency in meet ing the needs of the l ine agenc ies of 
state government . A composite of features that have to do with ease o f  
use of comptro l l e r ' s systems , provis ion of CPE to agenc ies , and 
services to l ine agency f i scal pe rsonne l has been devel oped based on 
several tables included in NASACT , 1 9 96 . Thes e  are : 
• Use of LAN/WAN ne tworks for providing access to central account ing 
systems ( Tab l e  2 4 , page s 1 4 5 - 1 5 1 ) . 
• Use of c l ient server app l i cat ions in conj unc t i on with central 
account ing sys tems ( Table 2 4 ,  pages 1 4 5 - 1 5 1 ) . 
• Provi s i on of CPE to l ine agency f i scal personnel ( Tables 1 7 a ,  pages 
1 0 6 - 1 0 8 ; and 1 7 b ,  pages 1 0 9 - 1 1 1 ) . 
• Use of procurement ca rds ( Table 1 6 , pages 1 0 0 - 1 0 5 )  
• Use o f  t rave l cards ( Tabl e  1 6 , page s 1 0 0 - 1 0 5 ) . 
These f ive measures are comb ined into a composite measure of 
e f fectivene s s  for the l ine agenc ies . The NASACT , 1 9 9 2  resu l t s  of the 
1 9 91 survey contains information on use of LAN/WAN networks ( tabl e  2 3 , 
pages 9 9 - 1 0 1 )  and provi s i on of CPE to l ine agenc ies ( tables l Oa and 
l O b ,  page s 2 1 - 2 4 )  . 
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Mul t ipl e Con s t i tuenc i e s - Competing Values 
The above ident i f ied const i tuencies of the State Comptro l l e r  have 
different val ue s , make compe ting demands on the State Comptro l l e r  and 
ut i l i z e  d i f f e rent outputs of the Comptro l l er ' s  agency . Some means of 
sat is fying these sets of constituenc ies must be found i f  the State 
Comptro l l e r ' s agency i s  to be cons idered e f fect ive according to t he 
mul tiple const i tuency mode l favored by Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 ) . The manner in 
which t he Comptro l l er i s  se lected and the organizat ional pos i t ion of 
the o f f ice may impact the amount of power and discret ion the 
Compt rol ler has to f ind the be s t  mix or compromise in e f fective l y  
performing h i s  or h e r  dut ies . 
STATE COMPTROLLER ' S  AGENCY CHARACTER ISTICS 
Effect ivene s s , a s  indicated by the above measures , wi l l  be cons ide red 
to be the dependent variabl e .  Agency characte ristics , such as method 
of select ion of s tate comptro l l e r ,  agency organi zat ional conf igurat ion , 
profess ional qua l i f ications and tenure of the state comptro l ler w i l l  be 
cons idered a s  independent variabl es . The research que s t ions wi l l  be 
answered by de termining whe ther any corre lat ion exi s t s  between the 
independent variables and e f fect ivene ss as described above . Thirteen 
measures of e f fe c t iveness for the 1 9 9 5  data are estab l ished . Of these , 
the l a s t  f ive wi l l  be taken as a composite . Some of these measures are 
also ava i lable f rom the 1 9 9 1  survey . Use of the 1 9 9 5  data contained in 
the above sources wi l l  be the primary means of determina t ion . Where 
ava i labl e , this  w i l l  be compared to the s imilar 1 9 9 1  data . 
1 5 7  
The ef fect ivenes s  variables are considered t o  b e  the dependent 
variables . The test ing wi l l  involve determination of corre lat ion 
between the characte r i s t i c s  of the state comptrol l er ' s agency in terms 
of method of selection ,  organi zat ional conf igurat ion as described 
below ,  qua l i f icat ions and tenure of the state comptrol l e r  with the 
effectivene s s  va riabl e s . Analys i s  of cross tabulat ions wi l l  be t he 
main method of the de terminat ion of correlat ion . 
LEVELS OF MEASUREMENT 
Meier and Brudney ( 1 9 9 3 ) indicate that there are three l eve l s  of 
measurement , nominal , ordinal and interval . welch and Comer ( 1 9 8 8 )  
ident ify a fourth , leve l , rat i o . Mos t  o f  the e f f ect ivenes s  variables 
ident i f i ed in this research are ordinal variabl es . That i s , even 
though many are yes or no que st ions , there is an order ranki ng to them . 
For example , the agency e i ther rece ived an unqua l i f ied opinion on the 
audit of the f inanc i a l  statements or it did not . To rece ive an 
unqual i f ied opinion i s  cons idered preferable to rece iving a qua l i f ied 
opinion . S imilarly,  receipt of the GFOA cert i f icate , preparat ion of 
interim f inanc ial reports , provis ion of analys i s , etc . are ordered 
higher than not receiving the GFOA cert i f i cate , not preparing interim 
reports and not providing analys is , etc . 
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A few o f  the e f fect ivenes s  variables may b e  clas s i f ied a s  interval . 
The bond rat ings , Financial Wor ld rat i ngs and expendi ture to revenue 
ra tios could be treated as interval variables . These wi l l  be treated 
as ordina l variables in this research proj ect . Appendix C i s  a code 
book which conta i ns informat ion on how the variables are coded . 
On the other hand , the independent variables , method of select ion and 
organizat i ona l conf igura t i on are nominal variables . No order i s  
at tached to whether the state comptro l l e r  is e l ected , appointed b y  the 
governor ,  other o f f i c i a l , or i s  career civil s ervi ce . S imilarly,  no 
order i s  at tached to the particular organ i zat ional configura t ion in 
which the agency i s  l ocated in the s tate gove rnment . 
Whether the s tate comptrol l e r  i s  certif ied or not would usua l ly be 
cons idered as an ordinal var iabl e .  Having a cert i f i ca t i on for an 
\ 
account ing related pos i t ion would rank higher than not having thi s 
qual i f icat ion . Having a l onger or shorter tenure would be considered 
as a nominal var i abl e . 
As i s  evident from the above , the variabl e s  involved in the research 
are ordinal or nominal . For ordinal and nominal variabl e s ,  contingency 
tables ( o r  cross tabulat ions ) are the appropriate method of analys i s  
(Meier and Brudney , 1 9 9 3 ; We l ch and Comer , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
Thi s  research w i l l  devel op contingency tables that present t he 
dependent and independent variabl es in appropr iate format us ing 
percentages .  
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Testing of each hypothe s i s  w i l l  b e  accompl i shed by stat ing each i n  the 
form of a nul l  hypothe s i s . The results w i l l  a l l ow for acceptance or 
rej ection of the nul l  hypothes i s . 
Testing for s t at i s t i cal s igni f i cance is generally u sed to ensure that 
conclus i ons drawn f rom a samp l e  are repre sentat ive of the population 
the samp l e  represent s . Thi s  research dea l s  with the ent i re popul at ion 
of state comp t ro l lers and not a sample of them . Accordingly,  tests of 
stat i s t ical s igni f i cance will not be used in this research ( We l ch and 
Come r ,  1 9 8 8 ,  p .  2 1 9 - 2 2 0 ) . Contingency tables wi l l  be presented t hat 
show rel evant per centages . De terminat ion of t he material i ty or 
strength of associat ions w i l l  be based on compari son of obse rved to 
expected outcome s . When analyz ing the c ross tabulat ions , percentages in 
the total column are used as benchma rks . Individual categories would 
not be cons i dered rel evant unl e s s  they d i f f ered f rom the total 
percentages by at least 10 percent . Expected outcome s a s sume no 
associat ion . 
An add i t iona l app roach to e f fect ivene s s  on the part of the o f f ices o f  
the 5 0  s t a t e  comp t rol l e rs i s  a top down l ook at effectivenes s .  
Ef fect ive and ine ffect ive states wi l l  be i dent i f ied generally based on 
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the e f fect ivene s s  indicators above indicated . Characterist ics of the 
state agency wi l l  be revi ewed to determine if e f fect ive states have any 
particular characteri stics in common . The e f fect iveness indicators and 
characteristics  w i l l  be those contained in NASACT 1 9 96 , 1 9 92 and in the 
Barret t  and Greene Financ i a l  World rat ings described above . 
SUMMARY :  EFFECTIVENESS CRI TERIA 
External consti tuenc i e s - f inanc i a l  communi ty 
• Agenc i e s  having c l ean opin ion ' s  on the i r  CAFR are determined to be 
e f fect ive , those having qua l i f ied op inions wi l l  are considered to be 
ine f fect ive . 
• Agenc i e s  having the GFOA cert i f i cate of Achi evement are cons idered 
to be e f f ect ive , those not having the cert i f i cate are cons idered to 
be ineffect ive . 
External Constituenc ies - c i t i zens 
Citi zens of the s tate are an important external constituency of t he 
state comptroller . Obta ining an unqua l i f ied audit opinion and receipt 
of a GFOA cert i f i cate are equal ly good measures for c i t i zens as for the 
financial communi ty .  Accordingly,  e f f ect iveness in sati s fact ion of the 
needs of c i t i z ens is considered the same as those for the other 
external consti tuency iden t i f i e d ;  i . e . , the f inancial communi t y .  
Internal constituencies - f inancial management t eam 
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• States that prepared interim f inancial reports are cons i de red 
e f f ective . Those that did not are cons idered ine f fect ive . Use o f  
the 1 9 9 5  dat a  contained i n  the above sources w i l l  b e  the primary 
means of det e rminat ion . This w i l l  be compared to the s imilar 1 9 9 1  
data . 
• States that provided rout ine f inancial analys i s  are cons idered 
e f f ect ive . Those that did not are cons idered inef f ect ive . Use of 
the 1 9 9 5  data conta ined in the above sources will be the p rimary 
means of de t e rmination . This w i l l  be compared to the simi l a r  1 9 9 1  
data . 
• States that ident i f ied be s t  prac t i ce s  or devel oped benchmarks are 
considered to be e f f ect ive . Those that did not are cons idered to be 
ine f fe c t ive . Onl y  1 9 9 5  da ta i s  ava i l abl e . 
• A numerical grade has been ass igned to bond rat ings and each state 
given t he appropriate numerical grade based on i t s  1 9 9 5  bond rating 
as conta ined in t he 1 9 9 5  Financ ial world rat ing . Both 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1  
bond ratings are avai labl e . 
• A nume r i cal grade has been given to each state that corre sponds to 
the f inanc i a l  management rat ing g iven by F inanc ial World ( Barrett 
and Greene ) in 1 9 9 5  rat ing o f  t he states . In this manne r ,  A=4 , A­
= 3 . 7 5 ,  B+ = 3 . 2 5 .  B = 3 , e t c . The 1 9 92 Barrett and Greene F inancial 
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World rat ings of the states g ives only ove ral l  rat ings and does not 
contain a f i nanc i a l  management only rating . Overal l  rat i ngs for the 
1 9 9 2  rat ings wi l l  be used . Addit ionally,  the Barret t  and Greene 
1 9 9 9  rat ing publ i shed in Governing are used in a l imited way as 
these be came ava i l able late in the research proj ect . Le tter grades 
for f inanc i a l  management were compared to selection criteria only . 
( See chapters 4 and 5 for addit ional informat ion . )  
• The ratio of general expenditures to general revenues for f i scal 
years 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 2  has been deve l oped . States scoring 1 . 0 0 or above 
are considered to be ine ffect ive . Those scoring between . 9 9 and . 9 6 
are cons idered to be fairly e f fective . Those scoring . 9 5 or be low 
are cons i dered to be very e f fect ive . 
Internal cons t i tuencies - l ine agencies 
A composite e f fect ivene ss measure ha s been deve loped of services 
provided by the s tate comptro l l er ' s agency that include LAN/WAN 
networks ,  c l ient server app l i cat ions , provi s ion of CPE to agencies , use 
of procurement card and use of trave l card . Agencies can score in a 
range o f  between z ero ( l east e f fect ive ) and f ive ( most e f fective ) . Use 
of the 1 9 9 5  data contained in the above sources wi l l  be the primary 
means of determinat ion . Where ava i l abl e ,  this wi l l  be compared to the 
similar 1 9 9 1  data . 
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The effect ivenes s  measures discussed above are cons idered t o  be 
dependent variabl e s . The research ident i f ie s  agency character i s t ics in 
four areas a s  descr ibed below a s  the independent var iabl es . Thes e  are 
method of s e l e c t i on , organ i zat i onal configurat i on ,  profess i onal 
qua l i f i ca t ions and l engt h  of tenure of the state comptro l l e r . The 
research compares t he independent variables ( agency characteri s t i c s ) to 
the dependent var i ables ( e f fect ivene s s  measure s )  using conti ngency 
tabl es ( c ross tabulat ions ) . 
METHOD OF S ELECTION OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
The f i r s t  r e s e a rch qu e s t ion i s : doe s  the manne r  in which the S ta t e  
Comptrol l e r  i s  s e l e c ted impac t the e f f e c t ivene s s  o f  t h e  S t a t e  
Comptro l l er ' s agency? 
Hypothe s i s  1 .  
The f i r s t  hypothe s i s  i s  that there wi l l  be a s trong r e l a t ionship 
between the method of s e l e c tion of the S t ate comp t r o l l e r  and the 
e f f e c t ivene s s  of the S t a t e  Comp t ro l l er ' s agency . 
This hypothe s i s  i s  restated in the f orm of a nul l  hypothe s i s . 
The res earch wi l l  not f i nd a s t rong r e l a t ionship be tween the method o f  
s e l e c t i on o f  the S ta t e  comp trol l e r  and the e f f e c t ivene s s  o f  the S ta t e  
Comp t ro l l er ' s agency . 
This hypothe s i s  was tested as described below : 
Select ion of State Comptroller 
Select ion of state comptroller can be grouped into four categories . 
The se a re : 
• Elected 
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• Appointed b y  the governor and serves at the pl easure of the governor 
• Appointed at a l evel lower than that of governor 
• Career civil service 
Corre lat ion be tween e f fect iveness and method of select ion was conducted 
by use of cross tabul at ions . Use of the 1 9 9 5  data contained in the 
above sources was the primary means of determinat ion . Where avai l abl e ,  
this was compared t o  the s imilar 1 9 9 1  data . 
ORGANI ZATIONAL CONFIGURATION FOR THE STATE COMPTROLLER' S AGENCY 
The second r e s earch que s t ion i s : does the organ i z a t i onal con f i guration 
of the S ta t e  Comp t ro l l er ' s  agency in the l arger context of s tate 
government impact its e f f e c tivene s s ?  
Organ i z at ional conf iguration of the state comptrol l er ' s agency in the 
larger context of state government may faci l itate or hinder integrat ion 
of the f inanc ial management funct ion . I t  is reasonable to conclude 
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that the organ i za t ional conf igurat ion o f  the state comptro l l e r ' s agency 
wil l impact the e f fect iveness of the agency ' s  performance . 
Hypo the s i s  2 
The s e cond hypo th e s i s  i s  that there wi l l  be a s trong r e l a tionship 
between the organ i z a t ional con f i guration of the S ta t e  comp tro l l er ' s 
agency and i t s  e f f e c t i vene s s .  
This hypothe s i s  i s  restated in the form of a nul l  hypothe s i s : 
The r e s e arch wi l l  not f i nd a s t rong r e l a t ionship be tween the 
organ i z a t i onal con f i guration of the S t a t e  comp t ro l l er ' s agency and i t s  
e f fec tivene s s . 
This hypothe s i s  was te sted as described be low . 
Organizat ional con f igura ti on 
Organizat ional conf igurat ion of the state comptro l l e r ' s  agency can be 
grouped into three categories . Thes e  are : 
Func ti ona l ly integrated f i nance function . 
• Comptro l l er ' s agency f i t s  into a department of f inance that includes 
the budget o f f icer and other f i nance agencies . Comptrol l e r  and 
• 
budget off icer report directly to the director or secretary of 
f i nance . 
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The state comptrol l e r  i s  appointed by and serves a t  the pleasure o f  
the governor . The state comptroller reports direct ly t o  the 
governor and does not f i t  into a department of f inance t hat includes 
the budget o f f i ce r .  Budget off icer also reports directly t o  the 
Governor . 
Indirec t ly integra ted f inance funct ion 
• State comptrol l er ' s  agency f i t s  into a department of f inance that 
does not inc l ude the budget o f f icer . Comptroller reports directly 
to the direc tor or secretary of f inance . Budget o f f i cer reports 
directly to Governor . 
Non- func t i ona l ly integrated finance funct ion 
• State Comp t ro l l e r  is e l ected and the re fore doe s not report to 
governor e i t he r  directly or indirect ly . 
During the research phase , close examinat ion was made of actual 
organizat ional conf igurat i ons to determine if earl ier , tentat ive 
conclus ions hold up . Data contained in the 1 9 96 NASACT i s  s l ight ly 
different f rom that in the 1992 book . The main concern i s  that budget 
off ice and comp t ro l l er ' s operations are integrated . Mos t t reasurers 
are el ected . 
1 6 7  
Correlations between e f f ect iveness and organi zat iona l conf igurat i on 
were dete rmined by use of c ross tabulat ions comparing organizat i ona l 
conf igurat ion to the e f fect ivenes s  measure s .  Use of the 1 9 9 5  dat a  
contained in t h e  above sources was the primary means of det e rminat ion . 
Where ava i l ab l e , this wa s compared to the simi lar 1 9 9 1  data . 
Addi t i ona l l y ,  hypotheses regarding profess ional ism and tenure are put 
forward . 
PROFESSIONAL I SM 
The third research que s t i on i s  do the pro f e s s i onal qual i f i c a t ions o f  
the S ta t e  Comp t ro l l e r  impact the e f f e c t ivene s s  o f  the S t a t e  
Comptro l l er ' s agency? 
These qua l i f ications are evidenced by professional cert i f i ca t i on of the 
state comp t ro l ler . I t  i s  reasonabl e  to conclude that the profess ional 
qua l i f i cat ions of the state comptroller w i l l  impact the e f f e c t ivene s s  
of the performance of the s tate comp tro l l er ' s agency . 
Hypothe s i s  3 
The third hypo the s i s  i s  that there wi l l  be a s trong r e l a tionship 
between the p ro f e s s ional qua l i f i c a t ions of the S t a t e  comp trol l e r ,  a s  
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indi cated by the comp trol l er be ing a CPA o r  holding another reasonab l e  
f inanc i a l  c e r t i f i c a t i on and t h e  e f f e c tiveness o f  the S t a t e  
Comp tro l l e r ' s  agency . 
This hypothe s i s  i s  restated in the form of a null hypothesis : 
The r e s e arch wi l l  no t f ind a s trong r e l a t ionship b e tween the 
pro f e s s ional qual i f i c a t i on s of the S tate comp t ro l l er and the 
e f fec tiven e s s  of the S t a t e  Comp t ro l l e r ' s  agency . 
The NASACT surveys ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 , 1 9 92 ) ident i fy the qua l i f icat ions of 
each state comptro l l e r  in terms of whethe r  or not each i s  a CPA or 
holds other reasonable f inancial cert i f i cation . This agency 
charac t e r i s t i c  is cons idered as an independent variabl e .  
State comptro l l e r s  having any f inanc ially related certi f i cat ion are 
considered as be ing profess iona l l y  cert i f ied . In addition to CPA 
( cert i f ied pub l i c  accountant ) other p rofessional cert i f ications held by 
state comptrol lers included CMA ( ce r t i f ied management accountant ) ,  CGFM 
( cert i f ied government f inanc ial manage r ) , CFP ( ce rt i f ied f inancial 
planner ) ,  CFE ( ce r t i f ied f raud examine r )  and CGFO ( ce rt i f ied government 
f inanci a l  o f f i cer ) per NASACT 1 9 96 , table 1 ,  pages 5 and 6 .  S tate 
comptro l l ers holding any of the above cert i f ications are cons idered to 
be profess iona l l y  cert i f i e d .  The state comptro l l ers were grouped into 
two groups , cert i f ied and not cert i f ied . 
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Test ing o f  this hypothe s i s  involved determination o f  correl a t ion 
between those s ta t e  comptrollers who are CPA ' s or are otherwi se 
cert i f ied and t hose heading agencies that are considered e f f ective as 
described above for method of sele ct ion and organi zat ional 
conf igurat ion . 
Addit iona l l y ,  a determina t i on was made as to whether method of 
selection or organi z a t i ona l con f iguration correlates to state 
compt rol l ers who are CPA ' s or hold other f inanc ial cert i f i cat ion . 
TENURE IN OFICE 
The f o u r t h  r e s e a r c h  que s t i on i s  doe s  t h e  l ength o f  tenure o f  t h e  S t a t e  
Comptro l l e r  impac t t h e  e f f e c t ivene s s  o f  t h e  S t a te Comp t ro l l e r ' s  agency? 
It is reasonable to concl ude that the l ength of tenure in o f f ice of the 
state comptrol l e r  w i l l  impact the e f fectiveness of the performance of 
the state comptro l l er ' s agency . 
Hypothe s i s  4 
The fourth hypothe s i s  i s  that there wi l l  be a s trong r e l a tions hip 
between the l ength of tenure of the S t a t e  comp trol l e r  and the 
e f f ec t ivene s s  of the S t a t e  Comp t ro l l er ' s  agency . 
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This hypothe s i s  i s  restated i n  the form of a nul l hypothe s i s : 
The r e s e arch wi l l  n o t  f i nd a s trong r e l a tionship be tween the l ength o f  
tenure o f  t h e  S ta t e  comp t r o l l e r  and the e f f e c t iven e s s  o f  the S t a t e  
Comp tro l l er ' s agency . 
The NASACT surveys ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 , 1 9 92 ) ident i f y  the tenures of each 
state comptrol l e r  in t e rms of consecut ive years in o f f i c e . This agency 
charact e r i s t i c  is cons idered as an independent variable . Test ing o f  
this hypothes i s  involved de terminat i on of corre lation between those 
state comptrol l er s  having longer tenures in o f f ice and t hose heading 
agencies that are cons idered e f fective as described above for method o f  
select ion and organ i z a t ional conf iguration . 
Two tests were made . First , fol lowing Meye r ,  1 9 7 9 , l onger t enures are 
be cons idered to be six or more consecut ive years in o f f ice , whi l e  
shorter tenures a r e  cons idered t o  be less than s ix conse cut ive years i n  
off ice . S econdly , four categories of tenure were compared . The se are 
1 0  years or more , 6 - 9  years , 2 - 5  years and less than 2 years . 
Additiona l l y ,  a determinat ion was made as to whether method of 
selection or organ i z a t i onal conf igurat ion corre lates to state 
comptro l l e rs having l onger tenure . 
Fol lowing are two charts , f igure s 1 0  and 1 1 , that present the 
independent and dependent variables and indicates the leve l of 
measurement each variable i s . 
VARlABLES 
Independent variabl e s ,  Figure 1 0  
Agency charac t e r i s t i c s  Level o f  var i ab l e  
Method of s e l e c t i on o f  State Nominal 
Comptro l l e r  
Organizat ional conf igura t i on Nominal 
State Comptro l l e r  i s  CPA Ordinal 
Tenure in o f f ice Nominal 
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Dependent variables, Figure I I  
E f f e c tiven e s s  me asures Level o f  variab l e  
Unqual i f ied audit opinion on CAFR Ordinal 
GFOA cert i f i cate on CAFR Ordinal 
Prepares interim reports Ordinal 
Provides f inancial  analys i s  Ordinal 
Ident i f ie s  b e s t  pract ices /develops Ordinal 
benchmarks 
Bond Ra t ing Ordinal 
Financ ial World/Governing rat ing Ordinal 
Expenditures / revenues rat io Ordinal 
Use of LAN/WAN ne tworks Ordinal 
Provides c l i ent - s e rve r app l i cat ions Ordinal 
Provides CPE to agencies Ordinal 
Use of procurement cards Ordinal 
Use of trave l cards Ordinal 
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RELIAB I LI TY AND VALI DI TY 
The concept of measurement re l i abi l i ty has to do with the cons i s t ency 
with which a g iven phenomenon rece ives the same eva luation by dif f erent 
evaluat ors . Threats t o  measurement re l iab i l i ty are subj ectivity and 
lack of prec i s ion . Reliab i l i t y  can be improved by rigorous training o f  
those doing the measuring to achi eve cons i s tency (Meier & Brudney , 
1 9 9 3 ) . In the case o f  the audi t opinion on the CAFR , the rigorous 
training of CPA ' s ( audi tors ) including the education ,  exper ience and 
test ing requ i rements for t he cert i f i cat ion imp l i e s  a high degree of 
rel iabi l i ty for this  measure . S imilarly,  bond rat i ngs are subj ect to 
rigorous ana l ys i s  and the s imi l arity of the rat ings produced by t he 
different rat ing services suggests the rel iabi l i ty of this measure . 
The GFOA cert i f icate i s  also subj ect to r igorous anal ys i s . These 
measures of e f fect ivenes s  are reasonabl y  prec i s e . 
The concept of measurement va l i dity has to do wi th how accurately the 
variable measures the concept it i s  intended to measure . The primary 
measures that I have ident i f ied , unqua l i f ied opinion , GFOA cert i f i cate , 
product ion o f  interim report s , provi s ion of f inancial  ana l ys i s ,  etc . 
appear to be reas onably va l id measures of the e f fec t ivenes s  of the core 
func t ions of t he State Compt rol l e r ' s  agency . Others , such as bond 
rat ings and Financial world ratings may be more broad - based measures of 
the f inance function as a whole rather than of the State Compt ro l l er ' s  
agency . The rat i o  of general expenditures to gene ral revenues over 
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time a l s o  measures such concepts a s  revenue e s timates , impact o f  the 
economy on t he particular taxing and program structure of the state 
government , and the budget process . However ,  I feel that the budgetary 
control func t i on and the necessary interim report ing and f inanc i a l  
analys i s  provi ded b y  t h e  S tate Comptro l l er ' s agency a r e  a necessary 
part of an e f f e c t ive program of f inancial management . 
With regard to the research de s ign , the concepts of internal and 
external va l idity are relevant . Internal val idity has to do with 
whether in a par t i cular research s tudy the independent variab l e  
actua l l y  d i d  cause or l e a d  to changes in the dependent variabl e .  The 
four criteria for internal val idity are t ime orde r ,  covariation ,  
nonspur iousness and theory ( Meier & Brudney ,  1 9 9 3 ) . 
The method of s e l e c t ion of the State Comptrol l e rs and organizat ional 
conf iguration of the agencies has rema ined very stable over t ime . 
Considering t ime orde r ,  earl ier methods of selection and conf igurat ions 
may be cons i dered to impac t  later performance . Due to t he s tabi l i ty of 
these variab l e s , later performance i s  not l ike ly to be corre lated with 
different method or conf igurat ion . Accordingly,  the research des ign 
should not have any d i f f iculty with t ime order . The l i t erature review 
provides my theor ies regarding the impact that the independent 
variables have on the dependent variables . 
1 7 5  
The research des ign f o r  this proj ect i s  a correlational s tudy . Meier & 
Brudney ( 1 9 9 3 , p .  1 3 9 )  indicate that these des igns are " ... relat ivel y  
strong in demonstrat ing covariat ion between independent and dependent 
variab l e s "  . 
Tes ting for stat i s t ical s igni f i cance is genera l l y  used to ensure that 
conc lus ions drawn f rom a s amp l e  are representative of the population 
the samp l e  represent s . This research dea l s  with the ent ire populat ion 
of state comptrollers and not a samp l e  of them . Accordingly,  tests of 
stat i s t ical s igni f i cance wi l l  not be used in this research ( We l ch and 
Come r ,  1 9 8 8 , p .  2 1 9 - 2 2 0 ) . 
A threat to the internal val idity of this type of research des i gn i s  
nonspur iousness ( Me i e r  & Brudney, 1 9 9 3 ) . One must b e  concerned that 
covar iation be tween independent and dependent variables is not caused 
by an unknown third variable that impacts both the independent and the 
dependent va riabl e s . The only way to deal with this problem i s  to 
hypothe s i z e  plausible third variables in advance and use stat i s t i cal 
control techniques to cont rol for these pos sible variables . The 
diff iculty of this is obvious . The results of the bas ic resea rch did 
not appear to war rant such an approach . 
External va l idity has to do with the degree to which results of 
research may be genera l i zed to different sett ings . Correlat ional 
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designs are relat ive l y  st rong with regard t o  external val idity (Meier & 
Brudney, 1 9 9 3 ) . 
QUALITATIVE METHODS TO BE USED ON THIS RESEARCH PROJECT 
The primary focus of this research proj ect involves the use of 
quantitat ive methods to determine whether methods of sel ection of the 
State Comptrol l e r  or organizational conf iguration of the State 
Comptro l l er ' s agency have an impact on e f fectivene s s  of the state 
comptro l l er ' s agency . I t  concluded that it would be ins ight ful to 
complement the quant i tat ive approach with qual itat ive informat i on . 
Research des i gns generally involve a trade - o f f  between breadth and 
depth . In qual itat ive research , the focus i s  on depth and deta i l . 
Qual itative methods may be used to add depth , de tail and meaning to 
quantitat ive s tudies . Thi s  depth and de tail generally comes from 
deve lopment of a sma l l  number of case studies ( Patton , 1 9 8 7 ) . 
Patton ( 1 9 8 7 ,  p .  8 )  indicates that qual itat ive data may be presented in 
combinat ion with quan t i tat ive data . He cons iders both qua l i tat ive and 
quant itative approaches to have s trengths and weaknesses . Rather than 
being mutual ly exclus ive approaches ,  they are alternative strategies 
and may be used i n  the same s tudy ( Patton , 1 9 9 0 ) . 
Use of d i f f e rent research st rategies to s tudy the same program i s  
cal led t ri angul at ion ( Patton, 1 9 8 7 ) . Some t ime s use of different 
methods produces con f l i c t i ng results . As Patton ( 1 9 8 7 , p .  1 6 1 )  
sugge s t s "  ... i t  can turn out that quant i tat ive methods and qua l i tat ive 
methods wi l l  end up answering dif ferent questions that do not eas i l y  
come together to provide a s i ngle , we l l - integrated p icture of the 
s i tuation . "  An analys i s  that attempts to resolve any result ing 
con f l i c t s  is l ikely to be insight ful . 
The central act ivity of qua l i ta t ive research and source of much 
qual i ta t ive data is f ie l dwork ( Patton , 1 9 9 0 ,  1 9 8 7 ) . Patton ( 1 9 8 7 , p .  
7 )  indicates that three methods of data collection are i nvolved i n  
qual i tat ive research . The se are : 
• in-depth , open- ended inte rviews 
• di rect observat ion , and 
• examinat ion of wr i t ten documents 
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What peopl e  involved with a program have t o  say about thei r  exper i ences 
is important raw da ta for qua l i tat ive research . Direct quotat ions of 
individual s  may be obtained from open - ended, i n - depth intervi ews , 
examinat ion of documents , or f rom re sponses to open - ended questions on 
surveys . Re l i ance only on quotat ions for unders tanding a program has 
certain l imitat ions . Often a better way to l earn about a program i s  
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observa tion,  and direct participat ion i n  the activi t ies of the program 
whi l e  obse rving is the be s t  way ( Pat ton , 1 9 8 7 ) . 
The act ivi t i e s  of interviewing and observing should be integrated . 
Ski l l  in both i s  necessary for qua l i tat ive research . A det a iled 
description of the a c t ivit ies of a program that put s the reader in the 
setting is important in presentat ion of qua l i tative research . Thi s  can 
have an impact on the user of the study . It can also provide the 
necessary context for the observat ions and quotations ( Patton , 1 9 8 7 )  
Patton ( 1 9 8 7 )  indicates that research des igns should specify uni t s  o f  
analys i s . These may be individual s  or groups of people . Agenc ies 
could be uni t s  of ana l ys i s . Patton ( 1 9 8 7 ,  p .  5 0 )  states that " one or 
more groups are selec ted as the unit of analysis when there is some 
important characteristic  that separa tes people into groups and that has 
important impl icat ions for the program . "  
Agencies , spe c i f i ca l l y  the state comptro l l e r ' s  agenc ies of t he 5 0  
states , a r e  the units of analys i s  f o r  t h i s  proj ect . The important 
character i s t i cs t hat separate these agencies are the methods of 
selection of the heads of the agenc ies and the i r  organizational 
conf igurat i ons in the l arger pattern of the state governments of which 
they are part . Addit i ona l l y ,  cert i f i cation qua l i f i cat ions and length 
of tenure of the state compt rol l e r  are characteristics . This is the 
case for both the qua l i t a t ive and qua l i t at ive aspects of thi s proj ect . 
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Because the researcher has been employed for a number of years i n  the 
virginia State Comptro l l er ' s agency , most of these observat ions have 
been de r ived f rom that experience . These observations a re on the order 
of direct part i cipat ion rather than merely observat ion . The 
observat i ons a re gene ral i zed to the other 4 9  state comptroller ' s  
agenci e s  by reviewing the informat ion contained in the NASACT 1 9 9 6  and 
1992  surveys . The de script ion of the act ivity of these agencies is 
conta ined in chapter 1 of this document . 
The descript ive data i s  supplemented by in-depth , open- ended interviews 
with current or past State Comptro l l ers . A smal l  sample of state 
comptrol l e rs wa s chosen to interview that would yield ins ight ful 
information that may not be de rived from the quant itative research 
data . 
Rather than a probabi l is t i c  sample , as would be used in quantitat ive 
research , qual i tat ive methods prefer a " purpose ful samp l e "  . 
Purposeful samp l e s  are int ended to select informat i on - rich cases for 
study in some depth ( Pat ton , 1 9 8 7 , pp . 5 1 - 5 2 ) . Pat ton sugge sts s everal 
strategies for choosing a purposeful sample .  Two that appear to be 
applicable are maximum variat ion sampl ing and typical case sampl ing . 
Some state comptro l l e r ' s  agencies appear to be more e f fect ive than 
others in performance of the i r  basic funct ions . variation sampl ing 
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would suggest that the sample should include both more e f fect ive and 
less e f fect ive agenc i e s . S imilarly,  the sample should inc lude e l ected 
as we l l  as appointed comptrollers . 
On the other hand , agenc ies may be grouped in te rms of e f f ec t iveness 
and method of s e l e c t ion of agency head . For example , some agenc ies 
with e l ected agency heads are e f fect ive , others less so . Some agenc ies 
with appo inted agency heads are e f fective ,  others are less so . This 
produces at least four categories . One or two typical agenc ies f rom 
each category could be inc luded in the sampl e .  Thi s  sugges t s  that a 
comb ination of va riation and typical sampl ing would produce a sma l l  
sample of around e ight state comptrolle r ' s t o  b e  interviewed , some 
elected and some appointed , with some being considered more and less 
effective . 
Patton ( 1 9 8 7 ) indicates that i n - depth,  open- ended interviews may be one 
of three types , or some combinat ion of these . The three approaches 
are : 
• informa l , conversat ional interview 
• interview guide approach , and 
• s tandardi zed , open - ended interview . 
Each o f  the s e  app roaches has i t s  strengths and weaknesses . The 
informa l , conversat i onal interview does not have a l i st of 
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predet e rmined que st ions to ask . The questions emerge f rom the context 
and are asked as part of a normal conversat ion . The interview guide 
contains a l i s t i ng of topics for discuss ion in outl ine form . Fina l l y ,  
the s tandardi zed approach u s e s  a que st ionna ire i n  which the 
interviewees are a l l  asked the same quest ions using the same wording 
and in the s ame orde r . The quest ions are a l l  open - ende d ,  however 
( Patton , 1 9 8 7 ) . 
For these intervi ews , an interview guide approach was used . The 
interview guide i s  presented as part of Appendix D .  
The quant i t a t ive research included i s  supplemented by presentat ion of 
the results of intervi ews . One of the states chosen i s  the 
Commonwea l t h  of Virgini a . Inte rviews with forme r comptrol l e r  Ed Mazur 
and current Comptro l l er W i l l i am Lands idle were he l d .  They were asked 
their opinions on each of the research questions . They were asked to 
discuss the relat ionships they have had with the governors and cabinet 
secreta ries and how these relat ionships impacted the i r  abi l i ty to be 
effect ive . The interview guide was tested on the current Virginia 
Comptrol le r . 
Virginia has been rated highly by Barrett and Greene ( 1 9 9 0 ,  1 9 9 1 , 1 9 92 , 
1993 , 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 9 )  in each of the rat ings . Addit iona l l y ,  Virginia 
has long held a triple A bond rat ing . Virginia has rece ived the GFOA 
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cert i f icate o f  achi evement . Virginia has scored highly on a l l  of the 
ef fectiveness var iables iden t i f ied earl ie r . 
Seven s tates in add i t ion to Virginia were chosen . A sample of nine 
individual s  represent ing e ight states was chosen for intervi ews . The 
criteria were dive rs i ty in e f fect ivene ss and characteristics . Thi s  
a l l owed f o r  e l ected as we l l  as appointed compt rol l ers to be 
intervi ewed . 
After the intervi ews were comp l eted , they were analyzed and the resu l t s  
o f  the analys is included in Appendix D and summarized in Chapter 4 ,  
Resu l t s  of Research . To the degree that they impact or add ins ight t o  
the f indings , e l ements are discussed in Chapter 4 ,  Re sul ts of Research , 
and Chapter 5 ,  Conclusions and Re commendat ions . 
The interviews are intended to provide some ins ight into the research 
quest ions . I t  i s  f e l t  that i n - depth ,  open- ended interviews wi l l  bring 
to l ight informat ion that would rema in hidden i f  rel i ance were solely 
to be p laced on quant itat ive methods . 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research was carried out through the USE OF SPSS B . O  for Windows . A 
series of cross t abula t ions was produced for analys i s  to address the 
research que s t i ons . The cross tabulat ions are included i n  Appendix B .  
Appendix C contains the Code Book with de t a i l  on coding of the 
variabl e s  in SPSS 8 . 0 .  
Add i t iona l l y ,  nine current or former state comptrol l ers were 
intervi ewed to add a qua l i tat ive dimens ion to the research . The 
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intervi ews are summari zed i n  Chapter 4 and descr ibed i n  more de t a i l  in 
Appendix D .  
Chap t e r  4 
Re su l t s  o f  R e s e a r c h  
QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
METHOD OF SELECT I ON OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
The f i rs t  research que s t ion is does the manner in whi ch the State 
Comptro l ler is s e l e cted impact the e f fect ivene ss of the S tate 
Comptro l l e r ' s agency? Thi s  gives r i s e  to the f i rst hypothe s i s . The 
f i rs t  hypothe s i s  is that there w i l l  be a s t rong relationship be tween 
the method of select ion of the State comptro l l e r  and the e f fect ivene s s  
of the State Comptro l l e r ' s agency . 
This hypothe s i s  i s  restated in the form of a nul l  hypothe s i s . 
The r e s e arch wi l l  n o t  f i nd a s t rong r e l a tionship b e tween the method o f  
s e l e c t i on o f  the S t a t e  comp t ro l l e r  and the e f f e c tiven e s s  o f  the S t a t e  
Comp tro l l er ' s agency . 
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Method of select i on of s tate comptro l l e r  i s  grouped into four 
categor i e s . Thes e  are : 
• El ected 
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• Appointed by the gove rnor and s e rve s at the pl easure of the governor 
• Appointed at a l eve l lower than that of governor 
• Career civil  service 
Corre lat i on between e f fect ivene s s  and method of select ion wa s conducted 
by use o f  cross tabul a t i ons . Use of the data conta ined in the above 
source s , prima r i l y  NASACT 1 9 96 ( mainly for 1 9 9 5  da t a )  and NASACT 1 9 9 2  
( ma inly for 1 9 9 1  da t a )  i s  the means of de termination 
Exte rna l Const i tuenc ies 
E f fect ivenes s  measures for external cons t i tuencies of the state 
comptro l l er ' s agency are rece ipt of an unqua l i f i ed ( c l ean)  opinion on 
the state wide CAFR ( f inancial statements ) by an independent auditor 
and also awarding o f  the GFOA Cert i f icate of Achievement o f  Excel l ence 
in Financ i a l  Report ing . 
Cross t abul a t i ons between me thod of s e lect ion and e f fectivenes s  a s  
measured b y  c l ean ( unqua l i f i e d )  audit opinion o n  t h e  CAFR for f i scal 
years 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1  were run ( s ee appendix B,  pages 1 and 2 )  . 
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Table 1 Cross tabulation 1 9 9 5 - Audit opinion/method of selection ,  
1 9 9 5  audit Elected Appointed Appointed Civil Total 
opinion by by o f f i c ial Service 
Governor lower than 
Governor 
Unqua l i fied 9 2 . n ( 1 2 )  9 3 . 7 t  ( 1 5 )  5 0 . 0 ' ( 6 )  5 7 . 1 t ( 4 )  7 7 . 1 t ( 3 7 )  
Qua l i f i ed 7 . 7 t ( 1 )  6 . n  ( 1 )  5 0 . 0 ' ( 6 )  4 2 . 9 ' ( 3 )  2 2 . 9 ' ( 1 1 )  
Total 1 0 0 . 0 ' ( 1 3 )  1 0 0 . 0 ' ( 1 6 )  1 0 0 . 0 ' ( 1 2 )  1 0 0 . 0 ' ( 7 )  1 0 0 . 0 ' ( 4 8 )  
Method o f  select ion and 1 9 9 1  audit opinion results fol low : 
Table 2 Crosstabulat ion 1 9 9 1 - Audit opinion/method of sel ection , 
1 9 9 1  audit Elected Appointed Appointed Civil Total 
opinion by by o f f i cial S e rvice 
Governor lower than 
Governor 
Unqual i fied 7 2 . 7 t ( 8 )  7 8 . 6 ' ( 1 1 )  3 3 . n  ( 4 )  4 0 . 0 ' ( 2 )  5 9 . 5 ' ( 2 5 )  
Qual i f i ed 2 7 . n  ( 3 )  2 1 . 4 \  ( 3 )  6 6 . 7 t ( 8 )  6 0 . 0 ' ( 3 )  4 0 . 5 ' ( 1 7 )  
Total 1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 1 1 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 14 )  1 0 0 . 0 ' ( 1 2 )  1 0 0 . 0 ' ( 5 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 4 2 )  
A s igni f i cant relat ionship between method o f  select ion and 
e f fectiveness as measured by unqua l i fied opinion on the CAFR was found 
for both f iscal periods thus refuting the nul l  hypothes i s . Elected 
state comptrol lers and those appointed by and serving at the pleasure 
of the governor scored s igni f icantly higher on this measure than did 
those s tate comptrol lers appointed by o f f i c ia l s  lower than governor and 
those who were civil s e rvice employees . 
This was true for both f iscal 1 9 9 1  and 1 9 9 5 . Between these two f i scal 
periods , states moved in the direction of increasingly obtaining 
unqua l i f ied opinions . In 1 9 9 1 , only 2 5  states ( o f  4 3  having audit 
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op inions ) had unqu a l i f i e d  opinions . By 1 9 9 5 , 3 7  s t ates ( o f  4 8  having 
aud i t  opinions ) had unqua l i f i ed opinions . 
Next , cross tabulat ions between method of selec t ion and e f fectivenes s  
as measured b y  receipt o f  t h e  GFOA Cert i f i cate of Achievement of 
Excel lence i n  Financ i a l  Repor t i ng ( Cert i f icate ) for the CAFR for f i scal 
years 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1  were run ( s ee appendix B page s 3 and 4 )  . 
Tabl e  3 Cross tabulation 1 9 9 5 - GFOA Cert i f i cate /method of s e l e c t ion , 
1 9 9 5  GFOA Elected Appo inted Appointed Civil Total 
Cert i f i cate by Governor by Service 
o f f i c i a l  
l ower than 
Governor 
Awarded 7 1 . 4 \ ( 1 0 )  8 1 . 3 % ( 1 3 )  4 1 . 7 \ ( 5 )  2 5 . 0 \ ( 2 )  6 0 . 0 \ ( 3 0 )  
Not Awa rded 2 8 . 6 \ ( 4 )  1 8 . 7 \ ( 3  ) 5 8 . 3 \ ( 7 )  7 5 . 0 \ ( 6 )  4 0 . 0 \ ( 2 0 )  
Tota l  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 1 4 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 1 6 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 12 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 8 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 5 0 )  
Fol lowed by the 1 9 9 1  resul t s . 
Tabl e  4 Cro s stabulat ion 1 9 9 5 - GFOA cert i f i cate /method of s e l e c t ion , 
1 9 9 1  GFOA E l ected Appointed Appo inted Civil Total 
Cert i f i cate by Governor by o f f i c i a l  Service 
l ower than 
Governor 
Awarded 5 0 . 0 \ ( 7 )  6 2 . 5 \ ( 1 0 )  2 5 . 0 \ ( 3  ) 1 2 . 5 \ ( 1 )  4 2 . 0 \ ( 2 1 )  
Not Awa rded 5 0 . 0 \ ( 7 )  3 7 . 5 \ ( 6  ) 7 5 . 0 \ ( 9 )  8 7 . 5 \ ( 7 )  5 8 . 0 \ ( 2 9 )  
Total 1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 1 4 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 16 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 1 2 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 8 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 5 0 )  
A s trong relat ionship between method o f  select ion and e f fect iveness a s  
measured b y  receipt of t h e  GFOA Cert i f icate f o r  the CAFR was found thus 
refut ing the nul l  hypothe s i s . A substantially higher proport ion of 
e lected state comptro l l e rs and those appointed by and serving at the 
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pleasure o f  the governor s cored higher on this measure than d i d  those 
state comptrol l e r s  appointed by o f f i c i a l s  lowe r than governor and those 
who were civil  s e rvice emp l oye e s . 
Aga i n ,  this was t rue for both f i scal 1 9 9 1  and 1 9 9 5 . Be tween the s e  two 
fi scal per iods , s ta t e s  moved in the direct ion of obtaining the 
cert i f i cate . In 1 9 9 1 ,  only 2 1  states had rece ived the Cert i f i cat e . By 
1 9 9 5 , 3 0  states had rece ived the ce r t i f icate . 
It i s  not surpris ing that the s e  two measures of e f f ect ivenes s ,  c l ean 
opinion and receipt o f  GFOA Cert i f icate produced s imilar resul t s . An 
unqua l i f ied ( c lean)  opinion i s  requ i red for the award of the GFOA 
cert i f i cate . See be low, f i rst the 1 9 9 5  resul t s : 
Thes e  measures of e f f e c t ivene s s  are ident i f ied with needs of the 
f inanc i a l  communi t y  tha t  compri s e s  an external cons t ituency of the 
output o f  the s ta t e  comptrol l e r ' s  agency . This study concludes that 
the nul l  hypothe s i s  regarding method of select ion for externa l 
cons t i tuenc i e s  i s  re j ected . I t  woul d  appear that method of s e l e c t ion 
is an important factor in sat i s fying the needs of this cons t i tuency . 
Interna l Con s t i tuenc i e s  
T o  test e f fect ivene s s  a s  perceived b y  t h e  state ' s  top f i nanc i a l  
management t e a m ,  a number of measure s o f  e f fe c t ivene s s  were ident i f i e d . 
The se included product ion of interim reports ,  provi s ion of f inanc i a l  
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analys i s , ident i f ica t i on o f  bes t  practices /deve lopment o f  benchma rks , 
bond rat ings , Financial World ratings and the holding of expenditures 
to ava i lable resources ove r t ime . This latter abi l ity i s  indicated by 
a ratio of gene ra l expendi tures to general revenues for f i scal years 
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 2 . 
Cross tabulat ions be tween me thod of select ion and these measures was 
run for 1 9 9 5  and , where avai labl e ,  for 1 9 9 1  informat ion ( see appendix B 
page s 5 through 1 8 )  . 
No s t rong association wa s found be tween method of select ion of the 
state comptro l l e r  and product ion of inte r im reports for the f i scal 
periods 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1  ( s ee appendix page s 5 ,  6 and 7 )  . 
With regard to prov i s i on of f inanc ial ana l ys i s , re sults are mixed . 
Comptrol lers who are s e l e c ted by and serve at the p l ea sure of the 
governor and those who are civi l service employee s  s core higher than 
e l ected comptrol l e rs and those appo inted at a level l owe r than 
Governor . Ina smuch as c i v i l  s e rvice comptrol l e rs and those s e l e c ted by 
an o f f i c i a l  lower than Governor appear to perform s imilarly in mea sures 
for exte rna l con s t i tuenc ie s ,  no clear pa tterns are observed by this 
cross tabulat ion ( s ee appendix B pages 8 and 9)  . 
Elected state comptro l l ers appear to be more l ikely to identify best 
pract ices and deve lop benchmarks than those s e l ected by other methods . 
Whether s igni f icantly more so or not may be arguable ( se e  appendix B ,  
page 1 0 )  . 
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When bond rat ing i s  compa red t o  method o f  select ion for 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1 , 
the resul t s  do not show s t rong , c l ear associat ions ( see appendix B 
pages 1 1  and 1 2 ) . S imi lar resu l t s  are noted for the compar ison o f  
Financial World rat ing to me thod of selection . The 1 9 9 5  rat ing i s  the 
f inanc i a l  management rat ing whe reas the 1 9 9 1  rat ing is the rat ing as a 
who l e  ( se e  append ix B pages 1 3  through 1 6 )  . 
As the mos t  recent rat ing form Barre tt and Greene became ava i lable 
recen t l y ,  ( se e  Governing volume 1 2 , number 5 ,  February 1 9 9 9 ) , cross 
tabul a t ions compar ing the s e  rat ings of f i nanc ial management o f  the 
states with me thod o f  s e l e c t ion were produced and analyzed . Genera l l y ,  
a highe r proport ion of c i v i l  service comptrol lers was rated o n  the low 
end ( se e  appendix B pages 1 0 1 ,  1 0 2  and 1 0 3 ) . Otherwi se , no c l ear 
pattern emerges . 
A rat io of general expendi tures to general revenues for fiscal  years 
1 9 8 5  through 1 9 9 2  was computed . A ratio of . 9 9 or less indicates that 
expendi tures have been he l d  to a level con s i s t ent with revenues over 
t ime . A rat io of 1 . 0 0 or greater indicates that expendi tures exceeded 
revenues for those f i scal years . A rat i o  of . 9 5 or less indicates that 
states have managed to accumul ate a 5 %  " ra iny day fundH 
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The period cove red form 1 9 8 5  through 1 9 9 2  inc l uded good t ime s a s  we l l  
a s  the early 1 9 9 0 ' s recess ion . This s tudy did not extend this ratio 
into the middl e 1 9 9 0 ' s  because performance of the economy after the 
early 1 9 9 0 ' s  did not generate the same pressures to contain spending , 
as was the case earl i e r . 
A compari son of method of select ion to the expendi ture to revenue ratio 
was made ( s e e  appendix B,  pages l7 and l 8 ) . No clear , s t rong 
rela t i onships were observe d ,  al though el ected comptrollers had s l ightl y  
more in the . 9 5 or l e s s  ca tegory , and comptrol l e rs sel ected b y  an 
o f f i c i a l  lower than governor had fewer in the l . O O or greater category 
relat ive to other me thods of select ion . 
The other interna l cons t i tuencies of the state comptrol l e r ' s  agency are 
the l ine agenc i e s  o f  state government . A composite e f f e c t iveness 
measure was deve l oped of services provided by the s tate comptro l l er ' s  
agency to the l ine agenc i e s . This measure was compared to method of 
selection o f  the state comptrol ler ( see appendix B, page 1 9 ) . The 
resul t s  suggest that e l ected s t ate comptrol lers and those appointed by 
and s erving at the pl easure of the governor tended to s core highe r than 
those appointed by o f f i c i a l s  lower than governor and civil  s ervice 
comptro l l ers a l though the d i f f e rences are not very large . 
The evidence for me thod of selec tion having a bearing on the state 
comptro l l er ' s agency ' s  abi l i ty to satisfy the needs of internal 
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cons t i tuenci e s  i s  mixed with no c l ear pa ttern be ing obse rved . Thi s  
study concludes that f o r  internal const ituenc i e s , the nul l  hypothes i s  
i s  not rej ected . 
Summary of C ross tabulat ions - Method of Sel ect ion 
In summary , it appears that method of sel ect ion is an important factor 
in sat i s fying the needs of the f inanc ial commun ity for provi s i on o f  
rel iable f inanc i a l  date . The s tate comptro l l e rs that are e l ected and 
those that are appo inted by and serve at the p l easure of the governor 
are more l ikely to mee t  these criteria than are those s tate 
compt ro l l ers that are appo inted by an o f f icial  lowe r than governor or 
that are c i v i l  s e rvice emp l oyees . 
As regards s a t i s f ac t i on of inte rna l cons t ituenc ies , the f inanc ial 
management team and the l i ne agenc ie s ,  me thod of select ion does not 
appear to have a very c l ear impact . 
DISCUSS ION OF RESULTS OF RESEARCH AND THE LITERATUR E - METHOD OF 
SELECTION OF GOVERNMENT OFFIC IALS 
Beyl e , 1 9 8 5  and Chi , 1 9 9 2  present argument s favoring both appointment 
and elect ion of s tate o f f i cia l s . The arguments for appo intment 
general ly f o l l ow the prescript ions o f  the progre s s ive re form era . 
Pol i t ical a ccountab i l ity to the publ i c  genera l l y  support s  the argument 
for direct e l e c t ion . Each method of select ion has certain s trengths 
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and certain weakne s s e s . To a degre e ,  the s trengths and weaknesses 
offset each other . No c l ear prescription fol l ows from these arguments . 
There i s  a l s o  a l i tera ture that compares the c i ty manager form of 
government to the s t rong mayor form . The resu l t s  o f  this body o f  work 
are mixed . The re i s  some sugges t i on in the earl ier research that 
appointed o f f i c i a l s  are more l i kely to provide ra t i onal adminis trat ion 
and neut ral compe tence , whi l e  the i r  e l e cted counterparts are more 
l ikely to favor pol i t ical respons ivene s s  in administra t i on ( Lineberry 
and Fowle r ,  1 9 6 7 ;  Ka rnig , 1 9 7 5 ;  Lineberry and Sharkansky , 1 9 7 8 ) . Later 
research by Morgan and Pe l i s sero ( 1 9 8 0 )  did not con f i rm these f indings , 
however . 
Rainey ( 1 9 9 1 )  points out that publ ic agencies ope rate in an envi ronment 
tha t includes a degree of t ens ion be tween competence values and 
respons iveness va l ue s . Ra iney ( 1 9 9 1 )  argues that e f fectivenes s  comes 
under the competence s e t  o f  va l ue s . S ince ra t i onal admini s t ra t i on and 
neutra l compe t ence are f e l t  to be better att ributes for the 
comptro l l e r ' s funct ion , and fol l owing Rainey ( 1 9 9 1 )  it wa s hypothe s i zed 
that appo inted comptro l l e rs wou ld be more e f f ect ive than those who are 
el ected . 
Meye r ' s ( 1 9 7 9 )  research suggests that e l e cted and c iv i l  service 
comptrol lers are be tter able than appointed comptro l l e rs to provide 
organi z a t i onal s tabi l i ty in somewhat turbulent envi ronment s . I t  was 
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hypothe s i zed that e l ected and c i v i l  service comptrollers woul d  l ikely 
be more e f f e c t ive . 
The mixed nature of the l i terature does not suggest in which direct ion 
the s trong relat ionship w i l l  be found between me thod of s e l e c t ion and 
e f fectivenes s .  Some of the l i t erature , the c i ty manager vs . s trong 
mayor research suggests that appointed comptrol l e rs w i l l  be more 
e f fe c t ive . On the other hand , Meye r ' s ,  1 9 7 9  research sugges t s  that 
elected and c i v i l  serv i ce comptrol lers wi l l  be more e f f e c t ive . No 
clear d i rect ion emerges f rom the l i terature as to method of selection . 
Howeve r ,  i t  doe s  suggest that method of select ion can have an impact , a 
s t rong relat ionship was ant i c ipated . 
According l y ,  the l i terature on select ion of rel evant government 
o f f i c i a l s  is mixed . 
The subj e c t  of integrat ion of the f inance funct ion i s  d i s cussed below 
under the organ i z a t ional conf iguration sect ion . However ,  i t  i s  
presumed that integrat ion i s  faci l i tated when comptrollers are 
appointed or civi l s e rv i ce , but not when they are e l ected . 
Based on the quan t i t a t ive methods employe d ,  with regards to external 
cons t ituenci e s , method of s e l e c t ion appears to have an impact on 
e f fect ivene s s . Those s tate comptrol l e rs that are e l ected and those 
that are appointed by and who s erve a t  the pleasure of the governor are 
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more e f f e c t ive i n  sat i s fying external cons t i tuenc ies than are those who 
are appointed by an o f f i c ial lower than governor or those who are civil  
servi ce employees . W i t h  regard to external consti tuenci e s  of the s tate 
comptro l l er , the nul l  hypothe s i s  for method of select ion i s  re j ected,  
that i s ,  s trong relat i onships were found betwe en me thod of select ion 
and e f fect ivene s s . 
However ,  the resu l t s  obtained from the quantitative methods employed 
we re not exactly those ant i c ipated . As indicated above , the l ite ra ture 
on method of select ion i s  mixed . I t  was ant i c ipated that the res earch 
would indicate that one of the methods , e l ect ion or appointment would 
be more e f fect ive . 
Considering the c i ty manager vs . s t rong mayor l i terature , e l ected 
comptro l l ers were thought to be more l ikely to stress po l i t i ca l  
respons ivene s s , whi le appo inted comptro l l ers were thought to s t r e s s  
neutra l  competence / ra t ional admini s t rat ion to a greater degree .  
Cons ide ring the i dea that neutral competence /rat ional admini s t ration 
was f e l t  to relate to e f fe c t ivenes s  for the funct ions of the 
comptro l l er , appointed comptrol lers should be more e f fect ive . 
Cons ide ring Meye r ,  1 9 7 9 ,  e l ected and civi l service comptrol l e rs were 
expected to be more i ndependent of the appoint ing o f f i c i a l  ( mayor or 
governo r )  and therefor be tter abl e to pe rform neutra l l y  and rationa l l y  
wi thout be ing respons ive to the appo int ing o f f icial . 
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D i f f e rences between these categories were expected t o  b e  observed . 
Prima r i l y ,  d i f ferences between e l ected comptrol lers and those appointed 
by and serving at the p l ea sure of the governor were ant i c ipated . The s e  
d i f fe rences w e r e  not observed . 
Rega rding external con s t i tuencies , those measures ident i f ied for the 
f inanc i a l  commun i t y  do ind i cate that method of selection is important . 
Howeve r ,  rather than d i f f e rence s between e l ected comptrol l ers and those 
appointed by and s e rving at the pleasure of the governor , the s e  two 
categor i e s  s cored s imilarly and s ign i f i cantly better than comptro l l ers 
appointed by an o f f i c i a l  l owe r than governor and those that are c ivi l 
serv i c e /me r i t  sys t em employees . 
The resul t s  of the research seem to con f i rm some of both strands of the 
l iterature . That i s ,  both e l ec t ed and appointed ( a t  a high leve l )  
comptrol l e rs are about equa l ly e f fe c t ive . The e f fect ivenes s  of the 
elected comp t rol l ers supports the research of Meyer ( l 9 7 9 ) , however , 
the f inding that c i v i l  service comptrollers are relat ive l y  l e s s  
e f fect ive than appointed ( at a higher leve l )  contradicts i t . 
The e l ected compt rol l e r  i s  certainly a pol i t i cal execut ive . I t  can be 
argued that the comp t rol l e r  who i s  appointed by and s e rves at the 
pleasure of the governor is a l s o  a pol i t i cal execut ive . Comptrol l ers 
who have some aspects o f  c ivi l servi ce protect ion and those appointed 
at a lower l evel , who f requent l y  s erve inde f i n i t e  t e rms may be 
cons idered as l e s s  pol i t i cal and more l ike career employees . 
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Pertain ing t o  e f fe c t ivenes s  i n  s a t i s fying external cons t i tuenc i e s  of 
the state compt rol l e r ,  par t i cul arly the f inanc ial commun i ty invol ved 
with present ing bond rat ings and those who buy and s e l l  bonds , t he more 
pol i t i cal exe cut ive s  appear to be more e f fect ive than the l e s s  
pol i t i cal exe cutive s . 
Given the impor tance of the pos i t ion of s tate compt rol l e r  and the 
respons i bi l i t ie s  this o f f i c i a l  has in provi s i on of centra l i zation of 
certain aspe c t s  o f  s tatewide account ing and control , i t  may that the 
more pol i t ical , h igher prof i l e  comptrollers have more c l out than the 
less pol i t ical and lower prof i l e  comptro l l ers . Thi s  clout pe rhaps 
man i f e s ts i t se l f  in an abi l i ty to obtain funding for new computer 
hardware and accoun t i ng appl icat ion sof tware and in access to t he 
governor and in more power as a member of the state ' s  top f i nanc i a l  
management t eam . 
I f  s o ,  this power i s  apparent ly ut i l i z ed to s a t i s fy an important 
cons t i tuency o f  t he s t a t e  compt rol l e r . Working to prepare a GAAP bas i s  
CAFR that i s  auditable and presents fairl y  t he f inanc ial condit ion o f  
the s t a t e  i s  an important goal that requ i re s  u p  to date sof tware which 
i s  expensive . 
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Addit iona l l y ,  the powe r o f  the more pol i t i ca l , higher prof i l e  
compt ro l l e r  g ives t h i s  o f f icial  more discretion to pursue the s e  goal s .  
Further , these o f f i c i a l s  may at the same t ime be more accountable , 
pol i t i c a l l y  and otherwise , than those comptrollers more resembl ing 
career emp l oyees . 
Regarding internal const i tuenc i e s , s t rong relat ionships between method 
of select ion and e f fe c t ivenes s  we re not found , that i s , the independent 
variab l e s  are not s t rongly correlated with e f fectivenes s . According l y ,  
the nul l  hypothe s i s  wa s not rej ected . This outcome f o r  internal 
cons t i tuenci e s  contradicts the expectat ion based on the l i tera ture that 
method o f  select i on ma tters . 
The nature of some of the va riables measured for interna l 
con s t i tuenci e s  may requ i re less " c lout" than those measured for 
externa l con s t ituenc i e s . Measures for the states f inanc i a l  management 
teams such as prepara t i on of interim reports , provi s ion of f inanc i a l  
analys i s  and ident i f i ca t ion o f  be s t  pract ices a r e  under t h e  control o f  
the s tate comptro l l e r . No c l ear pa ttern emerged . 
Al though e l e c ted comp t rol l ers and those appointed by and serving at the 
pleasure o f  the governor s cored higher on the l ine agency s cores than 
the other two cat egor i e s , the a s sociat ions were not s trong enough for 
this study to re j e ct the nul l hypothe s i s . 
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The other va riable s  mea sured for internal cons t i tuenc ies we re not 
total ly under the control of the state comptro l l e r . For examp l e , bond 
rat ings are impacted by leve l s  of debt , which involve pol i t ical act ions 
to a l a rge degre e . The ratio o f  expenses to revenues is largely a 
funct ion of the budget proces s , pa rt icularly when the economy i s  not in 
a downturn . Al so , the Ba rrett and Greene rat ings consider a number of 
factors , some o f  which are s imilarly not under the s tate comptrol l er ' s  
control . 
The conclusion i s  that the e f fect ivene s s  measures iden t i f ied for the 
external const ituen c i e s  and only a few of those ident i f i ed for the 
interna l con s t i tuenci e s  are sub j ect to the e f fect iveness of the 
comptro l l e r . That i s , for bond ra t i ngs , Barre t t  and Greene rat ings , 
e tc . , e f fect ivenes s  on the part of the state comptrol ler i s  necessary 
but not suf f i c i ent for succe s s . 
The me thod of s e l e c t ion wa s d i s cussed with the state comptro l l e rs that 
were interviewed for the qual i tat ive aspect of this research . The 
e l ected comptrol l e r s  f e l t  that elect ion g ives a comptrol l e r  more c l out , 
visibi l i ty and independence . Although of the opinion that method of 
select ion does not really ma t t e r ,  an appo inted comptrol l e r  reacted to 
the f indings that higher prof i l e , more pol i tical comptrol l ers ( e l ected 
and appointed by the governor ) were more l ikely to have c lean opinions 
and GFOA ce r t i f icate s . He f e l t  intuit ive l y  that these comptrol l e rs had 
more powe r to e f fect change . 
For mos t  comptrol l e rs interviewe d ,  the impact of method o f  select ion 
was f e l t  to be more of a phi l osophical que s t i on than a real one . 
Al though s everal comptrollers prefe rred one method to anothe r ,  the 
importance of me thod of select i on wa s downplayed . The intervi ewed 
comptro l lers gene ra l l y  fel t that successes we re found under a l l  
methods . 
Elec ted as we l l  as appointed comptrol l ers f e l t  i t  was important to 
subordinate pol it i ca l  cons idera t i ons to proper perf ormance of the 
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cont rol l ership func t i on . 
a l l  of the comptro l l e rs . 
Integrity was an important cons iderat i on to 
The resul t s  of the interviews regarding impact of method s e l e c t ion of 
state comptrol l e r  do not rea l l y  contradict the l i terature . Jus t  as the 
l itera ture is mixed a s  to pre ferred method of select i on , so are the 
views of state compt rol l e r s . Method of selection might have some 
impact on performance , but the comptro l lers intervi ewed f e l t  it was not 
a par t i cularly important factor . They f e l t  that successes occurred 
under a l l  me thods o f  s e l e c t i on . 
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ORGANI ZATIONAL CONFIGURATION 
The second research que s t ion is does the organi zat ional conf igura tion 
of the State Comp t ro l l er ' s  agency impac t  i t s  e f fect ivene s s ?  This g ive s 
rise to the second hypothe s i s . The second hypothes i s  i s  that there 
wi l l  be a s trong relat ionship between the organizat ional conf igurat ion 
of the State comptrol l e r ' s agency and its effect ivenes s . 
Thi s  hypothe s i s  i s  restated in the form of a nul l  hypothe s i s : 
The r e s earch wi l l  not f i nd a s t rong r e l a t ionship be tween the 
organ i z a t i onal c o n f i guration of the S t ate comp t ro l l e r ' s agency and i t s  
e f f e c t ivenes s .  
Organ i z a t ional configurat ion of the s tate comptro l l er ' s  agency can be 
grouped into three categor ies . The s e  are : 
• Functional ly integrated f i nance function . 
• Indirectly i nt egrated f inance funct ion 
• Non - func t iona l ly integrated f inance funct ion 
As was de scr ibed for method of select ion of the state comptro l l e r , 
external and inte rna l cons t i tuenc ies are iden t i f ied and measures of 
effectivenes s  to s a t i s fy e ach have been deve loped . Cross tabulat ion 
comparing these same measures of e f fect ivenes s  to organ i zat ional 
conf igura t i on of the s tate comptrol l er ' s  agency were produced . The 
results are described below . 
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A s  background f o r  t h i s  s e t  o f  cross tabulat ions , the non - funct iona l l y  
integra ted conf igura t i on i s  synonymous w i t h  e l e cted method of select ion 
( se e  appendi x  B ,  page 2 0 )  . 
Non - i nt egrated conf iguration scores higher on the var iables i dent i f ied 
for ext e rna l cons t i tuenc i e s  than the other two categories do . However ,  
this i s  attr ibuted t o  high scores noted for e l ected comptrol l e rs ( see 
method o f  s e l e c t i on ) . The other two organizational conf iguration 
categor i e s  ma sk the d i s t inct ion between appointment by governor , 
appointment by l owe r rank ing o f f i c i a l  and c ivi l service comptrollers . 
Accordi ng l y ,  this study concludes that organi z a t ional conf igurat i on 
doe s  not meaningfully impa ct the e f f e c t iveness of the state 
comptro l l er ' s agency to s a t i s fy i t s  external const i tuenc ies beyond 
method of s e l e c t ion . 
The evidence for organizat ional conf igura t ion having a bearing on the 
state comp t rol l er ' s agency ' s ab i l i ty to s a t i s fy the needs of internal 
cons t ituenci e s  i s  mixed with no c l ear pattern be ing obse rved . Non ­
integrated agenc i e s  we re l es s  l ikely to provide f inanc ial analys i s , 
indi rectly i ntegrated agencies were l e s s  l ikely to identify best 
prac tices and deve lop benchmarks and ful ly integrated agenc i e s  we re 
less l ikely to provide services to l ine agenc i e s . 
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Summary OF Crosstabula t ions - Orqan izat iona l Con f igurat ion 
In summary , it appears that organizat iona l conf iguration is not an 
important factor in s a t i s fying the needs of e i ther external or interna l 
cons t i tuenci e s  of the s tate comptro l l e r ' s agency . El ected comptrollers 
who funct ion in non- i ntegrated conf igurations are no l e s s  e f fective 
than those fun c t i on ing in more integrated conf igurations . 
DI SCUSS ION OF RESULTS OF RESEARCH AND THE LI TERATURE - ORGANI ZATIONAL 
CONFIGURATION / I NTEGRATION OF THE FINANCE FUNCTION 
Regardi ng the organ i z a t ional conf igura t ion of the comptrol l e r ' s agency , 
l i terature on organ i z ing the f inance funct ion for government favors 
integra t ion o f  the f i nance funct ion . Int egrat ion of the pub l ic f inance 
funct ion is organ i z a t iona l ly faci l i tated by having the s everal f inance 
funct ions ; those a c t i v i t i e s  per formed by the comptrol ler , t reasur e r ,  
taxat ion d i rector and budget di rector , report t o  a director of f inance 
who reports directly to the Chief Exe cut ive ( Lehan , 1 9 9 1 ; Ruche lman , 
1 9 8 7 ; Ros se l l  and Frasure , 1 9 6 4 ) . Thi s conf igura tion fa c i l i tates 
coordina t ion and cooperat ion and reduces f ragmentat ion . Add i t iona l l y ,  
integrat i on o f  the budget and ac count ing systems i s  des i red 
( Wooldridge , 1 9 8 2 ; Lynch , 1 9 8 5 ;  Hal l ,  1 9 8 7 ;  Wes tberry , 1 9 8 9 ;  Thurmaier , 
1 9 9 0 ; Garne r ,  1 9 9 1 ) . 
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The l it erature on integra t ion o f  the f inance function sugges t s  that the 
organ i z a t i onal conf igurat i on in whi ch the S tate Comptro l l er ' s agency i s  
a divis ion o f  a l arger depart o f  f inance would b e  the mos t  e f fect ive of 
the thre e . 
Met hod of s e l e c t i on has an impac t  on int egra t ion of the f inance 
func t i on . Appo intment o f  the comptrol ler should fac i l i tate integrat ion 
of the funct ion , as woul d  the case of a c ivi l se rvi ce comptroller . 
Elected comp t ro l l ers are independent of the governo r ,  which would t end 
to hinde r integra t ion . S i nce method of s e l ect ion has an impact on 
organ i z a t ional conf igura t i on ,  at l ea s t  for e l ected comptro l l ers , the 
concept o f  fun c t ional integra t i on is tes ted for organ i z a t ional 
conf igurat ion rathe r than under method of selection . 
The research did not t end to con f i rm the l it e rature on int egrat ion of 
the f i nance function that the variables on organizat ional conf igura t ion 
were intended to measure . The nul l  hypothe s i s  was not rej ected in that 
no s t rong relat ionship was found be tween e f fect iveness and 
organ i z a t ional conf igura t ion as measured for e i ther externa l or 
inte rna l conf igurat ions . 
In mos t  states , t he t reasurer i s  an e l ec t ed o f f i c i a l . This in i t s e l f  
would make i t  d i f f i cul t ,  from the s tandpoint of theory , t o  i ntegra te 
the f inance fun c t ion . The research focus ed primari ly on integrat ion o f  
the budget a n d  comptro l l er func t i ons . E l ected comptrollers , a minor i ty 
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i n  te rms o f  method o f  sel ection ,  tended t o  b e  reasonably successful in 
terms of sat i s fa c t i on of external cons t i tuencies . The e lected 
comptro l l ers a l s o  were the group of comptrol l e rs operating in a non ­
integra ted organ i z a t ional conf igurat ion . 
Clearly , e lected compt rol l ers , who function in non - integrated 
organi z a t ional conf igura t i ons are no l e s s  e f f ect ive than comptrol lers 
func t ioning in more int egrated conf igurat ions . I t  would appear that 
elected comptrol l e rs are a reasonably profe s s i onal group who , in order 
to cont inue to be re - e lected , mus t  perform e f fectively . E f f ec t ive 
performance requi res coordination with other f inance o f f i c i a l s  wi thout 
regard for hierarchical l ines or parti san a f f i l i ation . This research 
concludes that ac countabi l i ty of e l e c t ed comptro l l e rs ( and t reasurers ) 
to the publ i c ,  s e rves to o f f s e t  any centri fugal tendenci e s  that lack of 
integrated organ i z a t i onal configurat ion may impose . 
General l y ,  the intervi ews did not indicate that the state comptro l l ers 
felt organ i z a t ional conf iguration wa s important to integration of the 
f inance func t ion . Most s tate t reasurers are e l ected as are some 
comptro l l ers . Coordinat ion with other f inance o f f i c i a l s  was genera l l y  
not considered to b e  a problem . This contradicts the l i terature but 
not the quan t i tat ive research . 
PROFESSIONAL CERT I F I CATION OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
The third research ques t ion is do the profess ional qua l i f icat ions of 
the State Comptrol l e r  impact the e f fect ivenes s  of the State 
Comptro l l e r ' s agency? The third hypothes i s  is that there will be a 
s trong relat ionship between the profess ional qual i f ications of the 
State compt ro l l er and the e f fect iveness o f  the State Comptro l l er ' s 
agency . 
Thi s  hypothe s i s  i s  restated in the form of a nul l  hypothe s i s : 
The research wi l l  n o t  f ind a s t rong r e l a t ionship be tween the 
pro f e s s i onal qual i f i c a t ions of the S t a t e  comp t r o l l e r  and the 
e f f e c t ivene s s  of the S ta t e  Comp tro l l e r ' s agency . 
State comptrol l e r s  having any f inanc i a l l y  related cert i f icat ion are 
cons i dered a s  be ing profe s s iona l ly cert i f i ed . 
Cross t abulations compar ing the measures of e f fect ivene s s  to 
profes s i ona l cert i f i cat ion s tatus of the s tate comptrol l e r  were 
produced . The resu l t s  are descr ibed be low . 
Ext erna l const i tuenci e s  
A cros s t abulat ion comparing method of selection ( e l e cted vs . 
appointed) and cert i f i cation ,  see appendix B ,  page 4 1 )  sugges t s  that 
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far f ewer e l ected s tate comptrol lers are cert i f i ed than are those 
chosen by other s e l e c t i on methods . Howeve r ,  as presented above , 
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comptro l l ers chosen by this met hod o f  selec t ion ( e l ect ion ) s core high 
on rece iving unqual i f i ed audit opinion and GFOA Cert i f icate , as do 
those appointed d i re c t l y  by the governor . 
Tabl e  5 Cros stabulat ion 1 9 9 5 -method of selection/ Profess iona l 
cert i f i cat ion 
1 9 9 5  Cert i f ied Not cert i f ied Total 
Elected 5 . 0 \ ( 1 )  4 3 . 3 \ ( 1 3 )  2 8 . 0 \ ( 1 4 )  
Appo inted ( a l l , 9 5 . 0 \ ( 1 9 )  5 6 . 7 % ( 1 7 )  7 2 . 0 % ( 3 6 )  
including Civil 
Service 
Total 1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 2 0 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 3 0 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 5 0 )  
Cross t abulat ions be tween profess ional cert i f i cat ion status and 
unqua l i f ied audit opi nion were produced for both f i scal years ( se e  
appendix B ,  pages 4 2  and 4 3 ) . A higher proportion of non - cert i f ied 
state comptro l l e rs than cert i f ied comptrollers rece ived unqua l i f i ed 
op inions on the CAFR in both f i scal periods . Although not so s trong 
for 1 9 9 1 ,  the result for 1 9 9 5  does appear to be s igni f i cant . 
Tabl e  6 Crosstabulat ion 1 9 9 5 - Audi t  opinion/professional cert i f icat ion 
1 9 9 5  Audit Cert i f ied Not Cert i f ied Total 
Opinion 
Unqual i f i e d  6 6 . 7 % ( 1 2 )  8 3 . 3 \ ( 2 5 )  7 7 . 1 % ( 3 7 ) 
Qual i f ied 3 3 . 3 \ ( 6 )  1 6 . 7 % ( 5 )  2 2 . 9 % ( 1 1 )  
Total 1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 1 8 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 3 0 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 4 8 )  
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Tabl e  7 Cros stabulat ion 1 9 9 1 - Aud i t  opinion/professional cert i f icat ion 
1 9 9 1  Audi t  Cert i f ied Not Cert i f ied Total 
Op inion 
Unqual i fied 5 0 . 0 \ ( 5 )  6 2 . 5 \ ( 2 0 )  5 9 . 5 \ ( 2 5 )  
Qua l i f i ed 5 0 . 0 \ ( 5 )  3 7 . 5 \ ( 1 2 )  4 0 . 5 \ ( 1 7 )  
Total 1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 1 0 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 3 2 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 4 2 )  
The same result i s  obtained by compari son o f  profess ional cert i f i cation 
and GFOA ce r t i f icate ( se e  appendix pages 44 and 4 5 ) . The resul t s  for 
f i scal 1 9 9 5  appear to be s ign i f i cant . 
Tab l e  8 Cross tabulation 1 9 9 5 -GFOA cert i f i cate/profess ional 
cert i f i cat ion 
1 9 9 5  GFOA Cert i f i ed Not Cert i f ied Total 
Cert i f i cate 
Awa rded 4 5 . 0 \ ( 9 )  7 0 . 0 \ ( 2 1 )  6 0 . 0 \ ( 3 0 )  
Not Awarded 5 5 . 0 \ ( 1 1 )  3 0 . 0 \ ( 9 )  4 0 . 0 \ ( 2 0 )  
Total 1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 2 0 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 3 0 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 5 0 )  
Tabl e  9 Cros stabulat ion 1 9 9 1 -GFOA cert i f i cate/profess ional 
cert i f i cat ion 
1 9 9 1  GFOA Cert i f ied Not Cert i f ied Total 
Cer t i f i cate 
Awarded 3 6 . 4 \ ( 4 )  4 3 . 6 % ( 1 7 )  4 2 . 0 \ ( 2 1 )  
Not Awa rded 6 3 . 6 \ ( 7 )  5 6 . 4 \ ( 2 2 )  5 8 . 0 \ ( 2 9 )  
Total 1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 1 1 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 3 9 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 5 0 )  
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Thes e  resul t s , particularly those for the more recent period ( for 
external con s t i tuenc i e s ) refute the nul l hypothe s i s  that a s trong 
re lat ionship between profess ional cert i f icat ion and e f fe c t ivene s s  w i l l  
not b e  found . Howeve r ,  t h i s  result i s  oppos i t e  of what was 
ant i c ipated ; i . e . , that having a professional cert i f i cation would be 
associated with unqua l i f ied audit op inion and receipt of GFOA 
cert i f icat ion . 
I t  has a l ready been noted that e l ected state comptrol l ers ( a s  i s  the 
case with those appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the 
gove rno r )  are pos i t ively associ ated with the e f fect ivenes s  measures for 
external con s t i tuenc i e s ; i . e . , unqua l i f ied opinion and GFOA 
cert i f i cate . Al so , e l ected comptrol lers are not typ i c a l l y  cert i f ied . 
S imilar to the resu l t s  noted for organ i zat ional conf iguration ,  
s ign i f i cant ly higher scores for not - cert i f ied ( e l ected)  comptro l lers 
may be the result o f  the cert i f ied category containing comptrollers 
appointed by o f f i c i a l s  l ower than Governor and civi l service 
comptrol l ers a s  we l l  as those appointed directly by the governor . That 
is , some mas k ing may c l oud the resu l t s  of this set of cross 
tabula t ions . None - the - l e s s , this study concludes that non - cert i f ied 
comptro l lers were higher ( for 1 9 9 5 )  on these measures for externa l 
consti tuenc i e s . The resul t s  refute the nul l  hypothe s i s , but only to a 
l imi ted degree . 
Internal const i tuenc i e s  
Cross tabulat ions we re produced comparing profess ional certi f i cation 
status to the measures deve loped to de termine e f fe c t iveness of the 
state comptrol l e r ' s  agency in satis fying The state ' s  top f inanc i a l  
management t eam ( s ee appendix B ,  page s 4 6 - 5 9 )  . 
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No s t rong relat ionship wa s found be tween profess ional certi f i cation of 
the state comp t ro l l e r  and product ion of interim reports for the f i scal 
periods 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1 ( se e  appendix B,  pages 4 6 , 47 and 4 8 )  . 
With regard to provis ion of f inanc i a l  ana lys i s ,  cert i f ied state 
comptro l lers c l early provided this service in 1 9 9 1  more than not 
cert i f ied comptro l l ers . A S imilar di rect ion i s  noted for 1 9 9 5 , 
howeve r ,  by 1 9 9 5  the gap na rrows to a degree that renders the s trength 
of this association ques t i onab l e  ( se e  appendix B, pages 4 9  and 5 0 )  . 
No s t rong relat ionship i s  not ed between profess ional cert i f i cation and 
ident i f icat ion of be s t  practices and deve lopment of benchmarks ( s ee 
appendix B, page 5 1 )  . 
When bond rat ing i s  compared to professional cert i f i cation s tatus for 
1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1 ,  cert i f ied s tate comptro l lers s core better . Al though the 
relat ionship is s t rong for 1 9 9 1 , by 1 9 9 5 , howeve r ,  the resu l t s  are not 
particularly s t rong ( se e  appendix B pages 52 and 5 3 )  . 
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Cross t abulat ions comparing Financ ial Wor ld rat ing t o  profess ional 
cert i f i ca t ion for 1 9 9 1  ind i cate that cert i f ied comptro l l ers were 
genera l l y  s cored highe r . By 1 9 9 5 , howeve r ,  the dif ference i s  min ima l 
( see appendix B pages 5 4  through 5 7 )  . 
A compa r ison of p rof e s s ional certi f i cat ion to the expendi ture to 
revenue ra t i o  was made ( se e  appendix B ,  page s 5 8  and 5 9 ) . Cons idering 
a rat io of . 9 9 or l es s ,  cert i f ied state comptro l l ers s cored better than 
non - ce r t i f ied comptro l l ers . The d i f ference for 1 9 9 1  was s trong . The 
gap narrowed by 1 9 9 5  but i s  s t i l l  somewhat s trong . Cons i der ing a ra t i o  
of . 9 5 o f  l e s s ,  i n  1 9 9 1  cert i f i ed comptrol l ers scored be tter than non­
cert i f i ed comptro l l e r s . The 1 9 9 1  d i f fe rences were strong , howeve r ,  by 
1 9 9 5  the d i f ferences were minima l . 
The compos i t e  measure of s e rvices to l ine agencies was compared to 
profess iona l cert i f ication of the state comptrol ler ( s ee appendix B ,  
page 6 0 ) . The resul t s  suggest non - cert i f i ed state comptro l l e r s  are more 
e f fective in providing services to l ine agenc i e s  than those who are 
cert i f ied . 
The evidence for profe s s iona l cert i f i cation having a bearing on the 
state comptro l l e r ' s  agency ' s  abi l i ty to sat i s fy the needs of internal 
cons t ituenci e s  is mixed . Cert i f i ed comptro l l ers genera l ly satis f i ed 
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interna l const i tuenc i e s  be tter than non - cer t i f ied comptrol l e rs i n  1 9 9 1 . 
Howeve r ,  by 1 9 9 5 , the gap had c losed . 
Summary of cross tabul at i on s -pro f e s s i onal cert i f ication 
In summary , surp ri s ingl y ,  non - ce r t i f ied comptrol lers appear to be more 
e f fe c t ive in t e rms of s a t i s fact ion o f  external con s t i tuenci e s , 
prima r i l y  the f i nanc i a l  commun i ty .  This resu l t  may be due t o  mas k ing 
result ing f rom l umping a l l  comptro l l ers into two categories with one 
category , non - ce rt i f i e d ,  s t rongly related with e l ec t ed comptro l l e rs . 
I t  appears that prof e s s i onal cer t i f i ca t ion of the s tate comp t ro l l e r  i s  
not a part icularly important factor in s a t i s fying the needs of interna l 
cons t ituenci e s  o f  the s tate comptrol l e r ' s agency . 
DIS CUSS ION OF RESULTS OF RESEARCH AND THE LITERATUR E - PROFESS IONAL 
CERTIFI CATION OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
The l i tera ture on profe s s i ona l i sm in pub l i c  admi n i s t ra t i on i s  gene ra l l y  
support ive ( Moshe r ,  1 9 8 2 ; Toren , 1 9 8 6 ; Rainey , 1 9 9 1 ; Kearney and S inha , 
1 9 8 8 ) . The l og i c  for this research que s t i on fol l ows the practical 
reasoning that profes s i ona l expe r t i s e  should be appropriate to the 
tasks to be performed . 
The funct i ons o f  the state comptro l l e r  are those that are typical ly 
performed by members of the accoun t i ng profe s s i on . I t  i s  reasonab l e  to 
concl ude that the spe c i f i c  pro f e s s i ona l charac teris t i cs o f  the 
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funct ions o f  the state comptrol ler are bes t  ma tched by the knowledge , 
sk i l l s  and abil i t i e s  of those with an accounting education and 
experience . Much of the power of government o f f i c i a l s  i s  the power to 
persuade whi ch i s  ga ined by the i r  profess ional qua l i f i ca t ions . The 
abi l ity of the s tate comptro l l e r  to exercise this power i s  enhanced i f  
the state comptro l l er is a CPA . Other appropriate f inance oriented 
cert i f i ca t ions may be subs t i tuted . 
This research did f ind a s t rong relat ionship be tween profess ional 
cert i f i ca t ion on the part of the s tate comptro l l e r and e f fect iveness 
for exte rna l const i tuenc i e s  for 1 9 9 5  data . Non - cer t i f ied comptro l l ers 
scored highe r . According l y ,  the nul l hypothes i s  was rej ected for 
externa l con s t i tuenci e s  for the 1 9 9 5  data . For the 1 9 9 1  dat a  and for 
interna l con s t i tuenci e s  for both t ime periods , the da ta we re e i ther 
mixed or not s trong . According l y ,  no s trong relationship was found 
between cert i f i ca t i on and e f fect iveness for externa l con s t i tuenci e s  for 
the 1 9 9 1  t ime period or for interna l cons t i tuenc ies for e i ther . 
Re j ec t ion of the nul l  hypothes i s  i s  l imited to only external 
cons t i tuenci e s  for the mos t  recent t ime pe riod . The re fore only l imited 
conclusions may be reached . Given the l imitat ions , this research does 
not conclude that non - cer t i f ied comptro l l ers are more e f fect ive , but 
that lack of cert i f i ca t ion is not a hindrance to e f fectivene s s . 
As indicated above , e l ected compt rol lers , a minority in terms of method 
of select ion t ended to be reasonably success ful in terms o f  
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s a t i s faction o f  externa l con s t i tuenc i e s . The e l ected comptrol lers a l s o  
we re as a group , l e s s  l ikely to be prof e s s iona l l y  cert i f ied than the 
appointed comptro l lers . 
Even though l imited , the f indings cont rad ict the expected out come . 
Profess ional cert i f ication of the s t ate comptro l l e r  was f e l t  to be 
important . Cert i f i ed comptrol lers , pa r t i cularly CPA' s were f e l t  to 
more l ikely to be e f f ect ive in performing tasks that are predomina tely 
accounting oriented . Surpris ingl y ,  the oppo s i t e  turned out to be the 
case . Thi s  i s  due to the s t rong performance of e l ected comptro l l ers 
who are unl ikely to be certi f i ed . 
The s t ate comptro l l er ' s agenc ies have s t a f f  with appropriate f inanc ial 
certi f i cations . Virtua l l y  all  s ta t e s  have CPA ' s on sta f f . E l ec t ed 
comptro l l e rs agenc ies had on the ave rage 9 CPA ' s on s t a f f  which i s  
c l o s e  to the average f o r  a l I S O  s ta t e s  ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 , i f  New York and 
Texas are not counted as they are not typ i ca l )  . 
The presence of cert i f icat ion on the part of agency s t a f f  wa s 
ant i c ipa ted , howeve r ,  the agency head wa s f e l t  to be better abl e to 
manage the s t a f f  if c e r t i f ied and more l i kely to use d i s cret ion to 
pursue the usual goa l s  o f  CPA ' s ;  i . e . , c l ean opinion on CAFR . 
The state comptrol l e r s  that we re intervi ewed who we re accountants f e l t  
that having a n  a ccoun t i ng background was important . Those who were not 
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accountants did not f e e l  i t  was a s  important . The e l ected comptrol lers 
are less l ikely to be accountants than the appointed comptro l l ers , 
however this subgroup t ended to be success ful . The e l ec t ed 
comptrol l ers interviewed were non - a ccountants but had reasonab l e  
backgrounds . Although techn ical qua l i f icat ions woul d  no doubt be 
he lpful , nei ther e l ec t ed compt rol l e r  f e l t  they we re requ ired for 
e f f e c t iveness in the role o f  state comptro l l e r . One of the e l ected 
comptrol l e rs intervi ewed indicated that he had more of a pub l i c  pol icy 
orientation than a techni c a l  account ing ori enta tion . The technical 
aspects were cove red by pro f e s s ional s t a f f . 
TENURE IN OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
The fourth research ques t i on is doe s the length of tenure of the State 
Comptro l l e r  impac t  the e f f e c t ivene s s  of the S t ate Comptro l l er ' s  agency? 
My conc l us ion is that the l ength o f  tenure in o f f i ce o f  the s tate 
comp t ro l l e r  will impact the e f f e c t ivene s s  of the performance o f  the 
state comptrol l e r ' s agency . 
The fourth hypothe s i s  i s  tha t  there wi l l  be a s trong relat ionship 
between the l ength of tenure o f  the State comptro l l er and the 
e f f e c t i venes s  o f  the State Compt ro l l er ' s agency . 
This hypothe s i s  i s  restated in the form of a nul l  hypothe s i s : 
2 1 6 
The r e s e a r c h  w i l l  not f ind a s t rong r e l a t i onship be tween the l ength o f  
tenure o f  the S t a t e  comp t r o l l e r  and the e f f e c t iven e s s  o f  the S t a t e  
Comp tro l l e r ' s agency . 
Tenure was de f i ned in two ways for use in the cross tabulat ions . 
F i rs t ,  f o l l owing Meye r ,  1 9 7 9 ,  l onge r  tenures w i l l  be cons idered to be 
six or more consecut ive years in o f f i ce , wh i l e shorter tenures w i l l  be 
cons idered to be l e s s  than s ix consecut ive years in o f f i ce . 
Se cond l y ,  a f t e r  revi ewing the data , it wa s dec i ded that four categories 
should be used to de termine i f  any resul t s  that did not appear in the 
f i rs t  set of cross tabulat ions showed up when more groups were used . 
The four categories chosen were 1 0  yea rs or more , 6 to 9 years , 2 to 5 
years and l e s s  than 2 years . 
Cross tabula t i ons compa r ing the measures of e f f e c tivene s s  to l ength of 
tenure o f  the state comptro l l e r  were produced . 
de s c r ibed below . 
Ext e rna l const ituenc ies 
The resu l t s  are 
Cross tabula t i ons compar ing l ength of tenure in off ice with method of 
select ion were produced . In these , method of s e l e c tion was shown in 
two categor i e s , e l e c t ed and appo inted ( i nc luding civi l s e rvi c e )  Thi s  
was done t o  de termine i f  e l ected comptrol l e r s  tended t o  s e rve l onger 
tenure s . When tenure was categorized as l ong ( 6  years or mo re ) and 
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short ( l e s s  than 6 years ) s t rong d i f f e rences were not i n  evidence ( se e  
be low, also Appendix B ,  pages 6 1  and 6 2 ) . When tenure was shown in the 
four categori e s  des cribed above , e l ected comptrol l e rs t ended to s e rve 
longer , howeve r ,  the d i f f e rence is smal l .  Thi s  suggests that masking 
wi l l  probabl y  not lead to resul t s  favoring e l e c ted comptrol lers because 
a l l  others are in one category a s  was the case for organ i z a t iona l 
conf igurat ion . 
Tabl e  1 0  Cro s st abula t ion Me thod of select ion / t enure 
Select i on Me thod Tenure 6 or more Tenure l e s s  than Total 
( 2  categor i e s ) Years 6 Years 
E l e cted 3 1 . 6 \ ( 6 )  2 5 . 8 \ ( 8 )  2 8 . 0 \ ( 1 4 )  
Appo inted 6 8 . 4 % ( 1 3 )  74 . 2 \ ( 2 3 )  7 2 . 0 \ ( 3 6 )  
1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 1 9 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 3 1 )  1 0 0 . 0 \ ( 5 0 )  
Cross t abula t i ons betwe en tenure in o f f ice and unqual i fied audit 
opinion were produced for both f i scal years ( se e  appendix B,  pages 6 3 -
6 6 )  the resul t s  are mixed . Longer t enure appears to score better in 
1 9 9 1 , howeve r ,  the associat ion is not particularly s t rong . By 1 9 9 5 , 
d i f ferences are minima l . The resul t s  are not d i f ferent when four 
rather than two categor ies for tenure are used . 
The same resul t s  are obtained by compari son of t enure in o f f i ce and 
GFOA cert i f i ca t e  ( s ee appendix B , pages 6 7 - 7 0 )  S t rong , c l ear pa tterns 
do not emerge . 
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The l ength o f  t enure o f  the s tate compt rol l er doe s  not appear t o  have a 
bearing on e f f e c t ivenes s  of the state compt rol ler to s a t i s fy the 
demands o f  external cons t i tuenc ies . 
Interna l const i tuenc i e s  
Cross t abul a t i ons were produced comparing l ength of tenure i n  o f f i ce t o  
the measures deve loped t o  de termine e f fect iveness of the s tate 
comp t ro l l er ' s agency in s a t i s fying the s tate ' s  top f inanc ial management 
t eam ( s e e  appendi x  B ,  pages 7 1 - 9 8 ) . 
State comp t rol l e r s  s e rv ing l onger tenure appear to be more l ikely to 
produce interim reports for the f i scal periods 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1  ( s ee 
appendix B, pages 7 1 - 7 6 ) . When t enure is presented as two categories , 
a highe r percentage of comptrol lers serving s i x  or more years ind i cate 
product ion o f  interim report s . Howeve r ,  the d i f ference i s  not 
part icularly l a rge . When tenure i s  presented as four categories , 
pa r t i cularly in 1 9 9 5 ,  a higher proport ion of compt ro l l ers serving 1 0  or 
more years p repares interim reports than the other categor i e s . 
With regard to prov i s ion of f inanc i a l  analys i s , when tenure i s  
presented as two categor i e s , s t rong d i f ferences a r e  not in evidence . 
When presented as four categor i e s , comptrol lers serving 1 0  or more 
years s cored the lowe s t  pe rcentage , whi l e  the highe s t  pe rcentage wa s 
s cored by comp t ro l lers serving in the 6 to 9 years range . The 
d i f fe rences are l arge , howeve r ,  the resul t does not a l low for a 
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conc lus ion o n  the impact o f  l ength o f  t enure on e f f e c t ivene s s  for this 
va riable ( se e  Appendix B ,  pages 7 7 - 8 0 ) . 
No s trong relat ionship i s  noted be tween t enure and ident i f icat ion o f  
be s t  practices a n d  deve lopment of benchmarks ( see appendix B ,  pages 8 1  
and 8 2 )  . 
When bond rat ing and tenure are compared ( s ee Appendix B ,  pages 8 3 - 8 6 ) , 
the 1 9 9 1  rat ings favor longer t enure . When tenure i s  presented as two 
categor i e s , comp t ro l lers s e rving 6 or more years s core 2 0 \  points 
higher than those serving l e s s  than 6 years . When t enure i s  presented 
a s  four categor i e s , comptro l l e rs serving 1 0  or more years s core 
s igni f i cantly higher than other categor i e s . 
Wi th regard to the 1 9 9 5  rat ings , no d i f f e rence i s  obs e rved when t enure 
is presented as two categories . When tenure i s  presented as four 
categor i e s , comp t rol l e r s  s e rving 10 or more years s core h ighe r than the 
other categories , howeve r ,  the s e cond highe s t  category belongs to 
comptrol l e rs s e rving less than two years . The d i f f e rences between the 
highe s t  and some o f  the others are weak . The gap that existed in 1 9 9 1  
seems t o  b e  clos i ng by 1 9 9 5 . 
Cross t abul a t ions compar ing Financ i a l  World rat ing to t enure suggest 
that longer tenure i s  a s sociated with higher Financ ial World rat i ng . 
This i s  evi dent when t enure i s  presented as two categor i e s . No 
additiona l ins ight i s  gained by the presenta t i on of tenure as four 
categor i e s . ( se e  appendix B ,  pages 8 7 - 9 4 ) . 
A compa r ison of t enure to the expendi ture to revenue ratio was made 
( s ee appendix B ,  pages 9 5 - 9 8 )  
d i f ferences were sma l l .  
Cons idering a rat io of . 9 9 or l es s ,  
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Cons idering a rat io o f  . 9 5 o r  l e s s , for 1 9 9 1 , shorter t enure ( l e s s  than 
6 years when tenure is presented as two categories ) is a s sociated with 
a highe r percentage . Howeve r ,  by 1 9 9 5 ,  when t enure i s  presented as two 
categories the d i f ference di sappears . When tenure i s  presented as four 
cat egor ies for 1 9 9 5 ,  comptroll ers s e rving 10 or more years s cored lower 
than other categories wh i l e  those s e rving 6 to 10 years s cored highe r . 
The results for compari son of tenure and expendi ture/ revenue rat i o  ove r 
t ime are mixed and a l l ow for no c l ear trend in terms of the research 
que s t ions . 
The other interna l con s t i tuency iden t i f ied was the l ine agenc i e s . The 
compos i te measure of s e rvices to l ine agenc ies was compared to tenure 
of the s ta t e  comp t rol l e r  ( s ee appendix B ,  page s 99 and 1 0 0 ) . Line 
agency service scores are presented in three l eve l s . When the highe s t  
l evel only i s  considered , comptro l l ers se rving shor ter t enure s  s core 
higher than those s e rving longe r tenure s . Howeve r ,  when the highe s t  
two l eve l s  are cons idered , d i f f e rence s  a r e  minima l . Cons idering that 
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the construct ion o f  this compos i t e  measure we ighs s everal di spara te 
s ervi c e s  equa l l y ,  cons idera t ion of the highe s t  two leve l s  i s  l ikely to 
produce a more reasonabl e resu l t  than cons iderat ion than merely the 
highe s t  leve l . A�cording l y ,  the conclus ion is that s trong , c l ear 
d i f ferences are not observed in the e f fe c t iveness o f  comptrol l ers in 
providing s e rvices to l ine agencies based on t enure . 
The evi dence for t enure having a bearing on the state comptro l l er ' s  
agency ' s ab i l ity to s a t i s fy the needs of interna l cons t i tuencies i s  not 
s t rong . Comptrol l e rs serving 1 0  or more years are more l ikely to 
produce interim reports than those serving l e s s  than 10 years . 
Regarding bond rat ings , longer tenured comptro l l e rs s cored better i n  
1 9 9 1 ,  howeve r ,  b y  1 9 9 5 ,  t h e  d i f f erence had di sappea red . Genera l l y ,  
longer t enured comptrol l e r s  s cored higher on Financ i a l  World rat i ngs . 
No maj or d i f ferences were not ed for the other inte rnal cons t ituency 
var i abl e s . 
Summary of c ros s t abul a t i ons - Tenure in Off ice 
In summary , i t  appears that l ength of tenure in o f f i ce i s  not a 
part icularly important factor in s a t i s fying the needs of e i ther 
external or interna l cons t i tuencies of the state comptro l l er ' s  agency . 
Length of tenure in o f f ice was not correlated with any part icular 
method of s e l e c t ion . 
2 2 2  
DI S CUSS ION O F  RESULTS O F  RES EARCH AND THE LITERATURE-TENURE I N  OFFICE 
OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
Based on the research of Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 ) , the comptrol l e r  that has l onger 
tenure i n  o f f i ce i s  p re sumed to be better able to she l ter the operat ing 
core of h i s  or he r agency from the uncerta inty of the pol i t ical 
envi ronment faced by the agency . Ac cording l y ,  longer t enure on the 
part of the s tate comptro l l e r  i s  expected to be as sociated with 
e f fectivene s s . 
The resul t s  of research we re not suf f i c iently s trong to re j ec t  the nul l  
hypothe s i s . Accordingl y ,  i t  appears that leng th o f  t enure i n  o f f i ce , 
on the part of the s tate comptrol l e r , i s  not a part icularly important 
factor in s a t i s fying the needs of e i ther external or interna l 
const ituenci e s  of the comptrol l e r ' s agency . 
Al though , thi s conclus ion was not expected , a l l  state comptrol l er ' s 
agencies have pro f e s s ional career c i v i l  s e rvice s t a f f . The presence o f  
a pro f e s s i ona l ly s t rong career s t a f f  in these agenc ies can , to some 
degree o f f s e t  the impac t  that a short t enure may have on the o f f i ce of 
the agency head . 
Genera l l y ,  the o f f i ce of s tate comptro l l e r  t ends to a degree of 
stabi l i ty in t enure . The average t enure at the t ime of the 1 9 9 5  NASACT 
survey ( NASACT , 1 9 9 6 ) was 6 . 3  years . I f  Maryland i s  e l iminated ( a t  the 
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t ime the Maryl and comp t ro l l e r ,  an e l e cted o f f icial , had served for 3 7  
years ) the average was 5 . 7  years . Some e l ected comptrollers have been 
e le c ted for many terms ( for exampl e ,  Maryland and South Carol ina ) . 
S imilarly other appointed comptro l l ers have served for long periods 
( for examp l e , Pennsylvania and Iowa ) . 
All  of the comptrol l e rs that were interviewed had served at l ea s t  a 
reasonabl e  amount of t ime in o f f ice . None had served l e s s  than four 
years i n  o f f i ce . They genera l l y  f e l t  that t ime in o f f i ce i s  important . 
This does not contradict the conclus ion above that the o f f i ce of s tate 
comptrol l e r  i s  somewhat s table in terms o f  tenure in o f f i ce . 
TOP DOWN REVIEW 
Add i t iona l l y ,  a " top down " approach wa s considered . For the 1 9 9 5  
period , the top s ta t e s  i n  t e rms o f  bond ratings were Georg i a , Maryland , 
Missour i ,  North Carol i na , South Carol ina , Tennessee , Utah , V i rg in i a ,  
Delaware , Minnesota , New Jersey and New Mexico . S imilarly , the l owe s t  
rated s ta t e s  i n  t e rms o f  bond rat ings were Massachusetts , We s t  
Virgi ni a ,  Ca l i fornia , Lou i s i ana and New York . 
Top rated s tates in t e rms of bond ratings included repre sentat ives of 
all four categor i e s  i n  terms of method of selection . States with high 
bond rat ing having e l ected comptro l l ers are Maryland and South 
Carol i na . S tates with high bond rat ings having comptro l l ers appointed 
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b y  and s e rving a t  the plea sure of the governor are Virginia , Delaware , 
Minnesota , and New Jersey . States with h igh bond rat i ngs having 
comptrol l ers appo inted by an o f f i c i a l  lower than governor are M i s sour i , 
Tenne s s e e  and Utah . Fina l ly ,  s tates with high bond ra t i ngs having 
civil  s e rvice comp t rol l e rs are Georg i a , North Carol ina and New Mexico . 
NASACT , 1 9 9 6 , table 4 ,  pages 1 2  and 1 3 ,  indicates that North Carol ina ' s  
comptro l le r  i s  a me r i t  system/ c i v i l  service employe e . An interv i ew 
w i th the North Caro l i na s tate compt rol l e r ,  Edward Renf row ( February 2 4 , 
1 9 9 4 ) indicates this pos i t ion i s  appointed by the governor and 
con f i rmed by the Gene ral As s embly for a s even year term .  He f e e l s  that 
this i s  not real l y  a c i v i l  service pos i t i on a s  it i s  exempt from the 
personn e l  act . Once appointed and con f i rmed , the comptrol l e r  can only 
be removed before the end of the s even - year term for j us t  cause . 
mea sure of i ndependence i s  prese rved by this arrangement . 
Some 
Of the states with the l owe s t  bond ratings , New York , West V i rginia and 
Ca l i fornia have e l ec t ed comptro l lers , whi l e  Mass achus e t t s  and Lou i s iana 
have comptrol lers who are appo inted by the governor . 
Regarding the h ighe s t  rated states in terms of f inanc ial management by 
Financ i a l  World in 1 9 9 5 , Maryl and , M i s sour i , North Carol ina , Utah , 
Virginia and Minne sota are in agreement with the high bond rated s ta t e s  
containing a l l  categories of method of select ion . Addi t i ona l l y ,  
Financ i a l  Wor l d  rated Indi ana , which has a n  e l ected comptro l l e r ,  
highly . I owa and Ohi o ,  with comptro l l e rs appo inted by the governor 
were rated h ighly by Financial Wor l d ,  a s  was Kentucky , whi ch h a s  a 
comptro l l e r  appo inted by an o f f icial  lowe r than governor . 
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Regarding the lowe s t  rated states i n  terms o f  f inanc ial management in 
1 9 9 5 , F inancial world agreed with Louis iana ( appointed by the governor )  
and New York ( e l ec t ed ) . Add i t i ona l l y ,  Financ ial Wo rld gave a l ow 
f inanc i a l  management ra t i ng to I l l inois ( e lected ) , Alaska , Ma ine and 
vermont ( appo inted by an o f f i c i a l  l ower than gove rno r )  and Al abama 
( c i v i l  s e rvice ) . 
Thi s  top down l ook indicates that both highe r and l ower rated s tates 
are found in all categories . This approach appears genera l l y  to 
support the conclusions resul t ing from analys i s  of the cross 
tabu l a t i ons . No other conclus i on regarding method of s e l e c t i on resu l t s  
from this review . 
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QUALITATIVE METHODS 
INTERVIEWS 
For the qual itat ive part of the research , nine current or former s tate 
comptro l lers represent ing e ight s tates we re interviewed . The 
intervi ews were i n - dept h ,  open- ended interviews that ut i l i zed the 
interview guide included in Appendix D .  
Of the n ine , two comp t ro l l ers were e l ected , the other s even we re 
appointed . Three of these s even are appointed by and s e rve at the 
p l easure of the gove rnor . Two are appo inted by an o f f i c i a l  lower than 
governor . One is trad i t ional c i v i l  s e rvice and one is appointed by the 
governor to a s even - year term,  thus a f fording a degree o f  protect ion 
simi l a r  to that of c i v i l  s e rvice . 
Two of the interv i ewed comptrol lers represented Virginia , the current 
comp t ro l l e r  and a former comptro l l e r . Al l others were currently 
s e rv ing except for the former e l ected comptro l l e r  o f  South Carol ina . 
BACKGROUND AND PROFESSIONAL QUALI F I CATIONS 
The s tate comptrol l e r s  that were interviewed had va r i ed backgrounds . 
Seven who were appo inted at one level or another we re interviewed . Two 
e l ected comp t ro l l ers were interviewed . Obvious l y ,  the e l ec t ed 
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comptro l lers had pol i t i ca l  experience . O f  the non - e l ected comptrol l ers 
that were interviewe d ,  one had served as a s ta t e  s enator and also 
served three four - year terms as the s tate ' s  e l e cted state audi tor . 
Another had s e rved one fou r - year term as an appointed state comp t rol l e r  
of another s ta t e . Of the e l ec t ed comptro l l ers , one had served in his 
state ' s  house and senate and as Lieutenant Governor prior to h i s  
as sumpt ion o f  t h e  ro l e  of compt rol l e r . The other had practi ced law,  
served as a prosecut ing attorney and had been e l ected to the post of 
mayor in local government before becoming comptro l l e r . 
Most had some private sector work exper i ence . S everal had been 
employed in pub l i c  ac count ing ,  one in account ing for industry . Anothe r 
had worked in the f inance area in industry . One had i n i t i a l ly worked 
as an engineer in indust ry .  
Of the comptrol l e r s  interviewe d ,  four are CPA ' s ,  one i s  a CFE and two 
are CGFM ' s .  Four ma j ored in account ing a s  undergraduat e s , one in 
bus ine s s , one in engineer ing and one in pol i t i ca l  s c i ence /pub l i c  
adminis trat ion . The l a t t e r  two comp l e ted suf f i c i ent credit hours o f  
account ing courses to s i t  f o r  and p a s s  t h e  CPA examination . In t erms 
of postgraduate educat i on ,  two have an MPA, two have MBA ' s and two are 
at torneys . 
Appendix D contains the name s , t i t l e s , s tates and dates of interview o f  
the s ta t e  comptro l l ers and a de script ion of t h e  resul t s  o f  the 
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intervi ews , a s  we l l  a s  the interview guide used and a narrat ive o f  the 
resul t s  of the intervi ews . 
SUMMARY OF I NTERVI EWS 
The s ta t e  comptrol l e r s  that were intervi ewed are a truly impress ive 
group o f  indivi dua l s  in t e rms o f  expe r i ence and qua l i f i ca t i ons . The 
backgrounds we re dive rs e , with some having extens ive pol it i ca l  
background . Others have had re l evan t private sector experience . Some 
we re accountants and some were not . Gene ra l l y ,  the accountants f e l t  
t h i s  qua l i f i ca t i on was more important than those who we re not 
accountants .  
The comptro l l e rs int e rvi ewed genera l ly f e l t  that they had been 
e f fective in o f f i c e . Mos t  ment ioned i tems such as going to GAAP , c l ean 
op inions on the CAFR and GFOA cer t i f i ca t e  as achievements . 
Imp l ementing new account ing sys tems was indicated by s evera l . Some 
i nd i ca t ed that funding for obtain ing these new syst ems was not a l ways 
easy . 
Al l had s e rved at least a reasonabl e  amount of t ime in o f f i ce . I t  was 
generally f e l t  that t ime in o f f i ce is important . For the mos t  part , 
organ i z a t ional conf igurat i on wa s not an i s sue . 
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The impact o f  met hod o f  select i on wa s f e l t  t o  be more o f  a 
phi losophical que s t i on than a real one . S everal comptrol l ers indicated 
a preference for one me thod ove r anothe r .  The e l ec t ed compt rol l e rs 
f e l t  that e l ected comptrol l ers had more c l out , vi s i b i l i ty and 
independenc e . One comptro l l e r  who was appointed by and served at the 
p l easure o f  the governor intuit ive ly f e l t  that highe r pro f i l e  
comp t ro l l e rs probably had more power t o  e f fect change . Otherwis e , the 
importance o f  me thod o f  s e l e c t i on was downplayed . Mos t  f e l t  gene ral ly 
that succ e s s e s  were found under all methods o f  s e l e c t ion . 
An important theme that sounded through the intervi ews was the 
importance o f  qua l i t i e s  such as integrity , hone sty and accountab i l ity . 
This theme was sounded across the board . The s e  qua l i t i e s  are important 
to e l e c t ed as we l l  a s  to appointed comptro l l e r s . Po l i t i ca l  
cons i de rat ions should not keep the comptro l l e r  from doing t h e  right 
thing . This was the consensus of the intervi ewed comptro l l ers . 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUS IONS - RBSULTS OF RBSEARCH 
In summary , the f o l l owing was found with regard to the research 
que s t i ons . 
• Method of s e l e c t i on was found to be a factor in s a t i s fact ion of the 
needs o f  exte rna l con s t i tuencies o f  the s tate comp t rol l e r ' s agency . 
Genera l l y ,  more pol i t ical , higher pro f i l e  comptro l l e rs , those 
appo inted by and serving at the pleasure o f  the governor and those 
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who are directly e l e c ted , were found t o  b e  more e f fective than lower 
prof i le , l e s s  pol i t i c a l  comptrollers , those appointed by an o f f i c i a l  
lower than gove rnor or those who a r e  civil  service employees . 
Method of s e l e c t ion was not found to be a factor in sat i s faction of 
the needs of interna l cons t i tuenc ies of the state comptrol l e rs 
agency . 
• Organ i z a t ional conf igura t i on of the comptro l l e r ' s  agency in the 
context of the l a rger government was not found to be a factor in 
e f fect ivene s s . Integrat ion of the f inance funct ion i s  not a prob lem 
for those states with e l ected s tate comptrollers . 
• Profess iona l cert i f ication of the s tate comptro l l e r  was not found to 
be a factor in e f fect ivene s s  of the state comp t ro l l er . E l e c ted 
compt ro l l ers , who are l e s s  l i kely to be profe s s iona l l y  cert i f i ed 
than comptro l l e rs s e l e c ted by other methods , are e f fective . 
• Tenure in o f f i ce on the part of the state comptro l l er i s  not a 
factor in e f fe c t ivenes s  of the comptro l l e r ' s  agency . 
Chap t e r  5 
Summa ry , Conc l u s i ons and Recommenda t i ons 
PURPOSE OF S TUDY 
Each of the f i fty state governments i s  organi z e d  to include an 
organ i z a t ion that operates as the s t ate ' s  central accounting agency . 
The organ i z a t ion , an agency of s tate government i s  headed by an 
o f f i c i a l  t i t l ed the S tate Comptro l l e r or Cont ro l l er or other relevant 
t i t l e  such as D i rector , Commi s s ioner , or Chi e f  of Accounts . 
The core fun c t i ons genera l l y  performed by the s tate comp t ro l l e r ' s 
agency are 1 )  account ing and reporting , and 2 )  budgetary control . 
Typ i ca l l y ,  these func t ions are central i z e d  in the organ i zation . The 
cont ro l l e r  i s  not l imited to these core functions , howeve r ,  the s e  
funct ions a r e  t h e  one s common to t h e  ro l e  of a central account ing 
agency for s tate government ( NASACT , 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 9 6 ) . Thes e  two functions 
are inte rdependent . 
The state comptro l l e r  i s  an important state o f f i c ial . This research i �  
intended to determine whether method of s e l e c t ion o f  the state 
comptro l l er ( e l ec t i on or appointment ) ,  organ i z a t ional conf iguration o f  
t h e  s tate comptro l l er ' s agency,  profess ional qua l i f i cations o f  the 
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s tate comp t ro l l e r  o r  l ength of t enure se rved by the s tate comptro l ler 
have an impact on the e f fectivenes s  o f  the performance o f  the s tate 
comptro l l er ' s agency . 
THE LI TERATURES 
Method of S e l e c t i on of Government O f f i c i a l s  
The l i tera ture o n  s e l e c t ion o f  rel evant government o f f i c i a l s  i s  mixed 
as to which method might be preferred . Beyl e ,  1 9 8 5  and Chi , 1 9 9 2  
present pros and cons for elect i on and appo intment . 
The ea r l i e r  l i tera ture that compares the c i ty manager form of 
government t o  the s trong mayor form found d i f f erences in performance 
between thes e  two forms of mun i c ipa l gove rnmen t .  C i ty manager 
governments were found to be more ra t i ona l ly managed and l e s s  
po l i t ic a l l y  respons ive than s t rong mayor forms ( Lineberry and Fowl e r ,  
1 9 6 7 ;  Karnig , 1 9 7 5 ;  and Lineberry and Sha rkansky , 1 9 7 8 ) . La ter 
research by Morgan and Pe l is sero ( 1 9 8 0 )  found , to the cont ra ry ,  that in 
the l ong run , whether the c i ty was reformed or not made l i t t l e  
d i f f e rence , a l t hough they agree that research sugges t s  that s t ructure 
inf luences pol i c i e s  at the state leve l . S chne ider and Park ( 1 9 8 9 )  
cons i de r  the evidence rega rding c i ty manager c i t ies and rat i ona l 
admini s t ra t i on to be mixed . 
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Box ( 1 9 9 5 )  argues that whether rat i onal adminis trat ion o r  pol i t ical 
re spons ivenes s  is the best s t ructure for local governments depends on 
ones i deological pre ference . 
D i f f e rences have also been noted in county governments run by appo inted 
or e l e c ted chief execut ive s and those governed by the Commiss ion form 
of county gove rnment . Clearly,  having a s t rong execut ive mat ters 
whether e l ec t ed or appo inted ( S chne ider and Park , 1 9 8 9  and DeSant i s  and 
Renne r ,  1 9 9 4 ) . 
Cons ideri ng the earl i e r  c i ty manager vs . s trong mayor l i terature , 
e l ected comp t ro l l ers were thought to be more l ikely to stress pol i t ical 
re spons ivenes s ,  whi l e  appointed comptrol l ers were thought to stress 
neutral competenc e / rat iona l admini s t ration to a greater degre e . In 
view o f  the i dea that neut ral compet ence / rat ional admini s t ra t i on was 
f e l t  to relate to e f f e c t ivenes s  for the functions of the comptro l l e r ,  
appointed comptrol lers might theore t i ca l l y  b e  more e f fective . La ter 
research howeve r ,  did not con f i rm this mode l . 
Gi roux and Shie lds , 1 9 9 3  found d i f f e rences in performance for those 
c i ty manager c i t ies prepar ing GAAP based f inanc i a l  s ta tements for which 
they rece ived the GFOA c er t i f icat e . 
Cons idering Meye r ,  1 9 7 9 ,  e l ected comptrollers and those with civi l 
service protections were expected to be more i ndependent of the 
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appoint ing o f f i c i a l  ( mayor o r  governor )  and therefore better able to 
per form neut rally and rat iona l l y  without be ing respons ive to the 
appo int ing o f f i c i a l . 
The above suggests that method of select ion of the State Comptro l l er 
can have an impact on the e f f e c t iveness of the f inance S tate 
Comptro l l er ' s agency . Howeve r ,  the mixed nature of the l iterature doe s 
not a l low a predi ction as to wh ich method , i f  any , woul d  be more 
conduc ive to e f fe c t ivene s s . 
Organ i za t ional con f igurat ion/Integrat ion of the Finance funct ion 
Regarding the organ i z a t ional conf igurat ion of the comptro l l er ' s agency , 
l i tera ture on organ i z i ng the f inance func t i on for government favors 
integra t i on of the f i nance funct ion . Int egra t i on of the pub l i c  f i nance 
funct i on i s  organ i zat iona l ly fac i l i tated by having the s everal f inance 
func t ions ; those act i v i t i e s  performed by the comptro l l e r , treasure r ,  
taxa t ion di rector and budget d i rector , report t o  a dire c tor o f  f i nance 
who reports directly to the Chi e f  Execut ive ( Lehan , 1 9 9 1 ;  Ruchelman , 
1 9 8 7 ;  Ros s e l l  and Frasure , 1 9 6 4 ) . Thi s conf iguration faci l i tates 
coordina t ion and cooperat i on and reduce s  fragmentat ion . Addit iona l l y ,  
integrat ion o f  t h e  budget and accounting systems i s  desi red 
( Wooldridge , 1 9 8 2 ; Lynch,  1 9 8 5 ;  Hal l ,  1 9 8 7 ;  Wes tberry , 1 9 8 9 ;  Thurma i e r , 
1 9 9 0 ; Garne r ,  1 9 9 1 ) . 
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The l i tera ture on integrat ion o f  the f inance function suggests that the 
organ i z a t ional conf iguration in which the State Comptro l l e r ' s agency i s  
a divi s i on o f  a l a rger department o f  f inance would b e  the mos t  
e f fective o f  t h e  thre e . 
Profess ional Cert i f i cat ion of the State Comptrol ler 
The l i terature on pro f e s s iona l i sm in publ i c  admin i s t ra t i on i s  genera l ly 
support ive ( Moshe r ,  1 9 8 2 ; Toren , 1 9 8 6 ; Ra iney , 1 9 9 1 ; Kearney and S i nha , 
1 9 8 8 ) . The l og i c  for this research que s t ion fol lows the prac t i ca l  
reasoning that pro f e s s ional expertise shou ld b e  appropriate to the 
tasks to be performed . 
The funct ions of the s tate comptrol l e r are those that are typical ly 
performed by members of the account ing profess ion . I t  i s  reasonable to 
conclude that the spe c i f i c  pro f e s s ional charac teris t i cs of the 
funct ions of the s ta t e  comptro l l e r  are be st ma tched by the knowledge , 
sk i l ls and abi l i t i e s  of those with an accounting education and 
exper ience . Much of the power of government o f f i c i a l s  i s  the powe r to 
pe rsuade which i s  ga ined by the i r  profess ional qua l i f i ca t ions . The 
abi l i ty of the s tate compt rol l e r  to exerc i s e  this power woul d  
presumably be enhanced i f  the s tate comp t rol l e r  i s  a CPA . Other 
appropriate f inance ori ented cer t i f i ca t ions may be sub s t i tuted . 
Expectat ions were that profess ional cert i f i ca t i on woul d  be pos i t ively 
assoc ia ted with e f fe c t ivenes s .  
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Tenure i n  O f f i ce o f  the State Comptrol l e r  
Based o n  t h e  research o f  Meye r ( 1 9 7 9 ) , t h e  comptrol l e r  that has l onger 
t enure i n  o f f i ce is presumed to be be tter abl e  to she l ter the ope ra t i ng 
core of h i s  or he r agency f rom the uncertainty of the pol it i ca l  
environment faced b y  t h e  agency . Ac cording l y ,  l onger t enure on the 
part of the state comptro l l e r  is expected to be associated with 
e f fe c t ivene s s . 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The prima ry research ques t ions that this s tudy is intended to answer 
are : 
• Does the manner in which the State Comptro l l er i s  s e l ec t ed impact 
the e f fect ivenes s  of the State Comptro l l e r ' s  agency? 
• Doe s  the organ i z a t ional conf iguration of the State Comp t ro l l er ' s 
agency impact i t s  e f fect ivene s s ?  
• D o  the pro f e s s ional qua l i f i ca t i ons o f  the State Compt rol l e r  impac t  
t h e  e f f e c t ivene s s  of t h e  S t ate Comptro l l e r ' s  agency? 
• Doe s  the l ength o f  t enure of the S tate Comptro l l e r  impac t the 
e f fe c t ivene s s  o f  the S tate Comptrol l e r ' s agency? 
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MULTI PLE - CONSTI TUENCY MODELS O F  EFFECTIVENESS 
Writ ing in 1 9 8 2 , Zammuto ca tegori zed organizat i onal e f fectivenes s  
model s  as goal ba sed , sys t ems based and mul t ip l e  cons t i tuency mode l s . 
In goal based mode l s , whi ch predominate , e f fe c t ivenes s  involves 
achieving goa l s . Sys t ems based mode l s  focus on transforma t i on 
proces s e s . E f f e c t ivenes s  in mul t ip l e  con s t i tuency mode l s  involves 
meet ing the c r i t e r i a  set by the cons t ituenc ies o f  the organ i z a t ion . 
Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 )  pre fers mul t ip l e  cons t ituency mode l s . 
This research u t i l i ze s  a mul tip l e - cons t i tuency mode l o f  e f f e c t ivene s s . 
Unde r  this mode l , e f fect ivenes s  i s  def ined as s a t i s fact i on of the 
primary needs of ma j or con s t i tuenc ies of the s tate comptro l l er ' s  agency 
( Zammuto , 1 9 8 2 ) . Maj or cons t i tuencies of the s tate comp t ro l l er ' s  
agency are i dent i f ied . Measure s de s igned to test e f fect iveness in 
mee t ing the needs of each of the maj or con s t i tuenci e s  have been 
deve l oped . 
CONSTITUENC I ES OF THE S TATE COMPTROLLER ' S  AGENCY 
Fol l owing Zammuto ( 1 9 8 2 ) , the S tate Comptro l l e r ' s agency can be s een to 
have mul t ip l e  con s t i tuenc i e s . Account ing has d i f f e rent fun c t i ons . 
Financ i a l  account ing i s  prima r i ly concerned with the prepara t i on and 
aud i t i ng of f inanc ial statements according to GAAP for external users 
of f inan c i a l  s ta t ements . Managerial account ing , (of which cost 
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account ing i s  a subse t ) , on the other hand , i s  concerned with the 
provis i on o f  accoun t i ng informa t i on to an organization ' s managers to 
a s s i s t  then in making manage rial dec i s ions (Meigs , Mos i c h ,  Johnson and 
Ke l l e r ,  1 9 7 4 ) . S imilarly , governmental accounting information i s  
provided t o  both interna l and externa l users . 
Ext e rna l con s t i tuenc i e s  
The f i r s t  s e t  of cons t i tuenc ies of t h e  S t a t e  Comptro l l er ' s agency are 
the external users of the governmental ent i ty ' s f inanc i a l  s tatements 
contained in the s ta t e ' s  Comprehens ive Annual Financial Report , the 
CAFR . Thi s  set is made up of the f i nanc ia l/investment communi ty ,  
inc luding inve s tors i n  gove rnmental bonds , traders in these bonds and 
bond rat ing agenc ies ( Moodys and S tandard & Poor ' s ) . 
The pr imary value tha t this s e t  of const i tuenc ies demands i s  adequate 
discl osure o f  f ina.nc i a l  cond i t ion of the governmental uni t . Adequate 
f inanc i a l  d i s cl osure is necessary for the inves tors to make informed 
inves tment dec i s ions . The vehi c l e  for adequate f inanc i a l  d i s c losure i s  
the aud i ted set o f  f i nanc i a l  s tatements f o r  the f i s ca l  year ( CAFR ) that 
ha s been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles ( GAAP )  and that has an unqua l i f ied ( c l ean)  audit opinion . 
The CAFR i s  prepared after the books have been closed for the f i scal 
year . 
The Government Finance O f f icers Association ( G FOA) awards i t s  
Cert i f i ca t e  o f  Achievement f o r  Exc e l l ence in Financ ial Reporting to 
s ta t e  and local governments that prepare f inanc ial statement s  and 
reports that conform to GAAP and to other GFOA d i s closure 
recommenda t ions . Gi roux and Shields ( 1 9 9 3 , p .  2 4 9 )  argue that the 
Cert i f i cate o f  Achievement ( CA )  " . . .  is one measure o f  reasonably 
comp l e t e  f inanc i a l  report ing and can be cons idered an account i ng 
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monitoring t e chnique . "  An unqua l i f i e d  aud i t  opinion i s  requ ired for a 
state to rece ive the GFOA Cert i f icate of Achievement . Receipt of the 
GFOA cert i f i cate was conside red evidence of e f fectivene s s . 
C i t i zens of the s tate are an important external cons t i tuency of the 
s tate comp t ro l l e r . F i scal re spons ibi l i ty is important to this 
cons t i tuency as we l l . Obtain ing an unqual i f i ed aud i t  opinion and 
re ceipt of a GFOA cer t i f i cate are equa l l y  good measures for c i t i z ens as 
for the f inanc i a l  commun i t y . Usua l l y ,  the CAFR contains a written 
summary , including graphs , that presents the important e l ements o f  the 
state ' s  f inanc i a l  cond i t ion in terms that are unde rstandabl e by those 
not having an account ing or f inanc i a l  management background . 
Internal Const i tuenc i e s  
Two s e t s  o f  internal u s e r s  a r e  ident i f ied . The primary needs of each 
thes e  sets o f  users d i f f e r . 
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The s ta t e ' s  top f inancial managers need a ccounting informa t ion t o  make 
f inanc i a l  de c i s ions during the budge t execut ion phase . The top 
f inanc i a l  manage rs inc lude such o f f i c i a l s  as Secre tary or Di rector of 
Finance , State Comptro l l e r , State Budget Dire c tor and State Tax 
Commiss ione r ,  and members and s t a f f  of l eg i s l a t ive money commi t te e s . 
Thes e  managers need t ime ly interim reports of actual revenues and 
expend i tures compared to those e s t imated and budgeted . Holde r ( 1 9 8 7 , 
pp . 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 )  points out that managers and administrators responsible 
for such fun c t i ons as budget execut ion , contro l l ing expendi tures 
( f i scal comp l i ance ) ,  reviewing opera tions and applying analyti cal 
techni ques t o  f inanc i a l  informat i on are internal users o f  governmental 
accounting systems . The information needed by the s e  users i s  not the 
CAFR , which is produced a s  of the end of the f i scal per iod , but rather 
more t ime l y  informa t i on that i s  conta ined in f inanc i a l  reports that are 
prepared on a recurr ing ba s i s  during the f i scal year ( Holder ) . 
Fisca l  respons ibi l ity i s  the primary value of the s tate ' s  top f inanc ial 
management t eam . The abi l i ty to manage the s tate ' s  f inance s  i s  
achi eved by centra l i zation o f  budget ary control t o  ensure that 
expend i tures are he l d  in l ine with appropriat ions and with revenues to 
the degree pos s i bl e . Genera l l y ,  the s tates have balanced budget 
requi rements ( NASBO , 1 9 9 5 ) . The bal anced budget requi rements of the 
states nec e s s i ta t e  the f i s cal responsibi l ity value of this 
const i tuency . P i t svada and Howard ( 1 9 8 6 ) c i t e  Buck ' s  1 9 3 4  work on the 
need for centra l i za t ion for f inanc i a l  execut ives to control spending i f  
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necessary due t o  revenue s hort fal l s  during the budget execut ion phase . 
The veh i c l e  used by these managers are interim f inanc i a l  reports that 
contain compa r isons of actual to e s t imated revenues and actual 
expendi tures to appropriat ions a s  we l l  a s  control features o f  the 
state ' s  general l edge r  accounting sys tem that ensure that expendi tures 
w i l l  not exceed appropri a t i ons . Al so , they rely on the pol i c ie s , 
procedures and account ing contro l s  manda ted by the State Comptro l l e r . 
Al s o ,  prov i s ion of f i nancial ana l ys i s  in conj unction with periodic 
report i ng by the s ta t e  comptro l l e r  was cons idered evidence of 
e f fect ivenes s .  Furthe r ,  evidence o f  actions taken by the state 
comptro l l er to iden t i fy best practices or deve lop benchmarks was used 
to det e rmine e f f e c t iveness .  
The state government ' s  top o f f i c ia l s  are interested in rece iving a good 
bond rating . Add i t ional l y ,  the s e  o f f i c i a l s  w i l l  de s i re a good rat ing 
f rom Barre t t  and Greene ( l 9 9 9 , 1 9 9 5 , 1 9 9 1 )  in the pub l i c a t ions 
Financial  World and Gove rning .  According l y ,  the bond rat ings and the 
Barre t t  and Greene rat ings for the state ' s  f inanc i a l  management 
performance were used as a measure of e f f ect ivene s s . 
An important goal of the s tate ' s  top o f f i c i a l s  i s ,  ove r t ime , to hol d  
general expendi tures in l i ne with general revenue s .  I f  a rainy day or 
budget s tabi l i zation fund has been ma intained so much the bet ter . 
Evidence of holding genera l expendi tures in l ine with genera l revenues 
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was det e rmined by a ratio of general expendi tures to general revenues 
for each s ta t e  for a per i od of f i scal years . This per iod includes the 
early 1 9 9 0 ' s  recess i on . A rat i o  of 1 . 0 0 or greater is cons i dered 
i ne f fe c t ive . A ratio of less than 1 . 0 0 i s  considered e f f e c t ive . A 
ration o f f  . 9 5 or l e s s  i s  evidence o f  a 5 \  rainy day fund balance and 
is considered mor e  e f fective . The ratio has been deve l oped based on 
f i scal years 1 9 8 5  through 1 9 9 2  f rom informa t ion conta ined in the 
several edit i ons of The Book of the States . 
Other internal users ident i f ied for this research are the l i ne agenc i e s  
of s t a t e  gove rnment . The rel evant managers here are the agency heads , 
usua l ly appo inted by the Gove rnor , and the agency f i scal personnel ,  
usua l ly career c i v i l  s e rvice empl oye e s  with pub l i c  f inancial management 
or account i ng backgrounds . The l ine agenc ies mus t  fol low control 
pol i c i e s  and procedures of the State Compt ro l l e r . The values of the 
l ine agenc i e s  include hav ing the abi l i ty to use some d i s c re t ion in 
spending the resources appropriated to them in carrying out the 
agency ' s miss i on . The l ine agenc ies value reasonab l enes s  o f  cont rols 
( not too s tr ingent ) and a s tatewide accounting syst em that is 
reasonabl y  user f r i endly . ( A  veh i c l e  used by l ine agenc ies i s  a l so 
interim f inanc ial statements at the l eve l o f  agency . )  
Other measures o f  e f f ec t ivene s s  are generally a s sociated with internal 
cons t i tuenci e s  o f  the s tate comptro l l e r ' s  agency . The s e  have to do 
with s e rvices provided to l ine agenc ies and the use r - f r i endl iness of 
the comptro l l er ' s sys t ems and contro l s . The dependent variables 
indicated be l ow include these . 
Independent Variables 
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Do certain factors inf luence the performance o f  the state comptro l l e r ' s 
agency? Four independent va riables were i dent i f ied as possibly having 
an impact on the abi l i ty of the s tate comptro l l e r  to perform 
e f fe c t i ve l y . The s e  are : 
• Method o f  select i on o f  the state comptro l l e r  
• Organ i z a t i onal conf igura t i on of the s t a t e  comptro l l e r ' s agency 
• Pro f e s s i onal cert i f i cat ion of the state comptrol l e r ,  and 
• Length of t enure in o f f ice of the state comptro l l e r  
Four research ques t i ons we re deve loped and hypotheses related to the s e  
ques t i ons were sta ted in nul l hypothe s i s  terms . Quantitat ive methods 
as de s c ribed be low were ut i l i z e d  to attempt to answer the research 
que s t ions . 
Addit i ona l l y ,  a numbe r o f  dependent variables were i dent i f i e d  a s  
p o s s i b l e  ind i cators o f  e f f ect iveness o n  t h e  p a r t  of t h e  s t a t e  
comp t ro l l e r . Each of the dependent variables i s  ident i f ied with a 
part icular cons t ituency of the s tate comptro l l er ' s  agency . 
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Dependent va riables 
Ext erna l Const i tuenc i e s  ( Financ i a l  community and c i t i z ens o f  the stat e )  
• Unqua l i f ied Aud i t  Opi nion on CAFR 
• GFOA Cert i f i ca t e  on CAFR 
Interna l Const i tuenc i e s - State ' s  Top Financial Management Team 
• Prepares int e r im reports 
• Provides f inanc i a l  ana l ys i s  
• Ident i f i e s  best pra c t i c e / devel ops benchmarks 
• Bond rat ing 
• Financial  World/Governing ( Barrett and Greene ) rat i ngs 
• Expendi ture s /Revenues Rat i o  
Interna l Con s t i tuenc i e s - L ine agenc i e s . A compo s i t e  va riable composed 
o f  the f o l l owing : 
• Use of LAN/WAN networks 
• Provides cl ient - s erve r app l icat i ons 
• Provides CPE to l ine agency f i scal s t a f f  
• U s e  of procurement card 
• Use o f  trave l card 
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RESULTS O F  RESEARCH 
METHOD OF SELECTION OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
The f i r s t  research ques t ion is does the manner in whi ch the State 
Comptro l l e r  i s  s e l e ct ed impac t  the e f f ect iveness of the S ta t e  
Comptro l l er ' s agency? Thi s  g i v e s  r i s e  to t h e  f i rst hypothe s i s , which 
i s  that there wi l l  be a s t rong relat i onship be tween the method of 
select i on of the S tate comptro l l e r  and the e f f e c t ivene s s  of the S tate 
Comptro l l er ' s agency . Thi s  hypothe s i s  is restated in the form o f  a 
nul l hypothe s i s . 
The r e s e arch wi l l  n o t  f ind a s t rong r e l a tionship be tween the me thod o f  
s e l e c t i on o f  the S t a t e  comp t ro l l e r  and the e f f ec t i vene s s  o f  the S ta t e  
Comp tr o l l er ' s agency . 
The methods of s e l e c t i on i dent i f ied for this research are : 
• Elected 
• Appointed by and s e rves at the p l easure of the gove rnor 
• Appointed by an o f f i c i a l  l ower than governor 
• Civil S e rvice 
Cross tabu l a t i ons between me thod of select i on and e f fe c t iveness a s  
measured b y  c l ean ( unqua l i fied)  aud i t  op inion o n  t h e  CAFR for f i scal 
years 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1  were run ( s ee appendix B,  pages 1 and 2 ) . A 
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s i gn i f i cant re l a t i onship between method of s e lect ion and e f fect ivenes s  
as measured b y  unqua l i f ied opinion on t h e  CAFR was found for both 
f i scal periods thus re fut i ng the nul l  hypothe s i s . Elected s tate 
comptro l lers and those appo inted by and serving at the p l easure of the 
governor s cored s ign i f i cant l y  h igher on this measure than did those 
s tate comptro l l ers appo inted by o f f i c ia l s  l owe r than governor and those 
who we re c i v i l  service employe e s . 
This wa s t rue for both f i scal 1 9 9 1  and 1 9 9 5 . Between the s e  two f i scal 
periods , states moved in the direction of increa s ingly obtaining 
unqual i f i ed op inions . 
Next , cross tabulat i ons betwe en method of select i on and e f fect iveness 
a s  measured by receipt of the GFOA Cert i f i cate of Achi evement of 
Excel l ence i n  Finan c i a l  Reporting ( Cert i f i cate ) for the CAFR for f i scal 
yea rs 1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 1  were run ( s ee appendi x  B pages 3 and 4 ) . A s trong 
relat i onship between method of s e l e c t ion and e f f ect ivene s s  as mea sured 
by rece ipt of the GFOA Cert i f i cate for the CAFR was found thus refut ing 
the nul l  hypothe s i s . A substan t i a l l y  higher proport ion of e l ected 
state comptro l l ers and those appointed by and serving at the plea sure 
of the governor s cored higher on this measure than did those state 
comptroll ers appo inted by o f f i c i a l s  l ower than governor and those who 
were c ivi l s e rvice employe e s . 
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Aga in , this was t rue for both f i scal 1 9 9 1  and 1 9 9 5 . Between the s e  two 
f i scal periods , s tates moved in the direct ion of obtaining the 
cert i f i cat e . 
Thes e  two measures o f  e f fect iveness for external const i tuencies 
produced congruent resul t s . 
The cross tabu l a t i ons des i gned to measure e f fect iveness for internal 
cons t i tuenc i e s  did not yield any s t rong associations . The evidence for 
method of select i on having a bearing on the s tate comptro l l e r ' s  
agency ' s abi l ity to s a t i s fy the needs of internal const i tuenc ies i s  
mixed w i t h  n o  c l e a r  pattern be ing observed . This s tudy conc l udes that 
for internal cons t i tuenc ie s ,  the nul l  hypothe s i s  i s  not rej e c ted . 
Top- down Review 
Addit i ona l l y ,  a " top down" approach wa s considered . Financ i a l  Wor ld 
Rat ings and Bond Rat ings were cons i dered . Some degree of agreement in 
the highe s t  and l owes t  cat egori e s  be tween the s e  two subj ective means of 
evalua t i on was i dent i f i ed . Method of select ion wa s cons idered . 
This top down l ook indicates that both higher and l ower rated s tates 
are found in all categorie s . This approach appears genera l ly to 
support the conc lus ions result i ng from analys i s  of the cross 
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tabulat i ons . No othe r conc lus i on regarding method of select i on resul t s  
f rom this review . 
Discuss ion o f  Resul t s  of Research 
The research indicates that met hod o f  select i on is an important factor 
in sat i s fying the needs of the f inanc i a l  community for provi s i on of 
rel iable f i nanc i a l  da t a . The s tate comptrol l e rs that are e l ected and 
those that are appointed by and serve at the p leasure of the governor 
are more l ikely to mee t  these c r i t er i a , as mea sured by unqua l i f i ed 
audit opinion and receipt o f  GFOA cert i f i cate , than are those s ta t e  
compt ro l lers that are appo inted b y  a n  o f f icial  l owe r than governor or 
that are c i v i l  s e rvice emp l oye e s . 
As regards s a t i s fact i on of internal con s t i tuenc ies , the f inanc i a l  
management t eam and t h e  l i ne agenc ies , method of s e l ec t i on does not 
appear to have a very c l ear impact . 
The l i t erature regarding method of s e l ect i on i s  mixed and conta ins 
three s t rands . Arguments are put forward favoring both e l ec t i on and 
appointment of gove rnment o f f i c i a l s  ( Beyl e ,  1 9 8 5  and Chi , 1 9 9 2 ) . The re 
is a l i t erature that compares the c i ty manager form of gove rnment to 
the s trong mayor form ( Lineberry and Fowl er , 1 9 6 7 ;  Karnig , 1 9 7 5 ; 
L ineber ry and Sha rkansky, 1 9 7 8 , Morgan and Pe l is sero , 1 9 8 0 ;  Rainey , 
1 9 9 1 ; Box , 1 9 9 5 ) . Fina l l y ,  there i s  a l i terature on state and local 
f inance o f f icers ( Meye r ,  1 9 7 9 ) . 
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The l iterature suggests that both e l ec t i on and appo intment o f  
government o f f i c i a l s  may be preferab l e , tha t  appointment i s  pref e rable , 
that e l ec t i on ( o r  c i v i l  service status ) i s  pre f e rabl e ,  and that 
i deological a ssumpt i ons determine preference . According l y ,  the 
l itera ture on method if s e l e c t i on is mixed . No clear direct ion eme rges 
from the l i t e ra ture a s  to method of s e l e c t ion . Howeve r ,  i t  does 
suggest that me thod of s e l e c t i on can have an impac t .  
The sub j e c t  o f  i nt egrat i on of the f inance funct ion i s  di scussed below 
under the organ i z a t i onal conf igura t i on sect ion . Howeve r ,  i t  i s  
presumed that integra t i on i s  fac i l itated when comptro l l e r s  are 
appo inted or c ivi l s e rvi ce , but not when they are e l ected . 
The results obtained f rom the quant i tat ive methods employed were not 
exactly those ant i c ipated . As indicated above , the l iterature on 
method o f  s e l e c t ion i s  mixed . I t  wa s ant ic ipated that the research 
woul d  i nd i ca t e  that one o f  the methods , e l e c t ion or appo intment woul d  
b e  more e f fective . 
Con s i de r ing the c i ty manager vs . s t rong mayor l i tera ture , e l ected 
comptroll ers we re thought to be more l ikely to stress po l i ti c a l  
re spons ivene s s , whi l e  appo inted comptro l l ers were thought to s t r e s s  
neutral competence /rational admini s t ra t i on to a greater degree . 
Cons idering the i dea that neut ral compet ence / ra t i onal admi n i s t ra t i on 
was f e l t  to relate to e f fect ivene s s  for the func t i ons of the 
comptrol l e r , appointed comptrol l e r s  should be more e f fect ive . 
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Cons idering Meye r , 1 9 7 9 ,  e l ected and civi l service comptrol l e r s  were 
expected to be more i ndependent of the appoint ing o f f i c i a l  ( mayor or 
governo r )  and therefore be t t e r  able to perform neut ra l ly and rat i ona l l y  
wi thout be ing respons ive t o  the appo int ing o f f i c i a l . 
D i f ferences between these categories we re expected to be obs e rved . 
Prima r i l y ,  d i f fe rences be tween e l ec t ed comptro l l ers and those appo inted 
by and s e rving at the pleasure of the governor were ant i c ipated . The s e  
d i f ferences were n o t  obs e rved . Howeve r ,  rathe r than d i f ferences 
be tween e l ec ted compt rol l e r s  and those appo inted by and s e rving at the 
p l easure of the governor , these two categories scored s imilarly and 
s igni f i c an t l y  better than compt rol l e r s  appo inted by an o f f i c ial l owe r 
than governor a.nd thos e  that are c i v i l  s e rvice/me r i t  syst em emp l oyees . 
The quant i ta t ive resea rch on me thod of s e l e c t i on indicated that e l ected 
comptro l l e r s  and those appo inted by and s e rving at the pleasure o f  the 
governor were mor e  e f fective than those appointed by o f f i c i a l s  l ower 
than governor and those who are civi l s e rvice emp l oyee s  on two of the 
thirteen measures of performance . The s e  two are the mos t  highly 
visible measures to external const i tuenci e s  of the state comptro l l e r ' s 
agenc i e s . 
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The resu l t s  o f  the research seem t o  con f i rm some o f  both s t rands o f  the 
l i terature . That i s , both e le c t ed and appointed ( a t  a high l eve l ) 
comptro l lers are about equa l ly e f fe c t ive . The e l ected comp t ro l l e r  i s  
certainly a po l i t ical exe cut ive . I t  can be argued that the comp t ro l l e r  
who i s  appointed b y  and serves a t  t h e  pleasure of the gove rnor i s  a l s o  
a pol i t ical execut ive . Comptro l l ers who have some aspec t s  o f  c i v i l  
service protect ion and those appo inted at a l owe r leve l , who frequen t l y  
se rve inde f in i t e  t e rms may b e  cons idered a s  l e s s  po l i t i cal and more 
l ike career employees . 
The more pol i t i c a l  execut ives appear to be more e f fective t han the l e s s  
pol i t ical execut ives in s a t i s fying external cons t i t uencies o f  t he s t a t e  
compt ro l l e r ,  par t i cularly t h e  f inanc ial commun ity involved with 
present ing bond rat ings and those who buy and sell bonds , 
The met hod o f  s e l e c t i on wa s di scussed with the s t a t e  comptro l l ers who 
were interv i ewed for t he qua l i tat ive aspect of this research . The 
e le c t ed comp t ro l l ers f e l t  t hat e l e c t i on g ives a comptro l l e r  more c l out , 
vi s ib i l i ty and independence . The f i ndings that higher prof i l e , more 
pol i t ical comptro l l e r s  ( e l ected and appo inted by the governo r )  were 
more l ikely to have c l ean op inions and GFOA cert i f i cates made sense 
intui t ively t o  one of t he intervi ewe e s  who f e l t  t hat the s e  comp t rol l ers 
had more powe r to e f fect change . 
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Al though s everal comptro l l ers interviewed pref e rred one method to 
another ,  the importance o f  me thod of s e l e c t io� was downp l ayed . The 
intervi ewed comptrol l ers genera l ly f e l t  that succe s s e s  were found under 
a l l  me thods . The qual i tat ive research generally did not produce a 
consensus as to any one bes t  method of s e l e c t ion . Method o f  s e l e c t ion 
was general l y  downplayed . 
E l e cted as we l l  as appo inted comptrol lers f e l t  i t  was important t o  
subordinate pol i t i c a l  cons idera t i ons to proper performance o f  the 
contro l lership funct i on . 
a l l  o f  the comptrol l e r s . 
Integrity was an important conside ra t i on to 
Jus t  a s  the l i terature makes pro and con arguments for e l e c t ion and 
appointment as me thods of s e l e c t ion , so successes h ighl ight the pro 
arguments o f  the l i t e rature . I f  each me thod has s t rengths and 
weaknes s e s , and the s t rengths and weakne sses c ancel each other out , 
then i t  i s  not counter intuit ive to f ind both e lected and appo inted 
comptrollers to be e f fective . I t  really comes down to the person who 
f i l l s  the role of s ta t e  comptro l l e r . The comptrol l e r s  that were 
intervi ewed we re a l l  ve ry impre s s ive individua l s  who would have 
achieved success without regard for method of select i on . 
Method of select i on was found to be a factor in two of thirteen 
var i ab l e s  measured ,  a l be i t , thes e  two factors were highly v i s ible and 
general l y  agreed upon . I t  was found to be a factor in the s a t i s faction 
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o f  external cons t i tuencie s , but not inte rnal cons t i tuenc i�s .  
According l y ,  whi l e  me thod o f  select i on i s  a factor , i t  i s  not an 
overwhe lming ly important factor in determining e f fe c t ivenes s  of the 
state comptro l l e r . For examp l e , there i s  no cause and e f fe c t  
relat i onship involved . The mechanism by which me thod o f  s e l e c t ion i s  a 
factor i s  sub t l e  and ope rates in the way in wh ich i t  may empowe r 
certain individua l s  more o r  l e s s  in the o f f ice they occupy . 
D i f f e rences in opera t i ons o f  the s tates , as we l l  as in the exper i ences 
and backg rounds o f  the o f f i c i a l s  may mediate the way in which a 
comptro l l e r  i s  empowe red relat ive to other key players such as the 
gove rnor , s e c re t a ry ,  budget o f f icer , l eg i s l at ive commi t t e e  member s , 
e t c . Some s tates have s t ronger gove rnors than others for examp l e . 
I t  appears that me thod of s e l e c t i on i s  a factor in e f fe c t ivene s s , but 
not the only factor . According l y ,  i t s  importance is l imited to s ome 
degre e . To the degree that i t  i s  a factor , the mor e  high prof i l e  
comp t ro l lers a r e  l ikely to have more power and influence due e i ther t o  
e l e c t ion or access to the governor . 
ORGAN I ZATIONAL CONFIGURAT I ON / I NTEGRATION OF THE FINANCE FUNCTION 
The se cond r e search ques t ion is does the organ i z a t i onal configuration 
of the State Comptro l l er ' s agency impact its e f fect ivene s s ?  Thi s gives 
rise to the s econd hypothes i s , whi ch i s  that there wi l l  be a s trong 
relat i onship between the o rgani z a t ional conf igura t i on o f  the State 
comptro l l er ' s agency and i t s  e f fectivene s s . This hypothes i s  i s  
restated i n  the form o f  a nul l  hypothe s i s : 
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The r e s e arch wi l l  n o t  f ind a s t rong r e l a t ionship be tween the 
organ i z a t i onal con f i guration of the S t a t e  comp tro l l e r ' s agency and i t s  
e f f e c t ivene s s . 
Organ i z a t i onal conf igura t i on of the s tate comptro l l e r ' s agency can be 
g rouped into three categor ies . Thes e  are : 
Funct iona l ly integra t ed f i nance func t i on . 
• Comp t ro l l er ' s agency f i t s  into a depa rtment o f  f inance that includes 
the budget o f f i c e r  and other f i nance agenc ies . Comptrol l e r  and 
budget o f f i ce r  report directly to the di rector or secretary o f  
f inance . 
• The s ta t e  comp t ro l l e r  i s  appointed by and s e rves at the p l easure of 
the governor . The s tate comptro l l e r  reports directly to the 
gove rnor and does not f i t  into a department of f inance that includes 
the budget o f f i ce r . Budget o f f i c e r  a l s o  reports directly to the 
Governo r . 
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Indirectly integrated f inance funct i on 
• Agency f i t s  into a department o f  f inance that does not incl ude the 
budget o f f i ce r . Comptrol l e r  reports directly to the director or 
secretary o f  f inance . Budget o f f icer repor t s  directly to Governor . 
Non - funct iona l ly integrated f i nance funct ion 
• State Comptrol l e r  is e l ected and there fore doe s not report to 
governo r e i the r directly or ind i re c t l y . 
As was des c r ibed for method o f  select i on of the s ta t e  comptrol l e r , 
ext e rnal and interna l cons t i tuencies are ident i f ied and measures of 
e f fect ivene s s  to sat i s fy each have been deve l oped . Cross tabulat i on 
compar ing these s ame measures o f  e f fec t ivene s s  to o rgani z a t i onal 
con f igura t i on o f  the state comp t ro l l er ' s agency were produced 
As background for thi s set o f  c ross tabu l a t i ons , the not - integrated 
conf igura t i on i s  synonymous with e l e c ted method o f  s e l e c t ion . 
Non - integrated conf igura t i on ( e lected compt rol l e r s )  scores h igher on 
the var iabl e s  i dent i f ied for externa l con s t i tuencies than the other two 
catego r i e s  do . Howeve r ,  this i s  a t t r ibuted to high scores noted for 
e l ected comp t r o l l e r s  ( se e  method o f  s e l e c t i on ) . The other two 
organi z a t i ona l conf igura t i on categories mask the d i s t inct ion between 
appo intment by governor , appo intment by l ower ranking o f f i c i a l  and 
civil  s e rvice comptrol l e rs . According l y ,  this s tudy concludes that 
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organizat ional conf igura t i on does not meaningfully impac t  the 
e f fect i vene s s  o f  the s ta t e  comptrol l e r ' s agency to s a t i s f y  its externa l 
cons t i tuenci e s  beyond method o f  s e l e c t i on . However ,  to the degree that 
the measures of e f fectiveness for ext erna l con s t i tuenci e s  reflect 
reasonable i nt egra t i on of the f inance funct ion , non - integrated 
organ i z a t i onal conf igurat i on associa ted with e l ected comptro l lers does 
not adversely impact integrat ion . 
The resu l t s  o f  the cross t abulat ions comparing organi za t i ona l 
conf igura t i on to the e f fect ivenes s  va riables for interna l 
con s t i tuen c i e s  are mixed with no c l e ar pa tterns . 
Summary and conc l us ions -organi zat ional con f igura t i on 
In summary , i t  appears that organi z a t i ona l conf igurat ion i s  not an 
important factor in s a t i s fying the needs of e i ther externa l or interna l 
cons t i tuenc ies o f  the s tate comptro l l er ' s agency . Elected comptro l lers 
who funct i on in non - integrated configura t i ons are no l e s s  e f fective 
than those comptro l l e rs agencies funct ioning in more integrated 
configurat i ons . 
Regarding the organ i z a t iona l con f igurat i on of the comptro l l e r ' s agency , 
l i tera ture on organ i z ing the f inance funct ion for government favors 
integra t i on of the f i nance func t i on . I nt egrat ion of the pub l i c  f inance 
func t ion is organ i z a t i ona l ly fac i l i tated by having the s everal f i nance 
func t ions ; those activi t ie s  performed by the compt rol l e r , treasure r ,  
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t axat i on director and budget directo r ,  report t o  a director o f  f inance 
who reports directly to the Chie f  Executive ( Lehan , 1 9 9 1 ; Ruchelman , 
1 9 8 7 ;  Ros s e l l and Frasure , 1 9 6 4 ) . This conf igura t i on fac i l i tates 
coord inat i on and cooperat i on and reduces f ragmentat ion . Add i t iona l ly ,  
integrat ion of the budget and accounting systems i s  de s i red 
( Wooldr i dge , 1 9 8 2 ; Lynch ,  1 9 8 5 ;  Hal l ,  1 9 8 7 ; Wes tberry , 1 9 8 9 ;  Thurma i e r , 
1 9 9 0 ; Garne r ,  1 9 9 1 ) . 
The research , whi ch focused prima r i l y  on integrat ion o f  the budget and 
comptro l l e r  func t ions , did not t end to con f i rm the l i tera ture on 
i nt egra t i on of the f i nance fun c t i on that the va riables on 
organ i z a t i onal conf igurat i on were intended to measure . Elected 
comptro l lers , a minority in terms of met hod o f  s e l e c t ion , tended to be 
reasonably succes s ful in t e rms of s a t i s f act i on of externa l 
cons t ituenci e s . The e l ected comp t ro l l e rs a l s o  were the group o f  
comp t ro l lers operat i ng in a non - integrated organ i z a t i ona l 
conf igurat i on . 
Clearly,  e l ected comptro l l ers , who f unc t i on in non - int egrated 
organ i z a t i onal conf igura t i ons are no l e s s  e f fe c t i ve than comptro l l e rs 
function ing in more integrated configura t i ons . I t  would appear that 
e l ected comp t rol l ers are a rea sonabl y  pro f e s s i onal group who , i n  order 
to cont inue to be re - e l ected,  mus t perform e f fective l y . E f f e c t ive 
performance requ i re s  coord ina t i on with other f inance o f f i c ia l s  wi thout 
regard for hierarchi cal l ines or parti san a f f i l ia t i on . Thi s  research 
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concl udes that accountabi l i ty o f  e l e c ted compt rol lers ( and t reasure r s )  
to the pub l i c , s e rves to o f f se t  any centr i fugal tendencies that l a c k  o f  
integrated organ i zat i onal configura t ion may impose . 
General l y ,  the interviews did not indicate that the state comptrol lers 
f e l t  o rgani z a t i onal configuration was important to integra t i on of the 
f inance func t i on . Mos t  s tate t reasurers are e l e c ted as are some 
comptrol l ers . Coord inat ion with other f inance o f f i c i a l s  was generally 
not cons i dered to be a probl em . Thi s  cont radi c t s  the l i te rature but 
not the quan t i tat ive resea rch . 
Organ i z a t i on cha r t s  present l ines of authority and accountab i l i t y . 
Thes e  e l ement s  of forma l i zat ion are ne cessary for mode rn , l a rge and 
complex organi z a t i ons , such as gove rnment s . Howeve r ,  l ines on charts 
are only symbo l s . We should not expect that people woul d  only 
communi cate with others directly above or be l ow them on the chart s . 
The charts a t t empt to present a model of rea l i ty that i s  inevitably a 
s imp l i f icat i on of the real wor l d  of the organ i z a t i on . Just as method 
of s e l e c t i on is a factor in empowe r i ng certain emp l oyees , so , may be a 
place on an organ izat ion chart . The latter i s  l e s s  o f  an important 
factor than i s  the forme r . 
Organ i z a t i onal conf i gura t i on wa s ant i c ipated to be an important factor 
in i nt egrat i ng the f inanc i a l  management func t i on . This does not appear 
to be the case . E l ec ted comptro l l e r s  head agencies that are , at least 
theoret i ca l l y  not i nt egra t ed , and certainly are as e f fe c t ive as 
compt ro l l ers func t i oning i n  more integrated organizat ional 
con f igu rat ions . 
PROFESS IONAL CERT I F I CATION OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
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The third research que s t i on i s  do the pro f e s s i onal qua l i f i ca t i ons o f  
the State Comp t ro l l e r  impa ct the e f fect ivene s s  o f  the State 
Comptro l l er ' s agency? The third hypothe s i s  i s  that there will be a 
s trong relat i onship between the pro f e s s i onal qua l i f i ca t i ons of the 
State comptro l l e r  and the e f fect ivenes s  of the State Comptro l l er ' s 
agency . Thi s hypothe s i s  i s  restated in the form o f  a nul l  hypothe s i s : 
The r e s e a r c h  wi l l  not f i nd a s t rong r e l a t ionship be tween the 
pro f e s s ional qual i f i c a t ions of the S t a t e  comp t ro l l e r  and the 
e f f ec t ivene s s  of the S t a t e  Comp tro l l er ' s  agency . 
State comp t ro l lers having any f inanc i a l l y  related cert i f i ca t i on are 
cons i dered a s  be i ng profe s s i ona l ly cert i f ied . In add i t i on to CPA 
( ce r t i f ied pub l i c  accountan t )  other pro f e s s i ona l cert i f icat i ons held by 
s tate comptro l l e r s  included CMA ( ce r t i f ied management accoun tant ) ,  CGFM 
( cert i f ied government f inanc i a l  manage r ) , CFP ( cert i f i ed f inanc i a l  
pl anner ) ,  CFE ( ce rt i f i ed fraud examiner)  and CGFO ( ce rt i f ied government 
f inanc i a l  o f f i ce r ) . State comptrollers hol ding any of the above 
certi f i ca t i ons were considered to be prof e s s i ona l l y  cert i f i e d . The 
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state comptrol lers we re grouped into two clas s i f icat i ons , cert i f ied and 
not cert i f ied . 
Cross t abul a t i ons compar ing the measures of e f fectivene s s  to 
profe s s i onal c e r t i f ication status o f  the s tate comptro l l er were 
produced . Non - cert i f i ed comptrol lers s co red h igher than cert i f ied 
compt rol lers did on the e f fect ivene s s  measures for external 
consti tuenc i e s . For the more recent f i scal per i od , but not the earl i e r  
one , t h e  assoc iat ions a r e  s trong enough to b e  cons i dered meaningful . 
The evi dence for pro f e s s iona l c e rt i f i ca t i on having a bea ring on the 
s tate comptrol l er ' s  agency ' s  abi l i ty to s a t i s fy the needs of interna l 
const ituenc i e s  i s  mixed . 
I t  ha s a l ready been noted that e l e c ted s tate comptro l l ers ( a s  i s  the 
case w i th those appointed by and s e rving at the pl easure of the 
governo r )  are pos i t ively a s sociated with the e f fect iveness measures for 
ext e rna l con s t i tuenc i e s ; i . e . , unqua l i f i ed opinion and GFOA 
cert i f icate . Al so , e l ected comptrol lers are not typical l y  cert i f ied . 
S imilar to the resu l t s  noted for organ i z at i onal con f igura t i on , 
s i gn i f i cantly higher scores for not - ce rt i f ied ( e l ected)  compt rol l e r s  
may b e  t h e  resul t o f  the c e rt i f ied category contain ing comptrol l e rs 
appointed by o f f i c ia l s  l ower than Gove rnor and c i v i l  s e rvice 
compt rollers a s  we l l  as those appo inted directly by the governor . That 
i s , some mask ing may c l oud the resul t s  of this set of cross 
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tabu l a t i ons . None - the - l e s s , this study concludes that non - cert i f ied 
comptrol l e rs were higher ( for 1 9 9 5 )  on these measures for externa l 
cons t ituenc i e s . The resul t s  are meaningful , but only to a l imited 
degree . Non - ce r t i f i e d  comptro l lers , many o f  whom are e l ec t ed , are 
succe s s ful i n  sat i s fa c t i on o f  externa l cons t i tuenc i e s . 
Summary and conc lus ions -profess i ona l cert i f i cat i on 
In summa ry , surp r i s ing l y ,  non - ce r t i f i ed comptrol l e r s  appear to be more 
e f fe c t ive in t e rms of s a t i s f act ion o f  externa l cons t ituenc i e s , 
prima r i ly the f inanc i a l  commun i t y .  This resul t may b e  due to masking 
resu l t ing f rom l umping a l l  comptrol l e rs into two categories with one 
category , non - ce r t i f i ed ,  s t rong l y  r e l a ted with e l e c ted comptrol lers . 
Elected comptrol l e r s  score highly on s a t i s fa c t i on o f  exte rna l 
const i tuenc i e s . This resea rch conc l udes that prof e s s i onal 
cert i f i ca t i on of the state comptrol l e r  i s  not a pa r t i cularly important 
factor in s a t i s fying the needs o f  externa l con s t i tuenc i e s  of the s tate 
comp t ro l l e r ' s agency . S imi l a r l y ,  profe s s i onal cert i f i ca t ion i s  not a 
factor in s a t i s fying the needs of interna l con s t i tuenc ies o f  the state 
comptro l l e r ' s agency . 
Prof e s s i onal cert i f i ca t i on of the state comptrol l e r  was f e l t  to be 
important . Cert i f ied comp t ro l l e rs , pa r t i cularly CPA ' s were f e l t  to be 
more l ikely to be e f fective in perfo rming tasks that are predominate l y  
account ing o r i ented . Surp r i s ingly,  the oppos i t e  turned out to be the 
case . Thi s i s  due to the s t rong performance o f  e l ected comptrol l ers 
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who are unl ikely to b e  c e r t i f i e d . The s tate comptro l l er ' s agenc ies 
have s t a f f  with appropriate f inanc ial cert i f i ca t ions . Al l s tates have 
CPA ' s on s t a f f . Elected comptrollers agenc ies had on the average 9 
CPA ' s on s t a f f  whi ch i s  c l os e  to the average for a l I S O  states ( NASACT , 
1 9 9 6 , i f  New York and Texas are not counted as they are not typ i ca l ) . 
I t  appears that pro f e s s i onal cert i f i ca t ion of the s tate comptrol l e r  i s  
n o t  a part icularly important factor in s a t i s fying the needs o f  interna l 
con s t ituenci e s  o f  the s ta t e  comptro l l e r ' s agency . 
As indi cated above , e l ected comptro l l e rs , a minori t y  in terms of method 
of s e l e c t ion t ended to be reasonably success ful in terms of 
s a t i s faction of external consti tuenc ies . The e l ected comptrol l e r s  a l s o  
were as a group , l e s s  l ikely to b e  pro f e s s iona l ly cert i f ied than the 
appo inted comp t ro l l e r s . 
Even though l imi t ed ,  the f indings contradict the expected outcome . 
Profess ional cert i f i ca t i on of the state comptro l l e r  wa s f e l t  to be 
important . Cert i f ied comp t ro l lers , pa r t i cularly CPA ' s were f e l t  to 
more l ikely to be e f fect ive in performing tasks that are predomina tely 
account ing oriented . Surp r i s ing l y ,  the oppo s i t e  turned out to be the 
case . This i s  due to the s trong perfo rmance of e l e c ted comptrol l e r s  
who a r e  unl ikely to b e  cert i f i e d . 
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The state comptro l lers that were interviewed who were accountants f e l t  
that having a n  a ccounting background was important . Thos e  who were not 
accountants did not feel it was a s  important . The elected comptrol l ers 
are less l ikely to be accountants than the appo inted comptro l lers , 
however this subgroup tended to be succes s ful . The e l e c ted 
comptroll ers intervi ewed were non - a c countants but had rea sonabl e  
backgrounds . Although technical qua l i f icat i ons woul d  no doubt be 
helpful , nei ther e l ected comptro l l e r  f e l t  they were required for 
e f fe c t ivenes s  i n  the role o f  s tate comptro l l e r . One of the e l e c ted 
compt ro l lers interviewed indicated that he had more of a pub l i c  pol icy 
orientat ion than a t e chn i cal ac counting orientat ion . The t e chnical 
aspects were cove red by profess i onal sta f f .  
Due to the l imited extend o f  the f i nding , this research concludes that 
profe s s i onal cert i f ica t i on o f  the s t ate comptrol l e r  i s  not a 
part icularly important fac tor in sat i s fying the needs o f  ext e rna l or 
internal const i tuenc i e s  of the state comptro l l e r ' s agency . 
LENGTH OF TENURE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
The fourth research que s t i on is does the l ength of tenure of the State 
Comptro l l e r  impact the e f fect ivenes s  o f  the State Comptrol l e r ' s agency? 
My conc lusion is that the l ength of tenure in o f f i c e  of the state 
comptro l l e r  wi l l  impa ct the e f fect iveness o f  the performance of t he 
state comptro l l er ' s agency . 
The fourth hypothe s i s  i s  that there w i l l  be a s trong relat ionship 
between the l ength of tenure of the State comptro l l er and the 
e f fect ivene s s  of the State Comptro l l er ' s agency . This hypothe s i s  i s  
restated in the f orm of a nul l  hypothe s i s : 
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The r e s e arch wi l l  n o t  f ind a s t rong r e l a t ionship be tween the l ength o f  
tenure o f  the S t a t e  comp t ro l l e r  and the e f f e c t ivene s s  o f  the S t a t e  
Comp tro l l e r ' s  agency . 
Tenure was def ined in two ways for use in the cross t abulat ions . 
First , fol l owing Meye r ,  1 9 7 9 ,  l onge r  t enures were cons idered to be s i x  
or more conse cut ive years in o f f ice , whi l e  shorter tenures were 
cons idered to be l e s s  than six consecutive years in o f f i ce . 
S econdl y ,  a f t e r  revi ewing the data , it was dec i ded that four categories 
should be used to determine if  any resul t s  that did not appear in the 
f i rs t  set of cross tabulat i ons showed up when more groups were used . 
The four categor i e s  chosen were 1 0  yea rs or mo re , 6 to 9 years , 2 to 5 
yea rs and l e s s  than 2 year s . 
Cross tabula t i ons compar ing the measures o f  e f fe c t ivenes s  to l ength o f  
tenure of the s ta t e  comptro l l e r  were produced . No s trong associat ions 
were noted between l ength of t enure and e f fect iveness for e i ther 
externa l or internal cons t i tuencies . 
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Summary and conclus ion s - Tenure in O f f ice 
In summary , it appears t ha t  l ength o f  t enure in o f f ice is not a 
par t icularly important fac tor in sat i s fying the needs of e i t her 
externa l o r  interna l cons t i tuencies of the state comptro l l er ' s agency . 
Length o f  tenure in o f f ice was not s t rongly corre l a t ed with any 
part icular met hod of s e l e c t ion . 
Based on the research of Meyer ( 1 9 7 9 ) , the comptro l l e r  t hat has l onge r  
tenure in of f i ce i s  presumed t o  be better abl e  t o  she l t e r t he ope rat ing 
core of his or he r agency from the uncerta inty of the po l i t i ca l  
environment faced b y  t he agency . Ac cording l y ,  l onger tenure on t he 
part of the state comptro l l e r  i s  expected to be associated with 
e f fect i vene s s . 
The resul t s  o f  research were not suf f i ciently s t rong to be cons i dered 
to support t he l i terature . Accordingly,  i t  appears that l ength of 
t enure in o f f ice , on the part of the state compt rol l e r , i s  not a 
part icularly important factor in sat i s fying the needs of e i ther 
ext e rna l or internal const i tuenc ies o f  the comptro l l e r ' s agency . 
No c l ear , s t rong relat i onship between l ength of tenure and 
e f fect ivenes s  was found . Addit i ona l l y ,  no s t rong re l a t i onship wa s 
found between me t hod of s e l e c t i on ( appointed vs . e l ected)  and l ength o f  
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tenure . Again,  the state comptroller ' s  agencies have career staff that 
can ensure cont inuity when changes in leadership occur . 
Although, this conc lus ion was not expected, a l l  state comptrol l er ' s 
agenc ies have profess ional career civil service staff . Also , the 
office of state comptroller tends to a degree of s tabi l i ty in tenure . 
Al l of the comptrol lers that were intervi ewed had served at least a 
reasonabl e  amount of time in off ice . They genera l l y  f e l t  that t ime in 
office is important . This does not contradict the conc lus ion above 
that the off ice of state compt rol ler is somewhat stable in terms of 
tenure in off ice . 
This res earch concludes that the stabi l i t y fac tor for the off ice of 
state comptroller coupled with the existence of professiona l ly st rong 
career staff ing of the agenc ies tend to mit igate the e f fects of shorter 
tenure genera l l y .  
SUMMARY O F  CROSS TABULAT IONS AND CONCLUS IONS B Y  CONSTI TUENCY 
External constituenc ies 
With regards to external cons ti tuenc ies , method of sele ct ion appears to 
have an impact on e f f ectiveness . Those s tate comptro l l ers that are 
e l ected and those that are appo inted by and who se rve at the pleasure 
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o f  the governor are more e f fect ive i n  sat i s fying externa l 
cons t i tuenc ies than are those who are appointed by an o f f i c i a l  lowe r  
than governor o r  those who a r e  c i v i l  service employees . 
Profess ional cert i f i cat ion appears to be related to e f fect ivene s s  in 
service to external const i tuenc ies as we l l ,  howeve r ,  not in the 
direction ant ic ipated . A highe r proport ion of non - ce rt i f ied s tate 
comptrol lers produced CAFR ' s with unqual i f ied audi t  opinions and 
rece ived GFOA Cert i f i cations . Clearly,  e l ected comptrollers , many of 
whom are not cert i f ie d ,  are e f f ective in t e rms o f  these two measures . 
Thi s  research concludes that profess iona l cert i f i cation of the state 
comptroller i s  not a particularly important factor in sat i s fact ion of 
the needs of ext erna l cons t i tuenc ies o f  the state comptro l l er ' s agency . 
Ne i ther organi zat ional conf igurat ion nor length of tenure appears to 
have a bearing on e f fect ivene ss of the state comptrol ler in 
sat i s fact ion of exte rnal cons t i tuenc ies . 
Interna l Consti tuenc ies 
In summary , ne ither method of sele ct ion , organizational conf igurat ion ,  
professional cert i f i cation nor length of tenure was considered t o  have 
a bearing on e f fecti vene ss of the state compt rol ler to sat i s fy the 
demands of int ernal cons t i tuencies . 
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QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Interviews 
In addi t ion to the quant i ta t ive research , nine current or forme r state 
comptrollers represent ing e ight states were int ervi ewed . Of the n ine , 
two comptrol lers were elected , the other seven were appointed . Three of 
these seven are appo inted by and serve at the pleasure of the governor . 
Two are appointed by an official  lowe r than governor . One i s  
tradi tional civil service and one i s  appointed by the governor to a 
seven -year term ,  thus affording a degree of protect ion s imilar to that 
of civil service . 
Appendix D contains the name s ,  t i t les , states and dates of i nt e rview of 
the state comptro l lers , as we l l  as a copy of the interview guide and a 
de tailed narra t ive of the results of the intervi ews . 
Summary of Intervi ews 
The state comptroll ers that were intervi ewed came from diverse 
backgrounds and are an impress ive group o f  individua l s . 
The comptrollers int ervi ewed genera l l y f e l t  that they had been 
ef fect ive in off ice . Most ment i oned i t ems such as going to GAAP , clean 
opinions on the CAFR and GFOA cert i f i cate as achievements . 
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Implementing new accounting systems was indicated by several . Some 
indicated that funding for obtaining these new syst ems was not always 
easy . 
Method of select ion was di scussed with the state comptrol l e rs that were 
intervi ewed for the qua l i tat ive aspect of this res earch . The impact of 
method of select ion was felt to be more of a phi losophical question 
than a real one , although several comptro l l ers preferred one method to 
another . 
The el ected comptrol lers felt that elect ion gives a comptroller more 
clout , visibil i ty and independence . Whi l e  method of selection might 
have some impact on performance , its importance was generally 
downplayed and the compt ro l l ers indicated that successes were found 
under all methods . 
Genera l l y ,  the intervi ews did not indicate that the state comptrol lers 
felt organi zat ional conf iguration was important to integration of the 
f inance function . Most state treasurers are e l ected , as are some 
comptrol lers . Coordinat ion with other f i nance o f f i c ia l s  was general ly 
not cons idered to be a problem . 
not the quantitat ive research . 
Thi s contradicts the l i terature but 
The state compt ro l lers that were interviewed who we re accountants felt 
that having an accounting background was important . Those who were not 
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accountants did not feel i t  was a s  important . The e l ected comptrollers 
are less l ikely to be accountants than the appointed comptro l lers , 
however this subgroup tended to be successful . 
Al l of the comptrol lers that we re interviewed had s e rved at least a 
reasonable amount of t ime in o f f ice . They generally felt  that t ime in 
off ice is important . This does not cont radict the conclus ion above 
that the office of state comptrol ler is somewhat s t ab l e  in t e rms of 
tenure in off ice . 
An important theme that sounded through the interviews was the 
importance of qua l i t i e s  such as integrity,  honesty and accountab i l i t y .  
This theme was sounded across the board . Thes e  qua l i t i e s  are important 
to e l ected as we l l  as to appointed comptrol lers . Pol it ical 
cons iderat ions should not keep the comptro l l e r  f rom doing the r ight 
thing . This was the consensus of the intervi ewed comptro l l e rs . 
Elected as we l l  as appointed compt rol lers felt  i t  was important to 
subordinate pol i t i cal cons iderations to prope r performance of the 
control l ership funct ion . Integrity was an important cons iderat ion to 
all of the comptrol lers . 
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUS IONS 
In summary, the fol lowing was found with regard to the research 
que st ions . 
• Method of selection was found to be a factor in s a t i s f ac t i on o f  t he 
needs of external cons t i tuenc ies of t he s tate comptrol l e r ' s  agency . 
Genera l l y ,  more pol i t ical , higher prof i l e  comptrol l e r s , t hose 
appointed by and serving a t  the pleasure of the governor and t hose 
who are directly e l ected , we re found to be mor e  e f f e c t ive t han l ower 
prof i l e ,  less pol i t ical compt rol lers , those appo inted by an o f f i c ial 
lower t han governor or those who are c ivi l s e rvice employees . 
Method of selection was not found to be a factor in sat i s fact ion o f  
the needs of internal cons t i tuenc ies o f  t he s tate comp t ro l l e rs 
agency . 
• Organizat ional conf igurat ion of the compt rol l e r ' s agency in t he 
• 
• 
context of the l a rger government was not found to be a factor in 
e f fect ivenes s .  Integrat ion of the f inance funct ion i s  not a problem 
for those s tates with ele cted s t ate compt rol lers . 
Professional cert i f i cat ion of the state comptroller was not found to 
be a factor in e f fect iveness of the s t ate comp t ro l l e r . Elected 
compt rol lers , who are less l i kely to be profess iona l l y  cert i f ied 
than compt ro l l e rs selected by other me thods , are e f fect ive . 
Tenure in o f f ice on the part of the state compt rol l e r  i s  not a 
factor in effectivene ss of the comp t ro l l e r ' s  agency . 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations that would be expected to f l ow out o f  a pro j ect such as 
this would be prescript ive . For exampl e ,  part icular methods o f  
sel ect ion would b e  prescr ibed . The quant itat ive exe rcise sugges t s  that 
electing comptro l l ers or having them appo inted by and serving at the 
pl easure of the governor are equa lly good methods o f  sel ection and 
that , at least for satisfact ion of external cons t i tuenci es , these are 
pre fe rable to appointment at a lower level or civil se rvice 
appointment . 
Howeve r ,  when cons idered in l ight of the qua l i tat ive research as we l l ,  
method of selection is not cons idered to be a s igni f i cant factor . I t s  
eff ects are somewhat subt l e . N o  recommenda t ion is forthcoming . 
Based on the quantitat ive research , no particular organ i za t i onal 
conf iguration is prescribed . S imilarly,  cer t i f icat ion on the part of 
the compt ro ller is not important nor is l ength o f  tenure . 
Although length of tenure did not re sult in clear s t rong associat ions 
with the independent va riable s ,  it shou ld be pointed out that state 
comptro l lers are genera l l y  not " in and outers·  . A review of the 
tenures in NASACT 1 9 96 indicates that the average for the 5 0  states at 
that time was 6 . 3  years . 
8 . 6  years . 
The average for the el ected compt rollers was 
Al though some elected comptro l l ers have served very long tenures , 
comptrollers sel ected by other methods have a l s o  se rved fai rly l ong 
tenures . 
The accounting duties of the state comptroller are not sub j ect to 
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ideology in a parti san sense . There is no Republ i can or Democrat bas i s  
o f  account ing . Although conservatism is one o f  the gene ra l l y  accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP ) , this is not in any way related to social 
cons ervat i sm or l iberta rianism . Accounting does not spl i t into l iberal 
and conse rva t ive schools with ideo l ogi cally dr iven prescript i ons l ike 
Economi cs , for instance . Appo intments are not pa r t i cularly l ikely to 
be made because someone passes an ideolog i cal l i tmus tes t ,  a l though 
party a f f i l i at ion is no doubt an important e l ement in cho i ce of an 
appo intee . 
A reasonabl e  degree of technical competence tends to mot iva te a person 
toward the o f f ice . This same qua l i f ication tends toward his or her 
selection ,  whether by election or appo intment . Interest ingly,  the two 
elected comptrollers intervi ewed by the resea rcher were both ini t i a l l y  
chosen to f i l l  a n  unexpi red term be f ore seek ing re - e l ect i on to t h e  post 
in the i r  own r ight . 
Bas i cal ly,  any method of select ion can produce a capable state 
comptroller . S imilarly,  lack of an integrated organizat i ona l 
2 7 4  
conf igurat ion does not appear to b e  a problem . As long as t he 
comptro l l er ' s agency has appropriately educated and qua l i f i ed career 
staf f , l eadership qua l i ties of the comptrol ler are not dependent on 
profess ional cert i f i cat ion or necessarily on l ength of tenure . 
Cons istently short tenures of a series of comptrol l ers might be l ikely 
to l ead to d i f f i cul t i e s  in terms of cont inuity and in retaini ng capable 
staff . 
The j ob of the state compt rol l er is important to the f inanc i a l  we l l  
being o f  the state . I t  is important that capable individua l s  are 
selected and that they are able to retain appropriately qua l i f i ed s t a f f  
in the i r  agencies . Beyond that , the theore t i cal importance of such 
variables as method of selection ,  organizat ional conf igura t i on ,  e t c . 
does not appear to have a large bearing . 
POS S I B I L ITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In l ight of the somewhat surpris ing f i nding that higher pro f i l e ,  more 
pol i t ical comptrol l ers appear to be more e f f ect ive in s a t i s faction of 
the needs of some of the i r  impo rtant cons t i tuencies , future research 
should be more concerned with factors such as power rather than method 
of sel ect ion or organ i z at ional configura t i on . Method of s e l e c t i on and 
organizat ional conf igurat ion are factors that f igure in empowe r ing the 
comptroller rather than in impact ing e f fect ivene ss dire c t ly . 
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For future research i t  might be interesting t o  compare the ratios o f  
general revenues t o  general expendi tures with other characte r i s t ics of 
the states to determine if any corre lat ion exists . The measures of t ax 
capacity,  tax e f fort , or f i scal stress might be rel evant . I t  would be 
expected that a high degree of f i scal stress to correlate with l ow 
ratios . Unemployment rate should be a good proxy for f i scal s t ress . 
Higher measures of tax ef fort should corre late with h igh rat ios . Tax 
capacity probably would corre late with high ratios . 
The state comptrolle r ' s agenc ies a l l  seem to be moving in the same 
direct ion . As more recent data on states with unqual i f i ed op inions and 
GFOA cert i f i cates becomes ava i l abl e , this research should be updated . 
As more and more states achieve these goa l s ,  the dist inct ion between 
comptrol lers chosen by dif ferent methods of sel ect ion wi l l  l ikely 
become less clear . 
As NASACT per iodi cal ly updates i t s  survey of the state comptro l l e rs , 
more information may be ava i l able that can be used to me asure 
e f fect ivene ss for interna l cons t i tuenc ies of the comptrol ler ' s  
agencies . 
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Appendix A 
GLOS SARY OF TERMS 
A l l o tmen t - A part of an appropriat ion which may be encumbered or 
expended during an a l l otment period . ( GAAFR , 1 9 6 8 ) . 
Appropr i a t ion - An authori zation granted by a legislative body to make 
expenditures and to incur obl igat ions for spec i f i c  purposes ( GAAFR , 
1 9 6 8 )  . 
Aud i t  - " The examina t ion of document s ,  records , report s ,  systems of 
interna l control , accounting and f inanc i a l  procedure s ,  and other 
evidence for one or more of the fol l owing purpose s : 
a )  To ascertain whe ther the sta tements prepared f rom the accounts 
present f a i rl y  the f inanc ial pos it i on and the resu l t s  of ope rations of 
the . . .  governmental uni t  in accordance with generally accepted 
account ing principles . . .  and on a bas i s  cons i s tent with that of the 
preceding year . 
b) To det e rmine the propriety,  lega l i ty ,  and ma thematical accuracy o f  a 
governmental uni t ' s  f inanc i a l  t ransact i ons . 
c )  To ascertain whether a l l  f i nanc ial t ransact i ons have been properly 
recorded , 
Al 
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d) To ascertain the s tewardship of pub l i c  o f f i c i a l s  who handle and are 
re sponsible for the f inanc ial resources of the governmental uni t . "  
( Hay and Mikesel l ,  1 9 7 4 , pp . 6 6 3  - 6 6 4 ) . 
Audit Report - " A report s igned by an auditor cover ing the audit or 
inve s t igat ion made by him . " ( Hay and Mikesel l ,  1 9 7 4 , p .  6 6 4 ) . 
Audi tor ' s  Op in ion - " A  s t at ement s igned by an auditor in which he 
states that he has examined the f inanc ial s tatements in accordance with 
genera l ly a ccepted aud i t i ng s tandards (with excepti ons , if any ) and in 
which he expre s s e s  h i s  opinion on the f inanc ial cond i t ion and resul t s  of 
ope rat i on . . .  of the governmental un i t . "  ( Hay and Mike s e l l ,  1 9 7 4 . p .  
6 6 4 )  . 
The op inion may be unqual i f i ed ( c l ean) in which the audi tor opines that 
the f inanc i a l  s tatements present fairly the f inanc ial pos i t ion and 
resul t s  of operat i on of the governmental uni t .  The audi tor may render a 
qua l i f i e d  op inion in with the exceptions indicated the f inanc ial 
statements present fairly the f inanc ial pos i t ion and resul t s  o f  
operat i on of the gove rnmental uni t . I f  the audi tor i s  unable to render 
even a qual i f ied opin ion , the auditor wi l l  i s sue a d i s c l aimer o f  
op inion . ( Me igs , Larsen and Meigs , 1 9 7 7 ) . 
CAFR - Comprehens ive Annual Financ i a l  Repor t .  The CAFR contains the 
general purpos e  f i nanc i a l  statements , an int roductory section ,  
supporting s ta t ements and a s ta t i s t ical section ,  and provides a 
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comprehensive s t at ement of the governmental ent i ty ' s f inanc i a l  pos i ti on 
and resu l t s  of opera t ion . ( Holde r ,  1 9 8 7 ) . 
CPA - C e r t i f i e d  Pub l i c  Accountan t . An accountant to whom a state has 
granted a c e rt i f i ca t e  showing that he has met prescribed educat iona l , 
exper i ence , an examina t i on requ irements des igned to insure competenc e  in 
the prac t i c e  of pub l i c  account ing . The accountant holding such as 
cert i f i cate i s  pe rmi tted to use the designat ion Cert i f ied Publ i c  
Accountant , commonly abbreviated to CPA . ( GAAFR , 1 9 6 8 )  This i s  the 
dominant c e rt i f i ca t i on of the accounting prof e s s ion . 
Expendi ture - Cos t o f  goods de l ivered or s e rvices rende red , or cash 
disbursements for these purposes ( adapted f rom GAAFR , 1 9 6 8 )  . 
GAAP - Gener a l l y  Accepted Accoun t i ng Princip l e s . .. The t e rm general l y  
accepted accounting princip l es ha s long been used in the standard form 
o f  audi t report and in account ing l i terature genera l ly . The t e rm i s  
used by the CPA i n  h i s  aud i t  report t o  indicated whe ther the ( en t i ty )  
be ing audited has prepared i t s  f inanc i a l  statements in an acceptab l e  
manner ,  so that they may fai rly be compared w i t h  t h e  p r i o r  year ' s  
statements and with the f inanc ial statements o f  other ( comparable 
ent i t i e s ) . "  ( Me igs , Mos ich , Johnson and Ke l l e r ,  1 9 7 4 , p .  1 2 ) . 
GAAS - Gen e r a l l y  Accepted Audi t i ng S t andards . .. To inform a reader ( o f  
f inanc i a l  s tatements )  o f  the competence of the examinat ion o n  which an 
opinion has been based , the report states ( i f  appropriate ) that the 
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exami na t i on was made in accordance with generally accepted audit ing 
standards and included a l l  procedures that the auditor cons idered 
necessary in the c i r cumstances . Complying with genera l l y  accepted 
aud i t ing s tandards involves comp l iance with each of ten bas i c  s t andards 
that are grouped under three maj or headings : general standards (persona l 
a t t ribute s  of the auditor ; s tandards of f i e l d  work ; ( and) standards of 
reporting . "  ( S te t t l er , 1 9 8 2 , p .  9 ) . 
GASB - Governmental Accoun ting S t andards Board . The organ i zat i on 
prima r i l y  respons ible for e s tabl ishing , reviewing , and changing 
accounting s tandards for s tate and local governments .  
Aronson and Schwart z ,  editors ) . 
( Holde r ,  1 9 8 7 ,  in 
GFOA - Government F inance O f f i c e r s  Assoc i a t i on . This i s  an associat ion 
of s tate and local f inance o f f icers . 
GFOA Cer t i f i c a t e  o f  Achi evement for Exc e l l ence in Finan c i a l  Repo r t i ng . 
( CA )  The Government Finance O f f icers As sociat ion ( GFOA) awards i t s  
Cert i f icate of Achievement f o r  Exc e l l ence in Financial Report ing to 
state and local gove rnments that prepare f inanc ial statements and 
reports that conform to GAAP and to other GFOA d i s closure 
recommendat ions . Gi roux and Shields ( 1 9 9 3 , p .  2 4 9 )  
GPFS - Gene r a l  Purp o s e  Finan c i a l  S ta t emen t s . The general purpose 
f inanc i a l  sta tements provide an ove rview of the f inanc ial pos i t i on and 
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resu l t s  o f  ope rat i ons of the governmental enti ty . These are the bas i c  
f inanc i a l  statements o f  the ent i ty . ( Holde r ,  1 9 8 7 ) . 
I n t e rnal Control - The foll owing i s  f rom the MFOA ( now GFOA) booklet How 
to Evaluate and Imp rove Internal Controls in Gove rnmental Units ,  1 9 8 1  . 
• Genera l l y ,  internal control is the plan of organi zat ion and the 
methods and procedures used to safeguard assets and other resources , and 
to a s sure that those assets and resources are used a s  e f f ec t ive ly as 
poss ible a s  di rected by the governing board and management . This i s  the 
core de f i n i t i on of internal control as de f ined by the Gene ral Account ing 
O f f i ce ( GAO ) and the Ame rican Ins t i tute of Cert i f ied Pub l i c  Accountant s 
(AICPA) The de finit ion app l i e s  to governmental uni t s  at a l l  leve l s , 
f rom f ederal gove rnment agenc ies to the sma l l e s t  uni t . 
Anothe r ,  s imi lar de finit ion i s  from the accounting profession . 
• 
Interna l control comprises the plan of organ i zat ion and a l l  o f  the co ­
ordinate methods and measures adopted within a bus iness to sa feguard i t s  
asse t s , check t h e  accuracy and rel iabi l i ty of i t s  accounting data , 
promote opera t i onal e f f i c i ency , and encourage adhe rence to prescribed 
managerial  pol i c i e s . Thi s  de finition pos s i b i l ity i s  broader than the 
meaning some t imes attr ibuted to the term . I t  recogn i z ed that a ' system' 
of internal control extends beyond those matters which relate directly 
to the funct i ons of the accounting and f inanc ial department s . "  ( SAS 
# 1 )  
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PAFR - Popul a r  Annual Financ i a l  Repo r t . The PAFR i s  a summa r i zed and 
s imp l i f ied presentat i on of informat i on contained in a governmental 
ent i ty ' s comprehens ive annual f inanc i a l  report . I t  i s  for c i t i z ens who 
wish to better understand the f inance s  of thei r  government , but do not 
have accounting or f i nanc ial management backgrounds . 
Revenue - Increases to assets whi ch do not increase l iabi l i t i e s  or 
represent recovery of expendi tures .  Revenues of government a l  uni t s  are 
usua l ly prima r i l y  taxes and fees that are used to support opera t i ons of 
the uni t  ( adapted f rom GAAFR , 1 9 6 8 ) . 
B 1 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent 
auOlt opinion 1 ��::> 48 I 96.0% 2 I 4 .0% 50 1 method of selection 1 995 1 00.0% 
audit opinion 1 995 * method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
aua� opinion unquallneu L-oum 1:£  1::> 0 4 j( 
1 995 % within method of 92.3% 93.8% 50.0% 57 . 1 %  77. 1 %  selection 1 995 
qualinea l;ount 1 1 6 3 1 1  
% within method of 7.7% 6 .3% 50.0% 42.9% 22.9% selection 1 995 
Total Count 1 3  1 6  1 2  7 48 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% selection 1 995 I -
8 2  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N T Percent N I Percent N 1 Percent 
aualt opinion 1 !:J!:JT 421 84.0% 81 1 6.0% 50 I method of selection 1 991  1 00.0% 
audit opinion 1 991 • method of selection 1 991 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 991 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
aUIDf opinion unquaTlf1ed coum 8 1 1  4 L 25 
1 991 % within method of 72.7% 78.6% 33.3% 40.0% 59.5% selection 1 99 1  
qualified Count 3 3 8 3 1 7  
% within method of 27.3% 2 1 .4% 66.7% 60.0% 40.5% selection 1 991  
Total Count 1 1  1 4  1 2  5 42 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 99 1  
-
B 3  
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
l,;I-UA certmcate OT 
achievement 1 995 • 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00 .0% 
method of selection 1 995 
GFOA certificate of achievement 1 995 · method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
\.or-u,", certmcate OT awaraea ceruncale \",oum 1U  13 :J L 3U 
achievement 1 995 % within method of 7 1 .4% 8 1 .3% 4 1 .7% 25.0% 60.0% selection 1 995 
not awarded certincate \,;ount 4 3 7 6 20 
% within method of 28.6% 1 8.8% 58.3% 75.0% 40.0% selection 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% selection 1 995 
8 4  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
L;I-UA certmcate or 
achievement · method of 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
selection 1 99 1  
G FOA certificate o f  achievement · method o f  selection 1 99 1  Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 99 1  
Selected b y  
Selected by officia l  not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
L;I-UA certificate or awaraea certificate L;oum 7 1U 3 1 21 
achievement % within method of 50.0% 62.5% 25.0% 1 2.5% 42.0% selection 1 991  
not awarded certificate Count 7 6 9 7 29 
% within method of 50.0% 37.5% 75.0% 87.5% 58.0% selection 1 99 1  
Total Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 99 1  
8 5  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases I 
Valid Missing Total I 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-'repares Internal Intenm 
reports 1 995 • method of 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
selection 1 995 
Prepares internal interim reports 1 995 • method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
t-'repares t-'repares Internal Intenm Gount 10 13 11 6 4U 
internal interim reports % within method of 7 1 .4% 8 1 .3% 9 1 .7% 75.0% 80.0% reports 1 995 selection 1 995 
Does not prepare Internal Count 4 3 1 2 1 0  
interim reports % within method of 28.6% 1 8.8% 8.3% 25.0% 20.0% selection 1 995 
lotal Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
8 6  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares external Imenm 
reports 1 995 • method of 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
selection 1 995 
prepares external interim reports 1 995 • method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
prepares prepares external Intenm l;ount !j ::I b 4 L I  
external interim reports % within method of 57. 1 %  56.3% 50.0% 50.0% 54 .0% reports 1 995 selection 1 995 
does not prepare external Count 6 7 6 4 23 
interim reports % within method of 42.9% 43.8% 50.0% 50.0% 46.0% selection 1 995 
l otal Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
8 7  
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares external Intenm 
reports 1 991 • method of 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
selection 1 991 
prepares external interim reports 1 991 • method of selection 1 99 1  Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 991 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
prepares prepares external Intenm t.-ount 7 5 4 4 20 
external interim reports % within method of 50.0% 3 1 . 3% 33.3% 50.0% 40.0% reports 1 991 selection 1 991 
aoes not prepare external count 7 1 1  8 4 30 
interim reports % within method of 50.0% 68.8% 66.7% 50.0% 60.0% selection 1 991  
Total count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 991  
---- - _. 
8 8  
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N T Percent N I Percent N I Percent 
roUfme analysIs 1995 50 J 1 00.0% oj .0% 50 I method of selection 1 995 1 00.0% I 
routine analysis 1 995 * method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
routine perrorms routine analysIS \..,oum j 0 z :> HI 
analysis 1 995 % within method of 21 .4% 50.0% 1 6 .7% 62.5% 36.0% selection 1 995 
does not perform routine Count 1 1  8 1 0  3 32 
analysis % within method of 78.6% 50.0% 83.3% 37.5% 64.0% selection 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
-
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missinq Total 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent 
routine analysIs 1 ��l 50 I 1 00.0% o 1 .0% 50 T method of selection 1 99 1  1 00.0% 
routine analysis 1 991 * method of selection 1 991 Crosstabulation 
Elected 
rouune performs routine analysIs (.;ount 1 
analysis 1 991 % within method of 7 . 1 %  selection 1 991 
does not perform routine Count 1 3  
analysis % within method of 92.9% selection 1 991 
Total Count 1 4  
% within method of 1 00.0% selection 1 99 1  
method o f  selection 1 991  
Selected by 
Govemor 
4 
25.0% 
1 2  
75.0% 
1 6  
1 00 .0% 
Selected by 
official not 
Govemor 
j 
25.0% 
9 
75.0% 
1 2  
1 00 .0% 
- --
8 9  
Civil 
Service Total 
2 l U  
25.0% 20.0% 
6 40 
75.0% 80.0% 
8 50 
1 00.0% 1 00.0% 
- --
B 1 0  
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N T Percent N I Percent N I Percent 
oeSfpractlces Hl95 50 I 1 00.0% o I .0% 50 I method of selection 1 995 1 00.0% 
best practices 1 995 · method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
best . IU·S DeSl vount l U  I:l ti 4 LI:l practices practices/develops % within method of 71 .4% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 56.0% 1 995 benchmarks selection 1 995 
does not Iu best practlces (.;ount 4 8 6 4 22 
or develop benchmarks % within method of 28.6% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 44.0% selection 1 995 
Total L;ount 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
B 1 1  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
comDlnea Dona raung 1 '::1'::10 
• method of selection 1 995 4 1  82.0% 9 1 8 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
combined bond rating 1 995 * method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
com15lned 3.!> or over Count L 4 3 3 12 
bond rating % within method of 20.0% 26.7% 33.3% 42.9% 29.3% 1 995 selection 1 995 
J1for 3.25 Count 4 5 4 3 1 6  
% within method of 40.0% 33.3% 44.4% 42.9% 39.0% selection 1 995 
below 3.0 Count 4 6 2 1 1 3  
% within method of 40.0% 40.0% 22.2% 1 4 .3% 3 1 .7% selection 1 995 
Total Count 1 0  1 5  9 7 4 1  
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
B 1 2  
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
comolnea oona rating t-vv 
92 • method of selection 4 1  82.0% 9 1 8.0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 991  
combined bond rating FW 92 · method of  selection 1 99 1  Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 99 1  
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
comolnea .j.;) or over L,oum J 2 4 L , , 
bond rating % within method of 30.0% 1 3 .3% 44.4% 28.6% 26.8% FW 92 selection 1 99 1  
J . U  o r  J.L5 c.;ount 5 7 3 3 1 8  
% within method of 50.0% 46.7% 33.3% 42.9% 43.9% selection 1 991 
below 3.0 c.;ount 2 6 2 2 1 2  
% within method of 20.0% 40.0% 22.2% 28.6% 29.3% selection 1 991 
lotal Count 1 0  1 5  9 7 41  
% within method of 1 00 .0% 1 00 .0% 1 00 .0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% selection 1 99 1  
B 1 3  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases I 
Valid Missing Total I 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
r manclal vvono comOine j 
+ 4 , 1 995 · method of 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00 .0% 
selection 1 995 
Financial World combine 3 + 4 , 1 995 • method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
t"manClal A or A- \....ount L 4 j , l U  
Wor1d combine % within method of 1 4 . 3% 25.0% 25.0% 1 2.5% 20.0% 3 + 4 , 1 995 selection 1 995 
t:S+, t:S or t:S- L;ount 6 8 5 5 24 
% within method of 42.9% 50.0% 4 1 .7% 62.5% 48.0% selection 1 995 
L;+, L; ,  L;-,  [)+, U or u- L;ount 6 4 4 2 1 6  
% within method of 42.9% 25.0% 33.3% 25.0% 32.0% selection 1 995 
Total count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
B 1 4  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
r Inanclal wona �aung I '<!'<!o 
• method of selection 1 995 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
Financial world Rating 1 995 * method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Govemor Govemor Service Total 
rlnanclal A, or A- c.;ount 2 4 3 l 10 
world % within method of 1 4 .3% 25.0% 25.0% 1 2.5% 20.0% Rating selection 1 995 
1 995 B+, B or B- Count 6 8 5 5 24 
% within method of 42.9% 50.0% 41 .7% 62.5% 48.0% selection 1 995 
c.;+, c.; or C- Count 4 3 1 1 9 
% within method of 28.6% 1 8 .8% 8.3% 1 2.5% 1 8.0% selection 1 995 
D+, D orLJ- Count 2 1 3 1 7 
% within method of 1 4 .3% 6.3% 25.0% 1 2 .5% 1 4 .0% selection 1 995 
lotaf Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% selection 1 995 
8 1 5 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-lnanClal vvorla .\�L! rewer 
categories ' method of 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
selection 1 991 
Financial World (92)  fewer categories * method of selection 1 991 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 99 1  
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
t" lnanClal 1 - 1 0  \.-oum 5 ::. 4 1 15 
World (92) % within method of 35.7% 3 1 .3% 33.3% 1 2.5% 30.0% fewer selection 1 991  
categories 16-35 count 4 7 4 5 20 
% within method of 28.6% 43.8% 33.3% 62.5% 40.0% selection 1 99 1  
36-50 Count 5 4 4 2 1 5  
% within method of 35.7% 25.0% 33.3% 25.0% 30.0% selection 1 991  
r otal Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 991 I.....--.. __ 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
rlnanClal wona Katlng ll:ll:lL 
• method of selection 1 991 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
Financial world Rating 1 992 * method of selection 1 991 C rosstabulation 
Elected 
rlnanClal 1-1 U vount J 
world % within method of 2 1 .4% Rating selection 1 991 
1 992 1 1 -20  t;ount 4 
% within method of 28.6% selection 1 99 1  
z1 -JO \..,ount 1 
% within method of 7 . 1 % selection 1 99 1  
31 -40 count 2 
% within method of 1 4 .3% selection 1 991 
4 1 -50 Count 4 
% within method of 28.6% selection 1 99 1  
Total \..,ount 1 4  
% within method of 1 00.0% selection 1 99 1  
method o f  selection 1 99 1  
Selected b y  
Selected by official not 
Governor Governor 
L 4 
1 2 .5% 33.3% 
4 
25.0% 
5 4 
31 .3% 33.3% 
3 1 
1 8 .8% 8.3% 
2 3 
1 2 .5% 25.0% 
1 6  1 2  
1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 
--
Civil 
Service 
1 
1 2.5% 
2 
25.0% 
4 
50.0% 
1 
1 2 . 5% 
8 
1 00.0% 
- -
B 1 6  
Total 
1 U  
20.0% 
1 0  
20.0% 
1 0  
20.0% 
1 0  
20.0% 
1 0  
20.0% 
50 
1 00.0% 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
cxpenaltures to Kevenues 
ratio 1 985-92 • method of 50 1 00 .0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
selection 1 995 
Expenditures to Revenues ratio 1 985-92 • method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
�pendltures to .�::> or less L-oum 
Revenues ratio % within method of 
1 985-92 selection 1 995 
.96 to .�9 count 
% within method of 
selection 1 995 
1 .00 or greater count 
% within method of 
selection 1 995 
Total count 
% within method of 
selection 1 995 
Elected 
ti 
42.9% 
5 
35.7% 
3 
2 1 .4% 
1 4  
1 00.0% 
-- -
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not 
Govemor Governor 
2 3 
1 2 .5% 25.0% 
8 8 
50.0% 66.7% 
6 1 
37.5% 8.3% 
1 6  1 2  
1 00.0% 1 00.0% 
8 1 7 
Civil 
Service Total 
1 12 
1 2 .5% 24.0% 
5 26 
62.5% 52.0% 
2 1 2  
25.0% 24.0% 
8 50 
1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 
-- - _. ---
B 1 8  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid M issing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
�penallureS tO Kevenues 
ratio · method of selection 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 991 
Expenditures to Revenues ratio · method of selection 1 991 C rosstabulation 
method of selection 1 991  
Selected by  
Selected by  official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
t:xpenOilures .�:> or less Count 6 2 3 1 12 
to Revenues % within method of 42.9% 1 2 .5% 25.0% 1 2 .5% 24 .0% ratio selection 1 991 
.96 to .99 Count 5 8 8 5 26 
% within method of 35.7% 50.0% 66.7% 62.5% 52.0% selection 1 991 
1 .00 or greater Count 3 6 1 2 1 2  
% within method of 2 1 .4% 37.5% 8.3% 25.0% 24.0% selection 1 991  
Total count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 99 1  
B 1 9  
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Line agency services 
scores 1 995 • method of 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
selection 1 995 
Line agency services scores 1 995 • method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
Line agency j.:J, 'I, 4.:J or :> c;ount :J f � 1 16 
services % within method of 35.7% 43.8% 25.0% 1 2 . 5% 32.0% scores 1 995 selection 1 995 
2, 2.5 or 3 --C-ount 7 4 7 4 22 
% within method of 50.0% 25.0% 58.3% 50.0% 44 .0% selection 1 995 
0, 1 or 1 .5 Count 2 5 2 3 1 2  
% within method of 1 4 .3% 31 . 3% 1 6 .7% 37.5% 24 .0% selection 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
-
B 20 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
eleclea vs appolmed 
organizational configuration 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
elected vs appointed · organizational configuration 1 995 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
eTeaeavs electea l-oum 1 4  14 
appointed % within organizational 1 00.0% 28.0% configuration 1 995 
appointed Count 1 0  26 36 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 72.0% configuration 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
B 2 1  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
aUo!l opinion 1 ':1':10 
organizational configuration 48 96.0% 2 4.0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
-- -
audit opinion 1 995 • organizational configuration 1 995 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
auolt opInion unquallnea L;ount 12 7 18 37 
1 995 % within organizational 92.3% 70.0% 72.0% 77. 1 %  configuration 1 995 
quafifled Count 1 3 7 1 1  
% within organizational 7 .7% 30.0% 28.0% 22.9% configuration 1 995 
Total Count 1 3  1 0  25 48 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
B 22 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
aUOl1 opinion 1 �� 1 
organizational configuration 42 84.0% 8 1 6 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 991 
audit opinion 1 991 • organizational configuration 1 99 1  Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 99 1  
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
audit opinion unqualified count t! 5 12 25 
1 99 1  % within organizational 72.7% 55.6% 54 .5% 59.5% configuration 1 99 1  
qualified Count 3 4 1 0  1 7  
% within organizational 27.3% 44.4% 45.5% 40.5% configuration 1 99 1  
Iota I Count 1 1  9 22 42 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 99 1  
-
B 23 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
\.:It" Up, cef1lTlca,e or 
achievement 1 995 • 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% organizational configuration 
1 995 
- -- -- -_1.....-.- -- ..... - -- -
G FOA certificate of achievement 1 995 ' organizational configuration 1 995 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
\.:it"uP, certmcate or awarded ceruncale (.;oum l U  !J 1 ::>  JU 
achievement 1 995 % within organizational 7 1 .4% 50.0% 57.7% 60.0% configuration 1 995 
not awarded certil1cate Count 4 5 1 1  20 
% within organizational 28.6% 50.0% 42.3% 40.0% configuration 1 995 
lotal Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% confi..9uration 1 995 
B 24 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
GI--uAcertmcate Of 
achievement · 50 1 00.0% organizational configuration 0 .0% 50 1 00 .0% 
1 991  
GFOA certificate o f  achievement · organizational configuration 1 991 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 99 1  
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
I..:>r- UI-\ certmcate OT awaroea certmcate l.;oum 7 4 1U 21 
achievement % within organizational 50.0% 40.0% 38.5% 42 .0% configuration 1 99 1  
not awarded certlflcate Count 7 6 1 6  29 
% within organizational 50.0% 60.0% 6 1 .5% 58.0% configuration 1 99 1  
Total Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 99 1  
- - _.-
B 25 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N 1 Percent N J Percent N I Percent auOlt opinion 1 ��:> eleCleo 48 J 96.0% 2J 4.0% sol 1 00.0% vs appointed 
audit opinion 1 995 · elected vs appointed C rosstabulation 
elected vs appointed 
elected appointed Total 
auOlt opinion unqualilleo L-ount 12 25 37 
1 995 % within elected vs 92.3% 7 1 .4% 77. 1 %  appointed 
qualified count 1 1 0  1 1  
% within elected vs 7.7% 28.6% 22.9% appointed 
Total count 1 3  35 48 
% within elected vs 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% appointed 
B 26 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-'repares Internal Intenm 
reports 1 995 • 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% organizational configuration 
1 995 
Prepares internal interim reports 1 995 · organizational configuration 1 995 C rosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
-Prepares t-'repares Internal Intenm Gount 1U 8 22 40 I intemal interim reports % within organizational 7 1 .4% 80.0% 84.6% 80.0% reports 1 995 configuration 1 995 
Does not prepare Internal Count 4 2 4 1 0  
interim reports % within organizational 28.6% 20.0% 1 5.4% 20.0% configuration 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
B 27 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares eXlernal Intenm 
reports 1 995 • 50 1 00.0% 0 organizational configuration .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
prepares external interim reports 1 995 · organizational configuration 1 995 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 995 
Not I ndirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
prepares prepares eXlernal Intenm L;ount 8 I 12 27 
external interim reports % within organizational 57. 1 %  70.0% 46.2% 54.0% reports 1 995 configuration 1 995 
does not prepare external count 6 3 1 4  2 3  
interim reports % within organizational 42.9% 30.0% 53.8% 46.0% configuration 1 995 
Total count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
B 28 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares external lmenm 
reports 1 991 • 50 1 00.0% organizational configuration 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 99 1  
prepares external interim reports 1 991 • organizational configuration 1 991 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 99 1  
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
prepares prepares external Intenm I..-ount 7 4 !J 20 
external interim reports % within organizational 50.0% 40.0% 34.6% 40.0% reports 1 991 configuration 1 991 
does not prepare external count 7 6 1 7  30 
interim reports % within organizational 50.0% 60.0% 65.4% 60.0% configuration 1 99 1  
,otal count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 99 1  
B 29 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
routine analysIs 1 ::I_::I!) organizational configuration 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
routine analysis 1 995 • organizational configuration 1 995 C rosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
rounne pefTorms routine analysIs L;Ount 3 4 11 Hi 
analysis 1 995 % within organizational 2 1 .4% 40.0% 42.3% 36.0% configuration 1 995 
aoes not perform routine L;ount 1 1  6 1 5  32 
analysis % within organizational 78.6% 60.0% 57.7% 64.0% configuration 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
B 30 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
routine analysIs 1 ::1::11 
organizational configuration 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 991 
routine analysis 1 991 • organizational configuration 1 991 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 99 1  
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
rouune perrorms routine analysIs \.;oum 1 L f 10 
analysis 1 991 % within organizational 7 . 1 %  20.0% 26.9% 20.0% configuration 1 99 1  
aoes not perform routine count 1 3  8 1 9  40 
analysis % within organizational 92.9% 80.0% 73. 1 %  80.0% configuration 1 991 
lotal Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 99 1  
B 3 1  
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
oeSl practices 1 ��:> 
organizational configuration 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
best practices 1 995 · organizational configuration 1 995 Crosstabulation 
orQanizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
best IU S  oes! (.;ount 1U 2 16 28 
practices practices/develops % within organizational 71 .4% 20.0% 6 1 . 5% 56 0% 1 995 benchmarks configuration 1 995 
does not 10 best practices Count 4 8 1 0  22 
or develop benchmarks % within organizational 28.6% 80.0% 38.5% 44.0% configuration 1 995 
IOtaT Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
--
B 32 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
comolneo oono rating 1 \!\!!> 
• organizational 4 1  82.0% 9 1 8.0% 50 1 00.0% 
configuration 1 995 
combined bond rating 1 995 · organizational configuration 1 995 Crosstabulation 
orQanizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
comblneO j.!> or over L;Ount 2 4 6 12 
bond rating % within organizational 20.0% 50.0% 26. 1 %  29.3% 1 995 configuration 1 995 
3.0 or 3.25 Count 4 2 1 0  1 6  
% within organizational 40.0% 25.0% 43.5% 39.0% configuration 1 995 
berow� Count 4 2 7 1 3  
% within organizational 40.0% 25.0% 30.4% 31 .7% configuration 1 995 
Total Count 1 0  8 23 4 1  
% within organizational 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
-
B 33 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
comolnea oona rating rVV 
92 • organizational 4 1  82.0% 9 1 8 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
configuration 1 991  
combined bond rating FW 92 · organizational configuration 1 991 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 991  
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
combmea J.::> or over L;Ount :3 :3 5 11 
bond rating % within organizational 30.0% 37.5% 2 1 .7% 26.8% FW 92 configuration 1 991 
3.0 or 3.25 Count 5 3 1 0  1 8  
% within organizational 50.0% 37.5% 43.5% 43.9% configuration 1 99 1  
below 3.0 count 2 2 8 1 2  
% within organizational 20.0% 25.0% 34 .8% 29.3% configuration 1 991  
Total Count 1 0  8 23 41 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 99 1  
B 34 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
.... Jnanclal wona comolne � 
+ 4 , 1 995 • organizational 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
configuration 1 995 
Financial World combine 3 + 4 , 1 995 · organizational configuration 1 995 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
rlnanClal PI or A- count L 3 5 10 
World combine % within organizational 1 4 .3% 30.0% 1 9.2% 20.0% 3 + 4 , 1 995 configuration 1 995 
B+, B or B- Count 6 5 1 3  24 
% within organizational 42.9% 50.0% 50.0% 48.0% configuration 1 995 
C+, C, C-, 0+, 0 or D- Count 6 2 8 1 6  
% within organizational 42.9% 20.0% 30.8% 32.0% configuration 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
B 35 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
r-Inanclal wone Kallng l ��:J 
• organizational 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
configuration 1 995 
Financial world Rating 1 995 ' organizational configuration 1 995 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
r-lnanClal ,..., or 1'1- vOUnt L j :;, l U  
world % within organizational 1 4 .3% 30.0% 1 9 .2% 20.0% Rating configuration 1 995 
1 3  24 1 995 8+, 8 or 8- count 6 5 
% within organizational 42.9% 50.0% 50.0% 48.0% configuration 1 995 
C+, C or C- count 4 1 4 9 
% within organizational 28.6% 1 0 .0% 1 5 .4% 1 8 .0% configuration 1 995 
D+, D or LJ- count 2 1 4 7 
% within organizational 1 4 .3% 1 0.0% 1 5 .4% 1 4 .0% configuration 1 995 
Total count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
B 36 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-lnanClal vvona (l:IL) rewer 
categories ' organizational 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
configuration 1 99 1  
Financial World (92) fewer categories * organizational configuration 1 991 Crosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 991 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
t-Inancla� 1-1 !> \..-ount !> 2 8 15 
World (92) % within organizational 35.7% 20.0% 30.8% 30.0% fewer configuration 1 99 1  
categories 1 6-35 L;ount 4 5 1 1  20 
% within organizational 28.6% 50.0% 42.3% 40.0% configuration 1 99 1  
36-50 L;ount 5 3 7 1 5  
% within organizational 35.7% 30.0% 26.9% 30.0% configuration 1 99 1  
Total count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 99 1  
B 37 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
rlnanClal wono Katlng 1 '<i'<iL 
• organizational 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
configuration 1 991 
Financial world Rating 1 992 * organizational configuration 1 991 Crosstabulation 
orQanizational confiQuration 1 99 1  
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
"""FInancial 1-1 u (.;ount 3 1 6 10 
world % within organizational 2 1 .4% 1 0.0% 23. 1 %  20.0% Rating configuration 1 991 
1 992 1 1 -20 Count 4 3 3 1 0  
% within organizational 28.6% 30.0% 1 1 .5% 20.0% configuration 1 991 
2 1 -30 Count 1 2 7 1 0  
% within organizational 7 . 1 %  20.0% 26.9% 20.0% configuration 1 991 
31 -40 Count 2 1 7 1 0  
% within organizational 1 4 .3% 1 0.0% 26.9% 20.0% configuration 1 991  
4 1 -50 Count 4 3 3 1 0  
% within organizational 28.6% 30.0% 1 1 .5% 20.0% configuration 1 991  
Total Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 991  
B 38 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missinq Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
�penanures to Kevenues 
ratio 1 985-92 * 50 organizational configuration 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
Expenditures to Revenues ratio 1 985-92 * organizational configuration 1 995 C rosstabulation 
organizational configuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
�xpenallures lo .�o or less ,-,ounl b 2 4 12 
Revenues ratio % within organizational 42.9% 20.0% 1 5 .4% 24 .0% I 1 985-92 configuration 1 995 
.96 to .99 Count 5 5 1 6  26 
% within organizational 35.7% 50.0% 6 1 . 5% 52.0% configuration 1 995 
1 .00 or greater Count 3 3 6 1 2  
% within organizational 2 1 .4% 30.0% 23. 1 %  24.0% configuration 1 995 
lotal Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Cxpenallures lo �evenues 
ratio · organizational 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
configuration 1 991  
Expenditures to Revenues ratio · organizational configuration 1 991 Crosstabulation 
t:xpenOilUres .::10 or less I..-oum 
to Revenues % within organizational 
ratio configuration 1 991 
.96 to .99 Count 
% within organizational 
configuration 1 99 1  
1 .00 o r  greater Count 
% within organizational 
configuration 1 99 1  
Total Count 
% within organizational 
configuration 1 99 1  _ 
organizational configuration 1 99 1  
Not 
integrated 
6 
42.9% 
5 
35.7% 
3 
2 1 .4% 
1 4  
1 00.0% 
- - -_. 
Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated 
2 4 
20.0% 1 5 .4% 
5 1 6  
50.0% 61 .5% 
3 6 
30.0% 23. 1 %  
1 0  26 
1 00.0% 1 00.0% 
B 39 
Total 
l L  
24.0% 
26 
52.0% 
1 2  
24.0% 
50 
1 00.0% 
B 40 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid MissinQ Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Line agency services 
scores 1 995 • 50 organizational configuration 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
Line agency services scores 1 995 · organizational configuration 1 995 C rosstabulation 
oroanizational confiQuration 1 995 
Not Indirectly Fully 
integrated integrated integrated Total 
·l.1ne agency ,j.:J, 4, 4.0 or 0 \..,ount 5 3 tl 16 
services % within organizational 35.7% 30.0% 30.8% 32.0% scores 1 995 configuration 1 995 
2, 2.5 or 3 t;ount 7 6 9 22 
% within organizational 50.0% 60.0% 34.6% 44.0% configuration 1 995 
0, 1 or 1 .5 Count 2 1 9 1 2  
% within organizational 1 4.3% 1 0.0% 34.6% 24.0% configuration 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 0  26 50 
% within organizational 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% configuration 1 995 
B 4 1  
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
electea vs appolntea 
professional certification 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
elected vs appointed · professional certification 1 995 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
eleCIea vs eleCIea L;oum 1 13 14 
appointed % within professional 5.0% 43.3% 28.0% certification 1 995 
appointed Count 1 9  1 7  36 
% within professional 95.0% 56.7% 72.0% certification 1 995 
Total Count 20 30 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% I certification 1 995 
B 42 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
aUOlt opinion 1 ��� 
professional certification 48 96.0% 2 4.0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
audit opinion 1 995 · professional certification 1 995 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
auOlt opinion unqualrneo Count 12 25 � 
1 995 % within professional 66.7% 83.3% 77 . 1 %  certification 1 995 
qualified Count 6 5 1 1  
% within professional 33.3% 1 6.7% 22.9% certification 1 995 
lotal Count 1 8  30 48 
% within professional 1 00 .0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
8 43 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
aUOll opinion I ::J::J I 
professional certification 42 84.0% 8 1 6 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 99 1  
audit opinion 1 991 • professional certification 1 991 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 99 1  
certified not certified Total 
audit opinion unqualified Count 5 20 25 
1 99 1  % within professional 50.0% 62.5% 59.5% certification 1 991 
qualified Count 5 1 2  1 7  
% within professional 50.0% 37.5% 40.5% certification 1 991 
Total Count 1 0  32 42 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% certification 1 99 1  
B 44 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid MissinQ Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
I..:it-UA cemncate or 
achievement 1 995 • 50 1 00.0% professional certification 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
GFOA certificate of achievement 1 995 · professional certification 1 995 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
I..:it-UA cemnca:e or awaroea certlTIcate \.,;oum � 11 3U 
achievement 1 995 % within professional 45.0% 70.0% 60.0% certification 1 995 
not awarded certillcate Count 1 1  9 20 
% within professional 55.0% 30.0% 40.0% certification 1 995 
Total count 20 30 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
B 45 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
\..;jrUA cel1lncate ot . achievement · professional 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% certification 1 99 1  
GFOA certificate o f  achievement ' professional certification 1 991 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 99 1  
certified not certified Total 
\..;jrUA certmcale or awaraea cel1lncate l-ount 4 1 f 21 
achievement % within professional 36.4% 43.6% 42.0% certification 1 991 
not awarded certificate Count 7 22 29 
% within professional 63.6% 56.4% 58.0% certification 1 99 1  
Total Count 1 1  39 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% certification 1 991  
B 46 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missinq Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Prepares Internal Interim 
reports 1 995 • professional 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
Prepares internal interim reports 1 995 ' professional certification 1 995 Crosstabulation 
professional certification I 
1 995 I 
certified not certified Total ! 
Yrepares t-'repares Internal Interim Gount 1 f 23 40 
internal interim reports % within professional 85.0% 76.7% 80.0% reports 1 995 certification 1 995 
Does not prepare Internal Count 3 7 1 0  
interim reports % within professional 1 5 .0% 23 .3% 20.0% certification 1 995 
lotar count 20 30 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
B 47 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares eXlernal Interim 
reports 1 995 • professional 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
prepares external interim reports 1 995 • professional certification 1 995 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
prepares prepares external Interim count 9 18 27 
external interim reports % within professional 45.0% 60.0% 54.0% reports 1 995 certification 1 995 
does not prepare external Count 1 1  1 2  23 
interim reports % within professional 55 .0% 40.0% 46.0% certification 1 995 
Total Count 20 30 50 
% within professional 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
8 48 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missinq Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares external Imenm 
reports 1 99 1  • professional 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% certification 1 991 
prepares external interim reports 1 991 • professional certification 1 991 C rossta bulation 
professional certification 
1 991 
certified not certified Total 
prepares prepares external Imerlm L;oum 5 1 ::>  LU , 
ex1ernal interim reports % within professional 45.5% 38.5% 40.0% reports 1 991 certification 1 991 
does not prepare ex1ernal count 6 24 30 
interim reports % within professional 54.5% 6 1 .5% 60.0% certification 1 991  
Total Count 1 1  39 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 991 
B 49 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
routine analysIs l_��::>. professional certification 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
routine analysis 1 995 * professional certification 1 995 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
routine perlorms routine analysIs l-oum � !::I 15 
analysis 1 995 % within professional 45.0% 30.0% 36.0% certification 1 995 
does not perform routine Count 1 1  2 1  32 
analysis % within professional 55.0% 70.0% 64.0% certification 1 995 
Total Count 20 30 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
B 50 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
routine analysIs 1 ��l 
professional certification 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 991 
routine analysis 1 991 • professional certification 1 991 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
, 1 99 1  
certified not certified Total I 
routine per orms routine analysIs \..,oum !J !J 1U I 
analysis 1 99 1  % within professional 45.5% 1 2 .8% 20.0% certification 1 99 1  
does not perform rouline Count 6 34 40 
analysis % within professional 54. 5% 87.2% 80.0% certification 1 99 1  
Total Count 1 1  39 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 991 -
B 5 1  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
oes! practices 1 �l:I!l 
professional certification 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
best practices 1 995 · professional certification 1 995 C rossta bulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
oes! IU s ueSI ,-,oum l L  l b  Ltl 
i practices practices/develops % within professional 60.0% 53.3% 56.0% I 1 995 benchmarks certification 1 995 
does not 10 best practices Gount 8 1 4  22 
or develop benchmarks % within professional 40 .0% 46.7% 44.0% certification 1 995 
Total Gount 20 30 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
B 52 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
comolneo Dona rating 1 ��:> 
• professional certification 41  82.0% 9 1 8 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
combined bond rating 1 995 · professional certification 1 995 C rosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
comolnea 3.:> or over count 6 6 12 
bond rating % within professional 37.5% 24 .0% 29.3% 1 995 certification 1 995 �O or 3.25 count 6 1 0  1 6  
% within professional 37.5% 40.0% 39.0% certification 1 995 
below 3.0 Count 4 9 1 3  
% within professional 25.0% 36.0% 31 .7% certification 1 995 
Total Count 1 6  25 41  
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
B 53 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
comolnea Dona rating r-vv 
92 • professional 4 1  82.0% 9 1 8.0% 50 1 00.0% 
certification 1 991 
combined bond rating FW 92 • professional certification 1 991 C rosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 99 1  
certified not certified Total 
combined -3:!> or over Count 0- -0 11 
bond rating % within professional 55.6% 1 8.8% 26.8% FW 92 certification 1 991 
3 .0 or 3.25 Caunt 2 1 6  1 8  
% within professional 22.2% 50.0% 43.9% certification 1 99 1  
below 3.0 . Count 2 1 0  1 2  
% within professional 22.2% 31 . 3% 29.3% certification 1 991 
Total Count 9 32 4 1  
% within professional 1 00 .0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% certification 1 99 1  
B 54 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-Inanclal wOrla comolne ,j 
+ 4 , 1 995 • professional 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
certification 1 995 
Financial World combine 3 + 4 , 1 995 · professional certification 1 995 C rosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
.t-manClar . f'I or A- Gount 4 b l U  World combine % within professional 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 3 + 4 , 1 995 certification 1 995 
B+, B or t:S- Gount 1 0  1 4  24 
% within professional 50.0% 46.7% 48.0% certification 1 995 
C+, G ,  G-, U+, 0 or U- count 6 1 0  1 6  
% within professional 30.0% 33.3% 32.0% certification 1 995 
Total count 20 30 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% certification 1 995 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing 
N Percent N Percent N 
r lnanClal wOrld Katlng 1 ��!> 
• professional certification 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 
1 995 
Financial world Rating 1 995 * professional certification 1 995 Crosstabulation 
rlnanClal 
world 
Rating 
1 995 
Iota I 
A, or A-
t!+, B or B-
C+, C or C-
D+, D or D-
Gount 
% within professional 
certification 1 995 
Count 
% within professional 
certification 1 995 
Count 
% within professional 
certification 1 995 
Count 
% within professional 
certification 1 995 
Count 
% within professional 
certification 1 995 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified 
4 6 
20.0% 20.0% 
1 0  1 4  
50.0% 46.7% 
4 5 
20.0% 1 6 .7% 
2 5 
1 0 .0% 1 6 . 7% 
20 30 
1 00.0% 1 00.0% 
-
B 55 
Total 
Percent 
50 1 00.0% 
Total 
1U 
20.0% 
24 
48.0% 
9 
1 8 .0% 
7 
1 4 . 0% 
50 
1 00.0% 
B 56 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Va l id Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-lnanClal vvono y::!LI. rewer 
categories · professional 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
certification 1 991 
Financial World (92)  fewer categories · professional certification 1 991 Crosslabulation 
professional certification 
1 991 
certified not certified Total 
""FInancial , -, 0 -Count 5 10 15 
World (92) % within professional 45.5% 25.6% 30.0% fewer certification 1 991 
categories 1 6-35 Count 4 1 6  20 
% within professional 36.4% 4 1 .0% 40.0% certification 1 991 
36-50 Count 2 1 3  1 5  
% within professional 1 8 .2% 33.3% 30.0% certification 1 991 
,otal -C-ount 1 1  39 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 991 
B 57 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-lnanCial Wona Kaung l ��L 
• professional certification 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 991 
Financial world Rating 1 992 • professional certification 1 991 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 991 
certified not certified Total 
� lnanClal l-lU count -S 5 10 
world % within professional 45.5% 1 2 .8% 20.0% Rating certification 1 99 1  
1 992 1 1 -20 Count 1 9 1 0  
% within professional 9. 1 % 23. 1 %  20.0% certification 1 99 1  
2 1 -30 count 1 9 1 0  
% within professional 9. 1 %  23 . 1 %  20.0% certification 1 991 
31 -40 Count 3 7 1 0  
% within professional 27.3% 1 7 .9% 20.0% certification 1 99 1  
4 1 -50 Count 1 9 1 0  
% within professional 9 . 1 %  23. 1 %  20.0% certification 1 99 1  
Total Count 1 1  39 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% certification 1 99 1  
B 58 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
cxpen9�ures to Kevenues 
ratio 1 985-92 • professional 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00 .0% certification 1 995 
Expenditures to Revenues ratio 1 985-92 • professional certification 1 995 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
�penallures IO .�::. or less L,oum 4 8 l L  
Revenues ratio % within professional 20.0% 26.7% 24.0% 1 985-92 certification 1 995 
.96 to .99 <..;ount 1 3  1 3  26 
% within professional 65.0% 43.3% 52.0% certification 1 995 
1 .00 or greater Count 3 9 1 2  
% within professional 1 5 .0% 30.0% 24.0% certification 1 995 
Total count 20 30 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00 .0% certification 1 995 
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C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
cxpenOllureS lO Kevenues 
ratio · professional 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
certification 1 99 1  
Expenditures to Revenues ratio · professional certification 1 9 9 1  Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 991  
certified not certified Total 
bpendl ures .�!l or less \,;ounl 1 11 12 
to Revenues % within professional 9 . 1 %  28.2% 24.0% ratio certification 1 991 
.96 to .99 count 9 1 7  26 
% within professional 8 1 .8% 43.6% 52.0% certification 1 991  
1 .00 or  greater Count 1 1 1  1 2  
% within professional 9 . 1 %  28.2% 24.0% certification 1 991 
Total Count 1 1  39 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% certification 1 99 1  
B 60 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Line agency services 
scores 1 995 • professional 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
certification 1 995 
Line agency services scores 1 995 * professional certification 1 995 Crosstabulation 
professional certification 
1 995 
certified not certified Total 
Llne agency .j .O , ,,, , ... . 0 or ;;J l-OUnl 0 1 U  1 0  
services % within professional 30.0% 33.3% 32.0% scores 1 995 certification 1 995 
2, 2 .5 or 3 Count 7 1 5  22 
% within professional 35.0% 50.0% 44.0% certification 1 995 
0, 1 or 1 .5 count 7 5 1 2  
% within professional 35.0% 1 6 .7% 24 .0% certification 1 995 
Total Count 20 30 50 
% within professional 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% certification 1 995 
B 61  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missi� Total 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent electea vs appolmea 50 I 1 00.0% o I .0% 50 I 1 00.0% tenure in office 1 995 
elected vs appointed ' tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
electea vs electea l;oun 6 cr 14 
appointed % within tenure in office 3 1 .6% 25.8% 28.0% 1 995 
appointed Count 1 3  23 36 
% within tenure in office 68.4% 74.2% 72.0% 1 995 
Total Count 1 9  31  50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
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Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
eleClea vs appointed 
tenure more categories 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
elected vs appointed · tenure more categories 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
eleCleU vs eleClea ,-,oum 4 L :J j 14 
appointed % within tenure more 36.4% 25.0% 29.4% 2 1 .4% 28.0% categories 1 995 
appointed Count 7 6 1 2  1 1  36 
% within tenure more 63.6% 75.0% 70.6% 78.6% 72.0% categories 1 995 
Total Count 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
- -�--
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Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent 
audit opinion 1 ��!:> 'Tenure 48 I 96.0% 2 1 4 .0% 501 1 00.0% in office 1 995 
audit opinion 1 995 * tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
audit opInion unquafifieO Goum 13 L4 � 
1 995 % within tenure in office 76.5% 77.4% 77. 1 %  1 995 
qualified Count 4 7 1 1  
% within tenure in office 23.5% 22.6% 22.9% 1 995 
iotal Count 1 7  3 1  48 
% within tenure in  office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
C rosstabs 
aUOlt opinion I �� I (enure 
in office 1 991 
N 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing 
I Percent N I Percent 
42 J 84.0% 8
1 
1 6.0% 
audit opinion 1 991 • tenure in  office 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 99 1  
6 years or less than 6 
more years 
audit opinion unquallnea Gount 11 14 
1 99 1  % within tenure in office 73.3% 51 .9% 1 99 1  
qualified Count 4 1 3  
% within tenure i n  office 26.7% 48. 1 %  1 991 
Total Count 1 5  27 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 991 
B 64 
Total 
N I Percent 
50 J 1 00.0% 
Total 
25 
59.5% 
1 7  
40.5% 
42 
1 00.0% 
B 65 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid MissinQ Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
aualt opinion 1 '::1'::1:> tenure 
more categories 1 995 48 96.0% 2 4 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
-
audit opinion 1 995 * tenure more categories 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
a��lt opinion unquallnea L,oum ts 0 1 ..l  1 1  j{ 
1 995 % within tenure more 72.7% 83.3% 76.5% 78.6% 77. 1 %  categories 1 995 
quahnea Count 3 1 4 3 1 1  
% within tenure more 27.3% 1 6.7% 23.5% 2 1 .4% 22.9% categories 1 995 
Total Count 1 1  6 1 7  1 4  48 
% within tenure more 1 00 .0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 I- -
8 66 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
auolt opinion ll:ll:ll .tenure more categories 1 991 42 84.0% 8 1 6 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
audit opinion 1 991 • tenure more categories 1991 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 991 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
al:l<:lIl opinion unquallneo L;oum 8 3 f 7 25 
1 991 % within tenure more 80.0% 60.0% 46.7% 58.3% 59.5% categories 1 991 
qua lined Count 2 2 8 5 1 7  
% within tenure more 20.0% 40.0% 53.3% 41 .7% 40.5% categories 1 991 
Total Count 1 0  5 1 5  1 2  42 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 99 1  
8 67 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
ur-uf\ cemncale or 
achievement 1 995 • tenure 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
in office 1 995 
_ .. 
GFOA certificate of achievement 1 995 · tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
GrUA certmcate or awaraea certmcate l.,ount 10 20 3U 
achievement 1 995 % within tenure in office 52.6% 64.5% 60.0% 1 995 
not awarded certificate Count 9 1 1  20 
% within tenure in office 47.4% 35.5% 40.0% 1 995 
Total Count 1 9  3 1  50 
% within tenure in office 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
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Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
\.orUr\ cernncate at 
achievement · tenure in 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
office 1 991 
GFOA certificate of achievement · tenure in office 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 99 1  ! 6 years or less than 6 
more years Total , 
GI-UA certmcate or awaraea cernncate \..,ount 9 12 21 
achievement % within tenure in office 50.0% 37.5% 42.0% 1 991  
not awarded certificate Count 9 20 29 
% within tenure in office 50.0% 62.5% 58.0% 1 991 
lotal count 1 8  32 50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 99 1  -
B 69 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
<.;;rUA certificate ot 
achievement 1 995 • tenure 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% more categories 1 995 
-
GFOA certificate of achievement 1 995 ' tenure more categories 1 995 C rosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
10 years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
<.;;rUA certmcate ot awaraea certlhcate \..,ount f 3 1 £  ts jU 
achievement 1 995 % within tenure more 63 .6% 37.5% 70.6% 57 . 1 %  60.0% categories 1 995 
not awarded certificate Count 4 5 5 6 20 
% within tenure more 36.4% 62.5% 29.4% 42.9% 40.0% categories 1 995 
Total Count 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
B 70 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
L;I-UA certmcate aT 
achievement · tenure more 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
categories 1 991 
GFOA certificate of achievement · tenure more categories 1 99 1  Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 991 
10 years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
\.or-VA cemncate aT awaraea certmcate vaunt b 3 !> 1 L1 
achievement % within tenure more 46.2% 60.0% 27.8% 50.0% 42.0% categories 1 991  
not awarded certificate Count 7 2 1 3  7 29 
% within tenure more 53.8% 40.0% 72.2% 50.0% 58.0% categories 1 99 1  
Total c.;ount 1 3  5 1 8  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 99 1  
B 7 1  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t"'repares Imernal Imenm 
reports 1 995 • tenure in  50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
office 1 995 
Prepares internal interim reports 1 995 · tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
I-'repares t"'repares Imernal Intenm \.;ount 16 £4 40 
internal interim reports % within tenure in office 84.2% 77.4% 80.0% reports 1 995 1 995 
LJoes not prepare Internal Count 3 7 1 0  
interim reports % within tenure in office 1 5 .8% 22.6% 20.0% 1 995 
Total Count 1 9  31  50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
8 72 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares extemal Interim 
reports 1 995 • tenure in 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
office 1 995 
prepares external interim reports 1 995 ' tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
prepares prepares extemal interim \.,ount 12 15 27 
ex1emal interim reports % within tenure in office 63.2% 48.4% 54 .0% reports 1 995 1 995 
does not prepare ex1emal count 7 1 6  23 
interim reports % within tenure in office 36.8% 51 .6% 46.0% 1 995 
Total Count 1 9  31  50  
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
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Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares external Intenm 
reports 1 991 • tenure in 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
office 1 991 
prepares external interim reports 1 991 * tenure in office 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 991  
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
prepares prepares external Intenm \.-oum � 11 20 
external interim reports % within tenure in office 50.0% 34.4% 40.0% reports 1 991 1 991  
does not prepare external Count 9 2 1  30 
interim reports % within tenure in office 50.0% 65.6% 60.0% 1 991 
Total count 1 8  32 50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 99 1  
B 74 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
r-repares Internal Intenm 
reports 1 995 • tenure more 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
categories 1 995 
Prepares internal interim reports 1 995 * tenure more categories 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure more cateqories 1 995 
10 years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
r-repares r-repares Internal ulfenm (.;ount 11 !> 12 12 4U 
internal interim reports % within tenure more 1 00.0% 62.5% 70.6% 85.7% 80.0% reports 1 995 categories 1 995 
Does not prepare internal Count 3 5 2 1 0  
interim reports % within tenure more 37.5% 29.4% 1 4 . 3% 20.0% categories 1 995 
Total Count 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
- --
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C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares external interim 
reports 1 995 • tenure more 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
categories 1 995 
prepares externa l  interim reports 1 995 · tenure more categories 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
prepares prepares external Intenm L;Ount 9 3 lU !J 27 
external interim reports % within tenure more 81 .8% 37.5% 58.8% 35.7% 54.0% reports 1 995 categories 1 995 
does not prepare external count 2 5 7 9 23 
interim reports % within tenure more 1 8 .2% 62.5% 41 .2% 64.3% 46.0% categories 1 995 
Total Count 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 __ 
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C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
prepares eXlemal Intenm 
reports 1 991 • tenure more 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
categories 1 991 
prepares external interim reports 1 991 • tenure more categories 1 991 C rosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 99 1  
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
prepares prepares eXlemal Intenm \.-oum f 2 b 5 LU 
extemal interim reports % within tenure more 53.8% 40.0% 33.3% 35.7% 40.0% reports 1 991 categories 1 99 1  
does not prepare extemal Count 6 3 1 2  9 30 
interim reports % within tenure more 46.2% 60.0% 66.7% 64 .3% 60.0% categories 1 991 
Total Count 1 3  5 1 8  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 99 1  
8 77 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missi� Total 
N I Percent N 1 Percent N I Percent routine analysIs 1 ::t::t:> 50 I 1 00.0% o I .0% 50 I 1 00.0% I tenure in office 1 995 
routine analysis 1 995 ' tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
roUUne perrorms rouune analysIs \.;oum b 1£ 18 
analysis 1 995 % within tenure in office 31 .6% 38.7% 36.0% 1 995 
does not perform routine Count 1 3  1 9  32 
analysis % within tenure in office 68.4% 6 1 .3% 64.0% 1 995 
Total Count 1 9  31  50  
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
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C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent routine analysIs n:1�1 
tenure in office 1 991 50 1 1 00.0% o 1 .0% 50 1 1 00.0% 
routine analysis 1 991 • tenure in office 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 991 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
routine perrorms rOUllne analysIs ount j f 1U 
analysis 1 991 % within tenure in office 1 6 .7% 2 1 .9% 20.0% 1 991 
does not perrorm routine l-ount 1 5  25 40 
analysis % within tenure in office 83.3% 78. 1 %  80.0% 1 991 
Total count 1 8  32 50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 991 
B 79 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
routine analysIs 1 ��!> 
tenure more categories 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
routine analysis 1 995 · tenure more categories 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
routine perrorms routine analysIs Count 1 !> 8 4 18 
analysis 1 995 % within tenure more 9 . 1 %  62.5% 47. 1 %  28.6% 36.0% categories 1 995 
does not perform routine Count 1 0  3 9 1 0  32 
analysis % within tenure more 90.9% 37.5% 52.9% 7 1 .4% 64.0% categories 1 995 
Total Count 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
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Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
routine analysIs I ::t::tl 
tenure more categories 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 99 1  
routine analysis 1 991 * tenure more categories 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 991 
10 years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
roullne perrorms routine analysIs \.;oum 1 L. !J L l U  
analysis 1 991 % within tenure more 7 .7% 40.0% 27.8% 1 4.3% 20.0% categories 1 991 
does not perform routine Count 1 2  3 1 3  1 2  40 
analysis % within tenure more 92.3% 60.0% 72.2% 85.7% 80.0% categories 1 991 
l otal Count 1 3  5 1 8  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 991 
- -
B 8 1  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent 
bes practices 1 ��::> 50 T 1 00 .0% o I .0% 50 I tenure in office 1 995 1 00.0% 
best practices 1 995 · tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
best IU s DeSt vaunt l U  l ts  Lts 
practices practices/develops % within tenure in office 52.6% 58. 1 %  56.0% 1 995 benchmarks 1 995 
does not 10 best practices \.-ount 9 1 3  22 
or develop benchmarks % within tenure in office 47.4% 4 1 .9% 44.0% 1 995 
Total count 1 9  31  50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
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Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
oest practices 1 ��!:> 
tenure more categories 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
best practices 1 995 · tenure more categories 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
10 years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
DeSf IU'S oeSf count 6 4 10 8 28 
practices practices/develops % within tenure more 54 .5% 50.0% 58.8% 57. 1 %  56.0% 1 995 benchmarks categories 1 995 
does not ID best practices Count 5 4 7 6 22 
or develop benchmarks % within tenure more 45.5% 50.0% 4 1 .2% 42.9% 44.0% categories 1 995 
lotal Count 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
B 83 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases I 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
comolneo Dono rating 1 ::i::i::> 
• tenure in office 1 995 41  82.0% 9 1 8.0% 50 1 00.0% 
combined bond rating 1 995 ' tenure in office 1 995 C rosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
comolnea J.S or over �ount 4 8 lL 
bond rating % within tenure in office 33.3% 27.6% 29.3% 1 995 1 995 
3.0 or 3.25 �ount 4 1 2  1 6  
% within tenure i n  office 33.3% 4 1 .4% 39.0% 1 995 
below 3.0 �ount 4 9 1 3  
% within tenure in office 33.3% 31 .0% 3 1 .7% 1 995 
Total count 1 2  29 4 1  
% within tenure i n  office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
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Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
comolnea oona rating 1 ��o 
• tenure more categories 4 1  82.0% 9 1 8 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
combined bond rating 1 995 · tenure more categories 1 995 C rossta bulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
comulnea J.O or over count 3 1 4 4 12 
bond rating % within tenure more 42.9% 20.0% 25.0% 30.8% 29.3% 1 995 categories 1 995 
3.0 or 3.25 Count 2 2 6 6 1 6  
% within tenure more 28.6% 40.0% 37.5% 46.2% 39.0% categories 1 995 
below 3.0 Count 2 2 6 3 1 3  
% within tenure more 28.6% 40.0% 37.5% 23. 1 %  31 .7% categories 1 995 
lotal Count 7 5 1 6  1 3  4 1  
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
- -
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Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases I 
Valid Missif!g Total I 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent J comolnea oona rating r vv 4 1  I 82.0% 91 1 8.0% 50 J 1 00.0% J 92 • tenure in office 1 99 1  
combined bond rating F W  92 * tenure in office 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 99 1  
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
comolned --:r.o or over --C-ount 0 !> 1 1  
bond rating % within tenure in office 40.0% 1 9 .2% 26.8% FW 92 1 991 
3.0 or 3.25 Count 4 1 4  1 8  
% within tenure in office 26.7% 53.8% 43.9% 1 991 
below 3.0 --Count 5 7 1 2  
% within tenure i n  office 33.3% 26.9% 29.3% 1 991 
Total Count 1 5  26 41  
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 99 1  
B 86 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
comblnea bona rating rVV 
92 • tenure more categories 4 1  82.0% 9 1 8 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 991 
combined bond rating FW 92 · tenure more categories 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 991 
10 years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
comolnea :5.::> or over count 5 1 4 1 11 
bond rating % within tenure more 45.5% 25.0% 26.7% 9 . 1 %  26.8% FW 92 categories 1 991 
3 .0 or 3.25 count 2 2 7 7 1 8  
% within tenure more 1 8 .2% 50.0% 46.7% 63.6% 43.9% categories 1 991 
below 3.0 Count 4 1 4 3 1 2  
% within tenure more 36.4% 25.0% 26.7% 27.3% 29.3% categories 1 991  
lotal Count 1 1  4 1 5  1 1  41  
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 99 1  
B 87 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-Inanclal wOrla comolne j 
+ 4 , 1 995 • tenure in office 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
Financial World combine 3 + 4 ,1 995 · tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
.r.lnanclal ,... or A- vount 4 6 1U 
World combine % within tenure in office 2 1 . 1 %  1 9 .4% 20.0% 3 + 4 , 1 995 1 995 
B+, B or B- count 1 2  1 2  24 
% within tenure in office 63.2% 38.7% 48.0% 1 995 
C+, C, G-, u+, D or 0- Gount 3 1 3  1 6  
% within tenure i n  office 1 5 .8% 4 1 .9% 32.0% 1 995 
Total c.;ount 1 9  31  50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
B 88 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
rlnanClal vvorla (�L) fewer 
categories · tenure in office 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 991 
Financial World (92) fewer categories · tenure in office 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 99 1  , 6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
rlnanclal ,-1!> --Count 7 8 15 
World (92) % within tenure in office 38.9% 25.0% 30.0% fewer 1 991 
categories 1 6-35 Count 9 1 1  20 
% within tenure in office 50.0% 34 .4% 40.0% 1 991 
36-50 --C-ount 2 1 3  1 5  
% within tenure i n  office 1 1 . 1 %  40.6% 30.0% 1 99 1  
iotaT Count 1 8  32 50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 99 1  
B 89 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
r Inanclal vvona combine j 
+ 4 , 1 995 • tenure more 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
categories 1 995 
Financial World combine 3 + 4 , 1 995 * tenure more categories 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
rlnanclal M ar M- \.-oum 4 4 L I U  
World combine % within tenure more 36.4% 23.5% 1 4 . 3% 20.0% 3 + 4 , 1 995 categories 1 995 
B+, B ar B- Count 7 5 7 5 24 
% within tenure more 63.6% 62.5% 4 1 .2% 35.7% 48.0% categories 1 995 
C+, C, C-, u+, U or u- count 3 6 7 1 6  
% within tenure more 37.5% 35.3% 50.0% 32.0% categories 1 995 
Total Count 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
B 90 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
r manclal vvona \ '::ILl rewer 
categories · tenure more 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
categories 1 991 
Financial World (92) fewer categories · tenure more categories 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure more cateqories 1 991 
10 years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
�Inanclal 1 -1 !:> \..,oum !:> "L !:> 3 15 
World (92) % within tenure more 38.5% 40.0% 27.8% 2 1 .4% 30.0% fewer categories 1 991 
categories 1 6-35 Count 6 3 7 4 20 
% within tenure more 46.2% 60.0% 38.9% 28.6% 40.0% categories 1 991 
36-50 Count 2 6 7 1 5  
% within tenure more 1 5 .4% 33.3% 50.0% 30.0% categories 1 99 1  
Total Count 1 3  5 1 8  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 991 
B 91  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-lnanClal wone Katlng ll:1�::' 
• tenure in office 1 995 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
Financial world Rating 1 995 · tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
rlnanClal 7\, or A- Gount 4 6 10 
world % within tenure in office 2 1 . 1 %  1 9 .4% 20.0% Rating 1 995 
1 995 B+, B or B- Count 1 2  1 2  24 
% within tenure in office 63.2% 38.7% 48.0% 1 995 
C+, C or C- Count 2 7 9 
% within tenure in office 1 0.5% 22.6% 1 8.0% 1 995 
1)+, 0 or 0- Count 1 6 7 
% within tenure in office 5 .3% 1 9 .4% 1 4.0% 1 995 
Total Count 1 9  3 1  50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 995 
---
B 92 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-lnanClal wono Katlng 1 ��L 
• tenure in office 1 991 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
Financial world Rating 1 992 · tenure in office 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 99 1  
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
rlnanClal 1-10 --C-ount (j 4 l U  
world % within tenure in office 33.3% 1 2 .5% 20.0% Rating 1 991  
1 992 1 1 -20 Count 3 7 1 0  
% within tenure i n  office 1 6 .7% 2 1 .9% 20.0% 1 991 
21 -30 Count 6 4 1 0  
% within tenure in office 33.3% 1 2 .5% 20.0% 1 991 
31 -40 Count 2 8 1 0  
% within tenure i n  office 1 1 . 1 %  25.0% 20.0% 1 991 
41 -50 Count 1 9 1 0  
% within tenure in office 5.6% 28. 1 % 20.0% 1 99 1  
Total Count 1 8  32 50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 99 1  
B 93 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
t-Inanclal wona I"{allng n:1�O 
• tenure more categories 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 995 
-
Financial world Rating 1 995 ' tenure more categories 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
t-lnanClal ,..., or ,...- voun! 4 4 L l U  
world % within tenure more 36.4% 23.5% 1 4.3% 20.0% Rating categories 1 995 
24 1 995 t:S+, t:S or t:S- count 7 5 7 5 
% within tenure more 63.6% 62.5% 41 .2% 35.7% 48.0% categories 1 995 
C+, C or C- Count 2 3 4 9 
% within tenure more 25.0% 1 7 .6% 28.6% 1 8 .0% categories 1 995 
u+, U or U- count 1 3 3 7 
% within tenure more 1 2 .5% 1 7 .6% 2 1 .4% 1 4 .0% categories 1 995 
Total count 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
B 94 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
rmanClal wona Katlng HI�L 
• tenure more categories 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
1 991 
Financial world Rating 1 992 * tenure more categories 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 99 1  
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
rlnanClal l-IU L..ount :J 1 .j 1 l U  
world % within tenure more 38.5% 20.0% 1 6 .7% 7 . 1 % 20.0% Rating categories 1 991 
1 0  1 992 1 1 -20 Count 2 1 5 2 
% within tenure more 1 5 .4% 20.0% 27.8% 1 4.3% 20.0% categories 1 99 1  
2 1 -30 (.;ount 3 3 1 3 1 0  
% within tenure more 23. 1 %  60.0% 5.6% 21 .4% 20.0% categories 1 99 1  
31 -40 Count 2 6 2 1 0  
% within tenure more 1 5 .4% 33.3% 1 4.3% 20.0% categories 1 991 
41 -50 (.;ount 1 3 6 1 0  
% within tenure more 7.7% 1 6 .7% 42 .9% 20.0% categories 1 99 1  
Total (.;ount 1 3  5 1 8  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% categories_1 99 1  
B 95 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
�xpenOltures to Kevenues 
ratio 1 985-92 • tenure in 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
office 1 995 
Expenditures to Revenues ratio 1 985-92 ' tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
E:xpenOltures to .�o or less ount 4 8 l L  
Revenues ratio % within tenure in office 2 1 . 1 %  25.8% 24.0% 1 985-92 1 995 
.96 to .99 (;ount 1 0  1 6  26 
% within tenure in office 52.6% 5 1 .6% 52.0% 1 995 
1 .00 or greater count 5 7 1 2  
% within tenure i n  office 26.3% 22.6% 24.0% 1 995 
Total Count 1 9  31  50  
% within tenure in office 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 995 
B 96 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N I Percent N I Percent N 1 Percent 
t;xpenOl ureS IO Kevenues sol 1 00.0% 01 .0% sol 1 00.0% ratio · tenure in office 1 991 
Expenditures to Revenues ratio · tenure in  office 1 991 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 991 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
expenol ures .�::. or less l-ounl 2 10 12 to Revenues % with in tenure in office 1 1 . 1 %  31 .3% 24.0% ratio 1 991 
.96 to .99 Count 1 0  1 6  26 
% with in tenure in office 55.6% 50.0% 52.0% 1 991 
1 .00 or greater count 6 6 1 2  
% within tenure i n  office 33.3% 1 8 .8% 24.0% 1 99 1  
Total Count 1 8  32 50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 991 
B 97 
C rosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
cxpen�ltures to Kevenues 
ratio 1 985-92 * tenure more 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
categories 1 995 
Expenditures to Revenues ratio 1 985-92 · tenure more categories 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure more cat�ories 1 995 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
�xpenultures to .::10 or less I.-oum 1 j :, j 1£ 
Revenues ratio % within tenure more 9 . 1 %  37.5% 29.4% 2 1 .4% 24.0% 1 985-92 categories 1 995 
.96 to .99 count 6 4 7 9 26 
% within tenure more 54.5% 50.0% 4 1 .2% 64.3% 52.0% categories 1 995 
1 .00 or greater \.;ount 4 1 5 2 1 2  
% within tenure more 36.4% 1 2 . 5% 29.4% 1 4 .3% 24.0% categories 1 995 
Total count 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
B 98 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid MissinQ Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
�xpenOItUreS IO Kevenues 
ratio ' tenure more 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
categories 1 991 
Expenditures to Revenues ratio · tenure more categories 1 9 9 1  Crosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 991 
10 years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
�xpenollures .�:> or less L;oum 2 5 5 12 
to Revenues % within tenure more 1 5 .4% 27.8% 35.7% 24.0% ratio categories 1 991 
.96 to .99 Count 7 3 9 7 26 
% within tenure more 53.8% 60.0% 50.0% 50.0% 52 .0% categories 1 991 
1 .00 or greater Count 4 2 4 2 1 2  
% within tenure more 30.8% 40.0% 22.2% 14 .3% 24 .0% categories 1 991 
Total Count 1 3  5 1 8  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00 .0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 99 1  
B 99 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases ! 
Valid Missing Total ! 
N Percent N Percent N Percent I 
Line agency services 
scores 1 995 • tenure in 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
office 1 995 
Line agency services scores 1 995 • tenure in office 1 995 Crosstabulation 
tenure in office 1 995 
6 years or less than 6 
more years Total 
Line agency j.::>. 'I. '1.0 or ::> vount j 1 j  1 0  
services % within tenure in office 1 5 .8% 41 .9% 32.0% scores 1 995 1 995 
2. 2. 5 or 3 Count 1 1  1 1  22 
% within tenure in office 57.9% 35.5% 44.0% 1 995 
O. 1 or 1 . 5 Count 5 7 1 2  
% within tenure in  office 26.3% 22.6% 24.0% 1 995 
Total Count 1 9  31  50 
% within tenure in office 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 995 
B 1 00 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Line agency services 
scores 1 995 • tenure more 50 1 00.0% 0 .0% 50 1 00.0% 
categories 1 995 
Line agency services scores 1 995 ' tenure more categories 1 995 C rosstabulation 
tenure more categories 1 995 
1 0  years or less than 2 
more 6 to 9 years 2 to 5 years years Total 
Line. agency ..l. :::> , 4, 4 .:> or b l,;oum £ 1 8 b 1 0  
services % within tenure more 1 8 .2% 1 2.5% 47. 1 %  35.7% 32.0% scores 1 995 categories 1 995 
2 , 2 .5  or 3 {.;ount 6 5 6 5 22 
% within tenure more 54.5% 62.5% 35.3% 35.7% 44.0% categories 1 995 
0 ,  1 or 1 .5 count 3 2 3 4 1 2  
% within tenure more 27.3% 25.0% 1 7 .6% 28.6% 24.0% categories 1 995 
l otal {.;ount 1 1  8 1 7  1 4  50 
% within tenure more 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% categories 1 995 
B 1 0 1  
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent 
governing 1 ��� t:S memoa 50 I 1 00.0% o I .0% 50 I 1 00.0% of selection 1 995 
governing 1 999 B • method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
governing 1-'1, 1-'1- ,-,oum L !> L 1 l U  
1 999 B % within method of 1 4 .3% 3 1 .3% 1 6.7% 1 2 .5% 20.0% selection 1 995 
B+, B, 1::5- Count 8 1 0  9 2 29 
% within method of 57. 1 %  62.5% 75.0% 25.0% 58.0% selection 1 995 
(.;+, (.;,  \.;-, u+ (.;ount 4 1 1 5 1 1  
% within method of 28.6% 6.3% 8 .3% 62.5% 22.0% selection 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
B 1 02 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases J 
Valid Missing Total I 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent 
Governing 1 ��� metnoa 50 I 1 00.0% o I .0% 501 1 00.0% of selection 1 995 
Governing 1 999 · method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
Governing /"\, /"\-, 0+ Count 4 { 4 1 16 
1 999 % within method of 28.6% 43.8% 33.3% 1 2 .5% 32.0% selection 1 995 
1:3 count 5 4 3 1 1 3  
% within method of 35.7% 25.0% 25.0% 1 2 . 5% 26.0% selection 1 995 
B-, c+ Count 2 4 4 3 1 3  
% within method of 1 4 .3% 25.0% 33.3% 37.5% 26.0% selection 1 995 
C, c-, u+ count 3 1 1 3 8 
% within method of 2 1 .4% 6.3% 8.3% 37.5% 1 6 .0% selection 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
B 1 03 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missi� Total 
N I Percent N I Percent N I Percent 
l:iovernlng �� L; memoo or 50 J 1 00.0% OJ .0% 501 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
Governing 99 C ·  method of selection 1 995 Crosstabulation 
method of selection 1 995 
Selected by 
Selected by official not Civil 
Elected Governor Governor Service Total 
l:iovernlng A, A-, t:l+, t:l Count 9 11 7 2 29 
99 C % within method of 64.3% 68.8% 58.3% 25.0% 58.0% selection 1 995 
8-, C+, C, C-, D+ Count 5 5 5 6 21  
% within method of 35.7% 3 1 .3% 41 .7% 75.0% 42.0% selection 1 995 
Total Count 1 4  1 6  1 2  8 50 
% within method of 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% 1 00.0% selection 1 995 
Appendix C 
CODE BOOK 
The var i ab l e s  have been entered into SPSS 8 . 0  Students Version . Two 
programs were e s t abl i shed . One i s  for the data contained in the 
Financial Wo rld September 2 6 , 1 9 9 5  rat ing of the states and in NASACT 
1 9 96 and that i s  related to 1 9 9 5  data . The other i s  for the data 
contained in Financ ial Wor l d  May 12 , 1 9 9 2  rat i ng of the states and in 
NASACT 1 9 9 2 and that i s  rel ated to the 1 9 9 1  da ta . The variables have 
been coded as fol l ows : 
INDEPENDENT VAR IABLES 
Method of S e l ec t ion of the state Comptrol ler 
S e l e c t i on o f  s tate compt ro l l er i s  grouped into four categories . The se 
are : 
• E l ected ( code 1 )  
• Appointed by the governor and s erves a t  the pl easure o f  the governor 
( code 2 )  
• Appointed at a l eve l l ower than that of governor ( code 3 )  
• Career c i v i l  service ( code 4 )  
Addit i ona l l y ,  s e l ec t i on was coded in terms o f  e l ected ( code 1 )  and 
appo inted ( i nc l uding civil  s erv ice , code 2 )  . 
C1 
Organi zat i onal Con f igurat ion of State Comptroller ' s  Agency 
C 2 
Organ i z a t i onal con f igurat i on of the state comptrol l er ' s  agency can be 
grouped into three categor ies . Thes e  are : 
Non - funct i ona l ly integrated f inance funct ion 
• State Comptro l l e r  i s  e l ected and therefore doe s not report to 
gove rnor e i t he r d i rectly or indirectly ( code 1)  . 
Indirectly i nt egrated f inance funct i on 
• Agency f i t s  into a department of f inance that does not include the 
budget o f f icer . Comptrol l e r  reports directly to the director or 
secretary o f  f inance . Budget o f f icer reports directly to Governor 
( code 2 )  . 
Ful l y  Funct i ona l l y  integrated f inance funct ion . 
• Comptro l l e r ' s  agency f i t s into a department of f inance that includes 
the budget of f i ce r  and other f inance agencies . Compt rol l e r  and 
budget o f f icer report directly to the director or secre tary of 
f inance ( code 3 )  . 
• Appointed by the governor and s e rves at the pl easure of the 
governo r .  Reports directly to the governor and does not f i t  into a 
department of f inance that includes the budget o f f i c e r . Budget 
o f f icer also reports d i rectly to the Governor . 
Profes s ional Cert i f i cat ion of State Comptroller 
C 3 
The state comptro l l e rs were grouped into two groups , cert i f ied ( code 1 )  
and not cert i f ied ( code 2 )  . 
Length of Tenure in O f f i ce of the State Comptroller 
Tenure was def ined in two ways for use in the cross tabulat ions . 
Longer t enure s  are cons idered to be s ix or more consecut ive years in 
o f f ice ( code 1 ) , shorter t enures are cons idered to be less than six 
consecut ive years in o f f ice ( code 2)  . 
Addit i ona l ly , four categories were ident i f i ed to determine i f  any 
resul t s  that did not appear in the f i rst set of cross tabul at ions 
showed up when more groups were used . The four categor ies chosen we re 
1 0  years or more ( code 1 ) , 6 to 9 years ( code 2 ) , 2 to 5 years ( code 3 )  
and l e s s  than 2 years ( code 4 )  . 
DEPENDENT VAR IABLES 
Unqua l i f ied Opinion on CAFR 
For the states having audit op inions , unqua l i f ied opinion was coded 1 
and qua l i f i ed ( o r  othe r )  was coded 2 .  
C 4 
GFOA Ce r t i f i cate of Achi evement of Exc e l l ence in Financial Report ing 
States rece iving the GFOA cert i f i cate are coded 1 ,  states not receiving 
the GFOA cer t i f i cate are coded 2 .  
popular Annua l  Financ ial Report 
Data was not obta ined for this variabl e .  When the proposal was 
presente d ,  t he commi t tee expressed some concern with this measure . 
Genera l ly , the CAFR contains summary and analys i s  appropriate for non-
accountant s .  S eparate i s s uance o f  this informat ion i s  not i ndicat ive 
of i t s  product ion and presentation . The committee suggested that i f  
this measure was ut i l i z e d ,  i t s  importance shoul d  be downplayed . 
Inasmuch as the 1 9 9 1  data appeared to be misleading and the 1 9 9 5  data 
was not read i ly avai labl e , the de c i s ion was made to not uti l i z e  
i s suance o f  a PAFR a s  a me asure of e f fectivene s s . 
Prepares Interim Reports 
Data included in NASACT 1996 inc luded informa t ion on whether the state 
prepares interim f inanc ial reports for interna l use and for external 
use . For the data contained in NASACT 1 9 9 2 , only preparat ion o f  
intern a l  f inanc ial reports f o r  external u s e  was ava i l able . States 
C 5 
prepari ng interim f inanc ial reports were coded 1 ,  those not prepar ing 
these reports were coded 2 .  
Provide s Rout ine Financ ial Analys i s  
States provi ding rout ine f inanc ial analys is were coded 1 ,  state not 
providing rout ine f inanc i a l  ana l ys i s  were coded 2 .  
Ident i f i e s  Best Prac t i ces and/or Deve l opments Benchmarks 
Onl y  NASACT 1 9 9 6  conta ined informat ion in which state ident i f i ed best 
practices and/or deve l oped benchmarks . S tates that ident i f ied be s t  
prac t i c e s  and/or deve l oped benchmarks we re coded 1 .  Those that did not 
were coded 2 .  
Bond Rat ing 
Agency bond rat ing contained in Financ ial World we re scored numerically 
a s  f o l l ows : 
S ta.ndard r. Poores Moody ' s 
AAA 4 . 0 0 Aaa - 4 . 0 0 
AA+ = 3 . 5 0 Aa 1 - 3 . 5 0 
AA 3 . 0 0 Aa = 3 . 0 0 
AA- = 2 . 7 5  
A+ 2 . 5 0 Al - 2 . 5 0 
A 2 . 0 0 A 2 . 0 0 
A- I.  7 5  
Baal 1 .  5 0  
C 6 
The scores f rom the two services we re combined and averaged . Average 
combined scores of 3 . 5 0 or over we re coded 1 .  
were coded 2 .  Scores below 3 . 0 0 were coded 3 .  
Financ i a l  Wor l d  Ra t ings 
Scores of 3 . 0 0 or 3 . 2 5  
I n  the Sept ember 2 6 , 1 9 9 5  edit i on o f  Financial World ( volume 1 6 4 , 
number 2 0 )  Barre t t  and Greene rate the states in " State of the States 
In add i t ion to ranking the states f rom one to f i fty overal l ,  
Barrett and Greene a s s ign a letter grade between A and D - to each state 
for its f inanc ial management . 
For the 1 9 9 5  cross tabulat ions , states we re grouped into four 
catego r i e s . Thes e  are A or A- , ( code 1 ) , B + ,  B or B- ( code 2 ) , C + , C 
or C - ( code 3 )  and D+ , D or D- ( code 4 ) . An addit i ona l l y ,  cross 
t abul at i ons were produced with the s tate grouped into three categories . 
Thes e  are the same as above except that C '  and D ' s are both included in 
code 3 .  
In the May 1 2 ,  1 9 9 2  edit ion of Financial World ( volume 1 6 1 ,  number 1 0 ) , 
Barrett and Greene present " The state of the States· . Each state is 
ranked overa l l  f rom one to f i fty . For the 1 9 9 2  ranking , Barrett and 
Greene do not provide a s eparate let ter grade for f inanc i a l  management .  
Finan c i a l  management cons i de ra t i ons are important to the rank ings . 
For the 1 9 9 1 cross tabul at ions , states were grouped into five 
C 7 
catego r i e s  according to the rankings . States ranked between 1 and 1 0  
were coded 1 ,  s tates ranked between 1 1  and 2 0  were coded 2 ,  state 
ranked between 21 and 30 were coded 3 ,  states ranked between 31 and 4 0  
were coded 4 ,  and s tate ranked between 4 1  and 5 0  were coded 5 .  
Addit iona l l y ,  for the 1 9 9 1  cross tabulations , the s tates we re grouped 
into three ca tegories . State ranked between 1 and 1 5  were coded1 , 
s tates ranked be tween 1 6  and 3 5  were coded 2 ,  and states ranked between 
36 and 50 were coded 3 .  
Governing Rating 
The mos t  recent ratings of the states f rom Barre tt and Greene are 
pub l i shed in Govern ing ,  volume 1 2 , number 5 ,  February 1 9 9 9 , " Grading 
the State s " . Ba rrett and Greene ass ign letter grades to each state 
for f inanc i a l  management , capital management , managing for resul t s , 
informa t ion te chnol ogy and an average ( overa l l )  grade . Three cross 
tabulat ions compar ing the letter grades o f  the states for f i nanc ial 
management with method of select ion we re produced and anal yzed . 
The f i r s t  presentat ion groups A and A- together ( code 1 ) , B + , B and B ­
toge the r ( code 2 )  and C+ , C ,  C - and D+ together ( code 3 ) . The se cond 
present a t i on includes B+ with A and A- ( code 1 ) . B i s  in a s eparate 
ca tegory ( code 2 ) . B - and C+ are grouped together ( code 3 ) , whi l e  C ,  
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C - and 0+ are together ( code 4 ) . The third presentation presents the 
grades in only two groups . The first  group includes A, A- , B+ and B 
( code 1 ) . The s e cond includes B- , C+ , C ,  C- and D+ ( code 2 ) . 
Expendi tures to Revenues Ratio 
Several edit ions of The Book of the States provided the source for 
general revenues and general expendi tures for each f i s cal year . Fi scal 
years 1 9 8 5  through 1 9 9 2  we re chosen . A ratio of total general 
expendi tures to total general revenues for the e ight f i s cal years was 
computed for each state . I f  the ratio wa s less than 1 . 0 0 ,  expenditures 
were l e s s  than revenues for the per iods covered . I f  the ratio was 
greater than 1 . 0 0 ,  expendi tures exceeded revenues . I f  the ratio was 
. 9 5 or l e s s ,  the s tate generated a surplus that could be ut i l i z ed as a 
" rainy day fund" . 
States were grouped into three categor ies . States having a ratio of 
. 9 5 or less were coded 1 .  States having a rat i o  be tween . 96 and . 9 9 
were coded 2 .  S tates having a ratio of 1 . 0 0 or greater were coded 3 .  
Line agency s e rvices scores 
Thi s  va riable wa s only ava i lable in NASACT 1 9 9 6  for the 1 9 9 5  cross 
tabulat ions . A compo s i t e  score was deve l oped based on f ive services 
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provided by the s tate comptro l l e r ' s agency for l ine agenc ies . These 
are : 
• Use o f  LAN/WAN ne tworks 
• Provide s cl ient - s e rver app l icat ions 
• Provides CPE to l ine agency f i scal staff 
• Provide s procurement credit cards , and 
• Provide s t rave l c redit cards . 
In each instance , e i ther the state did or did not provide the service . 
States scored betwe en ° and 5 depending on how many of the s e rvices 
were provided . I f  a s tate was in the process of implementing a 
s e rvice , . 5  was s cored for that service . Accordingly,  scores of . 5 , 
1 . 5 , 2 . 5 , 3 . 5 , and 4 . 5  we re pos sibl e .  
States were grouped into three categories . States scor ing 3 . 5 , 4 . 0 , 
4 . 5  or 5 . 0  were coded 1 .  States scoring 2 . 0 ,  2 . 5 , or 3 . 0  were coded 2 .  
States scori ng 0 . 0 , 0 . 5 , 1 . 0  or 1 . 5  were coded 3 .  
As is evident from the above di scuss ion of the coding , a l l  variables 
were treated a s  e i the r nominal or ordina l . Al l quant itat ive 
calculat ions were in the form of cross tabula t i ons between two 
vari abl e s . 
Appendix 0 
State Compt ro l l e r s  Intervi ewed 
These are a l l  clas s i f ied as personal correspondence . 
W i l l i am E .  Lands i d l e , S tate Compt rol l e r , Commonwealth o f  Virginia . 
Interviewed February 1 7 , 1 9 9 9 . 
Edward Ren f row S t ate Compt ro l l e r , S t ate o f  North Carol ina . 
February 2 4 , 1 9 9 9 . 
I nt ervi ewed 
Harvey C .  Eckert , Deputy Secre tary for Comptro l l e r  Operat ions , 
Commonwe a l t h  o f  Pennsylvan ia . Intervi ewed March 8 ,  1 9 9 9 . 
Wi l l i am J .  Ra f t e ry ,  S t ate Control ler , S tate of Wi scons in . 
March 1 5 ,  1 9 9 9 . 
Intervi ewed 
Shi r l ey Mos e s , Di rector of Accounts and Repor ts , Kansas Department o f  
Admi n i s t rat ion , S t ate of Kansas . Intervi ewed March 1 9 ,  1 9 9 9 . 
Ke i t h  Johnson , State Compt rol l e r ,  State o f  Ok l ahoma . Intervi ewed March 
2 3 , 1 9 9 9 .  
Edward J .  Ma zur , former state Compt rol l e r , Commonwealth o f  V i rginia . 
Intervi ewed March 2 5 ,  1 9 9 9 . 
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Earl E .  Morr i s , Jr . ,  former Comptrol ler Genera l ,  State o f  south 
Caro l ina . Intervi ewed Apr i l  I ,  1 9 9 9 . 
J .  D .  W i l l iams , s tate Cont ro l l e r ,  S t at e  of Idaho . Interviewed Apr i l  6 ,  
1 9 9 9 . 
INTERVIEW GU IDE 
NOTE : Thi s  i s  intended to be a guide to an open- ended. in- depth 
interview . Pos s ible i tems l i sted below certain que s tions in bul l et 
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format are not intended to be part of the que s t ion . They are intended 
as top i c  guides to a s s i s t  the int erviewer in probing aspects of the 
que s t i on if neces sary . 
How did you come to be the State Comptrol l e r ?  What i s  your background? 
Pos s ible topi c s  inc lude : 
• What wa s col l ege ma j o r ?  
• Do you have an accounting background? 
• CPA? 
• What wo rk exper ience in private sector? 
• pub l i c  Sector? 
• What po l i t i cal expe r i ence have you had? 
Do you feel  that having an accounting background is important to the 
j ob of State Comptro l l e r? 
Why or why not? 
f 1 th t hav; ng previous exper ience in state government i s  D o  you e e  a • 
important to the j ob of State comptrol l e r ?  
Why or why not ?  
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Do you feel  that having pol i t O I . �ca expe r�ence or background i s  important 
to the j ob of State Compt rol l e r ?  
Why or why not? 
What do you feel  are the mos t  important funct ions /act ivi ties your 
o f f ice perfo rms ? Why? 
Pos s i b l e  act ivi t i es/funct ions include : 
• Accoun t ing 
• Financial Reporting 
• Budgetary Control 
• Expendi ture Compl iance 
• Spe c i f i cat ion of Internal Controls 
• Others , spe c i fy 
What do you feel cons t i tutes e f fectiveness on the part of the State 
Comptrol l e r  or the State Comptro l l e r ' s  agency? 
Do you feel  that you have been e f f ect ive in the rol e  of State 
Comptrol l e r ?  I n  what ways ? 
Has your agency been e f fe c t ive during your tenure? Elaborate 
How do you think your agency could be more e f fective? Elaborate . 
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Has t he e conomy had an impact on your abi l i ty to funct ion e f fectively 
in the ro l e  of State Comptrol l e r ?  
How l ong have you s e rved in t h e  capac i ty of S t a t e  Comptrol l e r ?  Has 
your t ime in o f f i ce been adequa te for you to achieve your goals as 
state comptro l l e r ?  
Wha t performance measures d o  you f e e l  are appropriate f o r  a State 
Comptro l l e r ' s  agency? 
De s c ri be t he nature of your relat ionships with the following o f f i c ials 
of your state . How much t ime do you spend with these o f f i cers? Are 
your a c t ivit ie s  e f f e c t ive l y  coordina ted with the i r s ?  How does this 
come about ? 
l .  Gove rno r 
2 .  Secretary of Finance 
3 .  Treasurer 
4 .  Budget D i rector 
5 .  Other rel evant agency 
Is the CAFR aud i t ed ?  
• State Auditor?  
• CPA f i rm? 
head 
If yes ,  is it audited by : 
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Do you feel  that whether the auditor i s  a state auditor or a CPA f i rm 
i s  importan t ?  
Why or why not ? 
S ome State Compt ro l l e r s  are : 
1 .  E l ected 
2 .  Appointed by and s e rve at the pl easure of the Governor 
3 .  Appointed by an o f f icial  at a l eve l l owe r than that of Governor 
4 .  Career c i v i l  s e rvice /me rit sys t em employees 
( You are whi ch of the above ? )  
Based on your experience , has the method o f  your select i on had an 
impac t  on your ab i l ity to perform e f fect ively in the rol e  of State 
Comptro l l e r ?  Why or why not ?  In what way ,  e l aborat e .  
In your op inion ,  whi ch method of selec t ion of the S tate Comptro l l er do 
you f e e l  would be s t  fac i l i tate e f f ect iveness in that off ice? Why or 
why not ? In what way ,  e l aborate . 
S tate governments are conf igured d i f f erently . 
Describe ( conf i rm )  the organizat ional conf igurat i on of your state . 
Based on your experi ence , ha s the organi zat ional conf iguration of your 
state government had an impact on your abi l ity to per form e f fect ively 
in the role of State Compt rol l e r ?  Why or why not ? In what way , 
e l abora t e . 
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In your opin ion , which organ i zational conf igurat ion of state government 
do you feel  wou ld be s t  fac i l i tate e f fec t ivenes s  in the o f f ice of State 
Comptro l l e r ?  In what way ,  e l abora te . 
The o f f ice o f  the s tate comptro l l e r  mus t  sat i s fy several 
cons t ituenc i e s . Wh ich con s t i tuenc ies do you feel exert the mos t  
inf luence on you in your r o l e  as s t a t e  comptrol ler? Which d o  you feel 
should exert the mos t  inf l uenc e ?  El aborate . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
pos s ib l e  con s t i tuencies inc lude : 
Governo r/Governor ' s  o f f ice 
Secretary or D i rector of Finance 
Budget Director 
Externa l users of State ' s  Comprehens ive Annual Financial Report 
( bond t rade r s , inve s tors and/or rat ing agenc i e s )  . 
• L ine agency personnel ( agency head/agency f i s cal o f f icer ) 
• Leg i s l a t ive commit tee members /staff  
• Gene ral Pub l i c  
In which directions do those exert ing inf luence tend? Are direct ions 
or underly ing values compatible or in con f l i c t ?  
Cons i de r  the concepts of : 
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1 .  pol i t i cal respons ivenes s  ( to Governor or to voters ? )  
2 .  neut ral compe t ency/ rat i onal admini s t rat ion 
Which do you feel  is the most important attribute regarding the role o f  
the s t a t e  comptro l l e r ?  Why? Elaborate . 
Do you f e e l  that the method of sel ect ion of the state comptrol ler or 
organ i za t i onal conf igura t i on o f  the agency ha s an impact on whether 
pol i t ica l respons iveness or neutral compe tency is s t ressed by rel evant 
con s t ituenc i e s ? Why? 
Do you feel  you s tate ' s  f i nanc ial management funct ion is adequately 
integrated? What improvements do you feel are needed,  i f  any? 
D i s cus s ?  
D o  you f e e l  that you have suf f i c i ent independence t o  do your j ob 
appropriately? E l aborate . 
Do you f e e l  that you have suf f i c i ent author i ty to manage your agency 
appropriately? E l aborate . 
In what areas do you feel  you have the discret ion to make a d i f f e rence 
in your role as s tate comptro l l er ?  
Pos s ib l e  areas : 
• Cho i ce of accoun t ing system 
• spe c i f i cat ion of inte rnal accounting controls 
• budgetary cont rol funct ion 
• Expenditure compl iance 
• Financial  Reporting 
• othe rs , spe c i fy 
Do you f e e l  the degree o f  discret ion you have i s  appropriate? Too 
l i t t l e ?  Too much? In whi ch areas? 
Do you ( o r  did you )  have any particular goa l s  that you wished to 
accomp l ish during your tenure a s  State Comptro l l er?  
Have you been able to achi eve these goa l s ?  El aborate . 
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Do you have any addit ional comment s  on your role as State Comptrol l e r ?  
D 1 0  
QUALITATIVE METHODS 
INTERV I EWS 
For the qua l i ta t ive part of t he research , nine current or former state 
compt ro l le r s  represent ing e ight states we re interviewed . The 
intervi ews were i n - depth , open - ended inte rviews that ut i l i zed the 
interview guide included in chapter 3 .  
of the nine , two comptrol l e rs were e l ected,  the other s even were 
appointed . Three of these s even are appo inted by and serve at the 
p leasure of the governor . Two are appointed by an o f f i c ial lower than 
gove rnor . One i s  t radi t i onal c ivil  servi ce and one i s  appo inted by the 
governor to a seven - year term ,  thus a f fording a degree of protect ion 
s imilar to that of c i v i l  s e rvice . 
Two of the interviewed comptrol lers represented Virginia , the current 
comptro l l e r  and a former comptro l l e r . Al l others were current ly 
s e rving except for the former e l ected comptrol l e r  o f  South Carol ina . 
BACKGROUND AND PROFES S I ONAL QUAL I FICATIONS 
The state comp t ro l lers that were intervi ewed had varied backgrounds . 
Seven who were appo inted at one l eve l or another were interviewed . Two 
e lected comp t rol l e r s  were interviewed . Obvious l y ,  the e l ected 
comptrollers had po l i t ical experience . Of the non - e l ected comptrol lers 
t ha t  were interviewed , one had served as a state senator and also 
o I I  
s e rved three four - year te rms as the state ' s  e l ected state auditor . 
Anothe r had s e rved one fou r - year term as an . appo1nted state compt rol ler 
of another s tate . Of the e l ected comptro l l ers , one had served in his 
state ' s  hous e  and senate and as Li eut enant Governor prior to his 
as sumpt i on o f  the role of comptro l l e r . The other had practi ced law, 
served a s  a prosecuti ng a t torney and had been e lected to the post of 
mayor i n  l ocal gove rnment before becoming comptro l l e r . 
Mos t  had some pr ivate sector work experience . Seve ral had been 
employed in pub l i c  ac coun t ing ,  one in accounting for indus t ry . Another 
had worked in the f inance area in industry . One had ini t ia l ly worked 
as an engineer in indus t ry .  
Of the compt rol l e r s  interviewe d ,  four are CPA ' s ,  one i s  a CFE and two 
are CGFM ' s .  Four maj ored in account ing a s  undergraduate s , one in 
busi ne s s , one in engineer ing and one in pol i t i cal s c i ence/pub l i c  
admini s t ra t i on . The latter two completed suf f i c ient credit hours of 
accoun t i ng courses to sit for and pass the CPA examinat i on . In t e rms 
of pos tgraduate educa t ion , two have an MPA , two have MBA ' s and two are 
attorneys . 
The above descript i on of qua l i f ications and exper i ence only presents 
the tip o f  t he iceberg . These state comptrol l ers are a diverse and 
extreme l y  we l l  qua l i f i ed group . 
Of the non - e l ected comp t rollers , s i x  f e l t  that i t  was important to have 
an a ccounting background . One felt  it would be d i f f icult for someone 
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with no account ing background to b e  credible . Another f e l t  an 
accounting background was necessary to be able to understand the i s sues 
and to have credi bi l i ty with your staff . Another felt  that you have to 
have the background to critically assess and evaluate recommendat ion 
f rom your s t a f f  and proposals f rom those outs i de your department . 
One f e l t  that the comptro l l er shoul d  at l east have a f inance 
background , for the functions of the state comptroller , an accounting 
background i s  bes t . Another s t re s sed that having a management 
background i s  he lpful and one mentioned that those who are not 
accountants have to h i re profess i onal sta f f . 
Both o f  the e l ected comptro l l er ' s intervi ewed are non - ac countant s .  One 
has a background in banking and in governmental f inance in e l ect ive 
o f f ice as member of s enate f inance committee was extensive . He 
unde rstood the i s sues , hired " Big E ight " consultants , profess iona l i zed 
his s t a f f  and l e a rned f rom the other comptrol lers . The other had taken 
account ing courses and become fami l iar with governmental accounting 
whi l e  s e rving as mayor of a c i ty . Most e l e cted comptrol lers are not 
CPA ' s but gene ra l l y as a group are e f f ect ive . 
All  of the comptrol l e r s  f e l t  that GAAP wa s an important concept . One 
however ,  i s  beginning to ques t i on the GASB . 
TENURE IN OFFICE 
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The t enures o f  the non - elected comptrol lers interviewed ranged f rom 4 
to 16 years . The tenures o f  the e l ected compt rol lers were 1 0  and 2 3  
years . All  f e l t  they had been or we re e f f ective in the i r  role as state 
comptro l l e r .  To be e f f ec t ive does require some t ime in office they 
f e l t . One sugges ted that at least 8 years were needed . 
EFFECTI VENES S  
Effectivene s s  was de f ined in several d i f f erent ways . " E f f ec t ivenes s  
i s  performance in mee t ing the agency ' s  miss ion in a cos t - e f fective 
way" ( Lands i dl e , W .  E . , February 1 7 ,  1 9 9 9 , persona l communicat ion) 
" E f f e c t i veness i s  the abi l i ty to put together a good staf f ,  to 
communicate with them and to keep the i r  morale and focus on a high 
leve l "  ( Renfrow, E . , February 2 4 , 1 9 9 9 ,  pe rsonal commun i cat ion) . 
" Prompt and s a t i s factory de l ivery of princ iple funct ions const i tutes 
e f fect ivenes s  ( WS ) . " E f f e c t ivenes s  in te rms of safeguarding the 
assets of the s tate involves having adequate internal controls in place 
and conforming to proper bus ine s s  prac t i ce s . In t e rms o f  f i nancial 
report i ng , e f f e c t iveness i s  producing t ime l y ,  accurate f inancial 
s tatements i n  accordance with GAAP" ( Johnson , K . , March 2 3 ,  1 9 9 9 , 
persona l communicat ion) . " E f fect ivene s s  i s  providing customer service 
to all s tate agenc ies to empower and enabl e  them to administer the 
miss ion of the i r  agencies as cost e f f ect ive l y  as pos s ible without 
j umping through unnecessary hoops imposed by the state comptrol ler"  
( Moses , S . , March 1 9 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  persona l communicat ion ) . " Ef fectivene s s  
i s  doing t h e  bas i cs very we l l "  ( Mazur , E .  J . , March 2 5 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  personal 
communi ca t i on )  . " E f f e c t ivenes s  i s  providing complete disclosure of 
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a l l  f inanc i a l  informa t ion that can b e  provided" ( Morris ,  E . , Apr i l  1 ,  
1 9 9 9 ,  persona l communicat ion) . " Effect ivenes s  has been going to GAAP , 
profe s s iona l i z ing the s t a f f  and prov iding accountabi l i ty" ( Eckert , H .  
C . , March 8 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  personal communicat ion ) .  In terms of e f f e c t iveness , 
" the u l t imate performance eva luat ion is gett ing re - el e cted" ( W i l l iams , 
J .  D . , Apr i l  6 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  personal communicat ion ) . 
Evidence o f  e f fect ivene s s  was a l so de scribed in terms of obtaining a 
cl ean aud i t  op inion and obtaining the GFOA cer t i f icate . Also important 
were good internal control systems . Impl ementat ion of up to date 
account ing systems wa s another area c i ted as evidence of e f fectivenes s . 
Seve ral ment i oned the d i f f iculty of obtaining funding for new 
account ing systems . 
Mos t  comptrol lers f e l t  that economic downturns had some impact on them , 
but generally the real bat t l e s  were over the budget . The comptro l l e r  
presents h i s tor ical informat ion f o r  compari son to the budget . One 
comptro l l e r  indicated that i t  was h i s  j ob to t e l l  the governor and the 
l eg i s l a ture what they did not want to hear . One indicated that the 
tougher the e conomy , the tougher the dec i s ions . Another pointed out 
that when the state has a surp l us , during good time s , funding for new 
systems and upgrades to exist ing systems is obtainable , but not when 
the state does not have a surplus . 
RELATIONSH I P S  
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I n  discuss ing relationships with the governor and other state f inance 
o f f i c i a l s ,  general l y ,  contact with the governor was not dai ly . Those 
that ment i oned the governo r ,  general ly the appointed comptro l l ers , had 
comments to the e f fect of once a month , not every day , occas iona l l y ,  
and genera l ly focused o n  year- end posit ion and selected reports . As 
one indicated " it was not a da i l y ,  close advisory relat ionship" 
( Mazur , E .  J . , March 2 5 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  personal commun i cat ion) . The Wi sconsin 
comptrol l e r , a civil service employee chosen by examinat ion indicated 
" not a s  much as appointed . "  ( Ra f tery ,  W .  J . , march 1 5 , 1 9 9 9 ,  pe rsonal 
communication )  S everal ment ioned relat ionships w i t h  cab inet leve l 
secretaries that they reported to as being very important . In addi t i on 
to expec t ed impor tant interactions with o f f i c i a l s  such as budget 
director and t reasure r ,  important relat ionships mentioned inc luded 
s tate audi tor . Relat i onships between comptro l l e r  and budget direc tor , 
whi l e  genera l ly good , are comp l ex . Budget directors are more 
pol i t ical , have d i f f e rent agendas and don ' t always unde rstand the 
accoun t i ng systems . One de scribed his relat ionship with the budget 
director as " l ove /hate" Genera l ly relationships we re sol id . 
Usua l ly , Treasurers are e l ected . Thi s  does not seem to cause a 
prob l em . Part isan d i f f e rences were not indicated to be a problem . 
CAFR ' s  
CAFR ' s  are more of ten audi ted by state auditors than independent CPA 
f i rms . Some s ta t e  auditors are appointed by the legis lature and some 
are directly e l e c ted . The comptro l l ers did not feel that there was 
much d i f ference between be ing audited by a state audi tor and an 
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i ndependent account ing f i rm . One comptrol l e r  indicated that i t  was 
probably harder to get a c lean opinion from a state auditor . State 
aud i tors genera l ly performed in a profess ional manner .  At l east this 
i s  the current observa t i on . I t  was not always the case in the pas t . 
One comp t ro l l e r  appo inted at a l eve l l owe r than governor had j us t  
convinced he r governor of the importance of going to GAAP . 
NEUTRAL COMNPETENCE/RAT IONAL ADMINISTRATION VS . POLITICAL 
RES PONS IVENESS 
Two concepts were i dent i fied . The se we re neutral competenc e / rat ional 
admini s t rat i on and pol i t ical re spons ivene s s . The comptrol l e rs we re 
asked which they f e l t  was mos t  important for the func t i ons of the state 
comptro l l e r . Mos t  f e l t  that neutral competenc e / rat ional administrat ion 
was the more pert inent . Two indicated that it was the role of state 
comptro l l e r  to bring these two perspect ives together . One e lected 
comp t ro l l er ( SC )  s tated that he " neve r let the pol i t ical s ide of his 
o f f ice determine his pos i t ion . "  ( Morris , E . , Apr i l  1 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  pe rsonal 
commun i ca t i on )  
METHOD O F  SELECTION 
Me thod of s e l ec t i on was di scussed with the comptrol l e rs . Some f e l t  
that the method o f  select i on had had a n  impact o n  the way they 
perfo rmed,  others did not . Some f e l t  one method wa s pre ferred, others 
f e l t  that i t  did not matter . No consensus was obse rved . 
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Two comptro l l ers that are appoi nted by and serve a t  the pleasure o f  the 
governor f e l t  that appointment was the better method . One of these 
felt that appoi ntment was prefe rred because if you want to make changes 
that impact the l ine agenc ies , a l l  you have to do is to s e l l  your plan 
to the gove rnor and the agencies wi l l  go along . He argued that e l ected 
comptro l lers do not have j ur i sdict ion over the l ine agencies that come 
under the gove rnor . Another gave as his reason for this that 
appo intment a l l owed the governor to choos e  a candidate with the proper 
creden t i al s . He a l s o  f e l t  that the nature of controll ership wa s not 
compa t i b l e  with the po l i t ical process and that par t isan i s sues shoul d  
n o t  b e  a fac tor in t h e  funct ions performed b y  the comptro l l e r . 
An e l e c t ed comptro l l e r  said that the appointment process probably 
guaranteed that a more technically qua l i f ied comptro l ler would be 
chosen . Thi s  comptrol l e r  f e l t  that having technical qua l i f icat i ons 
( be i ng an accountant ) was helpful but not nece s sary . He feels  that he 
has more of a pub l i c  pol i cy ori entat ion and that this is typ ical of the 
e l ected comp t ro l lers . 
A forme r e l ected comp t ro l l e r  de f initely f e l t  that e l ect ion was the 
pre ferred method . He felt  that the process of having to l i s t en to the 
people and to campaign was a s t rong plus for the individual chosen by 
e l e c t i on as a method . Al so , e l e c t ion gave the comptrol l e r  c l out , 
vi s ib i l i ty and independence .  
The tradi t i onal c iv i l  service comptrol l e r  f e l t  that the method of his 
s e l e c t i on and s tatus as a resul t thereof had provided certain 
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protect i ons aga inst pol i t ical inf luence , which he f e l t  were bene f icial . 
S imi l a r l y ,  another comptro l ler having a measure of independence 
provided by a s even - year t erm after appointment appreciated this 
independence . Intere s t i ng l y ,  this indivi dual had previous ly served as 
e l ected s tate auditor . H i s  point of view i s  that one of the two 
pos i t i ons ( comp t rol l e r  or auditor)  should be e l ected,  preferably the 
auditor . 
The e l ected comptrol lers f e l t  that e l e c t i on gives a comptrol l e r  more 
c lout , v i s i b i l i ty and independence . Al though of the opinion that 
method of s e l e c t i on does not rea l ly mat t e r ,  an appointed comptrol l er 
rea cted to the f indings that higher prof i l e , more pol i t i c a l  
comptro l lers ( e l e c t ed and appointed b y  t h e  governor )  were more l ike ly 
to have c l ean op inions and GFOA cert i f icates . He f e l t  intu i tively that 
the s e  comptro l lers had more power to e f fect change . 
The others gene ra l l y  indicated they f e l t  that method of selec t ion 
rea l ly did not ma t ter . The two who are appointed at a l eve l lowe r than 
gove rnor had interest ing comments . One f e l t  he had not had a l l  of the 
autonomy he woul d  have l iked . Whi l e  there might be some d i f f erence 
between e l ec t ed and appo inted comptrol lers , he f e l t  that the l eve l of 
appo intment did not matter . Another f e l t  that contro l l ership was an 
execut ive branch funct ion but that l ack of independence suggested by 
her method of s e l e c t ion was not an i s sue . 
Two interv iewed compt rol l e rs used the t erm " phi l osophical que s t i on" 
when t a l k ing about method of s e l e c t i on and i t s  impac t  on performance 
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and o n  the concepts o f  pol it ical respons ivenes s  vs . neutral 
competenc e / ra t i onale administra t i on . One appointed comptro l l e r  said , 
" in prac t i ce , e l ected comptrol l e rs have an unde rstanding of the need 
to be prof e s s iona l "  ( Johnson , K . , March 2 3 , 1 9 9 9 , pe rsonal 
commun i ca t i on ) . Thes e  comptrol lers were sugge s t ing that the ques t ion 
is more phil osophical than real . Al s o ,  an e l ected comptro l l e r  ( SC )  
indicated that h i s  pos i t ions we re n o t  determined pol i tical ly .  
Even though some o f  the comptro l lers pre f erred one method of selection ,  
they al l pretty much agreed that other methods o f  s e l ec t ion had a l so 
produced succe s s e s . The comptrol lers were act ive in the same 
organ i z a t i ons such as NASACT , NASC , GFOA and GASB . Those who had 
served for any l ength o f  t ime knew each other and were f r i ends . They 
a l l  learned from each othe r and enj oyed the successes of the i r  
coll eague s . I f  any consensus on this i s sue emerged, it was that many 
state comptro l l ers are very e f f ect ive and dynamic individual s .  The se 
individua l s  would l ikely be successful no matter how they came to 
o f f ice . The i r  simi l a r i t i e s  we re more important that the i r  differences . 
ORGANI ZATIONAL CONFIGURATION 
D i s cus s i ons of organi za t i onal conf igura t i on did not indi cate any real 
problems . One comptro l l e r  appointed at a l eve l l ower than governor 
f e l t  that her s tates f inance function was not adequately i nt egrated 
because " the budget sys tem does not talk to the account ing system" 
( Mose s , S . , March 1 9 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  personal communication ) . In the case of 
her s tate , the budget director , a l though theore t ically reports to the 
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secreta ry of admin i s t rat ion as does the compt rol ler , in real ity 
howeve r ,  the budget d i rector reports to the governor . Her goals 
include obtaining an integrated sys t em . The others comptro l lers did 
not ident i fy a problem in this area . Elec ted t reasurers do not 
general ly pose a probl em for func t iona l integration . 
INDEPENDENCE , AUTHORITY AND DIS CRETION 
Most comptro l lers f e l t  they had the right amount of independence , 
author i ty and d i s c re t i on . Some indi cated this was mos t l y  the case . 
Two wou l d  have l iked a l i t t l e  more discret ion . 
QUALITIES 
Repea tedly , the i s sues of integrity and honesty came up . Comments on 
the importance of thes e  qua l i t i e s  we re prompted by que st ions on 
e f fectivene s s , mos t  important func t i on ,  concep ts of neutral 
competenc e / rat ional adminis trat ion vs . pol i t ical respons ivenes s , 
i ndependence and impact of the economy on performance . Fol l owing are 
some r e l evant comments : 
• " To be e f fective in the off ice , one mus t  have an immaculate 
reputat i on and credibi l i ty .  The governor and general assembly mus t  
have con f i dence that you w i l l  act in the bes t  interest o f  the 
state"  ( Renf row , E . , February 2 4 , 1 9 9 9 ,  persona l communicat ion) 
• " The core o f  what they do involves integ r i ty and accountab i l i t y .  
The mos t  important things are integr ity,  t iming , ac countab i l ity,  
• 
• 
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f lexib i l it y ,  cons i stency and accountab; l ; ty .  • • I t  i s  important to say 
no when you have to say no . Your integrity as an individual i s  
important .  I f  you know something i s  wrong , you have to s tand up and 
l e t  the peop l e  knowN ( Eckert , H .  C . , March 8 ,  1 9 9 9 , persona l 
communicat ion) . 
" You have to develop conf idence in you on the part of the governor 
and the secretary . To be e f fect ive , you have to do this even though 
you have c i v i l  service protect i ons N ( Ra f tery ,  W .  J . , March 1 5 , 
1 9 9 9 , persona l communication ) . 
" It i s  important to have enthus iasm and tenaci tyN ( Moses , S . ,  March 
1 9 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  pe rsona l commun i cat ion) 
• " E l ected comptro l l e rs are more conscious o f  pub l i c  opinion , they 
are directly accountable to the people . The voters are smart , i f  
you don ' t d o  the j ob it be comes apparent after a whi l e N  ( Wi l l iams , 
J .  D . , Apr i l  6 ,  1 9 9 9 , personal communicat ion) . 
• The mes s age that i s  s ent to the state agenc ies and users of 
f inanc i a l  s tatements i s  important . " I have tried to send a me ssage 
of increas ing pro f e s s iona l i sm and accountab i l i ty of state 
governmentN ( Johnson , K . , March 2 3 ,  1 9 9 9 , pe rsonal commun i cat ion) 
• " I t i s  important not to have pa rtisan issue s N  ( in reference to the 
control l e rship funct i on not be ing compat i ble with pol i t i c s )  
( Lands idl e ,  W .  E . , February 1 7 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  personal communication )  
• " A  qua l i ty i s  important . You have to have the highes t  integrity 
and obj ect ivity . value in the o f f i c e  i s  measured by the trust that 
you generate . Trust comes not from being a po l i t ical operator but 
from being an hones t  broke r .  You have to have moral courage . Thi s  
• 
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include s the w i l l ingness to l eave you post i f  necessary" ( Mazur , E .  
J . , March 2 5 , 1 9 9 9 , personal communicat ion) . 
" S omet imes the j ob require s  you to t e l l  the governor and the 
general as s embl y  what they do not want to hear . "  This e l ected 
comptro l l e r  indicated that " he neve r let the pol it ical s i de o f  his 
o f f i c e  det e rmine his pos i t ion" ( Morri s ,  E . , Apr i l  1 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  pe rsonal 
communicat ion)  . 
The researcher be l ieves that the above comments real ly get at the core 
of the i s sue . The need for integrity,  for a good reputation , to do the 
r ight thing , to be w i l l ing to take the heat if necessary were 
cons idered more important than pol i t ical respons ivenes s  by e l ected and 
appo inted comptro l lers a l ike . 
universal theme . 
In one way or anothe r ,  this was a 
Al so , one should not necessarily cons ider the concepts o f  pol i t ical 
respons ivene s s  and neut ral compe tenc e / rat ional adminis trat ion to be 
di chotomies . The relationship between these i s  more sub t l e  than that . 
Pol i t i c a l  re spons iveness does not always have to be def ined in partisan 
terms . Two of the non - e l e cted comptrol lers f e l t  re spons iveness was 
important and that re conc i l ing these two tendenc ies was part of the 
j ob .  The e l ected comptrol lers f e l t  that they we re accountable to the 
people to perform the i r  j obs properly . 
SUMMARY 
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The state comptro l l e r s  that were interviewed are a truly impres s ive 
group of i ndividua l s  in te rms of experience and qua l i f i cat ions . The 
backgrounds were divers e ,  with some having extens ive pol i t ical 
background . Others have had rel evant private sector experience . Some 
were ac countants and some were not . Genera l l y ,  the accountants f e l t  
t h i s  qua l i f i ca t i on was more important than those who were not 
accountants .  
The comptrol lers interviewed generally f e l t  that they had been 
e f fe c t ive in o f f i ce . Mos t ment ioned i tems such as going to GAAP , c l ean 
opinions on the CAFR and GFOA cert i f i cate as achievements . 
Imp l ementing new accounting systems was indicated by several . Some 
indicated that funding for obta ining these new syst ems was not always 
easy . 
Al l had served at l east a reasonable amount of t ime in o f f i ce . I t  was 
genera l ly f e l t  that t ime in o f f ice is important . For the most part , 
organ i z a t i onal conf iguration was not an i s sue . 
The impact o f  method of s e l ect ion was f e l t  to be more of a 
phi losophical que s t i on than a real one . Several comptro l lers indicated 
a pre f e rence for one method ove r another . The e l ected comptrol l e rs 
f e l t  that e l ected comptrol l ers had more c lout , v i s ibi l ity and 
independence . One comptro l l e r  who was appointed by and served at the 
p l easure of the gove rnor intuit ive l y  f e l t  that higher prof i l e  
comptr o l l e r s  probably had more power t o  e f fect change . Otherwi se , the 
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importance o f  method of selection was downplayed . Mos t  felt  genera l ly 
that successes we re found under a l l  methods of select ion . 
An important t heme that sounded through t he intervi ews was t he 
importance o f  qua l i t i e s  such as integr ity , honesty and accountab i l i t y .  
Thi s  theme was sounded across t he board . These qua l i t i e s  are important 
to e lected a s  we l l  a s  to appo inted comptrol lers . Pol i t i cal 
cons idera t i ons s hould not keep the comptrol ler from doing the r ight 
thing . Thi s  was t he consensus of the intervi ewed comptrol lers . 
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